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Abstract 
My research is concerned with the way in which a coastal community in south-western 
Sri Lanka, affected by the Asian tsunami of 2004, has rebuilt itself. Prior to the disaster 
the social processes of this community involved individuals with different levels of 
capital and capacity (following Bourdieu), using the alliances available to them, to 
pursue the aspirations of their choice.  
My concern in this study is the impact of the tsunami on these social processes. In 
particular, I want to explain how in rebuilding their lives, the people of this village 
reproduced core aspirations, relationships and values, even while the effects of the 
tsunami  --  on trajectories and outcomes for different households  --  varied.  
The village was one in which the spatial organisation was such that the western half was 
involved in fishing, while the eastern half pursued other occupations. It was a village 
undergoing significant shifts in social arrangement, and the tsunami amplified rather 
than disrupted some of these trends.   
I am also interested in the inter-play between the local community and various external 
actors in the processes of reconstruction, particularly in the role played by the State and 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).  
I introduce my research by identifying some of the major issues which bear on my 
problem, as well as the themes of the disaster literature. Then, I describe the community 
which is the focus of this research, and the damage that it suffered in the aftermath of 
the tsunami. This is followed by a discussion of my theoretical and methodological 
approaches. Finally, I analyse the manner in which various initiatives in relation to 
relief and reconstruction, fed into the social processes of this community.   
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Introduction 
The Tsunami 
The Asian tsunami, on 26 December 2004, struck the eastern coast of Sri Lanka, at 
approximately 8.00 a.m., local time. During the next two and a half hours, the tsunami 
hit the southern and western coasts of Sri Lanka. It was caused by an undersea 
earthquake off the coast of Sumatra, Indonesia, measuring 9.3 on the Richter scale.1  
Two-thirds of Sri Lanka’s coastline was affected by the tsunami. The effect, however, 
was by no means uniform. While there was complete devastation in one location, a 
hundred metres away the damage was minimal. Thus, coastal communities were 
differentially affected by this disaster. This is now known to have been due to the 
geomorphological particularities of the Sri Lankan coastline. The loss of life, 
destruction of infrastructure and damage to livelihoods was on a massive scale. It was 
an event which caused a heavy loss of physical assets both in the community and among 
individual households.2 In some communities the damage to property and livelihoods 
was on such a scale that they ceased to function as viable social units.  
The Central Bank of Sri Lanka assessed the total economic loss to the country at US $ 
1.5 billion.3 The devastation was such that President Chandrika Bandaranaike 
Kumaratunga had to declare a national state of emergency and appeal for international 
assistance.    
My concern in this study is with the impact of this disaster, on the communities of the 
south-western coast of Sri Lanka, with a special focus on the village of Sinhapura, 
located just a few miles to the north of the city of Galle.4 Sinhapura is one of the many 
communities along this coastline, which was severely affected by the tsunami. Galle is 
the administrative capital of the Southern Province. It has a long history and was once a 
major port in the country. It continues to remain an important regional centre providing 
                                                          
1 The tsunami affected the other countries of the Bay of Bengal as well: principally, Indonesia, Thailand 
and India.  
2 I use the term household to denote a residential unit consisting, largely, of those who have kin 
relationships with each. The household is a unit of income, of consumption and expenditure and, often, 
one of production. See also Stirrat (1988); Netting, Wilk & Arnould (1984); Carsten & Hugh-Jones 
(1995).  
3 Source: Reconstruction and Development Agency (RADA) Report on the Tsunami. 
4 This is the pseudonym that I shall use for this village throughout this thesis. Except for proper nouns all 
non-English terms will be in italics. The names of my informants and all individuals from the village who 
figure in the thesis have been replaced with pseudonyms. 
12 
 
the Southern Province with important services in relation to education, health, transport, 
trade and distribution. Galle, though it is no longer a major port, has one of the largest 
fisheries harbours in Sri Lanka. It is also an important naval base. 
Sinhapura is one of the many villages dotted along the Galle Road, a trunk road which 
snakes along the western and southern coast of Sri Lanka.5 This road runs through the 
centre of the village. Sinhapura is not, per se, a fishing community: that is to say, not all 
households are involved in the fishing industry. On its western side Sinhapura exhibits 
all the features of a fishing community, while on its eastern side, it is a non-fishing 
coastal village.  
The geographical position of the village, between Galle to the south and the town of 
Ambalangoda to the north, has had implications for its growth as a place of importance 
in the micro region.6 By the time of the tsunami, however, Sinhapura did not have the 
importance that it had had as a centre some decades previously. The location of several 
government departments and service institutions previously sited in Sinhapura, had been 
shifted elsewhere in the 1970s. Although less important now, Sinhapura is still a more 
complex community than many of the neighbouring villages, smaller, and economically 
undifferentiated, which were, as it happened, almost entirely washed away by the 
tsunami.    
The notion of reconstruction  --  loss and recovery  --  is a central feature of disaster 
management in the aftermath of disasters of this nature. As Fordham puts it: “...the 
dominant ‘command-and-control’ model of disaster management has as a core aim the 
‘return to normality’ (largely undefined) of the affected community.” (Fordham: 
2004:175). This model of reconstruction focuses on responses by a range of individuals 
and institutions, in order to affect the ‘return to normality’.  
In the case of the tsunami disaster, too, the premise upon which the stakeholders  --  the 
affected communities, the state, the media and the humanitarian and non-governmental  
organisations involved in relief  --  visualised the future was that of ‘getting back to 
normal’. It was a process of construction, through a discourse in which the emphasis 
was placed upon reconstruction.  
                                                          
5 This was the only road connecting Colombo to the south at the time. There is now the Southern 
Expressway, opened to vehicular traffic in November 2011. 
6 The way in which Sinhapura achieved this importance, historically, will be discussed more fully in 
Chapters 1 and 3.  
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In the face of this disaster the responses oriented towards recovery came from the state, 
from relief organisations and from communities adjacent to those affected by the 
disaster as well as from philanthropic individuals.7 It was a context in which several 
agencies, representing many sources of funds, were competing to assist communities in 
their recovery. The interaction, between those affected by the tsunami and those who 
sought to assist them, was complex and had its impact on the institutions in the affected 
communities. The ‘normal’ avenues of succour in times of difficulty  --  kin and 
neighbours  --  were of little help in these circumstances. The efforts of the different 
actors created a context within which there was a new complement of resources, new 
aspirations and a new framework for the deployment of these resources. Thus, there was 
a change in resources in relation to assets and income, as well as changes in networks of 
relationships and the benefits which derived from them.  
My focus in this study is on the social processes of Sinhapura, the impact of the tsunami 
on these processes, and on the processes which have emerged. This resonates with 
Hastrup’s (2011) conceptualisation of a disaster, not as an event which interrupts a prior 
state of equilibrium, but as a process through which the tsunami and the village become 
intertwined.  
There was a collection of resources in Sinhapura prior to the tsunami. These resources 
were dramatically altered after the tsunami, both collectively and individually. What are 
the phenomena which have to be understood and explained, and what are the problems 
that can be derived from these? What are the significant institutions which need to 
figure in this analysis? Equally, what is the explanation for the differential behaviour of 
individuals and households, in the aftermath of this disaster? The processes through 
which communities remake themselves in the face of a disaster is, therefore, the focus 
of this study.8 
While my main interest is Sinhapura, I have tried to give my research a comparative 
dimension by expanding my focus to take in the western and southern coast of Sri 
                                                          
7 By relief organisations I refer to the UN and other international aid agencies, international and local 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and all other organisations of a non-governmental nature 
which were involved in disaster relief, some of which had an ad hoc character.  
 
 
8 The formulation of my problem and the concepts that I use are discussed in Chapter 2. In particular, I 
elaborate the sense in which I use the notion of social process.  
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Lanka, from Panadura, immediately to the south of Colombo, to Hambanthota, in the 
deep south. I spent a few days in key locations and observed the social processes of 
these affected communities.  
The Origin of my Research 
My family began a tsunami relief programme in Sinhapura on the 30th of December, the 
fourth day after the tsunami. This was formalised, in March 2005, into a Trust.9 It is 
from the involvement in this exercise that the idea of basing my PhD research in 
Sinhapura emerged.   
This section describes the circumstances under which the location of Sinhapura was 
chosen for this study. I do so with the objective of providing some background, but also 
because the experience of the relief programme strongly influenced my approach to the 
research.  
My family has owned beach land in Sinhapura since 1976. When the tsunami struck, 
our first concern was for the people who were taking care of the land for us and for 
those in the community whom we had got to know over a period of many years. Due to 
the breakdown in the systems of communication we could not get in touch with anyone 
from Sinhapura until the 28th of December. The people that we were most concerned 
with were safe from physical harm, but were entirely without food. Their household 
stocks had been washed away, as had the stocks in the High Street stores. The systems 
of food distribution had broken down completely, due to the destruction of bridges and 
roadways. The need, which was urgently communicated to us, was for food supplies.  
On the 30th of December we hired a van, filled it with dry goods such as rice, dhal, 
sugar, tea, and other necessities, and drove down to Sinhapura. As a bridge along the 
Galle Road had been destroyed the traffic police directed us to turn inland and find our 
way to Sinhapura along inland routes. We reached Sinhapura, through a somewhat 
circuitous route. During the next few days we travelled south several times taking van 
loads of dry goods with us, until the systems of food distribution were re-established.  
Meanwhile, the new school year was about to begin, on the 10th of January 2005. 
Parents were desperate because the children’s school books had been washed away. 
                                                          
9 The Coastal Fisheries and Industries Trust (COFIT) referred to as the Trust hereafter.  
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Requests were made to us that we supply the items which were lost. Thus, on the 7th of 
January, we took a van load of  books and other stationery supplies through the 
kindness of a businessman known to us, who let us purchase many items of stationery at 
a substantial discount.  
For Sinhapura, external assistance from any other source, whether governmental or 
otherwise, was non-existent at this point. Hence, my family and I became the focal point 
for the requests for assistance that the community made. It came to a point that there 
was a sea of people thronging the temporary office that we had set up on the beach land. 
We had to issue numbers in order to impose some order on a situation where everybody 
wanted to see us, immediately! Once the most urgent needs of food supplies and school 
books had been met, the real nature of the predicament of the community, with an 
almost total loss of income, now stared us, starkly, in the face.  
From all this it can be seen that we, too, were caught up in this process, responding as 
best as we could to the constant demands which were made upon us, within the scope of 
the limited resources available to us. These resources came from friends and relatives, 
resident outside Sri Lanka, some of whom happened to be in the country for the 
Christmas vacation. The only condition placed on these funds was that we had to be 
directly responsible for the use of the funds. The other funds received by the Trust came 
from three NGOs, including one in Pakistan which was keen to assist a relief effort 
where the people to whom they gave the money were already working with tsunami 
affected people. Apart from the basic requirement that the funds should be spent on the 
regeneration of this community, the Trust was given a free hand in the decision-making 
process. The obligations vis-à-vis the funders were more moral than otherwise. 
Furthermore, the funders were happy that as we had a property in the village which 
could be used as the office, there were no institutional expenses which had to be borne 
by them.10  
The more established, formal organisations found it difficult to fund the Trust. The 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), for instance, refused 
funding on the ground that the Trust had no record of past performance, for at least two 
years, which they could have examined. The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) 
had similar concerns regarding the Trust.  
                                                          
10 Expenses relating to transport and accommodation were borne by my parents and myself.  
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In this context a formal organisation became a necessity, especially to handle the 
financial aspects. We set up the Coastal Fisheries and Industries Trust (COFIT), in 
March 2005, and it is within the framework of this Trust that we conceived and 
implemented the tsunami relief programme.11  
The challenges in Sinhapura were not so much those of health and injury; nor was there 
a large scale disruption of housing. The damage was largely to the sources of livelihood. 
The context was one in which the focus of the government and non-governmental 
agencies was, prominently, on housing. Our own perception, however, was that the need 
in Sinhapura was, unmistakably, for the resuscitation of livelihoods.   
Thus, having observed the unfolding stages of relief and reconstruction, along the 
south-western coastline, we decided that our efforts should be focused, intensively, on 
Sinhapura. We felt that our skills, experience and resources would be much better 
utilised in working in an intensive way, in one community, immersing ourselves in its 
problems and engaging in a concentrated way with specific households. This was in 
contrast to the approach of many larger, established, organisations which concentrated 
on one or two initiatives, such as housing, over a wide geographical area. The emphasis 
on livelihoods was very much the outcome of our intensive method. If this had not been 
our approach it is unlikely that we would have seen the significance of the regeneration 
of livelihoods, and the intricacies of executing such a programme. We hoped that by 
concentrating our effort in this way, we would begin to understand the many complex 
processes which are inherent in community responses to a disaster, and the inter-
relations between these processes. Through this exercise, therefore, important features 
relating to the tsunami disaster could be identified and analysed, yielding applications 
with relevance for all tsunami-affected areas. This advantage would have been lost if we 
had spread ourselves and our resources far more thinly over a wider area, encompassing 
many more communities. We were, in fact, applying an anthropological approach to the 
relief operation by concentrating, intensively, on a single community and by giving this 
intensive approach ballast through research.  
                                                          
11 It is my parents and I who were involved in this exercise. My father, Dr. S. P.F. Senaratne, is a 
Development Anthropologist. My mother, Lalitha Senaratne, is a Barrister-at-law of the Inner Temple 
and an Attorney-at-law, Sri Lanka. My father was the Chairman of the Trust and it was under his aegis 
that much of the work of the Trust was planned and implemented. 
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It was having assessed the situation around us that we launched into the livelihoods 
programme. The objective of the Trust was to resuscitate the livelihoods, destroyed by 
the tsunami, and to provide immediate relief. However, the approach was not merely to 
make good the losses which were incurred because of the tsunami, but to establish a 
foundation which could provide a basis for the future.  
The fishing fleet of Sinhapura was considerably damaged and the businesses involved, 
both in trading and in the provision of services, were destroyed. The Trust was involved 
in the resuscitation of the fishing industry; the coir industry; the cottage industries; and, 
the regeneration of the commercial hub, the High Street.12 I was the coordinator of this 
Trust from its inception, in March 2005, until the time that I left Sri Lanka to start the 
MPhil/PhD programme at SOAS, in September 2006.13    
Together with the livelihoods programme we established a research programme. We felt 
that such a programme would enable us to respond to the needs of individual 
households and make disbursements more equitably than otherwise. It was, inevitably, 
research done under pressure. We conducted a household survey to acquire baseline 
information about this community and used methods such as informant group sessions, 
interviews and life histories.14 This was not with the simple objective of having enough 
data on a given household so that we could decide whether the request for assistance 
was reasonable. Such a request could only be assessed if comparative information was 
available, i.e., if the household in question could be set against other households, and its 
circumstances more comprehensively evaluated.15  
Beyond the focus on households, the understanding that we acquired involved us also in 
the analyses of those institutions, economic and otherwise, which linked these 
households to each other. The information emerging out of this research was highly 
relevant in the disbursement of grants for livelihood resuscitation, in a context in which 
there were many false applications for aid. Our attempt was to distinguish genuine 
                                                          
12 The traders of the High Street organized themselves, in February 2005, into a Trade Association, under 
the aegis of the Trust.  
13 A detailed analysis of the Trust, its interactions with the community, other organisations working in the 
region, and the institutions of government is provided in Chapter 5. 
14 As my father was a Social Anthropologist of many years’ experience and I had been trained in the 
discipline, up to the level of a Masters degree, we were able to evolve a methodology which was 
appropriate for this purpose. A full discussion of these methodologies is to be found in Chapter 2. 
15 This is discussed in some detail in Chapter 5.  
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applicants for aid from others who had got accustomed by then, to applying for any 
assistance that was available. Mohanasundaram, for instance, makes the point that in the 
provision of proper relief proper information of who is affected is required: “At the 
stage of rescue and relief operations, a high degree of emotion and sympathy prevails. 
This can alter the direction and speed of such operations. However, in the case of 
rehabilitation work, the onus must be on people’s long term welfare and decisions must 
not be taken in a spontaneous manner.” (2007:87) We felt that a systematic approach 
was a necessity, and that involved research.  
The survey was conducted by four investigators working in two teams. All four 
investigators were young women from Sinhapura. Prior to the commencement of the 
survey my father, as Chairman of the Trust, made an announcement at the Trust 
premises regarding the purpose of the survey and how it would be conducted. He also 
requested the community to render all the assistance that it could to the four 
fieldworkers.  
 
At the end of each day the four members of the team would discuss the information that 
had been obtained with my father and myself. Occasionally, it became necessary for the 
teams to go back to a household, to clarify the information. The inherent weaknesses of 
a survey are, on the one hand, that there may be too many questions and ones which are 
inappropriately phrased for the purpose of obtaining the information that is required; on 
the other, the possibility that the information may be inaccurate. Non-verifiable 
information such as attitudes and behaviour become problematic categories in survey 
research. As Leach (1967) has argued there is a range of sociological phenomena that is 
not accessible to this method of investigation. Furthermore, there is the danger that the 
survey can be used as an instrument of authority or discrimination in benefactor 
relationships. While as far as we were concerned this was not an issue, the village saw 
the survey as something the investigators might, sometimes, use against them. We dealt 
with these issues in two ways. The first was, that as it was a basic household survey, the 
questions were not of an order which might have led to highly subjective answers.16 
Furthermore, the investigators were from the village and knew its context and its 
                                                          
16 The survey dealt with: household composition; intra-household relationships, education, occupation, 
kin relationships, land and house ownership; ownership of fishing craft; the damage consequent upon the 
tsunami; aid obtained at that point in time.  
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inhabitants well. The second was, that at the end of each day, the four investigators, my 
father and I reviewed the day’s findings. This was an opportunity to further examine the 
data collected and also to counter, through cross-questioning, any agendas that the 
investigators might have been pursuing as well as to counter the strategic representation 
of households. Thus, there was a process of progressive and continuous corroboration.   
 
Was the Trust a unified source of intention and action? Interaction at the end of the day 
between the three of us, members of a nuclear family unit, enabled a review of the day’s 
activities. The consensus which emerged out of this discussion, and sometimes 
disagreement, meant that there was a uniformity of action as far as the Trust was 
concerned, even if not always of intention.  
 
It was inevitable, as the programme got underway, that we would need to re-examine its 
direction and its objectives. Clearly, we wanted to make our disbursements to the people 
who were most in need and whose appeals for relief were genuine. Our principal 
attempt was to restore whatever it was that a household had lost. An extension of this 
principle was the generation of an alternate source of income where the original one had 
been lost.  
In almost all instances, funds which were sought for educational purposes were 
regarded as expenditure which was based on a legitimate aspiration. In all this it was 
not, however, the intention of the Trust to spark off a major change in the social order of 
the community, even though this was, sometimes, an unintended consequence. For 
instance, for the crew members who were given canoes this became a supplementary 
source of income which continued to give them some measure of independence, even 
after the large boats on which they had crewed had been repaired and were operative 
once again. 
An issue which we had to deal with, many times, was whether the individual was more 
important than the community, or vice-versa. I cannot say that we applied a consistent 
principle in this regard. Let me illustrate this through the example of assistance for the 
repair of boats. We did, on some occasions, refuse a large sum for the substantial repair 
of a single boat on the principle that that the same sum could be allocated for the repair 
of three boats and, concomitantly, benefit more than one individual. Equally, there were 
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occasions when we did support the repair of one large boat which, if quickly effected, 
could provide incomes for eight households.   
An exercise in planning as a necessary preliminary step, was clearly not possible in the 
circumstances. The plan emerged, almost on its own, out of our interaction with the 
community, the initial relief disbursements and the research programme which we had 
embarked upon. We had to go into action with the disbursement of funds as a matter of 
urgency. As this got underway, an ad hoc committee of those whom we knew in the 
village helped us with background information which facilitated our decision making 
until this could be based on our own investigations.  
At this stage, moreover, we had no intention of taking this project beyond the level of 
relief. It was, in that sense, seen by us as a short-term exercise, even though we were 
always mindful of the future. Thus, this was not a participatory development project in 
the conventional sense of consultation with the community, feedback, and a plan which 
incorporated this. The ‘planning process’, if one could identify such a stage, was not 
straightforward, nor objective and far from obvious.  
To this extent, it might be argued, this was a top-down exercise. To a certain extent this 
is true. However, it must also be pointed out that there was a high degree of interaction 
between the community and the Trustees, and that the dynamics of the community and 
the needs of individual households determined, through interaction, the evolving 
programme of the Trust and its objectives. Participation lay in this interaction rather 
than in prior planning, which in the context was not possible.17 
The Trust could be creative in its disbursements in a way that larger, well-established, 
organisations could not. The rules and procedures of such organisations have been 
developed through long experience and are, in part, designed to avoid fraud and other 
types of mismanagement. This meant that their operation, by its very nature, had to be 
restricted. The Trust, operating as it did in a single village, had greater flexibility. It was 
                                                          
17 A British social scientist visiting Sinhapura, at this stage, remarked that the relationship between the 
community and the Trustees was one of friendship. What was implied was that there was a close 
relationship between the two, rather than the more impersonal interactions that he had encountered in the 
other places that he had visited.  
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able to respond to needs wherever they existed, untrammelled by the rules set by an 
external authority.18  
However, the Trust was exposed to the risks arising from the very flexibility which I 
have described above. Routines and procedures governing the established activities of 
recognised institutions, which could have guided the Trust in its disbursements were 
lacking. The method of working closely with the community exposed us, in some 
instances, to allegations of favouritism, the disbursement of grants to inappropriate 
beneficiaries and other alleged abuses of position. One evening, shortly after dusk, a 
stone landed on the roof of the Trust premises. Present at the time were myself, my 
parents, our local coordinator and her assistant, the caretaker of the beach land, his wife 
and three small children, and about four applicants for assistance. We rushed out into 
the garden which fronted the High Street but were unable to spot anyone. The general 
consensus amongst those present, was that this was the work of an individual who was 
dissatisfied with the response to the application for a grant or, alternatively, one who 
was unhappy about the favourable response to a rival’s application.  
There were those who received a grant and then came back a second and third time, for 
further assistance. As a principle, we did not encourage such applications as our 
objective was to restore the income of as many households as we could, in the context 
of the limited resources at our disposal. Thus, in addition to individuals who were 
disaffected because they did not receive any assistance from the Trust, there were those 
who became disaffected despite having received assistance from the Trust.19    
The country-wide emphasis at this time was on the restoration of material loss; housing 
in particular. However, there was also an attempt to generate other endeavours within a 
broad community development perspective. There was, for instance, the initiative to 
collect waste material as a community exercise. In Sinhapura, the response to this and 
similar schemes was lukewarm. Thus, we came to the conclusion that while the 
objective was laudable, people affected by a disaster were slow to respond to such 
ventures, while their households remained in disarray. The immediate concern was with 
the recovery of the household  --  physical, emotional, notional, aspirational. It was after 
                                                          
18 However, the Trust did have to abide by the laws of the land, especially as they pertained to a Trust. 
Furthermore, it had to abide by the sense of moral accountability felt by the Trustees.  
19 I discuss my position as the coordinator of the Trust, and the implications that this had for my research 
in the methodology section of Chapter 2.  
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a measure of recovery had been achieved or was within their sights, that people would 
be ready to engage with wider community concerns.   
After some time had passed, we began to think in terms of the long term development of 
this community. Our perceptions derived from a programme of research, focused, not 
merely on households and their inter-relations, but also on the complex processes of this 
community, in its inter-relations with other communities, located, moreover, in a region 
with particular characteristics.  
In 2006 there was a shift in the focus of the activities of the Trust away from relief to 
more long term activities. This had much to do with the perception that the village had 
of us. We were people from Colombo  --  an academic and previous head of a 
government institution; a lawyer; and their daughter  --  with whom, in the normal 
course of affairs, the village would not have interacted at this intense level. At first 
people were puzzled as to why the three Trustees should spend so much time and effort 
on the village. Some wondered whether we had political ambitions. When this was 
found not to be the case, the Trustees became the people with whom the village 
developed a close connection as those who were approachable, who had contacts in 
Colombo and, who could be called upon to go beyond the immediate problems of 
rehabilitation. Even more than the material capital which flowed into Sinhapura through 
the Trust  --  approximately Rs. 5 million  --  was the sense in the community, which 
prevails to this day whenever we visit, that in their hour of need we, as a family, were 
there for the village, to speak on its behalf to the outside world, in a context where the 
village felt vulnerable vis-a-vis Kotigama and Hikkaduwa.  
What can be said about the personal imperatives which propelled us into this activity? 
There was, on the one hand, the feeling that this disaster was an occasion when 
privileged people such as ourselves have to get involved. Then there were the ideas 
about social order, community, need, genuineness and rationality which were a product 
of the personal social, economic and political context from which we came (Emerson, 
Fretz & Shaw, 2001).   
 
This was the context of the origin of my PhD research. My research emerged out of my 
experiences and observations as the coordinator of the Trust. This role involved two 
major functions. The first was participation in the programme of research, together with 
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the rest of the team, in order to ensure that the data yielded by this exercise could be 
used for decisions about assistance, as well as for the planning of longer term 
programmes. The other had to do directly with the disbursement of funds, i.e., with the 
management of the programme. The need to make assessments, sometimes without all 
the relevant data to hand, meant that there was a cumulative increase in my 
understanding of the community, through an avenue other than that based on research. 
Applications for assistance had to be examined and their suitability for support decided 
upon, very quickly. All the information necessary to make such assessments was not 
always available. Some extrapolation of information from other sources, became 
necessary. Very soon, in the majority of instances, we learnt whether the assumptions 
that we had made in making decisions regarding the disbursement of funds were valid. 
Decision-making on the basis of tentative knowledge sometimes led to a confirmation 
of what was previously tentative. In this sense, it has been, as Mosse puts it: “…an 
unusual type of social research; complex, long-term…” (2005:ix).20  
The special skills that I had to conduct this research derived, inter alia, from the fact that 
my disciplinary training, at the masters and undergraduate level, had been in 
anthropology and development.21 I was a Sri Lankan whose mother tongue was Sinhala 
and I had ‘known’ the south-western coastal region of Sri Lanka from childhood. 
Furthermore, I had been involved with Sinhapura from the 4th day after the tsunami (30 
December, 2004), and had a ‘memory’ of the unfolding events.22 In the course of 2005 I 
had acquired some acquaintance with other communities on this coast, through separate 
tsunami work with the National Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA) and 
with the Sri Lanka Federation of University Women (SLFUW).    
My work as the coordinator of the project led me to the subject and to the location of 
this PhD research. It also led me to some of its component problems and to the 
approaches which I have since refined. For instance, the emphasis placed on school 
books and on education by households in the midst of devastation by the tsunami, lead 
me to reflect, at a very early stage, upon the aspirations prevalent in this community and 
                                                          
20 These themes, such as the obstacles to understanding that the role of fund disbursement might have 
imposed, are further discussed in the methodology section of Chapter 2.  
21 My disciplinary training: BA Honours, University of Sussex; M.Sc, London School of Economics 
(LSE).    
22 Further discussion of my role as coordinator and as anthropologist, and the way in which this informed 
my approach to fieldwork is to be found in the methodology section of Chapter 2.  
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the ways in which the community sought to realise these aspirations. In these and other 
ways my spell of work with the Trust shaped, in many respects, the subsequent 
direction taken by my research. To this extent, this research has much in common with 
McGilvray’s and Gamburd’s statement:  
“It will be obvious from the chapters in this book that in our writing, the 
temptation to explore particularly rich areas of our research data often 
supplanted our formal NSF research design. These choices reflect our pre-
existing knowledge of specific regions and cultural practices in Sri Lanka, as 
well as the wish to seize upon opportunities that opened up in our individual 
research sites. Good social science should leave room for serendipitous 
outcomes, especially in projects involving intensive first-hand fieldwork and 
data-gathering.” (2010:164). 
Sinhapura exhibited many of the characteristics common to these coastal communities. 
It had, however, some unique features which called for analysis, in particular, the way 
in which its social processes appeared to be the product of the articulation between its 
fishing and non-fishing components. 
Sri Lanka was shattered by the sudden and the devastating impact of the tsunami. Its 
effect was felt, primarily, in the coastal areas. The catastrophic effect of the tsunami was 
brought home to me because it had a direct impact on a community known to me and in 
a location in which my family owned some land. This interest was soon transformed, 
through the Trust, into one of active participation in regeneration. The tsunami became 
a national event and, thereafter, an international one. I had a powerful feeling of 
involvement, as well as one of responsibility, as far as issues of ‘representation’ and 
‘ownership’ were concerned. The fact that I come from a politically-oriented family 
had, no doubt, some bearing on this.23 In turn, this has had an effect on my perspective 
on anthropology, itself, and on how I, as a national of a developing country, (Das, 1995; 
Goonatilake, 2001) look at research within the framework of anthropology.  
Anthropology, has, then, not been about studying the ‘exotic’ or the ‘other’, but about 
understanding my position in my society, in my community, in my culture. As Eyben 
puts it: “This is much more than life-style. It is about choosing other perspectives to 
look at the inter-connections between history and my own life story and the choices I 
have made or failed to make.” (2006:18).  
                                                          
23 My grandmother, Florence Senanayake, was the first woman Member of Parliament (MP), in Sri 
Lanka’s (then Ceylon) first parliament, after Independence in 1947.  
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The premises from which the Trust had functioned, my mother’s property in Sinhapura, 
was sold in January 2006. Alternative premises were found in the form of a small house 
fronting the High Street, not far from the beach where the boats were berthed. This 
became the office of the Trust and it is in these premises that all further activities of the 
Trust were conducted.24 When I started my fieldwork in September 2007, it is this little 
house which was my base.  
 
The Research Agenda, its Issues and its Perspectives  
My research is not only an ethnography of a village which is, in part, devoted to fishing. 
It attempts to bring into focus a set of issues which relate to units wider than the village  
--  for instance, the political structure and institutions which, in the aftermath of the 
tsunami, dealt with reconstruction. Although the main focus of this study is Sinhapura, 
at many points and on many issues it goes beyond this single village and encompasses 
the region in which this village is located. Many issues which are critical to the region 
are illuminated by the circumstances and the events which take place in the village. 
There is, therefore, an important sense in which this is a study of a village and its 
region, even though not every part of this region is described in great ethnographic 
detail. Thus, the scope of my research has a wider a focus than Sinhapura and, in this 
sense, it is an ethnography of the ways in which the institutions of the state, of relief, 
and of the village mesh.    
The tsunami affected South and South-East Asia at the height of the tourist season. 
Many tourists from the west were in these countries to enjoy the Christmas holidays. 
Thailand, for instance, was a popular destination for Finnish tourists and 179 Finnish 
lives were lost (Kivikuru, 2006). The result was that in several western countries the 
tsunami received considerable media coverage which translated into unprecedented 
relief from the USA, Japan and Europe (Aeberhard, 2008). This relates to a wider issue. 
Regeneration took on not only a national character but also a global one, with a local 
impact. External assistance, originating in international centres, sifted and sanctioned by 
the national government, ultimately reached coastal populations. I am interested, 
therefore, in how an engagement with the issues of social reproduction, through the lens 
                                                          
24 In June 2013 the premises were vacated and the activities of the Trust wound up. However, the 
personal connections between the Trustees and the community continue.  
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of a reconstruction discourse, aids the understanding of the interaction between global, 
national and local processes (Marcus, 1990). As Mosse puts it:  
“….this means exploring a new kind of anthropology, one which situates the 
production of knowledge about other people, and places it explicitly within the 
framework of international relations, analysing the political and historical 
relations of power, and the systems of values which shape representations. 
Moreover, it does so in a way that places the anthropologist within this frame, 
and turns a self-critical lens onto the anthropologist-actor as a member of a 
transnational community, speaking from within and in the first person.” 
(2005:11).  
This research will also be an analysis of the dynamics of a fishing community, in a 
context in which such studies are not plentiful. These communities in Sri Lanka belong 
to a diversity of cultures. There are Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims engaged in fishing. 
The Sinhalese are Buddhists and Christians. The Tamils are Hindus and Christians.25 To 
this must be added the variety of technologies that are used and the variation in the size 
of communities. It is in this context, therefore, that I am concerned with incorporating a 
comparative dimension, into this research, in terms of other communities along the 
coast which have different geographical, social and economic landscapes and which 
responded to the tsunami in different ways. I shall be exploring the relationship between 
the occupational characteristics of fishing, the socio-cultural context, and the way that 
these, together with the dimensions of uncertainty, independence and indebtedness, 
have framed the response of fishing communities to disaster (Pollnac, 1985; Krishna, 
1990; Acheson, 1981; Firth, 1966; Stirrat, 1988).  
I have referred above to social processes, and what happens to them consequent upon a 
disaster. This is the chief concern of my study. These processes are located in a context. 
They have a geographical and regional context. They have an institutional context. They 
also have a conceptual context. In this section I examine the geographical, regional, 
institutional and conceptual issues which have a bearing on, and which illuminate, this 
context, placing my research within its relevant setting. Some of these issues figure in 
the writings on the analysis of disaster. Others have emerged from my experience of 
implementing a tsunami relief programme in Sinhapura, and from the fieldwork that I 
conducted on the south-western coast of Sri Lanka. In the last chapter of the thesis, once 
                                                          
25 Krishnamurthy (2007) highlights the diversity of fishing communities in Tamil Nadu which is inclusive 
of all castes and also adivasis and dalits. ‘Adivasis’ are the scheduled tribes in India. ‘Dalits’ are the 
scheduled castes in India.  
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the ethnographic data has been analysed, I shall be reverting to these themes and issues 
in the light of the analysis.  
The Disaster Literature 
Much of what has been written about disaster deals with floods, earthquakes, droughts, 
fires, cyclones and man-made disasters such as oil spills and chemical leaks. McGilvray 
& Gamburd (2010) state that it is a wall of water, not a conventional flood, which 
inundates lowland areas.26 It has a sudden destructive impact but, unlike an earthquake, 
does not devastate large contiguous regions. The close parallels with a tsunami are 
volcanic eruptions, flash floods and coastal storm surges. All of these permit only a 
small degree of advance warning and tend to affect narrowly delineated geographical 
areas or ecological zones. The tsunami is not a ‘periodic’ disaster (Dyer, 2002): it is a 
relatively rare type of disaster whose form and character are influenced by the 
geomorphological characteristics of the coastline. Blaikie et al (1994) include only four 
brief references to tsunami episodes in the second edition of their book published in 
2004, a little before the Asian tsunami occurred.27 My research, therefore, is concerned 
with the response of communities where natural disasters have been infrequent, as 
opposed to those constantly at the risk of disaster events.  
There are few ethnographies of tsunami disasters which explore, in depth, the dynamics 
of post-disaster societies. Therefore, my research has the capacity to add a new 
dimension to the disaster literature and also to contribute to an understanding of the 
disaster experience in Sri Lanka.    
Disasters have been analysed, classified and defined in various ways. Recent thinking 
has moved away from conceptualising disasters as created by natural causes, alone, 
towards seeing them as a product of the interaction between human endeavour and the 
natural world (Oliver-Smith & Hoffman, 1999, 2002; Oliver-Smith, 1996, 1999; Vayda 
and McKay, 1974; Lees and Bates, 1990; Blaikie et al, 1994; Smith, 1996; Lewis, 1999; 
Wijkman & Timberlake, 1984; Amaratunga & Fowler, 2007; Anderson & Woodrow, 
1989). As McGilvray & Gamburd put it disasters are now seen as all encompassing; as 
highlighting the relationship between the environment and human beings.   
                                                          
26 A full account of the physical aspects of a tsunami is provided by Jana (2005), Sugan (2005), Karan 
(2011) and Kumar & Sahani (2007). 
27 There have been descriptions of historic tsunamis in countries such as Portugal, Chile and Indonesia. 
28 
 
Furthermore, expectations are changing as far as disaster relief is concerned, with access 
to relief seen as an entitlement (Aeberhard, 2008). The attempt has been to encourage a 
shift away from a reactive strategy of post-disaster improvisation, to a pro-active one of 
pre-disaster planning and preparedness, in the context of the fact that the 1990s was the 
International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR). As a general perspective 
this relates to my conceptualisation of a disaster feeding into the social processes of a 
community.  
According to Simpson (2012), the literature on disaster is American dominated with 
three themes running through it. One of these is the definition and taxonomy of what a 
disaster is, and what it is not. Another is concerned with the event, as against the 
aftermath, where the moment of catastrophe is confused with what anthropologists, for 
instance, actually study. Simpson highlights the fact that the focus of study is not so 
much the event but the aftermath. He states that while there are structural similarities  --  
the collapse of social distinctions, mourning, identity, re-formation of distinctions and 
the creation of new economies  --  each event creates a particular kind of aftermath. I 
believe that my focus on social process encapsulates both these ideas as referred to by 
Simpson.  
The third theme in the literature identified by Simpson views a disaster as a natural 
laboratory for the study of human behaviour, where the underlying structure of society 
is exposed: “Disasters disclose fundamental features of society and culture, laying bare 
crucial relationships.” (Oliver-Smith & Hoffman:2002:6). This implies a duality 
between a ‘surface’ reality and the ‘hidden’ structure which is revealed by a disaster. It 
is a two tier conceptualisation, within a ‘structural’ framework. This highlights the 
constant tension between the conceptualisation of a disaster as a process, on the one 
hand, and as an event, which ‘ruptures’ a static entity, on the other. My 
conceptualisation of disasters is that they should be: “…. understood as processes unto 
themselves, rather than merely events that trigger processes.” (Garcia-Acosta:2002:58).  
The concept of vulnerability is central to this literature (Blaikie et al, 1994; Oliver-
Smith 1999, 2002; Hoffman 1999, 2002; Varley, 1994; Twigg and Bhatt, 1998; Cannon, 
2000; Frerks, 2010; McGilvray & Gamburd, 2010; Lewis, 1999; Hilhorst & Bankoff, 
2004). This approach looks at those aspects of society that reduce or exacerbate the 
impact of a hazard. It sees the effects of the disaster as a product arising from the 
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conditions of inequality and subordination in a society; the distribution of resources; 
and a specific combination of a natural hazard and disadvantageous circumstances 
(Maskrey, 1989). As Blaikie et al (1994) state, vulnerability represents the lack of 
ability to anticipate, cope with, and resist, the effects of a natural hazard. Vulnerability 
tends to be associated with the poor, although poverty and vulnerability are not always 
correlated. There is also a shift in emphasis, in this approach, from post-disaster 
response to the mitigation of pre-disaster conditions; the idea that vulnerability, in a 
disaster context, cannot be separated from vulnerability in everyday life (Fordham, 
2004). The concept of vulnerability has been useful in pointing to the different effects of 
the same natural disaster on communities which differ in the matters of resources and 
ecological circumstances. The approach has been useful in showing how the impact of 
such a disaster varies from one community to another. However, it has been of little use 
in explaining the effects of a disaster within a community. Thus, in my research, I 
cannot see that it has much analytical or methodological significance, from an 
anthropological viewpoint, in view of the geography of Sinhapura. It is, though, an 
important general perspective.  
The disaster literature also focuses on the concept of risk. According to Paine (2002) 
ideas about risk attempt to explain how it is dealt with within certain cultural processes 
in terms of the avoidance of the construction of risk, as a category, through repression, 
insulation and fatalism. Repression involves the denial of the existence of risk; 
insulation implies the protection of the self through, for example, a religious process; 
fatalism is the acceptance of what might happen as part of one’s destiny. The literature 
also deals with some of the issues of risk management (Zeckhauser & Shepard, 1984; 
Quarantelli, 1986; Smith, 1996; Paine, 2002).28 I shall examine Sinhapura’s way of 
managing risk in the course of this thesis. 
Another issue in the literature is the role of women in the context of a disaster. The 
dominant paradigm is a masculine perspective (Fordham, 2004; Enarson and Morrow, 
1998; Mies and Shiva, 1993; Agarwal, 1992; Wickramasinghe & Ariyabandu, 2003; 
Ruwanpura & de Mel, 2006k; de Mel, 2009; Ruwanpura, 2009; Goonesekere, 2009). 
Post-disaster reconstruction focuses on the formal sector and, as women tend to occupy 
                                                          
28 Zeckhauser and Shepard (1984) state that effective risk management depends on the implementation of 
a sequential series of actions  --  pre-disaster planning; preparedness; response; recovery and 
reconstruction. 
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a disproportionately large position in the informal sector, they tend to be marginalized 
in terms of access to resources and services. It is women who suffer most in a disaster 
(Hyndman, 2008). Furthermore, the point has been made that women are not visible in 
decision-making positions, in committees and organizations dealing with disasters, such 
that there is little incorporation of a feminine perspective into the policies relating to 
disasters (Neal and Phillips, 1990). Relief camps are often managed by men who are not 
sensitive to the issues of sexual and gender based violence, and to the need to safeguard 
the dignity of women (Pittaway, Bartolomei & Rees, 2007; Akerkar, 2007; Divakalala, 
2007; Youngs, Jones & Pande, 2005). As women’s experiences are rarely reflected in 
the descriptions and analyses of disasters, they become designated as ‘different’ and 
‘special’ and, therefore, not part of the disaster mainstream (Hyndman, 2009). For 
instance, there is little disaster research which has focussed on the special ways in 
which women experience disasters in terms of issues relating to feminine hygiene and 
child care. I am interested in the experience of the women of Sinhapura in terms of 
these themes.   
An aspect of the literature on the tsunami is a comparison of international disaster 
response objectives, principles and standards, with actual performance (de Silva, 2007; 
Jayasuriya & McCawley, 2010; Nanayakkara, 2007; Mulligan & Shaw, 2011; 
ActionAid et al, 200729). The many evaluatory and prescriptive documents by 
institutions such as the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) make the assertion, 
amongst others, that exceptional funding did not lead to an exceptional response, 
because the international humanitarian community focussed on the implementation of 
its own agendas, rather than on the agendas of the affected communities (Telford, 
Cosgrave & Houghton, 2006; Frerks, 2010).30 I do not intend my research to be an 
evaluation of success or failure. I hope that it will be a series of critical reflections on a 
process, which will have a bearing on these issues.     
The tsunami literature contains some generalisations regarding, for instance, the 
economy: “The tsunami disaster has paralysed the economy” (Domroes:2006:xi). The 
                                                          
29 Tsunami Response: A Human Rights Assessment. An assessment by ActionAid, the People’s 
Movement for Human Rights and Habitat International. Source: 
www.alnap.org/pool/files/actionaid_tsunami_hro_jan2006.pdf Accessed on 11 September 2012. 
30 The TEC conducted five independent thematic assessments in 2005. Source: Synthesis Report of the 
Tsunami Evaluation Coalition.  www.tsunami-evaluation.org; Accessed 31 March 2007. 
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tsunami affected areas did not make a vital contribution to Sri Lanka’s economy, except 
for the immediate and potential impact on tourism. The significant contributors to the 
Sri Lankan economy are the textile industry; the tea industry; foreign remittances from 
domestic labour in the middle-east;  the rubber industry; and, to a lesser extent, the 
coconut industry. It is true that fisheries production was seriously affected, but this has 
never been a substantial contributor to the economy. As Mulligan and Shaw put it:  
“The relatively limited economic impact is due to the fact that the sectors that 
experienced the most extensive damage, fisheries and tourism, are relatively 
minor contributors to the national economy, and losses in these sectors were 
offset by a post-tsunami construction boom and strong growth in the 
manufacturing and inland plantation agriculture sectors, which were unaffected 
by the tsunami.” (Mulligan & Shaw: 2011:238)    
Then, there are comments regarding industry: “In the first year following the tsunami, 
all small-scale industries, including fisheries, in the affected rural communities were 
completely abandoned” (Domroes:2006:16). Many small-scale industries such as the 
coir industry, and cottage crafts such as lace-making and embroidery, revived quickly 
through the efforts of small local organisations, such as the Trust, and the Coir Council 
of Sri Lanka. The fisheries industry while seriously affected was operational, in an 
embryonic way, in many communities by March 2005 in order to take advantage of the 
last month of the fishing season (April) on the southern and western coast. Clearly, 
narratives such as those of Domroes misrepresent this disaster.      
The coordination of relief and recovery efforts based on a long-term perspective for 
current and future reconstruction activities  --  so that short term gains will not create 
long-term problems  --  is another theme in the literature. As McGilvray and Gamburd 
put it: “The goal of combining reconstruction with economic change and socio-
economic development forms a second theme in contemporary natural disaster studies.” 
(McGilvray and Gamburd:2010:65). The assumption is that when resources come into a 
community, on an unusual scale, they must be put to the best use: “….. relief is an ideal 
entry point for embarking on development interventions.” (Emerson: 2007:106). 
Rebuilding after a disaster, is seen as the opportunity to initiate development 
programmes, which decrease the susceptibility levels of local people and mitigate the 
potential impact of hazards.31 In this context, research is presented as a fundamental 
                                                          
31 Some of these projects in Sri Lanka: teaching coastal populations, particularly women, to swim; the 
building of coastal barriers.  
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component of redevelopment. The adoption of an Eco-Health Framework for 
redevelopment, and the social, economic, cultural and political consequences of the 
Asian tsunami as well as a holistic approach to its remediation, is another aspect 
(Amaratunga & Fowler, 2007).  
 
The description of specific phenomena such as cash-for-work programmes or issues of 
displacement and resettlement, also figure in the literature (Rofi et al 2006; Doocy et al 
2006; Harvey; 2006; Fernando and Hilhorst, 2006; Frerks and Klem 2005; Yamazaki 
and Yamazaki, 2011; Harvey, 2006). A whole series of observations have been 
documented regarding the effects of the tsunami, in relation to injury, trauma, memory, 
gender, age, orphanhood and single parenthood (Felten-Bierman, 2006; Youngs et al 
2005; de Silva, 2006, Mendenhall, 2005, Simpson & de Alwis, 2006). My concern with 
process will, necessarily, cover many of these issues. I shall examine the importance of 
a long-term perspective in the concluding chapter. 
 
A related theme is the attempt to combine relief efforts with the restructuring of 
institutions. Stirrat (2006) comments on the attempts of the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) to restructure the fishing industry, in Sri Lanka, in the aftermath of 
the tsunami. Uyangoda (2005) argues that in the Sri Lankan post-tsunami context, state 
reform should have been incorporated into relief and reconstruction. His suggestion is 
that a federal form of government, which he terms ‘deep federalization’, should have 
been introduced to the country. Reconstruction in the Gulf of Mexico, after hurricane 
Katrina, faced similar problems of whether to rebuild the old or start from scratch with 
the new. Although such events are an opportunity to construct new institutions and 
confront the issues which come up with them, Waugh and Smith (2006) state that there 
is a certain comfort in rebuilding the old. In the concluding chapter, I examine the 
extent to which relief shades into the restructuring of institutions, and into long-term 
development.    
 
The disaster literature is, on the one hand, the product of those looking at a similar set of 
problems from different disciplinary backgrounds and, therefore, interests. There is 
concern with effect, damage and with the issues of reconstruction. Yet others, within the 
framework of their disciplines, attempt to disentangle the different layers of a disaster as 
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an event, and a disaster as a response. Anthropologists have their own interests. They 
are concerned, in a way that others are not, with culture and social process, as 
determinants of the disaster response, and also as factors which are influenced in a 
fundamental way by the disaster. A collection of articles edited by McGilvray & 
Gamburd (2010) is a good example of the interdisciplinary approach, in the sense of 
people writing from different disciplinary perspectives. However, some of the accounts 
in the disaster literature tend to be essentialised analyses of one dimension of a reality, 
taken out of context. In this sense, they are partial. Furthermore, there is the tendency 
for blanket statements which ‘flatten out’ the interesting dynamics of specific situations. 
An example is the theme that disasters emphasise great inequalities in society and that 
they worsen the socio-economic conditions of affected populations, en masse. There is 
here, in my view, some degree of misconception about the social dynamics of a disaster. 
In my research I seek to avoid these pitfalls by adopting an anthropological approach, 
i.e., an integrated, holistic one, to the analysis of this phenomenon.  
Media 
Another issue that is relevant to this study is the representation of this disaster by the 
media.  By its very nature, the media is instrumental in the construction of post-disaster 
discourses (Dayan, 1992; Benthall, 1993). The post-tsunami context was framed in 
terms of a series of narratives relating to the blurring of audiences and constituencies; a 
‘euphoria of togetherness’; ‘reconstruction’; ‘need’; ‘devastation’; ‘peace’; 
‘development’; and, ‘ownership’. The media representation, by both the local media as 
well as the international one, was of a nation-wide phenomenon of national unity 
oriented towards recovery. Examples of this included the attempts by Catholic priests to 
bring succour to Buddhist communities and the protection of those belonging to the 
Muslim community, in temples, by Buddhists monks. As Button puts it: “The framing 
process both constructs and reconstructs meaning in a selective manner that legitimizes 
some accounts while obscuring others, privileging some political agendas and negating 
others.” (2002:146). The media, by its very nature, tends to ‘reduce’ a phenomenon to 
its ‘basic’ elements, thereby flattening out various nuances. News stories tend to be de-
contextualized, such that the ‘meaning’ conveyed to the audience, is ‘partial’. A media 
report is but one of several possible representations of an event. The issue is the 
mediated, contested process by which one representation comes to be constituted as the 
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‘legitimate truth’: “A concern is ‘who has the power to define”: dominant discourses 
work by setting up the terms of reference and by disallowing and marginalizing 
alternatives” (Shore and Wright:1997:18). 
Furthermore, the media was very active in presenting tsunami-affected populations as 
falling, neatly, into the homogeneous, undifferentiated category of ‘the poor’. Any 
comparison of coastal populations, particularly those on the western coast, against those 
of the interior of the country, reveals the former as the more prosperous. Thus, the 
media representation was the construction of a mutual process of poverty alleviation and 
tsunami reconstruction.   
There was a strong stress on democracy, with its attendant principles of accountability, 
good governance and transparency, as well as on minorities (Luthra:2005).32 Fund-
raising events by the Sri Lankan diaspora in various countries received much 
prominence and moral approval, in the international media. Local interventions were 
marginalised.33 Another narrative was the ‘human interest’ stories (Bindra, 2005; 
Mydans, 2004; Rohde, 2005). Gordon (2007) designates individuals taking photographs 
and sending them to the media, as eye witness accounts of disaster situations, as ‘citizen 
journalists’ and argues that disasters generate such  people.  
My particular concern is with the way in which the media pursued its chosen mandate, 
so that it could influence the policies of both the state as well as relief organisations and, 
ultimately, the impact of this on coastal communities.    
Non-Governmental Organisations 
Non-governmental organisations did not address the same problems in their relief and 
reconstruction efforts. Many organisations found themselves with a large volume of 
resources to disburse. However, together with this inflow of resources, were stipulations 
from donors about the rules and regulations which should guide their disbursement, the 
purposes for which they could be used and the type of target community to be assisted. 
The focus was, substantially, on physical reconstruction and in particular on housing. 
There also seemed to be little in the way of needs assessment by way of communication 
with tsunami affected populations, when it came to the development of relief strategies. 
                                                          
32 See BBC Correspondent, Dumeetha Luthra’s reports on the dynamic between the Sri Lankan 
government and the LTTE, post-tsunami. Source: www.bbc.co.uk Accessed 1 November 2006.     
33 See Wilhelm (2005) for an account of a local intervention. 
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The guiding principle appeared to be the desire to publicise results which were quick, 
visible and, very obviously, a success. As Davis puts it: 
“The entire focus…. [has] been on their International NGO, their funding, their 
work, their logistics, their value and their problems. This narrow perception and 
introvert approach appeared to be underpinned with a tacit assumption that they 
were the best guardians of the interests of the disaster survivors, and not local 
communities, nor locally based NGOs, and certainly not the local or national 
government.” (2006:xiii).  
As de Ville de Goyet & Moriniere (2006) state, some of these organisations treated the 
tsunami affected countries as ‘failed states’. Gaasbeek, for instance, is critical of this 
approach. In his writings he focuses attention on the local populations as well as the 
actions taken by government:  
“I contend that three crucial aspects of the tsunami response have been 
misrepresented or ignored in the common discourses on the topic. First, the 
initial response in the East of Sri Lanka was actually effective and, though 
hectic, not chaotic. Many years of near-annual flooding and twenty years of 
violent conflict meant that most of those living in the East knew exactly what to 
do when they had to flee their houses. A pre-existing NGO co-ordination 
mechanism and efficient sharing of resources were in place; the government 
managed to restore roads and fuel and electricity supply within days; and the 
response capabilities of the various actors that were on the ground when the 
tsunami hit formed an almost natural symbiosis.” (2010:125-126).  
The competition, between these organisations, for donor funds and for recipients upon 
whom to expend resources, in the most visible way possible, was severe (Simpson, 
2007). Bindra (2005) has coined the phrase ‘competitive compassion’ to refer to this 
phenomenon. Stirrat (2006) makes the point that this competition had adverse effects on 
the efficiency and the effectiveness of relief disbursement. Koria (2009) makes a similar 
point about coordination, management and inefficiency.     
 
Non-governmental organisations were interested in the implementation of relief 
programmes and in their positive representation by the media. The implementation had 
to be seen as quick, efficient and effective such that the organisations would be seen as 
important players on the stage. My interest is in the manner in which the scale and 
characteristics of the resources available, influenced interventions in these coastal 
communities and, ultimately, the implications of this for the social processes of these 
communities, Sinhapura in particular. I return to these concerns in Chapter 5.    
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The North and the East  
The north and the east of Sri Lanka presented special problems, as far as relief and 
reconstruction were concerned, due to the on-going internal conflict. On the one hand, 
as Wickremasinghe (2006) states, the government had responsibility for the relief, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction of all tsunami affected citizens of Sri Lanka; on the 
other, the reality was that some areas of the north and the east were controlled by the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). An abortive attempt at resource-sharing 
between the LTTE and the government was attempted with the Post Tsunami 
Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS). However, this agreement was 
abandoned and a solution acceptable to both the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE 
was not reached. Keenan (2010), for instance, has argued that ‘tsunami recovery 
processes’ served to redefine and exacerbate the pre-tsunami situation of conflict. 
Gamburd (2010) states that residents supported aid distribution to affected populations, 
in LTTE-controlled territories, with the caveat that the LTTE was an unsuitable 
organisation to disburse aid. 
McGilvray & Gamburd (2010) state that a disaster is an opportunity, seldom taken, to 
set right conflicts in a society; the new resources that become available can be used as a 
lever in the resolution of on-going conflicts. They state that this opportunity was taken 
in Aceh, Indonesia, but not in Sri Lanka. According to Jemadu (2006), the Free Aceh 
Movement (GAM) unilaterally declared Aceh’s independence from Indonesia in 1976. 
From then, until the tsunami in 2004, there was conflict between GAM and the 
Indonesian government with the military playing a critical role. An agreement was 
reached in August 2005 in Helsinki, Finland. The point, here, is that the difference in 
circumstances between the north and the east of Sri Lanka and Aceh, which Jemadu 
amongst others have pointed out, is not commented upon by McGilvray & Gamburd. 
Uyangoda (2005) is critical of the fact that the government and the LTTE failed to reach 
agreement as to how post-tsunami recovery should be handled. He does not, however, 
elaborate the reasons as to why the government and the LTTE failed to reach consensus, 
on the issue of reconstruction.  
In the months after the tsunami there were statements, in a variety of fora, that the 
government had favoured the south and the west over the north and the east, for 
political reasons, in the disbursement of post-tsunami assistance (Kuhn, 2010). Equally, 
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there were comments that NGOs had favoured the north and the east, to counteract what 
they saw as the favouritism of the south by the government. The issue of proportions 
between the north and the south, and the ethnic politics that this might be thought to 
express, is not an issue with which this study is concerned. As this thesis is written on 
the basis of research on the south-western coast, I do not plan to examine the impact of 
the conflict on the disbursement of reconstruction funds. Nor do I make any attempts at 
comparison of the disbursement of aid, by both the state and other organisations, in the 
north and the east as opposed to the south and the west. However, the comments above 
have been made so as to put the problem in a national perspective.    
In this section I have presented certain themes and issues by way of introducing this 
research. I have discussed some of the themes which have emerged in the course of my 
fieldwork, and others which have received attention in the literature. Further issues of 
interest relate to the culture and the social processes of the type of community that I 
have chosen to focus on, and to comparative matters leading from it. These themes will 
receive refinement and examination in the chapters that follow.   
Chapter Outline 
I now give a brief indication of the content of the seven chapters that follow. Chapter 1 
is a description of the damage caused by the tsunami to the coastal regions of Sri Lanka; 
and the particular impact of the tsunami on Sinhapura. The chapter concludes with a 
comparison with other communities along the south-western coast.    
In Chapter 2 I am concerned with the explication of my research problem, the 
theoretical framework of analysis which I have developed to address this problem, and 
the methodology that I used in the collection of data.   
Chapter 3 examines the resources available to Sinhapura in the pre-tsunami period: 
fisheries; trade and employment; and, the political institutions which had an impact on 
the resources that were available to this community. The previous chapters have the 
essential function of providing a background as well as pointers to the way in which the 
pre-tsunami circumstances of the community can be understood. This chapter examines 
the social processes of Sinhapura at the time of the tsunami.  
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Chapter 4 is particularly concerned with the issues of entitlement, compensation and 
dispute mediation at the local level, generated by state policy and practice, in the 
aftermath of the disaster.  
In Chapter 5 I examine the impact of non-governmental sources of assistance upon 
disaster-affected communities.     
In Chapter 6 I illustrate, with many ethnographic examples, how different categories of 
people in Sinhapura responded to the circumstances in which they found themselves 
after the disaster. In this way, this chapter contrasts the pre-tsunami approach to 
resources, discussed in Chapter 3, with the situation that emerged in this respect, with 
the inflow of resources after the tsunami. It examines, therefore, the community’s social 
processes in the face of this disaster.  
In the concluding chapter, the Conclusion, I discuss the implications of this analysis for 
some of the issues and themes which have emerged as important in this study, including 
those which have been discussed in this chapter.  
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Chapter 1  --  The Tsunami and Sinhapura 
This chapter seeks to provide the background in terms of which much of the discussion 
in later chapters becomes intelligible. What was the damage inflicted by the tsunami in 
general, countrywide, terms? Where did Sinhapura’s particular experience fit into this 
picture along the south-western coast? In what way and to what extent was this 
influenced by the social processes in Sinhapura? 
Tsunami Damage and Responses  --  General  
In the areas affected by the tsunami there were huge human and economic losses. The 
official government figure for the loss of life was 35,322.34 There was the significant 
destruction of roads, bridges, and railway tracks with the consequent hampering of 
transport.35 In the village of Thelwatte, a little to the north of Sinhapura, a train was 
swept off the track due to a particularly fierce tsunami wave. Besides this, the 
significant damage was to public, commercial, domestic and religious buildings 
(Lawrence, 2010). The immediate result of this was that people were rendered 
homeless, community activities could not be conducted and livelihoods were affected.36     
Food shortage, looting, water-bourne disease, and the lack of availability of drinking 
water are some of the phenomena which have been documented, in the aftermath of 
disasters. Jana (2005) states that in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands there was an 
urgent need for healthcare services and bottled drinking water, to prevent the imminent 
outbreak of disease: “Health is often the most critical issue during the initial emergency 
period after a disaster…” (Aeberhard:2008:17S). In Sri Lanka this was not the case. No 
pronounced health concerns were reported by affected communities.37 Communities, 
inland, provided food, drinking water, medical assistance and temporary shelter. The 
other point of relevance is that no community in Sri Lanka is more than 30 kms from a 
government base hospital. Bosher’s comment that “…. the largest problems in Sri 
                                                          
34 Source: Reconstruction and Development Agency (RADA) Report on the Tsunami. 
35 Although damage to the Galle Road was considerable, it was operational within two weeks.  
36 The Consumer Price Index rose by 3.98% and the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) declined. “Initial 
predictions that the tsunami would shave more than a percentage point from GDP growth proved 
excessively pessimistic, and in fact GDP growth increased from 5.4% in 2004 to 6% in 2005” (Central 
Bank of Sri Lanka, 2006). Source: Reconstruction and Development Agency (RADA) Report on the 
Tsunami. Citation and full details in the bibliography. 
37 This is based on interviews with the medical profession and on the visit of a Consultant Physician to 
Sinhapura, under the aegis of the Trust.   
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Lanka and India post-disaster event are associated with access to adequate health care 
facilities.” (2006:64), is inexplicable as it was well documented that this was not the 
case. Thus, widespread disease and shortage of water were not, primarily, the problems 
which had to be addressed.   
As this was a disaster limited to coastal areas, the largest damage was to the fisheries 
industry. Bandara and Narampanawa (2007), state that there was a reduction of stock in 
the fisheries sector and that 50% of marine fisheries was completely destroyed. This 
rendered 100,000 fishermen, 80,000 fish traders and 20,000 workers, in ancillary 
services, jobless.38 Other sectors of the economy such as trading, dependent on the 
volume of fishing, were also affected.    
The other industry to be seriously affected by the tsunami was tourism, accounting for 
10.8% of the estimated GDP of US $ 18 billion of 2004.39 The seaside resorts 
experienced extensive infrastructure damage as well as the loss of life. In the aftermath 
of the tsunami, with the sudden drop in tourist arrivals, these resorts operated at a 20% 
occupancy, in spite of the fact that many dropped their prices by 30-40% (Gupta, 2005). 
Furthermore, these resorts did not receive compensation from insurance as the damage 
caused by a tsunami was not within the compensation cover. There were a few ex gratia 
payments amounting to between Rs. 100,000/- to 200,000/- each.40 However, the tourist 
industry recovered speedily for several reasons: the swift action of the government, with 
the Central Bank of Sri Lanka offering soft loans to tourist resorts for reconstruction; 
the deferment of the loan repayments of hotel owners; access to privately funded 
renovation programmes; the duty free importation of the material required for hotel 
refurbishment; aggressive marketing by the Sri Lanka Tourist Board (SLTB). Thus, 
many of the resorts affected by the tsunami were operational by February, 2005. 
Furthermore, the industry was kept afloat by aid workers and other groups who poured 
into the country and had to be accommodated. The 100m buffer zone which placed an 
embargo on rebuilding on the coastline, was not implemented in relation to the tourist 
resorts.  
                                                          
38 Source: www.fisheries.gov.lk Accessed on 10 April 2007 
39 Post-tsunami, the tourism sector recorded a negative growth of 3%. There was a loss in earnings of 
54.5%.  Source: Annual Statistical Report 2005, Sri Lanka Tourist Board. www.sltbstatistics.org  
www.srilankantourism.org www.slmts.lk Accessed 10 April 2007  
40 Source: Discussion with Mr.Sooriyagoda, Head of the Planning and Development Division of the Sri 
Lanka Tourist Board, on 22/8/2008. 
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The impact of the disaster cut across socio-economic levels, caste, ethnicity and 
religion. In contrast to the point made by McGilvray and Gamburd (2010), disasters are 
not always profoundly discriminatory as will become apparent in future chapters. In Sri 
Lanka, the more affluent strata of society were affected as much as the poorer ones. 
However, one must qualify this statement by making the point that the affluent had a 
better capacity to recover, than the poor. It is women and children who were 
significantly affected by this disaster. This is because men were better able to run, swim 
and climb trees.41 In some coastal areas the men were out at sea, fishing, where they 
were safe from the tsunami waves.  
It has been argued by many people, and in many different fora, that this widespread 
damage was not inevitable; that if Sri Lanka and, indeed, the Asian region had had an 
early warning system for such disasters, the massive loss of life might have been 
averted. Samarajiva (2005) states that while the advanced technology necessary for 
timely warning was available in the world, at the time of the tsunami, it was not readily 
available in Sri Lanka.   
Many institutions and individuals responded to this disaster event: the communities 
affected by the catastrophe; neighbouring communities; the government; the UN and 
other international aid agencies; smaller non-governmental organisations, both 
international and local; the commercial sector; the media; local and foreign 
philanthropists acting in their individual capacities; and, ad hoc organisations assembled 
for the purpose of dealing with this crisis.  
Response of Local Populations 
Before the government or humanitarian organisations appeared on the scene, post-
tsunami, the initial relief was provided by local populations in the form of food, 
clothing and shelter. These were communities, inland, which had close connections, of 
trade and marriage, with coastal communities. Domroes’ comment, “…..donations of 
government and private aid from all corners of the globe have poured in to Sri Lanka 
through innumerable organizations and individuals…” (2006:ix) marginalises the 
contributions of local populations, in the face of the disaster. This can be contrasted 
                                                          
41 Of those who received injuries in the High Street of Sinhapura 100% were women. My research in 
communities along the south-western coast corroborated the fact that women were disproportionately 
amongst those injured.  
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with Jana who states that: “A large number of people had devoted their attention and 
efforts to relief work and had been working ceaselessly…..since 26th December 2004 
without any remuneration.” (2005:121). Domroes’ comment can also be contrasted with 
that of Jayasuriya & McCawley (2010) evaluating the tsunami dynamic in Sri Lanka, 
Thailand and Indonesia, in the course of a project commissioned by the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB). One of their major conclusions is that the initial emergency 
relief effort was a major achievement due, in large measure, to the spontaneous 
responses of local communities and national governments. This is echoed by Lal Mohan 
(2005) regarding the Kanyakumari coast in South India. Mulligan & Nadarajah (2012) 
commenting on the early responses of communities to the interior of those affected by 
the tsunami, state that this response was remarkable for a country that was in no way 
prepared to face this disaster.   
The local police, Buddhist temples, Christian churches and Islamic mosques also played 
a significant role in providing succour. Furthermore, private individuals and the 
commercial sector organised convoys of aid to the affected areas. In the immediate 
aftermath of the tsunami, when there was little coordination of the relief effort, aid 
tended to be focused on visibly affected, large towns by-passing the smaller 
communities on the south-western coast, such as Sinhapura. 
Response of the State 
The government’s response came into effect within a week of the tsunami. The Task 
Force for Rebuilding the Nation (TAFREN) was established on 3 January 2005, directly 
under the control of the President.42 It was the central body for coordinating, and 
implementing, all tsunami-related activities.43 Under the aegis of TAFREN programmes 
of relief were established, and compensation disbursed to affected populations through 
the lower tiers of the bureaucracy.44 These programmes were under the coordination of 
the District and Divisional Secretariat, at the regional level. It was the Technical Officer 
(TO) of the Divisional Secretariat who assessed damage to housing and gave a 
certificate authorising compensation. The Grama Niladhari (GN) was the village level 
official who followed through the chain of command from the District Secretary, 
                                                          
42 TAFREN appears to be similar to the Integrated Relief Command (IRC) which was set up for the 
Andaman and Nicobar Islands by the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs (Jana, 2005).     
43 This organization was, subsequently, dismantled and the Reconstruction and Development Agency 
(RADA) took over its functions.    
44 These schemes are discussed at greater length in Chapter 4. 
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through the Divisional Secretary, to the village. The sums of cash were disbursed 
through the Samurdhi Bank and the items of food, such as dry goods, through the co-
operative.45 The Fisheries Inspector, the local official of the Department of Fisheries, 
assessed boat damage and issued temporary Identity Cards on the basis of which 
fishermen received compensation.  
 
The officials of the central administration were the important actors on the 
reconstruction ‘stage’. It was through them that state assistance flowed to those affected 
by the tsunami. The Grama Niladhari, the Technical Officer, officials of the Samurdhi 
Bank and of the cooperative movement, officials of the Divisional and District 
Secretariat became decision-makers and, therefore, important persons in this context. 
Furthermore, a document certifying tsunami damage from the government was 
necessary to obtain any assistance from relief organisations. It can be seen that quite 
apart from disbursing government relief the bureaucracy was central, in mediating 
between tsunami affected populations and those humanitarian organisations providing 
relief. In these circumstances, except in an ad hoc manner, the resources of government 
did not flow into disaster affected communities through the Members of Parliament 
(MPs), nor through the representatives of local government.  
 
The government’s accountability to tsunami affected populations had many dimensions. 
It could not, for instance, mark off its spheres of responsibility in the way that other 
organisations could, and did, do. The government had to rehabilitate the two major 
industries which were devastated  --  fisheries and tourism  --  mobilise banks and 
insurance companies; deal with the special problems of the north and the east; and, 
navigate the myriad legal considerations which arise in situations of this sort. 
Furthermore, it had to find land for new housing in areas where unused land was not 
freely available. There was little in the way of state-owned land on which to commence 
construction, in the vicinity of the coastal areas. This meant that land had either to be 
acquired from private sources, or state-owned plantations in the interior, had to be 
levelled, preparatory to the construction of housing. Acquisition of private land is a long 
                                                          
45 The Samurdhi movement was initiated as a poverty alleviation programme for households below a 
certain minimum income. A bank was established as part of this movement. The Cooperative movement, 
which has a long history in Sri Lanka, has, at various points, figured prominently in the equitable 
distribution of scarce food stuffs. In the immediate post-tsunami period it was called upon to play a 
similar role.  
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and tedious process. Furthermore, such acquisitions may be challenged in the courts of 
law as an infringement of fundamental rights.46    
 
The government also faced the challenge of the management of large amounts of aid 
flowing into the country, in the aftermath of the tsunami. Although not all amounts 
which were pledged were delivered, the volume of aid was still unprecedented.47 The 
main problem that the government faced was the widespread view that the line 
ministries could not be relied upon to deliver goods and services to affected people, as 
intended by the design of relief programmes. The belief in the integrity of the public 
service was, at this point, at an ‘all time’ low: “Successive governments have weakened 
the fabric of the public service by liberal dispensation of political patronage.” (Editorial, 
The Sunday Island, 21/06/2009). Vethasiromony (2005) makes the point, for the 
Kanyakumari coast in South India, that if an administrative system does not operate 
well in normal times it will not respond well to the extreme and special needs of a 
disaster. The government, therefore, found itself in a dilemma. On the one hand, 
confidence in the ability of the central administration to handle relief was low. On the 
other, there was even less confidence in local government institutions, as the device 
through which this should be done. Finally, the government opted for the disbursement 
of relief through the central administration, with TAFREN, and subsequently the 
Reconstruction and Development Agency (RADA) playing a strong monitoring role. 
All this was not conducive to quick decision-making, nor to the efficient delivery of aid.    
 
The Sri Lankan experience may be contrasted with the approach of the Gujarat 
government, in India, after the earthquake in 2001. Simpson states:  
 
“…in the aftermath…..as I have described it, the state began to impinge on 
freedoms and autonomy. It took an iron grip by divesting people of property and 
their property rights and investing heavily in a superabundance of new 
bureaucracy, which was often uncertain of its proper relationship with the pre-
existent bureaucracy.” (2005:238).  
                                                          
46The Sri Lankan government’s post-tsunami relief and rehabilitation work, at the local level, is discussed 
in Chapter 4. 
47 It was the case that, overall, only a third of the aid that was promised, in the aftermath of the tsunami, 
was received by Sri Lanka (Source: RADA). The United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) states that of a total of US $ 2.5 billion of emergency aid pledged by 
government donors, some 21% (US$ 0.55 billion) remained uncommitted nearly 18 months after the 
tsunami, in June 2006 (Telford and Cosgrave, 2007).  
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This did not happen in Sri Lanka. There was neither heavy investment by the state nor 
was there a radical change in the bureaucracy. Although RADA and TAFREN were 
directly under the President, they did not arrogate to themselves rights which disturbed 
the existing bureaucracy, or the property rights of individuals. While a buffer zone was 
initially imposed, and building within this zone was prohibited, there was no change in 
the ownership of land.48  It must be noted, though, that the approach followed in Gujarat 
related to a specific well-demarcated area, unlike in Sri Lanka, where the affected area 
was a narrow strip along two-thirds of its coastline. It is interesting to note that in the 
Sri Lankan context it was relief organisations, both international and national, which 
went into recruitment over-drive. Harris (2006), for instance, has commented on the 
negative impact of this, when he states that the recruitment and human resources 
development practices of relief agencies, in the face of disaster, are inappropriate, as 
well as being insensitive to the disaster response needs of affected populations.  
 
In Sri Lanka, disaster response and management has never been a critical element in 
national planning. Gandhi writing about India states that: “Although our country has 
been subjected to natural disasters from time to time, these have never been adequately 
factored into our planning process. By and large, we have taken the approach that these 
events are transient in nature and, therefore, can be addressed as and when they arise.” 
(Gandhi: 2007: 44-45). The situation has been similar in Sri Lanka. Minor natural 
disasters are frequent, but they had never been integrated into policy. The tsunami was 
on a scale which far exceeded that of other natural disasters.    
 
Response of Relief Organisations 
 
Relief organisations, including those of the UN system and prominent Non 
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) set up their own programmes.49 Many 
organisations concentrated on the construction of housing, both temporary and 
                                                          
48 The discussion of the buffer zone, and the implications of this imposition, are discussed in Chapter 4.  
49 The organisations of the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) were active in post-tsunami relief and 
reconstruction in Sri Lanka. The organisations are: CARE International, World Vision, Help the Aged, 
Islamic Relief, Oxfam, CARE Int. UK, Concern, Save the Children, the British Red Cross, Tearfund, 
Merlin, Christian Aid, CAFOD, ActionAid. Source: www.dec.org Accessed 10 November 2007. 
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permanent. There were others which were involved in immediate relief. It is only a few 
organisations which assisted in the restoration of livelihoods, apart from fisheries. 
Major donors released large sums to NGOs, both local and international, which, 
thereby, became the conduit through which these funds reached the affected 
communities.50  
A significant feature of the post-tsunami context was the role of microfinance 
organisations.  In the new circumstances which developed after the tsunami, with a 
severe shortage of capital, the opportunities for lending agencies expanded greatly. 
Thus, these organisations either multiplied their existing programmes or started new 
initiatives. Other organisations ventured into microfinance as a new and, as it turned 
out, lucrative venture.  
Response of Tsunami-affected Populations 
The tsunami affected populations exhibited a variety of reactions. There were two main 
themes of recrimination. One, was that some who had lost ‘everything’, had not got 
‘anything’. The other, was that some who had not lost ‘anything’ managed, through 
unscrupulous means, to secure substantial sums of money and other benefits. The 
redistribution of resources, in some instances, was such that those who had had little 
hope of improving their circumstances, in the normal course of events, now had access 
to such resources as enabled them to achieve a lifestyle which they could not have 
aspired to under normal circumstances. The anger directed at relief agencies and the 
institutions of government seemed to arise from the fact that they were seen, by those 
who did not benefit from these sources of aid, as the ‘architects’, of an ‘unjust’ 
redistribution of resources. There was also the feeling amongst the fishing component of 
these coastal communities that, as a group, their loss was greater than that of any other 
section of society and that it is they who were, primarily, entitled to compensation. This 
was a position that they pursued aggressively, in a variety of fora such as meetings with 
government agents and NGO representatives.51 The poor felt that the more affluent 
members of society had other avenues of recovery, and that government and 
humanitarian aid should be reserved, primarily, for them.  
 
                                                          
50 Source: interviews with several NGOs, both local and foreign. 
51 These themes are expanded, with ethnographic examples, in both Chapters 4 and 5.  
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Response of Financial Institutions 
   
For a period of six months after the tsunami all commercial banks provided special loan 
facilities to expedite the recovery process. In order to secure a loan, a police report 
certifying tsunami damage was necessary. The Commercial Bank of Ceylon, PLC 
instituted the Susahana Loan Scheme which entailed loans at 6% interest, with a one 
year interest free grace period. In January 2005 one of the Trustees, met the top 
management of the Commercial Bank, which was operating in the south-western region, 
regarding potential loans for the tsunami-affected in Sinhapura. He was told that while 
the bank was prepared to implement the loan scheme at the suggestion of the 
government, for a short period, they would, thereafter, have to revert to normal banking 
practice and to give loans only where these were well-secured. The majority of 
Sinhapura fell into the category of high risk borrowers. The officials further observed 
that the pursuit of defaulters, in the event of non-repayment of loans, would be very bad 
from a public relations point of view, for the bank. At this point the banks were trying to 
work out schemes whereby they would lend to local organisations such as village level 
associations which would, then, take the responsibility for repayment. In the event, no 
scheme which was regarded as viable by the banks, and helpful by potential borrowers, 
was formulated. The banks did not lend to borrowers in this high risk category, in the 
normal course of banking, and saw little reason to do so in times of catastrophe. The 
Bank of Ceylon had initiated a scheme of loans for fishermen in 1975, but in early 2005 
when the fishermen were in dire need of capital for the restoration of this industry this 
scheme was little in evidence. It was revived in 2011, by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 
in terms of the Diyavara Diriya Scheme.52 The idea was to promote self-employment 
activities amongst fishing families: coir, the production of local food, aquatic plants, 
ornamental fish, ready-made garments, fish-based products and handicrafts.53  
The manager of the Galle branch of the Commercial Bank told me, in 2005, that the 
Susahana loans were given to established entrepreneurial ventures, with a good credit 
history, in a context where loans tended to be regarded as grants. The maximum 
tsunami loan was Rs. 5 million. The manager of the Hikkaduwa branch stated that they 
                                                          
52 Source:‘Bank of Ceylon honours Fisheries Sector with Diyavara Diriya’ in The Island, 31/07/2011. 
53 Source:‘Loans to Fishermen to Start Self-Employment Projects’ by Don Asoka Wijewardena in The 
Island 17/09/2011. 
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had given Rs 250 million worth of tsunami loans. The money came from international 
donor agencies. It is through the Central Bank of Sri Lanka that these monies were 
channelled to the commercial banks. Some NGOs used the bank to facilitate the 
disbursement of resources.54    
While there was a certain fatalistic acceptance of the position taken by the banks there 
was, clearly, the feeling that long-standing customers had been somewhat cavalierly 
treated. The response was to turn to the institutions of microfinance, and to informal 
sources such as kin and personal connections. It is those tsunami affected customers of 
the banks whose credit history was satisfactory who were able to borrow large sums 
from the banks, for the rehabilitation of their entrepreneurial ventures, even though their 
incomes had been drastically curtailed.   
 
Response of Insurance Companies 
 
Most insurance policies in Sri Lanka did not cover earthquakes which are the cause of 
tsunamis. Thus, companies were not liable, in a strictly legal sense. What they did, is to 
make some ex gratia payments of approximately 10%, largely, for the purposes of 
public relations.55 This had the effect of making coastal populations wonder whether 
insurance, about which they had had doubts anyway, was of any use as a safeguard 
against a disaster of this nature in the future.   
Capitalist Development 
The capitalist development in the context of disasters, highlighted by Klein (2007), 
clearly did not take place on the south-western coast of Sri Lanka. This might have been 
because of the difficulties of regional redevelopment, because nowhere did the narrow 
strip of land affected by the tsunami constitute a region, where the redevelopment could 
be planned on a geographical or on an administrative basis. The only place where this 
                                                          
54 Source: Personal communication with Mrs. Firdhouse Ameer, Manager, Commercial Bank, Galle 
Branch on 30/6/2008  
55 Source: Personal communication with Mr. Sanjay Seneviratne, Head of Personal Insurance, Senaratne 
Associates (Now Senaratne Insurance Brokers), Liberty Plaza, Colombo 3 on 03/07/2008.  
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was possible was in Hambanthota where there was already a plan for the development 
of the town, its harbour and environs.56  
This section has been a discussion of the type of damage that Sri Lanka suffered as a 
result of the tsunami, and the responses to this damage by the various actors in this 
drama. It is about the nature of the resources that were lost, the new resources that were 
sought, and how these were obtained. The next section describes the context of 
Sinhapura, as a precursor to the description of the damage suffered by Sinhapura, which 
comes thereafter. What type of community is it? What is its geographical context? What 
is its composition in terms of caste, ethnicity and religion? What role has education 
played in widening its economic opportunities, and in strengthening its influence in the 
region? In all these respects, how does Sinhapura compare with the communities of this 
coast, particularly with those immediately to its north and its south? 
The Context of Sinhapura 
I shall now describe those aspects of Sinhapura which have to be understood if the 
material presented in the chapters which follow is to be meaningful.  
 
In Sinhapura, somewhat to the interior of the Galle Road there is a river. The strip of 
land between the Galle Road and the river, constitutes the landside of the community. 
There is, therefore, no village immediately to the interior with which Sinhapura has a 
‘special’ relationship, in contrast with many other coastal villages. The land between the 
Galle Road and the sea constitutes the four neighbourhoods where the fishing families 
live. There is an inlet where the boats are berthed which forms a natural harbour. The 
landside is comprised of two neighbourhoods, although these are more amorphous than 
the well-demarcated ones of the seaside.    
 
In ethnic terms Sinhapura is Sinhalese, except for one Tamil family, with a population 
of a little over three thousand.57 The cultural idiom of Buddhism, as a philosophy and as 
a way of life, and the ideas of Sinhala Nationalism, are central in the construction of its 
                                                          
56 The organised expansion of capital and infrastructure in the aftermath of the tsunami may have, to a 
certain extent, taken place on the east coast of Sri Lanka. However, I made no specific examination of the 
east coast as this was beyond the purview of my study.    
57 The population in Sinhapura, in February 2005, was 2236. The number of households was 544. Of this 
235 were on the seaside, 230 on the landside and 79 on the High Street. Source: The Grama Niladhari’s 
list as well as the survey conducted by the Trust.  
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worldview (Gombrich & Obeyesekere, 1988). Through a variety of ‘rituals of unity’ 
this community presents itself, to itself and to others, as a community of ‘good’ 
Buddhists (Spencer, 1990). Historically, the Buddhist temple has provided the 
normative base of the society: the corpus of rules, backed by the values and beliefs of 
Buddhist thought. Thus, the temple is at the centre of village life. However, a conflict 
over the succession of the chief incumbent monk of the temple, a few years prior to the 
tsunami, had the effect of ‘tarnishing’ the temple as the wellspring of the moral domain 
in the eyes of the community. The rifts created during this episode had not healed 
completely at the time of the tsunami. The result was that the temple did not have a 
congregation which had a strong core of members who participated in all its activities. It 
had, instead, different groups of people who undertook the different ritual activities 
associated with the temple: a situation of transitory involvement.       
 
Caste 
In order to comprehend the social dynamics of caste in Sinhapura, and indeed in the 
region, it is necessary to understand something about caste in Sri Lanka. There are 
differences between the Tamil and the Sinhalese populations of the north and the south. 
The caste picture of the Tamil north is different in composition, in rules of interaction 
and in such matters as access to Hindu temples. In the south, there are differences in 
caste composition and interaction between the interior of the country and the southern 
and western coastline. In the interior, in most villages, the majority caste is the 
Govigama, whose traditional occupation has been farming. It is regarded in these 
villages, as well as by the country as a whole, as the caste of the highest rank. This can 
be contrasted with India where, in most places, the highest ranked caste is not the 
majority caste. The Govigama comprise about seventy percent of the Sinhalese 
community in the interior and the rest (30%) of the population belong to castes whose 
function has been, historically, to provide various services to the whole community 
(Ryan, 1953; Leach, 1960; Senaratne, 1970; Seneviratne, 1997; Gunasekara, 1994; 
Furer-Haimendorf, 1966; Yalman, 1967).   
On the coastline, the picture is markedly different. There are single caste and, 
occasionally, multi caste villages dotted along the southern and western coastline. These 
communities have been, historically, single caste although they have sometimes been 
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grouped into a heterogeneous unit for administrative purposes. This can be contrasted 
with interior villages which are often multi caste, with land providing a substantial 
percentage of income (Senaratne, 1970). On the coast, the Karava, the Salagama and the 
Durava castes are the ones which are found most frequently, engaged in fishing, the 
collection and sale of toddy, in the coir industry, cinnamon peeling and a variety of 
entrepreneurial activities. Their numbers, compared to the totality of the Sinhalese 
population are small  --  approximately ten percent. These castes are of relatively recent 
Indian origin, the migrations beginning in the 15th century. The high rank of the 
Govigama is disputed by these three castes some of whom, in their single caste 
communities, have little or no interaction with the Govigama. An inter-caste marriage is 
a common occasion on which these rankings become significant. It is a matter of 
constant negotiation with regard to the attainment of status. In those communities 
comprised of more than one caste, there is a certain amount of caste interaction in the 
course of which issues of ranking lead to conflict (Leach, 1960; Yalman, 1967; 
Senaratne, 1970). However, inter-caste conflicts on the coastline are, largely, inter-
village conflicts. These conflicts relate to boundaries, to marriage, to the control of 
temple resources, to the provision of services and to fishing rights in the form of access 
to the beach. The arbiters of these conflicts are often the political authorities beyond the 
village. Thus, these conflicts unfold on the political stage in this region.        
The south-western coastal region was one of the areas of the country which benefitted 
from the enterprise shown by missionaries in the 19th century, in establishing 
educational institutions. This was, in fact, part of a wider policy followed by the 
colonial government to create a cadre of people who could fill the positions of a 
bureaucracy which was expanding at that time (Kannangara, 2011; Jayantha, 1990; 
Roberts, 1982). In time, the proportion of educated people from this region, employed 
by the government, was markedly higher than the rest of the country. This educated 
segment of society was drawn, largely, from the three prominent coastline castes. It is in 
this context, and in terms of this education, that these castes regarded themselves as 
differentiated from the interior, and as the equal of the Govigama. Since the 1850s the 
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Karava have challenged the Govigama at the national level, in terms of leadership in 
public affairs (Jayawardena, 2002).58   
Sinhapura is a single caste village comprised of the Karava caste. One part of the 
community has, traditionally, engaged in fishing while trade has been the province of 
the other.59 To the immediate south of Sinhapura is the community of Kotigama 
belonging to the Salagama caste.60 Oral traditions abound of conflicts relating to fishing 
and the temple, between Sinhapura and Kotigama. During the dispute over the 
succession, in the temple, the people of Kotigama who were devotees of this temple 
supported the non-Karava candidate. With regard to fishing, the controversies have been 
over the access to the beach. The beach in Sinhapura, is not considerable. Claims by 
Kotigama to a part of this beach have not, therefore, been at all acceptable. Another 
bone of contention has been various attempts by the two villages to appropriate to 
themselves governmental institutions such as local government offices, courts of law 
and the regional police. Thus, the main conflict between Sinhapura and Kotigama, in 
caste terms, has been over public institutions. It can be seen, therefore, that caste unity 
is a function of inter-caste relations and has much to do with identity and the control of 
resources. Notwithstanding this history of conflict, in more recent years, since the 
1970s, there has been an uneasy peace between the two communities. This is because 
some of the conflicts such as those over the siting of the police station and the TC have 
been resolved. Within Sinhapura, as in many other single caste villages, the large 
percentage of disputes of a day-to-day character are intra-village and intra-caste.  
Kotigama has benefitted from the inflow of resources from members of the Salagama 
caste, resident in urban centres. The Sinhapura position is different. Sinhapura 
benefitted, early on in the 20th century, from the educational facilities which were 
available in the large towns both to its north and its south. Many received a good 
education at the secondary level, attained skills, secured employment, and left the 
village. Over the years the migration from Sinhapura has been substantial: to Colombo 
and other urban areas, to the hill country, as well as to countries like Australia, the USA 
                                                          
58 This account is based on conversations with members of my family and also with senior residents of 
the south-western coastline, many of whom drew on their own family histories in responding to my 
queries.  
59 To be contrasted with Norr’s (1975) account of Tamil Nadu where she states that in South India, 
fishing is performed by a single caste, of low status.    
60 Kotigama is the pseudonym that I use for this village. 
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and the UK. The inflow of remittances, however, from these migrants has been 
negligible.61 The explanation of this is the fact that in the majority of cases the whole 
family has migrated. Thus, they have maintained little connection with Sinhapura and 
had no necessity to send remittances back.  
The Economy 
In Sinhapura, for about half a kilometre the Galle Road becomes the commercial hub of 
the community, the High Street. It is a common perception in the village that the 
prosperity of all, is dependent on the volume of fishing. It is, in fact, a mutually 
dependent relationship between fishing and trade. In addition to this there is some 
small-scale manufacturing and the provision of services such as carpentry, plumbing 
and electrical work. The economy is also fed through external employment in the larger 
towns of the region, as well as through employment in the government sector.62 
Furthermore, there are a variety of cottage crafts which provide supplementary income 
to households. The main cottage craft is the coir industry which has, for two or three 
centuries, been the province of women and which is distinguished from ‘newer’ craft 
industries. The Coir Factory is situated on the seaside and produces, principally, coir 
matting.      
 
From the early 19th century Sinhapura has had a diversified economy. There was trade 
with selected areas of southern India in a specialised type of cured fish called jadi, the 
trade in gems and the participation in the expanding plantation industry both in the 
hinterland of Galle and in the central hills of the country. As a result of these activities 
when the time came, in the 1960s and 1970s, for the innovations in the technology of 
fishing sponsored by the government, the community had within it enough capital to 
invest in the new technology. This is in contrast to some of the other communities on 
this coast which continued to fish in the old mode, without mechanising their craft, 
without nylon nets and without multi-day boats.    
 
                                                          
61 The role of caste in the distribution of resources will be discussed in some depth in Chapter 3. 
62 Employment in the government sector is a preferred form of service, although salaries are low, as there 
is security of tenure and a pension at the end of working life.  
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In the 1950s Sinhapura practised the ‘theppan’ type of fishing.63 From this, there was a 
shift to large wooden outrigger canoes or wallams as they are referred to, locally. In the 
late 1960s these wallams had outboard engines fitted to them and, eventually, the 
wallams themselves came to be constructed from fibreglass. Nylon nets were also 
introduced, at around this time, and after some initial resistance by the fishermen, came 
into widespread use.  
The south-west monsoon on this coast confines fishing to about six months of the year: 
the period called the haraya which is from October to April. May to September is 
referred to as the varakan period, by the fishermen, when the sea is stormy and fishing 
is difficult. In these lean months, the fishermen engage in fish drying activities, inshore 
fishing using small canoes, and occasionally, coir rope making.    
In the late 1970s with the new technology and other factors, such as the availability of 
credit and the improvements in services and infrastructure, coming together, there was a 
boom in fishing incomes. There were several implications of this in Sinhapura. One of 
these was a high degree of investment back again in the fishing industry, as well as in 
other ventures. The repayment of the debt of this investment was facilitated by the 
fishing boom. One of my best informants, Gunasena, told me that he bought his wallam 
on loan in November 1980 and that by February 1981, i.e., four months later, he had 
repaid the loan which covered the full cost of the wallam. There was an immediate 
effect on the businesses of the High Street. There was a boom here as well. The pattern 
amongst the fishing community and the High Street was to access credit, make this 
credit ‘work’ for them, repay the loan, and start the cycle again.     
 
The fishing community and those involved in trade, invested in superior fishing crafts 
and equipment; in vehicles such as lorries, buses and three wheelers; and in the 
purchase of real estate in inland villages. They also invested, in an increasingly 
intensive manner, in the education of their sons and daughters. The educational facilities 
which were available in the large towns of this region, beyond the village, involved a 
significant expenditure. This led to employment, beyond the village, both in 
government and in the commercial sector. What the entrepreneurs of this community 
did not invest in, was community development. They were not interested in the 
                                                          
63 The ‘theppan’ is a traditional craft which is made out of logs lashed together.  
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contribution to the improvement of community facilities such as the two schools and the 
library.64 The result has been that community facilities in Sinhapura are poor. Neither of 
the schools are of a level of academic excellence, which caters to the demands of those 
students who wish to pursue their education beyond the secondary level. Such students 
and their parents make every effort to enrol in the bigger schools of Galle and 
Ambalangoda.  
 
Another implication of this economic climate is that there was a change in the 
organisation of fishing. Boats began to be owned by people who did not necessarily go 
to sea themselves, for instance the High Street traders. The wallams had a crew of seven 
or eight who worked on the basis of a share of the income of the boat, on a given day. 
This gave them a freedom which allowed them to change to another boat should 
conditions turn out to be unsatisfactory. The routes of mobility from ancillary workers 
to crew members to boat owners also became more accessible.  
Altogether, there was an expansion in the village economy. An important feature of this 
new economy was the way in which credit was a ‘lubricant’ for growth, both the formal 
as well as the informal systems characteristic of communities of this type.65 Individuals 
had recourse to a variety of credit sources, both formal and informal.66 Four or five 
branches of well known national banks were within easy reach of the village. Yet, at 
this time, it was not possible to get loans easily from these institutions unless one had 
been an account holder for a period of time, and was willing to provide unimpeachable 
collateral. In these circumstances, with economic activity increasing in volume and with 
the availability of credit from formal sources not expanding correspondingly, the 
informal, local, systems of credit began to fill the breach. Those who had spare capital 
and who felt they could exercise the necessary controls to recover this capital, gradually 
became money-lenders. There were those who ran businesses on the High Street who 
lent money, as a supplementary business as well as to facilitate sales. There were others, 
                                                          
64 One of the schools is one of the earliest Buddhist schools to be established in the south.  
65 As Pollnac (1985) points out, the Sinhapura fishermen prefer the informal credit system. If at all 
possible they avoid banks and other financial institutions.  
66 There is an interesting contrast, here, with Ambakandawila where Stirrat (1988, 1989) states that the 
credit arrangements are interest free and reciprocal. In the case of Sinhapura, local credit is extended on 
the basis of very high interest and reciprocity is not guaranteed.    
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among whom were quite a few women, who loaned money to ‘known’ people  --  danna 
minissu.   
Although banking services have been freely available in the region for many years  --  
Hikkaduwa has the People’s Bank, the Bank of Ceylon, the Commercial Bank and the 
National Savings Bank  --  the fishermen have been chary of utilising these services. 
The tremendous variation of income and, therefore, the difficulty of repayment of loans 
according to a schedule, has had much to do with this. As far as the small entrepreneurs 
are concerned, in the 1980s and the 1990s there were strong attempts by the banks to get 
their custom. After the default of many loans, however, and the realisation, by the 
banks, that recovery through the legal process is complex, there has been a curtailment 
of these easy loans. What has stepped into the place of this lacuna is the microfinance 
loan.67 As far as insurance is concerned, although limited facilities were available, 
through the governmental system, most boat owners did not feel that expenditure on this 
count was worthwhile. Furthermore, it must be emphasised that insurance is available 
for the boats, the crew and the engines but not for nets, although these are often as 
expensive to replace. This perception of the boat owners has, of course, changed after 
the experience of the tsunami, when the perils of the lack of insurance were starkly 
revealed.   
From the 1920s when there was an Excise office and it was a port for the trade with 
India, Sinhapura had a certain importance in the region. In the 1970s, however, 
Sinhapura lost this position to Hikkaduwa. This has had much to do with Hikkaduwa’s 
growth as a centre of tourism. In part, this was the loss of its place as the centre for local 
government and for institutions of law and order such as the police. The immediate 
result was that the inflow of resources through political and administrative channels 
became considerably less than before.   
Thus, the situation in Sinhapura, before the tsunami, was that fishermen were using a 
variety of credit mechanisms to access new technology and increase income, which had 
implications for social position. They were able to utilise these opportunities due to the 
high levels of income, from fishing, which made the repayment of steep interest, 
feasible. This was a community, therefore, in transition, venturing from fishing into 
                                                          
67 Microfinance is the credit available to small enterprises in small communities which do not have access 
to commercial credit due, largely, to the lack of collateral. This credit is usually supplied by non-
governmental organisations.  
57 
 
other activities. Thus, compared to the 1950s, the profile of Sinhapura’s economy had 
changed considerably. Fishing now contributed to a much larger share of the total 
income than before. Coir rope making had declined to the extent, that it was marginal to 
the economy. The High Street businesses provided goods and services of a type 
unknown half a century previously.   
At the time of the tsunami, the fishing industry in Sinhapura had the following 
character: 60 wallams, operating with outboard engines which fish at a distance of 5-6 
kilometres from the shore; 15 small outrigger canoes, for inshore fishing; and, 15 multi-
day boats, used for deep-sea fishing, which had been promoted by the government in 
the 1990s, which were berthed in the harbours of Galle or Hikkaduwa.68 The main 
actors on this stage were the boat owners, sometimes also acting as skippers of their 
boats; the crew; the traders from whom provisions and fuel was purchased; ancillary 
workers such as those who assist in drawing the boats onto the beach; the fish traders 
and merchants; the itinerant traders of fish; boat makers; and, those who repaired 
damaged nets. Then, at one remove, were the officials of the Department of Fisheries, 
the Fisheries’ Co-operatives and the scientific community.69  
 
There were also a variety of fishing methods: night fishing using the night net; course 
fishing which is a daytime activity and uses the course net; inshore fishing in canoes; 
the use of the athanguwa.70 The division of the profit differed between night fishing and 
the course method: in the case of the former, half the profit went to the owner of the 
boat and the rest was split between the crew; in the case of the latter, it was only two-
fifths of the profit which was the rightful share of the owner. The multi-day boats were 
involved in three types of fishing: the log-centred fisheries, environmentally wasteful 
but highly profitable; the long line method; and, the ‘gill’ net or the maha dala. Of the 
544 households in Sinhapura 291 were involved in the fishing industry in one capacity 
or another.  
 
                                                          
68 Multi-day boats are used for deep-sea fishing and can remain at sea for a month, or more, at a time. 
69 The local representative of the Department of Fisheries is the Fisheries’ Inspector. The Fisheries’ 
Inspector represents the services provided by the government to fishing communities, at the local level. 
These services are: the registration of boats; provision of insurance; handling complaints; the 
apprehension of those practising illegal methods of fishing such as the use of dynamite. See Stirrat (1988) 
for an account of fishermen’s connections with the state in western Sri Lanka. 
70 This is a piece of equipment like a very large tea strainer. It is used during night fishing when the net 
has been laid and the fishermen are waiting for the fish to be trapped.  
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The sale of the fish was by auction on the beach, in the early morning. Fishermen sold 
their wares, principally, to the big merchants from the towns such as Ambalangoda and 
Balapitiya or to their agents. These merchants had their middle men in places such as 
Colombo and Kandy to which this fish was usually transported. A small percentage of 
the catch was sold to the itinerant traders present at the auction. The fishermen were 
quite ‘hard-headed’ when it came to the issue of pricing. However, long-term 
relationships with traders was also important. There were two important fish merchants 
in Sinhapura. A fairly recent innovation at the time, in 2004, was the use of mobile 
phones to send messages from boats at sea to fish traders waiting on the beach and, 
sometimes, those even further away in Colombo and Kandy.71 Thus, the sale of fish was 
accomplished, on occasion, even before the boat had come back to land. In this way this 
technology could affect the price of a category of fish even in far away Colombo. In 
fact, it was emphasised to me time and time again, by several fishermen, that a mobile 
phone was a necessity, not a luxury, in current day fisheries.   
 
There were some savings societies in the village. Those who joined these societies did 
so because they expected a fairly direct, personal financial benefit. There were also 
many who saw this as a low status activity and gave it a wide berth. The members were, 
almost entirely, women. While the men maintained the fiction that this was a 
supplementary income, as will be discussed in Chapter 3, what emerged in the course of 
my research is that these savings societies were very important to the village economy.    
 
The Political Context 
Sinhapura is situated within a particular political and administrative context. It belongs 
to more than one political constituency. It elects members to different political bodies at 
the local, regional and national levels  --  for instance, the Provincial Council (PC), at 
the provincial level, the parliamentary system at the national level and the Urban 
Council (UC) and Pradeshiya Sabha (PS) at the local level.72 One of the avenues 
through which resources reached the village was through the political institutions of the 
region. Under the 13th Amendment to the Constitution the central government made a 
quantum of resources available to local areas. The use of these resources were to be 
                                                          
71 In addition to Colombo, Kandy is also a distribution centre for this region. 
72 To be expanded in Chapter 3. 
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planned and managed by institutions, some of which like the Urban Council (UC) were 
already in existence, and others like the PC and the PS were established as part of this 
Amendment. In relation to Sinhapura the significant institutions have been the 
Hikkaduwa UC and the Kotigama PS. The control of access to resources in these two 
institutions is largely a matter of caste politics.73      
The Seaside and the Landside 
There has been, and continues to be, a geographical, as well as a notional cleavage 
between the fishing families on the seaside, and those uninvolved in fishing, on the 
landside. The latter have occupations and a lifestyle which is quite different from 
fishing households. This resonates with the social grouping of Ambakandawila (on the 
western coast, north of Colombo), which comprises the wella kattiya (beach dwellers) 
and the gamgoda kattiya (landside dwellers) (Stirrat, 1988). Those on the landside see 
themselves as ‘educated’, ‘religious’ and living a ‘moral’ life. In contrast, they see the 
fishing households as ‘dissolute’, ‘irreligious’ and ‘sinful’, rough and uncouth. Their 
view is that fishermen engage in the ‘sinful’ endeavour of killing fish, which goes 
against the basic tenets of Buddhism.  
 
The fishermen of Sinhapura manipulate various ideologies to contest their designated 
position in the moral domain. This is similar to Ram’s (1990) account of the way that 
the Mukkuvar community, in India, negotiates their designated ‘low’ position in the 
Hindu caste hierarchy, through an alliance with Catholicism, on the one hand, and 
through the representation of a ‘glorious past’ on the other. In Sinhapura the fishermen 
participate, regularly, in the ritual activities at the devale. They do a devol maduwa once 
a year to propitiate the gods (Acheson, 1981).74 It is interesting to note that while this 
notion of ‘sin’ comes from Buddhist thought, the ritual response is directed towards a 
pantheon of gods drawn from both Buddhist and Hindu cultural contexts. There is a 
parallel, here, with Norr’s (1975) account of Minakuppam where fishing is regarded as 
‘dirty’, as ‘polluted’, in terms of the purity and pollution dichotomy of the Hindu 
                                                          
73 The dynamic between caste and politics is one that I shall explore in some depth in Chapter 3. 
74 A devol maduwa takes place at the devale, which is a centre of for the worship and propitiation of the 
gods. It is conducted by the kapurala who is the relevant ritual practitioner. The purpose is to give thanks 
for good fortune in the previous year, to propitiate the gods, and to seek their protection in the coming 
year. All those engaged in fishing make some contribution towards the expenses that are incurred.   
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cultural context. It also resonates with Ram’s (1990) account of the Mukkuvar 
community, who are seen as belonging to a ‘polluting’ caste due to the fact that their 
occupation deals with ‘flesh food’. The point, in Sinhapura, is that this issue is framed, 
not within the Hindu caste idiom of purity and pollution, but within the Buddhist idiom 
of the ‘moral’, and its anti-thesis. There is also the contrast in that, unlike in South 
India, these fishermen belong to a high caste.       
 
The fishermen feel that their endeavour is the pivot upon which the village economy 
revolves and that, therefore, they are worthy of respect. They see themselves as a group 
who earn well and spend well: on food, clothing and gold (Stirrat, 1988). They are 
independent; individualistic; characterized by strength, virility, valour and 
competitiveness. They see their occupation as one that encapsulates masculinity in its 
‘purest’ form  --  one that requires immense physical strength and stamina and one that 
women, for instance, cannot do. As Paine puts it:  “Ultimately, it is their sense of being 
that is entwined in this enterprise.” (2002:70-71). Thus, what is valued is skill, effort, 
efficiency, and the ability to take risks fearlessly: “To be a man was to be an aggressive, 
self-confident and independent fisherman who took orders from no-one” 
(Stirrat:1988:54).75 By virtue of the fact of, relative, affluence the fishermen have not 
had to be dependent on patrons nor the state. They have been able to take an 
‘independent’ line vis-à-vis the ‘moral community’.76 
 
The fishermen recognise that they are in a risky occupation. At the same time they had 
developed approaches towards risk management which contained this risk and kept it 
within reasonable limits. The first of these was not to go out to sea on days when the 
weather was in any way unsuitable. The second was to perform those rituals such as the 
poson perahera and bodhi poojas which sought the protection of the gods.77     
 
While conspicuous consumption seems to have something to do with social position in 
Sinhapura, the latter does not seem to be determined by a strong economic base alone. If 
                                                          
75 There is a certain similarity between the ideological context of Sinhapura and the folk model of the 
‘Skipper Effect’, in Icelandic fisheries, described by Bjarnason and Thorlindsson (1993).    
76 These are views that were revealed to me in a succession of interviews with those from the landside as 
well as the seaside.  
77 The poson perahera is the temple ritual which celebrates the day of the full moon in June, regarded as 
the day on which Buddhism was introduced into Sri Lanka. Bodhi poojas are offerings of flowers at the 
temple in order to avert a disaster or gain some benefit.  
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this was the case the fishing community, obviously more affluent, would be the 
dominant group in the village. There is an on-going struggle for social supremacy, 
between the fishing families and those on the landside. The fishing community is 
unwilling to grant the landside a higher social position, by virtue of their education 
and/or their clerical and government employment. Such is the subterranean tension 
which pervades the social life of Sinhapura.78    
 
It will now be clear that there are two broad categories of people living in this village. 
There are the fishermen and their families living in the western sector of the village 
some of whom are the owners of mechanized wallams and multi-day boats. The other 
category of person pursues technical, teaching, or clerical occupations and lives, largely, 
on the eastern side of the village. There is also a smaller segment involved in trade 
whose businesses are located on the High Street, and who live either behind the store or 
in close proximity to it. For all these groups economic advancement, investment in 
education and, consequently, the improvement of lifestyle have been desirable 
aspirations. In recent years employment in countries such as Dubai and South Korea, 
where remuneration is much higher than in Sri Lanka, has been valued and obtained. 
There has been the temporary migration of an individual for the purpose of the 
economic advancement of the family. It is not the migration of the whole family, which 
was referred to earlier in this chapter. In this case, remittances have been used for a 
variety of purposes such as the construction of a house, expenditure on education, 
business investment and so on.   
Amongst the fishing community the extended family is important and there appears to 
be a certain level of cognatic marriage. Residence is either virilocal or uxorilocal, 
depending on inheritance. What is critical, is the availability of land and the potential of 
building a house in a village where land is increasingly scarce. On the landside, the 
extended family is not particularly significant; it is the nuclear family and the 
neighbourhood connection which is important. There seems to be a difference in 
marriage patterns between the landside and the seaside. This appears to relate to the 
greater prevalence of joint family households on the seaside, which is associated with 
the scarcity of land. On the landside the goal of establishing a household based on a 
                                                          
78 The cleavage between the landside and the seaside and the implications of it are discussed at greater 
length, with ethnographic examples, in Chapters 3 and 6.  
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nuclear family is pursued far more energetically, as land is more freely available. In the 
High Street, households are connected to each other by virtue of being descendents of 
the siblings of an earlier generation. This is to say, that many of these households have 
kin connections with each other. In the current generation the tendency appears to be to 
marry out of the village.        
In Sinhapura women do not participate directly in the activity of fishing. It is taboo for 
them to be on the beach at the time that the fishermen go out to sea or return. It is a 
taboo which is universally regarded.79 This can be contrasted with Ambakandawila, for 
instance, where women sell the fish (Stirrat, 1988), in addition to making many 
important decisions about the purchase of gear. The Sinhapura context can also be 
contrasted with Gulati’s (1984) account of women’s participation in the fishing 
industry, as prawn peelers and nylon net repairers. In Negombo (on the western coast, 
north of Colombo) and Kalmunai (on the eastern coast) women even go out to sea. In 
Sinhapura, women control the household income. As Ram (1990) states about the 
Mukkuvar economy, women are active in the ‘informal’ credit economy which is 
integral to the functioning of the community. The women play an important role in 
handling the various resources available to this community and making these resources 
‘work’ for them. They are active in money-lending and in the organisation of ‘seettus’.80 
They utilise the many microfinance programmes operating in the village. The women 
see their position in the private sphere as more empowering, in terms of respect and 
status, than an uncertain venture into the public domain. As Ram puts it: “I have argued 
that in the Mukkuvar community the domestic sphere is more empowering of women 
than is the kind of paid work available to most uneducated girls and women, a 
conclusion in direct contrast to what we have come to expect on the basis of 
modernisation theory.” (1990: 227).  
At the time that I was doing my fieldwork, and at the time of the tsunami, the internal 
conflict in Sri Lanka was on-going. I did not take it as a ‘given’ that the conflict shapes 
all social processes in the country. This is precisely the point that, in my opinion, merits 
                                                          
79 Stirrat’s (1988, 1989) account of Ambakandawila contains no description of such a taboo on women’s 
presence on the beach.    
80 A seettu is a credit circle common in many parts of South Asia. Most often it has an organiser and 
others join at his/her invitation. They pledge to contribute a certain amount, each month, for the duration 
of the exercise. The sum, so collected, is taken by one of the members of the circle, each month, who 
acquires this right either through an auction or through the drawing of lots.  
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problematisation. What I found interesting was the way in which the south was able, 
given the fact that Sri Lanka is a small country, to continue with everyday activities, 
largely, as if there was no military conflict taking place. The war was not a matter of 
daily discussion and its effects were rarely felt in Sinhapura. However, when there was 
an ‘episode’ such as the LTTE attack on Galle harbour which was reported by the 
media, it was certainly commented upon. I found the discussions tended to be more in 
the abstract and at the level of norms, rather than dealing with pragmatic realities. A 
comment by Arnold Bennett in his novel The Old Wives’ Tale illustrates this point: 
“...the big events that get into the history books, are, from the point of view of ordinary 
life, a background. Whatever is happening on the public scene, one’s own struggle goes 
on...” (1908: 12) It is only in a general sense that the bar to the progress of the country, 
was felt to be a hindrance to these coastal communities, especially in terms of access to 
employment.   
It is this lived experience, which I have described above, which was disrupted in a 
single day by the tsunami disaster. In the next section I shall describe the damage and 
destruction which took place in Sinhapura as well as the responses to this damage, by a 
variety of actors, and the implications of this.  
Tsunami Damage and Responses  --  Sinhapura 
The first wave of the tsunami hit Sinhapura at 9.15 a.m. on 26 December 2004. The 
second, arrived five minutes later. The water remained for about half an hour before part 
of it receded back into the sea, and the other part drained into the river.  
There were six deaths in Sinhapura due to the tsunami. The damage suffered by houses 
on the seaside was considerable. Household goods were washed away including gold, 
which is the form of saving amongst fishing households. 
The High Street, though not structurally damaged, lost stock and equipment. Thus, there 
was a pronounced capital loss. A trader with several businesses affected by the tsunami, 
told me that he had lost Rs. 3 million because of this disaster. The coir industry was also 
seriously affected. The retting pits, which produce the raw material from which coir 
rope is manufactured, were washed away by the tsunami waves.81 The machinery in the 
                                                          
81 The retting pits, which is where coconut husks are ‘rotted’ in order to produce coir fibre, were washed 
away by the tsunami waves, such that there was a dearth of coir for rope-making.    
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Coir Factory was affected by the salt water. Therefore, the operation of the factory 
ceased until 2009, when it was refurbished. This, together with the destruction of almost 
the whole of the fishing fleet, resulted in a severe disruption of livelihoods. The 
infrastructure was affected to the extent that occupations could not be pursued, with a 
consequent effect on income. A variety of services were not available to the community, 
in the days that immediately followed the tsunami: the transport services were severely 
disrupted and there was some doubt whether the schools would re-open on the due date 
in January 2005. The scale of loss, in many instances, was such that the resources of the 
village were unequal to the task of reconstruction. 
Water did not present a problem in Sinhapura. On the seaside the wells had been closed, 
before the tsunami, because of high salt content. The ones which were operational, were 
the ones on the landside. These wells were not affected by the tsunami waters and 
provided a source of water for the community, before the broken water pipes were 
repaired by the government authorities. There was no electricity as the electric poles 
were damaged. It is after six days that water and electricity were restored. As the 
grocery outlets on the High Street were closed, due to damage, food supplies had to be 
brought from inland communities. It was the temple which played a major role in 
feeding people during the initial days. The temple had a stock of food which was 
augmented by gifts of provisions from neighbouring temples, and also by donations 
from inland communities. This situation continued for about three weeks until the High 
Street began, slowly, to resurrect itself.     
When we visited Sinhapura on 30 December 2004 we observed signs of trauma 
everywhere, particularly amongst those that had sought refuge in the temple.82 There 
was conflict over the access to relief items; alchohol was prominently consumed; and, 
coarse language was frequent. The mood in this ‘liminal moment’ was one of despair, 
certainly, but also of anger and resentment at God, at nature, at the government, and at 
relief organizations (Turner 1961, 1986). This relates to the sense in which the 
fishermen’s sense of familiarity with the sea was disturbed. However, as far as the 
relationship with the sea was concerned, the disruption was of a short duration. The oral 
tales about a tsunami as a once in a 2000 year event, received much publicity and the 
                                                          
82 After the tsunami I did a Befrienders’ course and am trained to recognise the signs of those suffering 
from trauma although, obviously, not to treat it.   
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disaster came to be cast in these terms. This contributed towards regaining confidence in 
the sea, as an entity which would not unleash its power for another 2000 years.  
There were two consequences as far as the temple was concerned. The enmity between 
some sections of the community and the chief monk was dissipated, to a considerable 
extent, during the critical role played by the temple in the days immediately after the 
tsunami. At the same time, the enforced sojourn of some people in the temple 
considerably increased its regular congregation.    
There was a role reversal, as far as gender was concerned, in the immediate aftermath of 
the tsunami. Women had to be resourceful in a context where men had abrogated their 
role as chief bread-winner. It was women who queued for government assistance and 
liaised with relief organisations. Thus, men had to deal with issues of self-esteem, 
identity and confidence. Women took the view that men could not ‘cope’ with 
misfortune, and that women were the stronger sex  --  mentally, emotionally and 
spiritually. This situation can be contrasted with Hoffman’s account of the aftermath of 
the Oakland firestorm, in the USA, in 1991. She describes an ‘egalitarian’ context being 
transformed, after the disaster, into one of ‘traditional’ gender relations: “In the shock of 
loss, both men and women retreated into traditional cultural realms and personas. Men 
launched into command and took action.” (1999:177).      
Sinhapura had a, relatively, high income which translated into a determined pursuit of 
social mobility. In these terms, the impact of the tsunami was devastating. The people of 
Sinhapura felt that their losses were greater than the smaller villages of the vicinity. 
This cultivated a perception which saw ‘handouts’, very much as a right. The fishing 
households felt that it was they who had been, principally, affected by the tsunami and 
that, therefore, they should be the recipients of aid. In their view, destruction of house or 
boat was the only genuine criterion for receiving aid. This perception was the basis of 
much controversy between the landside and the fishing households.   
The entire fishing fleet of Sinhapura was damaged by the tsunami. Out of a total of 60 
wallams 16 were totally destroyed while 38 sustained damage to hulls and to engines, in 
varying degrees.83 In the case of the 15 canoes, 9 were no longer usable and 4 were 
slightly damaged. The harm to multi-day boats was minimal as many were out at sea. 
                                                          
83 Approximately 50 mobile phones, a vital piece of equipment in modern fisheries, were washed away by 
the tsunami waves. 
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The catch became a mere fraction of what it had been. The diminution of the catch had 
repercussions for the relationships between the boat owners, the crew and the fish 
traders.  
The boat owners as well as the small entrepreneurs, looked to organizations like the 
Trust; the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Sri Lanka (FCCISL); 
relief organisations; kin in the interior of the country; and, to the government to come to 
their aid. They also attempted to activate their political connections, with regional as 
well as national politicians. The donation of new boats, by relief agencies and foreign 
nationals, was the site of much contestation and debate about the ‘sea-worthiness’ of 
these boats, as well as whether the distribution was equitable.  
A few months after the tsunami, by June and July 2005, the number of wallams in 
Sinhapura had increased to 72, while the number of canoes rose to 34. In terms of multi-
day boats the increase was only one. The sources of this increase in the number of 
boats, were international relief agencies, local organizations, The Trust, individual 
foreign nationals, and the government84. The implication of this has been that the 
balance of power has shifted away from boat owners and skippers, to crew members. 
Whereas, before the tsunami, there was an abundant supply of crew and fewer boats, the 
situation afterwards, in the context of an abundance of boats, has been one in which 
skippers find it difficult to recruit a suitable crew.    
One of the greatest difficulties faced by the fishermen and the small entrepreneurs, in 
Sinhapura, was the repayment of loans, in a context in which income had abruptly 
ceased. There were several individuals who had a variety of debts  --  a house building 
loan; a loan on the boat; a loan on a three wheeler  --  and who found themselves in dire 
straits.85 Some microfinance organisations, such as the Sanasa Development Bank, 
suspended the repayment of loans for a grace period of about three months, as did some 
commercial institutions such as leasing companies.86 There were many disingenuous 
applications for compensation from the state as well as from the organisations involved 
in relief, in a context where many individuals were very concerned about their inability 
                                                          
84 Many fishermen had not registered their boats with the local fisheries authority and, therefore, had 
trouble in asserting a claim for compensation. Registration, though not expensive, was regarded as 
‘unnecessary’.       
85 A ‘three wheeler’ is a form of vehicular transport common in South Asia.  
86 Rahman (1991) has described how the Grameen Bank microfinance system suspends repayments 
during periodic floods, consequent upon tropical cyclones, in Bangladesh. 
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to repay loans, and the implications of this.87 For example, there were those who 
presented themselves as people who had had a boat when, in fact, they were crew 
members. Then there was the individual who claimed that his whole house had been 
rendered uninhabitable, when in fact only one wing was damaged. In this case, the 
claim was not successful since there were many to protest to the authorities that the 
application was a false one.   
A loss of income was also sustained by those in the village who worked in the tourist 
industry. These were people who while having a house to live in and all the other 
trappings of a reasonable lifestyle, suddenly found themselves in parlous circumstances 
due to the loss of income. 
What has been the response to this crisis, both within the village and beyond it? Though 
the rhetoric in terms of which these responses were framed, was about the retrieval of 
that which had been lost there was, in fact, much that was new in the situation which 
emerged. There were new resources from new sources reaching the community through 
new avenues. In the era prior to the tsunami, external assistance came from the state and 
from a few microfinance organisations. This was now expanded to new types of state 
assistance, to new NGO programmes and to financial help from individual donors.88 
The disbursement of these funds was on lines which were somewhat different to those 
to which the community was accustomed.   
The main sources of aid, certainly in the initial period, were individual foreign 
nationals, primarily those holidaying in the region, and the Trust. Foreign nationals 
‘walked about’ the region, disbursing large amounts of cash with, one presumes, the 
best of intentions. This had the effect, however, of a: “superabundance of what might be 
thought of as ‘disaster boom’ cash.” (Simpson:2007:933). It added to the atmosphere of 
confusion, and intensified feelings of envy amongst those who were not the fortunate 
recipients.   
The role played by the Trust in ensuring a steady income from the sale of coir rope was 
important in the aftermath of the tsunami, because it kept households functional when 
there was no income from fishing. The Trust did this by getting stocks of coir from 
                                                          
87 Simpson (2007) describes a similar scenario in Bhuj after the Gujarat earthquake. 
88 A full discussion of state assistance and the institutions through which this was channelled to the 
village is to be found in Chapter 4. A similar discussion with respect to non-governmental assistance is to 
be found in Chapter 5.  
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other parts of the country which were not affected by the tsunami. The Trust also 
arranged for the sale of the coir rope, produced by the tsunami-affected women, to 
Charles P. Hayley and Company, long time dealers in coir products with their main 
office in Galle.  
Aid was a way in which donors of First World communities represented themselves to 
their own societies, and accumulated symbolic capital (Clark, 2005). The actions of 
organisations such as the Sri Lanka Wales Association and the Sri Lanka Minnesota 
Friendship Society, in the aftermath of the tsunami, provide good examples of a process 
by which ‘philanthropy’, to Sri Lankan tsunami victims, was the instrument for the 
acquisition of symbolic capital in the home communities (Lowe:2004).   
It was some weeks after the tsunami that NGOs commenced various relief initiatives in 
the village. These included the disbursement of a variety of consumer items, such as 
packages of household goods and bicycles, and the construction of temporary shelter 
through an agreement with the government. These organisations were concerned with 
the immediate problem of the replacement of destroyed infrastructure and goods. Some 
of them, however, attempted initiatives with a more long term emphasis.   
The government relief programme of cash and dry goods, once it was established, was 
seen by all, whether tsunami affected or not, as a legitimate entitlement and as an easy 
avenue of capital. The access to the resources of the state became a source of social 
advancement (Spencer, 1990). As Simpson puts it, writing about the aftermath of the 
Gujarat earthquake: “…as a result, access to the government’s coffers became highly 
competitive and a source of jealousy, rivalry and suspicion.” (2005: 238).89 
Furthermore, in local terms, relief disbursements became a disincentive to the 
resumption of former income earning activities.  
Many fishing households felt that aid had not been ‘equitably’ distributed; that it had 
been arbitrarily decided or politically motivated, particularly by the local arm of the 
bureaucracy (Bavinck, 2008). They also felt that those with connections to relief 
agencies or to foreign nationals ‘brokered’ deals for their ‘clients’. In this context, there 
were allegations that some had turned the tsunami relief process into a ‘business’. 
                                                          
89 This is an issue which came up repeatedly in the interviews that I conducted, and also in sessions with 
informant groups.  
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Assistance came to be framed in terms of rights, which were seen as being 
compromised.  
While the relief programmes were designed to reach all those who suffered loss, the 
reality is that many fell through the crevices of these initiatives. There were those who 
should have received assistance from several sources but got it from nobody for reasons 
such as, the insufficiency of contacts; the inability to activate such contacts as they had; 
and the operation of rules and regulations to their disadvantage. It is through the 
creative access of resources, in terms of a variety of alliances, that most households 
attempted their recovery. Furthermore, state assistance, in most cases, particularly that 
which was provided to rebuild damaged housing, was not sufficient to make good the 
loss. It is also the case that there were those who received state aid even though they 
were not strictly entitled to it. Similarly, some received assistance from humanitarian 
organisations to which neither those notions of justice nor equity which prevailed in the 
community, entitled them.90   
The type of small enterprises which were a characteristic of Sinhapura’s economy, were 
not eligible for loans from commercial banks. The banks looked for a strong credit 
history, as detailed above, some collateral and evidence of the ability to repay the loan. 
It is in this context that opportunities opened up for the myriad microfinance institutions 
which started operations in Sinhapura, and the region, in the immediate months after the 
tsunami.    
 
The owner of a grocery store in Sinhapura told me that after the tsunami a prominent, 
private insurance company did not pay him his due compensation, although he had 
insured the grocery with them. According to the company, the insurance policy did not 
contain a cover for earthquake and, therefore, for tsunami. However, the owner was 
vociferous in his assertion that this same company had paid compensation to large 
supermarkets in Hikkaduwa, even though they had had the same cover. This, and 
similar instances, conveyed the impression that the insurance companies were 
somewhat capricious in their response to making good the losses resulting from the 
disaster.  
                                                          
90 A fuller discussion of these aspects of reconstruction, with illustrative cases are provided in Chapters 4, 
5 and 6.  
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There has been some temporary, as well as permanent, migration from Sinhapura after 
the tsunami. There were those who were too scared to continue to live near the sea and 
who, therefore, went to friends and relatives inland. Then, there were others who 
managed to buy land in the interior in order to move, permanently. There has been the 
‘forced’ migration of those who had their houses destroyed, within the 100m buffer 
zone  --  almost entirely fishing households. These households, have been resettled on a 
newly built housing estate, inland, 7 kms from Sinhapura.   
One aspect which was very clear in the post-tsunami context, is the fact that fishing 
communities, used to a lifestyle of ‘independence’, found their dependence on the state 
and other organisations problematic. Thus, there have been two big changes in the 
aftermath of the tsunami: migration of fishing households from these coastal 
communities to new tsunami resettlements inland; changes in the structure of the 
fisheries industry, particularly in terms of a widened base of the ownership of boats and 
equipment.      
Comparison of Sinhapura with other coastal communities 
The south-western coast, like most of Sri Lanka’s coastline, is dotted with communities 
where fishing is a major activity. Once I had done a fair amount of data collection in 
Sinhapura and on the institutions of the region, I constructed a framework, based on the 
themes of my research in Sinhapura, which encompassed the main features of a disaster-
affected community: size, composition, technology, damage, resources and response. It 
is in terms of this framework that my comparison of communities, affected by the 
tsunami, along this coastline was conducted. I travelled from Panadura, to the 
immediate south of Colombo, to Hambanthota, in the deep south of Sri Lanka, and 
spent a few days in specific communities. Therefore, the account of differences and 
commonalities which follows has a certain empirical basis.   
These communities are differentiated in many respects: population; ethnic composition; 
caste; and religious affiliation. In some it is only a segment of the population which is 
involved fishing. They are also differentiated in the fisheries technologies that they use. 
At one end of the spectrum is the non-mechanised outrigger canoe, while at the other 
end is the much larger, far more expensive, multi-day boat. There are different types of 
fishing such as lagoon fishing, river fishing, and the use of a variety of nets. Nets of the 
traditional variety  --  madal  --  are still used in areas where the geomorphology of the 
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coastline is conducive to this form of fishing (Alexander, 1982).  Moreover, there are 
different combinations of types of fishing and fisheries technologies.   
Technology does, of course, determine where the fishing is done and, therefore, the 
nature of the catch. This, in turn, decides to whom the catch is sold and the financial 
arrangements which underpin the endeavour. These different profiles of fishing depend 
on the size of the fishing community, and the access to capital and to markets. The 
various policies implemented by the government, in relation to fishing communities, has 
meant that in the last forty years these communities have seen a rise in incomes. This 
has enabled fishermen to take on much more in the way of credit for the expansion of 
their boats and equipment. It is not, however, every one of these communities which 
enjoyed this prosperity and which was, therefore, able to service a high volume of 
credit. This was possible only in communities such as Sinhapura, where capital from 
other sectors of the village economy could be mobilised for investment in fisheries. 
Thus, government policy did not have the same effect on all communities. Inherent 
differences interacted with these measures, to produce a wide variety of fishing 
communities along this coastline.  
Some of these communities have a High Street bazaar which caters to smaller inland 
communities and which has, therefore, increased the volume of its economic activities. 
One significant point of commonality is the fact that the education of the next 
generation is seen as a worthwhile aspiration, although the access to educational 
facilities tends to be variable. 
Such regional characteristics mark the south-western coast off from other places such as 
the north-western coast described by Stirrat (1988). Here, there were clearly differences 
in the mode of sale of the catch and the role played by women. Furthermore, this region 
is dominated by a Catholic religious culture.  
There was differentiated damage both to residences and to public buildings and to 
commercial establishments, along the coastline. In Peraliya, a village to the north of 
Sinhapura, the devastation of housing and other infrastructure was almost total. Much 
life was lost, such that the village did not re-emerge as a rehabilitated settlement after 
the tsunami. It was abandoned by those few inhabitants who were left amongst the ruins 
of the village. In a large community like Mirissa, a town considerably to the south of 
Sinhapura, where the fishing fleet was entirely composed of multi-day boats, damage to 
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equipment and to the harbour was very extensive. Reconstruction and rehabilitation has 
only been possible because of heavy external assistance. Sinhapura can be contrasted 
with Akurala, a much smaller community to its north, where the fishing technology was 
limited to small outrigger canoes and where the economy, consequently, was much 
smaller in scale. Besides this, Akurala’s economy did not go beyond fishing; it did not 
have the diversity that was a characteristic of Sinhapura. 
In Thotagamuwa, again to the north, there were neither buildings nor residences on the 
seaside of the Galle Road. On the landside the first line of defence was a series of shops 
which were largely destroyed. The houses were in fact behind the shops and were 
largely protected. In some villages where the fishing component was small and where 
the fisheries income was only a small proportion of total income, the disruption of the 
village economy was limited. In some places such as Koggala, to the south of Galle, the 
proximity of the Free Trade Zone provided the community with other sources of 
income, for instance from the garment industry, in the immediate post tsunami months.  
The greatest damage, by far, in the south was suffered by Hambanthota both in the 
number of people who lost their lives  --  about 15,000  --  and in the damage to the 
infrastructure of the town. It was a town which was controlled by the Muslim 
community, in the sense that local government institutions were dominated by Muslims 
and they played a significant role in the commercial sector. It had a mixed ethnic and 
caste composition. The tsunami hit Hambanthota on the day of its weekly fair so that at 
least half of those who died were from neighbouring communities, inland, who had 
come to the fair either to sell their goods or to make purchases. All this should make it 
clear that the damage suffered by coastal communities was in no way uniform.91  
The only place along the southern and western coast in which a long term plan was 
implemented, as the framework for reconstruction, was in Hambanthota. Such a plan 
existed at the time of the tsunami. Successive governments of the past had supported the 
plan, but had not implemented it. The tsunami disaster became the opportunity for a 
new Hambanthota and its implementation has proceeded with some speed.92  
                                                          
91 This is a point that I come back to in Chapter 6.  
92 I say this on the basis of informant sessions with various senior professionals, some of whom have had 
close political connections with these successive governments.  
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The infiltration of microfinance organisations had an interesting impact on the 
communities of the south-western coast. Its greatest effect was in communities which 
had operated at a high level of credit, relative to income. This income was now 
shattered. Sources of credit had to be located which would help the community until its 
own avenues of income were re-established. It is this role that the microfinance agencies 
filled, in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami. The expansion of microfinance also 
had another impact. Credit, not merely on this coast, but also in other parts of the 
country, had a way of operating within established social networks, both drawing on 
them and, in turn, cementing those relationships. The expansion of the microfinance 
activity tended to create new networks and, thereby, to some extent at least, to disrupt 
existing ones. In Sinhapura this was markedly evident, though perhaps it was not so 
apparent in some of the smaller communities where the size of the economy was much 
smaller.   
The response to post-tsunami circumstances was also differentiated. Those of a 
relatively high social position, in some communities, felt that it was beneath their 
dignity, despite the sudden change in fortune, to be dependent on the state and other 
organisations for assistance. For others this was not a concern so much as the potential 
largesse which was available for exploitation. Another theme was the view that the 
affluent had various resources which they would be able to mobilise and, therefore, that 
public assistance should be directed towards the poor. It is ideas about entitlement and 
recrimination which were the order of the day.  
Migration to new destinations became a feature of many communities. In some of the 
new settlements the inevitable mix of different castes, ethnicities and religions, and of 
people from different places, did not make for harmony, in the initial weeks. This was 
not so, however, in the Hambanthota resettlement, inland. As one informant told me: 
“Hama daama ape samaajaya misra samaajayak. Ema nisaa aluthen athi vuna gamvala 
misra svruupaya apata nupurudu deyak novai. Anith palaath vala athi vela thiyana 
gatum valata apata muna denna sidu vune naha” (We have always been a community 
of mixed caste, ethnicity and religion. Therefore, the plan of the new communities in 
which this mix was clearly a feature was in no way strange to us. As a result we have 
not experienced, in these new communities, many of the conflicts which are said to have 
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been a feature of new communities elsewhere).93 In some areas where large resettlement 
communities were constructed on land reclaimed from the jungle, some attacks by wild 
animals, particularly elephants, did take place. The volume of housing that was initiated 
by both government and other agencies varied in terms of the size of the community, 
the nature of the damage that it suffered and the extent to which its physical 
rehabilitation was seen as a priority. There was, however, much criticism of how this 
was done. Those who provided the money did not provide adequate supervision and the 
final result was housing, in many cases, which was below the acceptable standards. It 
must be clear that it is where the volume of building was high, that the opportunity for 
substandard construction was large.  
With this chapter I conclude what may be described as the background to this study. I 
have discussed those issues which provide me with my orientation. I have set out the 
circumstances which led me to Sinhapura. I have described the general features of the 
tsunami in its impact on Sri Lanka. I have also given such information about my 
primary focus, which is Sinhapura, which will enable the reader to set in context much 
that appears in the chapters to come. Finally, I have compared Sinhapura in terms of 
various critical features with the other communities of this coast. In the next chapter I 
set out my research problem; explain the theoretical approach in terms of which I 
approach this problem; and describe the methodological strategy that I deployed in 
order to gather my data.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
93 Personal communication with a tsunami affected informant in Hambanthota. 
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Chapter 2  --  Theory and Methodology 
The Research Problem 
In this chapter, I set out the research problem that I am concerned with, and the 
theoretical framework that I have developed for this purpose. I then set out the data that 
I collected; the sources from which these data were obtained; and the methods which 
were used for this purpose.   
My research problem may be stated as follows: How have communities on the south-
western coast of Sri Lanka, particularly in Sinhapura, reproduced themselves in the 
aftermath of the disruption created by the tsunami disaster, and what does this tell us 
about the social processes of this community?  
In my conceptualisation, social process is the deployment of resources to realise 
aspirations, while strategising and behaviour are the practices through which this is 
done.94 A disaster has an impact on resources. In addition to destroying physical assets, 
income and a variety of networks and alliances, a disaster disrupts the worldview of a 
community, which involves the imagining of the future in terms of a set of aspirations. 
With the inflow of resources, through various institutional interventions, to replace 
those that have been destroyed, what happens to aspirations? Do these aspirations, in 
turn, shape the pursuit of resources? How best can this interaction be identified, 
described and analysed? Thus, I am interested in the dialectic between resources and 
aspirations, i.e., the social processes of Sinhapura, and how this was affected by the 
tsunami.   
To elaborate this further, I am concerned with the factors which determined the 
responses to loss, as a social and culturally mediated experience. In what sense were 
these responses, by individuals and households, conditioned by their circumstances, 
attributes, capacities, social position and aspirations? How critical was the ability to 
mobilise alliances in this endeavour? What generalisations, if any, can be made about 
the nature of the reconstruction process? My problem, then, in the broadest terms, is to 
explain what happens to social process in the aftermath of a disaster  --  the social 
adaptations to loss and recovery.          
                                                          
94 These concepts are discussed in detail in the next section.  
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The Theoretical Conceptualisation  
In terms of the research problem stated above, the central concepts which I choose as 
important to my scheme of analysis should be able to make sense of how people 
respond to the destruction of resources through a catastrophe; their augmentation 
through the intervention of agencies both state and otherwise; their exploitation by 
different households and individuals; the aspirations in terms of which this is done; and, 
the connections and relationships which are deployed for this purpose.  
In developing a set of concepts useful for the analysis of the problem which I have set 
out, I found the ideas of Pierre Bourdieu of considerable use.  
In any community there are resources, be they social, material, notional or ideological, 
which are valued.95 Individuals ‘work’ to create the opportunities for the possession of 
these resources. Bourdieu refers to these resources as capital which is accumulated 
because it has value (Bourdieu, 1977, 1990; Jenkins 2002). The possession of capital 
confers power, reputation, authority and status which, dialectically, has implications for 
the process of accumulation. Bourdieu states that varied forms of capital  --  economic, 
cultural, linguistic, symbolic and social  --  are similar means and ends in the strategies 
that carry forward the pursuit of distinction within a social field. Thus, the possession of 
capital is the basis of capacity.    
The social field is the context within which the accumulation of capital occurs. 
Bourdieu’s notion of a social field is an arena of competitive struggles, involving a 
range of capitals used in order to acquire power, authority and reputation. Thus, a field 
is a system of social positions structured internally in terms of power relations: 
“Positions stand in relationships of domination, subordination or equivalence 
(homology) to each other by virtue of the access they afford to the goods or resources 
(capital) which are at stake in the field.” (Jenkins:2002:85, citing Bourdieu). An 
individual’s position in a social field constrains or enhances the capacity for 
accumulation. A field is also defined by what is at stake: “.the existence of a field 
                                                          
95 I do not use the term ‘value’ in the sense of a codified body of rules which orient social behaviour. I use 
it in the sense of the worth placed on an entity in a cultural context. This could be physical resources such 
as arable land, forests, mineral wealth, aquatic resources. It could be opportunities for trade, the sale of 
products of small-scale manufacture, services, labour. It could also be intangibles such as honour, status, 
fame, prestige, leadership, power, authority.  
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presupposes and, in its functioning, creates a belief on the part of participants in the 
legitimacy and value of the capital which is at stake in the field.” (Jenkins:2002:85).  
Related to capital is another important concept in Bourdieu’s scheme. This is practice. 
His goal, as he says at one point, is to develop a theory of social practice (Jenkins 
quoting Bourdieu, 2002). Indeed, it is in terms of practice that capital achieves its 
significance in the analytical scheme. The concept of habitus, in Bourdieu’s work, is the 
attempt to knit agency and structure together: “It is in bodily hexis that the idiosyncratic 
(the personal) combines with the systematic (the social). It is the mediating link 
between individuals’ subjective worlds and the cultural world into which they are born 
and which they share with others.” (Jenkins:2002:75, citing Bourdieu). It is through 
socialisation that habitus is created, and it is the genesis of practice. Bourdieu places the 
emphasis not on rule-governed behaviour but on the strategizing and the improvisatory 
nature of practice. For Bourdieu, practice is not wholly consciously organized, neither is 
it the aggregate of individual behaviour. In this conceptualisation, he sees practice as 
constrained by the opportunities and limits of the social field within which action 
occurs. It will be seen, therefore, that practice is an essential concept in the 
understanding of the accumulation of capital.      
Giddens’ (1979) use of the concept of ontological security (drawing upon R.D. Laing), 
with its basis in mutual knowledge echoes, to a certain extent, Bourdieu’s notion of the 
socialising nature of practice: “In most circumstances of social life, the sense of 
ontological security is routinely grounded in mutual knowledge employed such that 
interaction is ‘unproblematic’, or can be largely ‘taken for granted’.” 
(Giddens:1979:219). Both Bourdieu and Giddens focus, at this point, on the routinised, 
habitual nature of behaviour. They diverge, to the extent that for Bourdieu, behaviour 
has a stronger improvisatory and strategic nature whereas for Giddens, it is the 
normative orientation which is more important: “…ontological security can be taken to 
depend upon the implicit faith actors have in the conventions (codes of signification and 
forms of normative regulation) via which, in the duality of structure, the reproduction of 
social life is effected.” (Giddens:1979:219).  
Giddens’ (1979) notion of ‘discursive consciousness’ where he touches on the 
‘unknowing’ dimension of action which, he argues, is the product of knowledge which 
exists at the level of the unconscious finds some resonance with Bourdieu’s notion of 
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practice. The agent is not, necessarily, a ‘knowing’ actor who confidently negotiates the 
minefield of social life but, often, is one who manoeuvres in a context in which much is 
unknown. As Jenkins puts it, there is a constant tension, in Bourdieu’s work, between 
the conscious action of individual actors and socially constituted practice.  
A related but distinct contribution to these issues comes from Norman Long (2001, 
2006), who gives emphasis to the linkages and networks that develop with the 
individual at the centre. ‘Interface’ is the term that he uses for this interaction. Long 
attaches considerable importance to the scope that is permitted individuals in the 
conduct of their linkages and networks, and the consequences of their actions, given this 
scope. Long’s actor-oriented approach is about differing actor strategies, the conditions 
under which they arise, how they interlock, and their variability or effectiveness for 
solving specific problems.  
To re-capitulate: in Bourdieu’s terms, the social field is the context within which the 
accumulation of capital takes place. Participation in the social field and the competition 
that this implies, creates legitimacy and value for capital. Practice is the mechanism by 
which the accumulation of capital is realised. Bourdieu’s notion of strategising is 
relevant in the sense that this permits an exploration of how norms are used, or not, to 
legitimise certain processes of accumulation. His notions about the accumulation of 
capital, the position in a social field, and the strategic nature of practice are useful for 
the analysis of the manner in which the tsunami disaster affected the capacities of 
recovery of diverse actors. These ideas enable a critical perspective of the new social 
spaces, created by the changing interactions between individuals, within networks.  
Apart from the usefulness of Bourdieu I also found Appadurai’s ideas about aspiration 
and capacity relevant to my purpose.  
Appadurai starts from the position that while culture is about identity, property, 
heritage, monuments, customs, norms, values, beliefs and tradition it also has a capacity 
to generate and support various platforms of action, some of which may contradict one 
another: “…… cultural coherence is not a matter of individual items but of their 
relationships and the related insight that these relations are systematic and generative.” 
(Appadurai:2004:61). Thus, he is interested in one specific dimension of culture; its 
orientation to the future. In these terms, he is concerned with aspiration as a cultural 
capacity. The way in which collective horizons constitute the basis for collective 
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aspirations is cultural. For Appadurai, aspirations are determined by a cultural context, 
although the choices may be individual: “Aspirations are never simply individual 
......they are always formed in interaction and in the thick of social life.” 
(Appadurai:2004:67). Aspirations are, therefore, socially and culturally defined.  
According to Appadurai aspirations are the norms, values and beliefs central to a culture 
and conceived as specific and multiple designs for social life. Aspirations have to do 
with income, civic life, role in a group, religious affairs, political involvement and 
marriage. They are intimately bound up with the enduring idea that a community has of 
itself as developing, progressing, advancing:  
“…. in every case, aspirations to the good life are part of some sort of system of 
ideas which locates them in a larger map of local ideas and beliefs about life: life 
and death, the nature of worldly possessions, the significance of material assets 
over social relations, the relative illusion of social permanence for a society, the 
value of peace or warfare.....more narrow still, these intermediate norms often 
stay beneath the surface and emerge only as specific wants and choices: for this 
piece of land or that, for that  marriage connection or another one, for this job in 
the bureaucracy as opposed to that job overseas, for this pair of shoes over that 
pair of trousers. This last, more immediate, visible inventory of wants has often 
led students of consumption and of poverty to lose sight of the intermediate and 
higher order normative contexts within which these wants are gestated and 
brought into view. And thus decontextualized, they are usually downloaded to 
the individual and offloaded to the science of calculation and the market – 
economics.” (Appadurai:2004:68).    
Appadurai’s immediate concern is the nexus between culture, norms, capacity, 
aspiration and the future, in the context of a poverty alleviation and development 
paradigm. The poor lack the resources with which to express their views and get results 
skewed to their own welfare, in the political debates that surround wealth and welfare in 
societies. Their capacity to aspire to the ‘good life’ is weak. The rich are more able to 
produce justifications, narratives, metaphors and pathways through which bundles of 
goods and services are tied to wider social contexts and abstract norms and beliefs. 
Thus, capacity is not evenly distributed through the social world:  
“The capacity to aspire is thus a navigational capacity. The more privileged in 
any society simply have used the map of its norms to explore the future more 
frequently and more realistically, and to share this knowledge with one another 
more routinely than their poorer and weaker neighbours. The poorer members, 
precisely because of their lack of opportunities to practice the use of this 
navigational capacity (in turn because their situations permit fewer experiments 
and less easy archiving of alternative futures) have a more brittle horizon of 
aspirations.” (Appadurai:2004:69).  
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Appadurai argues that the poor have to be helped to develop those forms of cultural 
consensus, which is produced through verbal and material rituals, performances and 
metaphors, which may best advance their own collective long-term interest in matters of 
wealth, equality and dignity. It is by strengthening the cultural capacity of the poor, to 
aspire to newer and better things, that their situation can be changed. Thus, Appadurai is 
concerned with the way in which this process can be instrumental in the reduction of 
poverty in the particular context of Mumbai’s urban poor.     
For Appadurai what is significant is that this particular capacity of culture provides the 
framework within which the poor, in particular, can plan their advancement. My 
emphasis, however, is different. What I find useful in Appadurai’s ideas is the 
generative nature of culture and the notion that aspiration is a product of a certain 
cultural context. Thus, I shall use Appadurai’s ideas about aspiration and capacity to 
examine both the pre and post-tsunami contexts of Sinhapura, not only in terms of the 
poor but as far as the whole community is concerned. Appadurai does not address the 
differentials within the categories of rich and poor: it is the broad rich/poor dichotomy 
that engages him. My focus is, thus, different from that of Appadurai. I adapt 
Appadurai’s ideas to analyse the differential ways in which people pursued strategies of 
recovery after the tsunami, irrespective of whether they were rich or poor.  
When Appadurai states that the rich have “used the map of its norms to explore the 
future more frequently and more realistically” (Appadurai:2004:69) he is, on the one 
hand, emphasising the normative element and, on the other, pointing to a form of 
strategising in terms of aspiration which approximates, to a certain extent, to Bourdieu’s 
thinking. He does not, of course, expound a comprehensive framework within which 
this activity is thought to take place. In the case of the urban poor in Mumbai, what he 
presents is an example of the way that the poor have been creative in navigating their 
circumstances. It is not an abstraction of this phenomenon into a theoretical framework, 
unlike Bourdieu. As explicated above, Appadurai’s ideas about aspiration are a useful 
addition to Bourdieu’s ideas about what the individual does in his practice, within the 
social field, to get a better share of capital. Appadurai makes experience and practice 
key to aspiration, as a navigational capacity.   
Foucault’s ideas about discourse are useful in the conceptualisation of relief 
interventions and media representation, in a disaster context, as a series of discursive 
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practices (Ferguson, 1990; Foucault, 1981; Escobar 1995; Grillo 1997; Pottier 1997; 
Preston 1994; Hobart, 1993).    
Foucault has argued that institutions generate discourses which simultaneously 
construct a particular social dynamic, as a particular kind of object of knowledge, and 
create a structure of knowledge around that object. Discourse consists of groups of 
statements, and actions in relation to statements, identified as belonging to a single 
discursive formation whose unity is established by virtue of: “…..reference to a 
common object of analysis, presence of a…..mode of statement, deployment of a 
‘system of permanent and coherent concepts’, …..persistence of theoretical theme.” 
(Foucault:1981:39). Apthorpe and Gasper (1996) assert that through narrative, framing 
and the use of other linguistic devices ‘discourse’ becomes an actor/an agent  --  not a 
neutral participator, but a politically active one. Thus, in Foucauldian terms, the agent is 
not an individual actor but a focus, which gives coherence to an oeuvre.    
Foucault contends that discursive practices are characterised by a delimitation of a field 
of objects, the definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge, the 
effect of which is to make it virtually impossible to think outside this perspective as to 
do so is to appear beyond comprehension, beyond reason. This highlights how, through 
the possession of, and entitlement to, knowledge, the power and the legitimacy to make 
representations of ‘the truth’, come to be concentrated in the hands of a few individuals 
and groups. I see this construction of a ‘legitimate’ discourse, by external actors, as 
having shaped the reconfiguration of tsunami-affected communities.    
These ideas enable a critical perspective on how different forces, particularly within the 
world of relief intervention, coalesced to create an ‘ouvre’, which then became the 
framework of relief and reconstruction (Ferguson, 1990; Gane 1986; Nola 1998; 
Rabinow, 1984; Sheridan 1980; Sherzer 1987; Smart 1985; Rossi, 2004; Senaratne, 
2000). As Rossi puts it: “While no discourse is intrinsically ‘truer’ or ‘falser’ than the 
others, some discourses develop into a discursive configuration, and others exist in a 
state of marginality.”  (2004:6).    
I now present the theoretical framework within which I shall address the research 
problem spelt out at the beginning of this chapter, drawing largely upon the ideas of 
Bourdieu and Appadurai. This is not intended to be an abstract model based on their 
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concepts. It is, rather, a framework which is a tool of analysis, which helps me to 
examine the ethnographic data which are presented in Chapters 3,4,5 and 6.  
Capital is pursued because it is valued, and because it enables individuals to realise 
those aspirations which are the goal of social endeavour. Capital relates to resources of 
many kinds:  material; support in conflicts; reciprocities of various sorts; membership of 
groups; political alliances. It is in terms of the strategising of practice that capital 
accumulation takes place. This involves the competition for capital which is pursued 
with varying degrees of intensity. The possession of capital, i.e., capacity, designates 
the position occupied in the arena that is termed the social field  --  social position. 
Strategising to accumulate capital, depends on the nature of this capacity. In this context 
alliances, within networks of relationships which can be deployed in the accumulation 
of capital, are important. Thus, the volume and the nature of capital that can be 
accumulated is dependent, on the one hand, on capacity, and on the other, on alliance. 
Some networks of relationships have a greater capacity to accumulate capital than 
others. Therefore, capacity is differential, i.e., it depends on the individual’s position in 
a social field and on the nature of the networks of relationships. Individual actors are 
positioned in several fields, simultaneously. The accumulation of capital in one field has 
implications for the accumulation of capital in another field. The accumulation of 
capital and the change in capacity that this implies, can affect the position in the social 
field.  
Thus, the resources, capital in Bourdieu’s terms, that individuals and households have, 
at a particular moment in time, is their capacity. It is in terms of this capacity that they 
acquire their social position. From this position they aspire to the acquisition of more 
capital. It is based on capacity that they identify the aspirations that they are able to 
pursue and engage in strategising behaviour, deploying those alliances which are 
available to them through their networks. Equally, when a particular aspiration seems 
desirable individuals and households identify the resources necessary, and strategise to 
acquire these resources in order to realise the aspiration. It is this sequence of events 
which I refer to as social process, and which is a central concept in terms of which I 
analyse the impact of the tsunami on Sinhapura, in the following chapters.    
It may seem that by focusing on social process and, therefore, on resources and 
aspirations I am narrowing my area of social enquiry. In fact, much else is encompassed 
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by these two elements: individuals and households strategise to realise their aspirations 
using the resources at their disposal. Such strategizing has several implications. It has to 
be done through the avenues that society offers, that is, through its institutions and 
through the normative system which operates on those institutions. It will be seen, 
therefore, that the analysis of a situation through the concept of social process is, in fact, 
a comprehensive social analysis.   
What I have presented here, is the way in which I have drawn on Bourdieu and 
Appadurai so as to develop a framework which permits me to analyse, meaningfully, 
the issues presented by the impact of the tsunami on Sinhapura. This framework is 
necessarily eclectic; I have not taken the totality of Bourdieu’s concepts, nor have I used 
them entirely in his style. Still less have I done so with Appadurai. The attempt has been 
to use Bourdieu and Appadurai in developing a conceptual approach that is appropriate 
to the research problem described above. These then are the key theoretical ideas which 
will be used in the analytical description of the pre and post-tsunami processes that the 
next chapters will address.    
Methodology     
In this section I describe the data which I collected; their relation to the problem which 
is the concern of this study; the sources from which the data were obtained; and, the 
methods which were deployed to do so. I read, and understood, the SOAS ‘Statement on 
Ethics’ and abided by it, in the conduct of my research.96     
In terms of Bourdieu’s (2003) ideas about ‘participant objectivation’ the approach to 
fieldwork is a product of one’s worldview. It is on the basis of a ‘social past’ that the 
anthropologist selects the problem that he/she wishes to research, the method by which 
this is to be done and assigns importance to the type of fact that is important for his/her 
problem. In these terms, Bourdieu states that an ethnography must have some sense of 
the social world which created the anthropologist and his/her interest in the research at 
hand  --  the ‘historical unconscious’. He goes on to comment that this not only involves 
the personal circumstances of the anthropologist but also his/her position within the 
microcosm of anthropology:  
                                                          
96 Source: SOAS ‘Statement on Ethics’, www.soas.ac.uk ; ‘Ethical Guidelines for Good Research 
Practice’ of the Association of Social Anthropologists, www.theasa.org.uk; the guidelines of the 
American Anthropologists Association (AAA), www.aaanet.org/committees/ethics/ethcode.htm Accessed 
2 February 2007. 
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“It is indeed scientifically attested that her most decisive scientific choices (of 
topic, method, theory, etc.) depend very closely on the location she (or he) 
occupies within her professional universe, what I call the ‘anthropological field’, 
with its national traditions and peculiarities, its habits of thought, its mandatory 
problematic, its shared beliefs and commonplaces, its rituals, values, and 
consecrations, its constraints in matters of publication of finds, its specific 
censorships, and, by the same token, the biases embedded in the organizational 
structure of the discipline, that is, in the collective history of the specialism, and 
all the unconscious presuppositions built into the (national) categories of 
scholarly understanding.” (Bourdieu:2003:283)  
Emerson et al (2001) encapsulate both the personal, cultural and ideological past of the 
ethnographer, referred to by Bourdieu, as well as the way in which theoretical and 
institutional concerns shape research, excellently, in his concept of ‘stance’:  
“Stance: Regardless of the conventions used to depict social life and to 
transcribe talk, the writer more deeply filters observed events through a 
particular stance, that is, an underlying orientation towards the people he studies 
and their ways of living. Stance not only shapes how the ethnographer observes 
and participates in the field, thus shaping the content of field notes; but stance 
also prefigures how the ethnographer orients to his ‘writing subject’ in 
composing field notes (Emerson et al., 1995:42-46). Stance is reflected in such 
matters as how the ethnographer identifies with (or distances himself from) 
those studied: for example, in writing about them sympathetically (or not); in 
selecting certain kinds of local activities, which draw his attention, to write 
about in more detailed descriptions; and in prioritizing and framing certain 
topics and thus writing more fully about those events he sees as relevant. Shaped 
by disciplinary training, theoretical interests, and moral and political 
commitments, an ethnographer’s stance may be evident in the content, 
comprehensiveness and shadings of descriptions. Certainly, the tone of 
descriptions, as expressed through word choice, definitely reflects the writer’s 
stance.” (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw:2001:360). 
A debate which is relevant, as far as this discussion is concerned, is that of the 
positioning of insider and outsider. Aguilar (1981) states that all ethnographers face the 
problem that their subjects have pre-conceptions and expectations of them, and that they 
carry the ‘baggage’ of ‘ethnocentricism’ (outsider), on the one hand, and ‘cultural 
chauvinism’ (insider), on the other. When I started my fieldwork in Sinhapura I knew 
the community, both because of my work after the tsunami and because of its long 
association with my family. In this sense, for someone such as myself working in my 
own country, the issue was the ‘deconstruction’ of certain cultural codes and meanings 
which are taken as a ‘given’. I did my best to overcome the problematic issue of 
familiarity through self-reflexivity (Okely, 1992; Caplan, 1988). As Halstead puts it:  
“… the ethnographer must constantly test and refine her own perceptions, in a reflexive 
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approach that allows both for her own specific voice, but also centrally for that of her 
‘hosts’ in telling the story” (2001:320). The point, however, is that whether one is 
studying one’s own culture or another, it is necessary to cultivate reflexivity and self-
awareness  --  an awareness of oneself as an entity with a worldview, which can ‘colour’ 
one’s interpretation of ethnographic phenomena. In this context, Holy’s (1984) 
statement that the significant point is not the extent to which the anthropologist is a 
‘member’ of the community, but the competence of introspection and the ability to 
reflect on experience, is relevant. As far as I was concerned, I was quite well placed in 
Sinhapura because while I was not from the community (local) and, therefore, was able 
to cultivate a certain distance, I was from the wider cultural context of Sri Lanka and I 
could comprehend certain nuances of the social idiom. Therefore, the 
compartmentalization of the categories of ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ is not helpful when 
more often than not, these boundaries tend to blur: “…my participant informants 
positioned me as insider and outsider, demonstrating how the rigidity of these 
boundaries can collapse.” (Halstead:2001:307).   
When I started my fieldwork in September 2007 I was known as a member of a family 
which had, since 1976, had a relationship with Sinhapura, which was shot through with 
patronage.97 In this sense, there were certain cultural expectations which the community 
had of me, in terms of social position, age, gender and education. A facet of my 
situation was the fact that I was doing my research in a context where I had been 
involved in a relief project, as the coordinator of the Trust. As Mosse puts it: “It 
is…….an ethnography in which I am myself… [an] informant.” (Mosse:2005:ix).  
Given this context the following questions become relevant. What were the implications 
for my research, of my position as the coordinator of the Trust? How did this position of 
‘power’ feed into my data collection? Did my role of fund disbursement prove an 
obstacle to understanding the dynamic of this community?  
I found, in the course of my fieldwork, that there were various points at which I was at 
the receiving end of the suppression of information, and the evasion and deflection of 
questions. This was particularly the case during informant group sessions and in-depth 
interviews. In many instances it had to do with aid which had been disbursed by the 
                                                          
97 To reiterate, from 2006 to 2013 my family continued the work of the Trust, although with less intensity 
than before.  
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Trust to the community. People did not want these grants investigated in case some 
discrepancies in their household circumstances were revealed, between the situation as 
represented to the Trust in 2005 and the reality in 2007/2008, some years after the 
tsunami. This pattern of reaction on the part of my respondents was evident also in the 
case of my research assistant and the local coordinator. They were both reluctant to tell 
me about any event in the community, such as a fracas on the High Street, which did not 
reflect positively on Sinhapura.  
My position of ‘power’ was an obstacle to the information gathering as far as some 
people were concerned, and as far as some events and episodes were concerned. On the 
positive side is the fact that this same position of ‘power’ provided me with contacts 
which I might not have otherwise had. The connections formed in 2005 through the act 
of disbursement of tsunami aid became useful, in that I was known and had access to 
the community, in 2007/2008 when I was doing my fieldwork. Furthermore, what I 
tried to do was to incorporate the obstacles that I encountered into the research process, 
and turn it into an objective of inquiry.  
It will be clear, in terms of the discussion above and in terms of the discussion in the 
‘Origin’ section of the Introduction to this thesis, that this research was a product of the 
many particularities of my position. There is the fact that I am a ‘native’ anthropologist 
for whom the anthropological concerns are not the ‘exotic’ or the ‘other’, but those of 
the small developing country which I call home. Then, there is the fact that I was 
concerned about the ‘representation’ of the tsunami in some of the literature, as well as 
the media. It is all these concerns which have informed my approach to the research, the 
selection of the problem, as well as my approach to the data which I considered 
pertinent to the resolution of the problem at hand.     
When I started my fieldwork in September 2007 the main issue that I wanted to explore 
was: what happened to the social processes in Sinhapura, consequent upon the tsunami. 
It was essential, then, to ascertain the pre-tsunami relations of the community, in order 
to understand the social processes of loss and recovery. An understanding was required 
of individuals and households, and the strategies that they pursued to realise their 
aspirations in post-tsunami circumstances. Data collection along these lines was based 
on the themes outlined below: the attributes of households in terms of age, gender, 
education, occupation, land-holding, income and expenditure; the control of resources 
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including those intangibles such as status and power; aspirations; the institutions and 
associations of the community; conflicts; the external forces bearing upon this 
community including the state, development organisations and microfinance 
institutions.    
 
In terms of post-tsunami responses at the level of individuals and households, I was 
concerned with the following issues: differential strategies in terms of differential 
capacities, in the effort of recovery; the sources of assistance within the village such as 
kin, friends, neighbours, patrons, money-lenders; the significance of alliance and 
patronage, in the attempt to resuscitate livelihoods and reconstruct damage to house and 
property; the access to external resources and the barriers to this process; the control and 
appropriation of the opportunities which became available to the community after the 
disaster.  
Beyond this, I was interested in the state programmes of relief: the delays in the 
disbursement of initial relief; the impediments to the construction of housing and to the 
resettlement of those affected by the tsunami; and the low priority placed by the state on 
the resuscitation of livelihoods.   
 
As far as relief organisations were concerned I examined several issues: the decisions 
made about relief programmes at the level of policy, implementation and staff 
composition; the imperatives for uniform policies targeting tsunami-affected 
communities; the intense competition, between these agencies, to spend large volumes 
of resources; the ‘successes’ and ‘failures’ in this context; the responses of the 
communities to these interventions.    
 
My intention in the comparative exercise was to examine the commonalities and 
differences, in terms of capacities to recover, in the different socio-economic contexts of 
the south-western coast.       
     
Thus, my fieldwork had several distinct aspects to it: there were the data from 
Sinhapura; the data from communities along the coast, both to the north and south of 
Sinhapura; and the data from state and other organisations located in Colombo, 
Hikkaduwa and Galle. 
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In the course of my work as coordinator for the Trust, I had come to certain 
conclusions, about Sinhapura, on the basis of observation and experience. These 
conclusions were the foundation upon which I explored the trends and issues, with a 
‘fresh’ perspective, when I started my fieldwork in Sinhapura in September 2007. I was 
not in the position of many anthropologists who go into unknown territory where 
anthropologist and subjects do not know each others’ ‘cognitive maps’, and have to 
‘negotiate meaning’ (Holy, 1984). I was able to build upon the knowledge that I already 
had of the community (Bryman, 2001). At the same time I had to recognise very 
quickly, that some of the ‘conclusions’ which I had earlier come to during my work as 
the coordinator were, in fact, little more than biases which had to be re-examined 
through systematic investigation.  
The complexity of the phenomenon which I was investigating in Sinhapura, 
necessitated a varied methodological strategy (Nastasi, Hitchcock, Sarkar, Burkholder, 
Varjas & Jayasena, 2007). In collecting my data I followed the usual practices of 
establishing the reliability of information, through communication with a multiplicity of 
respondents. In this process some things were directly observed and became part of my 
own experience. Others derived from what people communicated to me. Verification of 
this type of data is mainly by corroboration. One method of corroboration is through a 
series of single informants. Another is by way of an informant group session. A third is 
through the cross-questioning of an interviewee. A fourth is by way of a case-study. 
Together, all of these methods constitute a cumulative process of corroboration. Within 
the broad context of participant observation, I pursued a qualitative research strategy, 
which incorporated informant group sessions, in-depth interviews, case-studies, life 
histories, genealogies and the study of documents, in a specific order.98 I now indicate 
the method by which I collected the data from each of the various sources.   
My fieldwork in Sinhapura had two distinct phases. During the first phase, the approach 
to data collection was extensive and wide-ranging. During the second phase, it was 
                                                          
98 The documents in Sinhapura were: deeds to land; records of private correspondence if accessible and 
ethically unproblematic; reports of investigations done in the district; temple records; correspondence 
relating to the tsunami between the citizens of Sinhapura and the state.    
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focused and specific. Each had its own collection of methods. I now describe these two 
phases in some detail.99    
I began the first phase of my fieldwork with an update of the household survey 
conducted by the Trust, in February 2005. In addition to information about households 
and individuals, this survey gave me the opportunity to get to know those members of 
the community who were not as familiar to me as some of the others. In the course of 
this, in discussion with my research assistant, I was able to pick out those people who I 
thought might serve as good informants.100 These were people who both had knowledge 
about one or more areas of community activity and who, in addition, had the time and 
the inclination to talk to me.  
When this was over, my effort was concentrated on the collection of data through the 
use of informants in a structured, progressive fashion. I shall come back to this 
presently. Parallel with this, I used other methods which, by their nature, were more 
appropriate to this preliminary phase.  
At the same time that I was conducting informant group sessions, I took life histories of 
many different sorts of people. The purpose of this was to identify the types of 
personalities in the community, as well as its crisis points. As Pahl and Thompson put 
it: “It is a characteristic strength of life-story interviews in any society that they can 
open a window to the workings of the private sphere of life, as in these instances of the 
subtle complexities of changing family patterns of everyday life and relationships” 
(1994:151). I used the life history to get a historical sense of this community. It is 
through one of these sessions that a significant event in the past, the conflict with 
Kotigama in 1974 over an episode of boat burning, came to my attention. I then 
incorporated the investigation of this episode into one of my informant group sessions. 
In the case of another life history I was taken aback when the person that I was speaking 
to informed me, in the most matter of fact tones, that he had attacked his father with a 
small sword and that there was a murder case against him. This is a fact about this 
                                                          
99 I have been initiated into this methodological strategy by my father, Dr. S.P.F. Senaratne. It is a scheme 
of fieldwork developed, initially, during his PhD fieldwork in Sri Lanka in the 1960s and refined further 
in the course of many research projects in Sri Lanka and in the other countries of South Asia. They are 
described in a forthcoming publication on Strategy Analysis.   
100 My research assistant, Enoka, had been involved in the survey in 2005. Therefore, she was someone 
that I knew well when I went back to do my fieldwork in 2007. Her role was to accompany me wherever I 
went in the village, and also to act as a primary informant on issues as they emerged from my research.  
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individual  --  someone whose wallam we had helped to repair  --  that none of my 
informants had thought necessary to share with me. I used this method to gain an insight 
into the ‘little narratives’ of this community (Faubion, 1993). While one of the potential 
limitations of life histories is the issue of standardized narratives, it was my experience 
that at the early stage of the study in which they were conducted, they did produce many 
insights on issues which were explored later.      
I used genealogies to gain an insight into the way in which the people of Sinhapura 
were connected to each other, as well as to neighbouring communities, by bonds of 
kinship. This provided me with an ‘entry’ into issues such as marriage, land-holding, 
patron-client relations and political clusters. I had some sense of the kinship picture of 
this village through my research with the Trust. I knew, for instance, that the bonds of 
kinship were stronger between the households on the seaside than on the landside, 
where marriage tended to be such that spouses were, largely, from other villages. 
Altogether, the genealogies gave me a picture of the different neighbourhoods of the 
community and their interconnections.   
I also examined the documents available in the village relating to its history. The 
perusal of documents, especially those contained in the temple in Sinhapura, recounting 
its history, enabled the contextualization of the ethnographic present, in a longitudinal 
perspective. There were documents written in Sanskrit, Pali, English and Sinhala.  
I spent some time both on observing critical events, as well as in identifying those 
events which had to be observed when they would occur at a later date. Important 
among these were several activities connected with fishing, as well as the rituals 
connected to the temple.    
I return now to the use of informants. I had several one-to-one sessions with each of my 
key informants. I did my best to ensure that my key informants represented a cross-
section of this community in terms of gender, age, occupation, income, neighbourhood 
and political affiliation. After the sessions with these informants I organised several 
informant group sessions. The issues which had been discussed, explored and refined in 
one session, became the basis and the agenda for the next one. Thus, these sessions had 
a progressive character. In this way the information that was emerging was subjected, 
through the interaction of successive informant group sessions, to checks on its validity 
(Pottier and Orone, 1995; Mosse, 1994; Gujit and Cornwall, 1995; Richards, 1995; and 
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Pottier, 1993,1997). I also discovered that with the progression and the deepening of 
issues, new dimensions on particular issues emerged. This systematic method enabled 
analysis and reflection by myself, the ethnographer, at each level. It was the forum of 
the informant group session that I used to publicise the nature and the scope of my 
research.  
 
One of the problems that I faced in gathering data through the informant group method, 
was the fact that some people were reluctant to voice their opinions to me because I was 
a member of the Trust. This related particularly to the disbursement of grants and their 
use. I found that I had to be creative in getting around this problem. When I sensed that 
someone was either reluctant to speak about an issue or was deliberately withholding 
information, I made it a point to give this issue my most meticulous attention. I 
addressed the issue with as many people as I could, and I found, often, that the 
information which had been suppressed by one source, would come to light through 
another. I also made it a point to find out everything that was possible about the 
individual concerned, such that the reason for the evasion would become explicable and 
inform my understanding of the social dynamic at work. As there was a cumulative 
process of data gathering, information which had been suppressed in one session, due to 
a dynamic between informants which was not always clear at the time, would often 
emerge in another.  
Inducing people to participate in an informant group session, was another difficulty that 
I experienced. Some came because of the personal connection that had been established 
with my family, through the work of the Trust; others, because they had received grants 
from the Trust; yet others came as a favour to my research assistant and her father, who 
were of good social standing in the village. The High Street traders, for instance, were 
only able to come during the afternoon when their stores were, temporarily, closed. The 
women who were homemakers led very busy lives between childcare, household chores 
and the care of the elderly, and struggled to make time for me. The fishermen, except 
for those who laid the night net, went out to sea at all hours of the day and night. 
Therefore, it was very difficult to schedule sessions with them. This added much 
uncertainty to these informant sessions but also an element of spontaneity, as I had to be 
ready to have a session whenever a group of people turned up, as they did with little or 
no notice.   
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Despite these difficulties I found that the informant group method, as I have described 
its use, was most productive in the preliminary phase of data gathering.  
I did not, however, regard the information obtained from this method as conclusive 
data. The data was indicative rather than definitive. It had differing levels of reliability. 
Once the preliminary data was obtained it was reviewed at some length, in terms of my 
research problem; the issues which required specific and detailed examination were 
identified; and a plan formulated for the second phase of fieldwork. It served as an 
important foundation for the identification of significant issues, and the formulation of 
hypotheses. It was, therefore, the corpus of data which became indispensable, for the 
next step of the research. It is after several informant group sessions on every major 
activity and institution in the community, that I refined my research problem into its 
most acute form, and designed the structure of the in-depth interview (Bryman, 2001). 
This was the second phase of my research, and the data collected during the first phase 
was a guide and an indication for the design of the investigation in phase two. Here, the 
case-study and the in-depth interview were the main methods of enquiry. It is the data 
from the second phase which provided me with that depth upon which to build my 
analysis.  
 
During the second phase of my fieldwork I relied mainly on two methods  --  the in-
depth interview and the case-study. In the interview, I explored the interactions and the 
behaviour of a single individual and the decisions which preceded it. It was based 
around a design, though not a questionnaire. The design consisted of several themes 
which were examined, sequentially, in the course of the interview. Each theme was 
further broken down into a series of issues. I did a hundred such interviews. As with the 
key informants, I did my best to ensure that these individuals represented a cross section 
of this community in terms of age, gender, occupation and residence in the various 
neighbourhoods of the village. In each and every case, I obtained informed consent 
before proceeding with the interview. It is from these interviews that I was able to 
gather information on the strategising by individuals, and further information on 
networks and institutions. I also obtained information on behaviour, attitudes, norms 
and the main decisions of an individual. It also allowed me to explore the various 
networks which were important for an individual in this community. I found that in 
terms of the information that I had gained from informant sessions, what was not 
93 
 
touched upon by a respondent, in an interview, was as significant as what was. This 
sensitised me, the ethnographer, to potential points of tension in the community, as well 
as issues for further investigation. Thus, I found that the interview provided me with the 
opportunity to deepen and refine the inferences and hypotheses, which were the result of 
the informant group sessions. The sort of intensive questioning that is possible in this 
type of interview, allowed for the exploration of ‘particular’ cases, of general trends, 
and so to come to stronger conclusions about the trends.   
The main problem that I encountered with this method was the fear on the part of 
interviewees, that information confidentially revealed in the course of an interview, 
would be used in a manner detrimental to their interest. Another concern, articulated by 
an informant as an explanation for the withholding of information, was that people did 
not want the Trust or any of its members to get to know too much about other sources of 
aid. This was particularly the case where we had, for instance, helped to repair an 
engine and the respondent had received aid for the same purpose, from another source.  
The other method which I used during this phase was the case study. Here, the sequence 
of activity of an event or a project or an institution was examined, through the interview 
of key participants. Essentially, I refer to an exercise in which an institution, episode or 
development intervention is examined in terms of its historical sequence, so that the 
participants in each of its sequences are clearly identified, and the rationale for their 
behaviour is established. This involves sessions with many different people. I conducted 
case-studies of the fisheries cooperative; the technology and relationships of fishing; the 
temple; the commerce of the High Street; microfinance institutions; the health 
institutions of the region; and the caste-politics dynamic of the region. I also did a case-
study of the various educational institutions available to this community in Galle, 
Hikkaduwa and Ambalangoda, and the ways in which these resources were utilised in 
the aspirations towards the future. In each of these case-studies, it was necessary to 
identify the situation before the tsunami, its impact and the way in which the activity or 
institution regenerated itself, subsequently.   
The way that I framed my research problem meant that some part of my data had to be 
obtained from locations outside Sinhapura. I now describe this part of my fieldwork, 
briefly.    
94 
 
My contact with central government institutions began with several sessions with the 
Grama Niladhari, at his office in Sinhapura. These were followed by visits to the 
Divisional Secretariat in Hikkaduwa, and the District Secretariat in Galle. I was able to 
get information relating to the government’s relief initiatives and the housing 
programme handled by these regional offices, as well as the problems and issues that 
they had to contend with in the days after the tsunami. Facts and figures relating to 
categories of damage in the Galle District were made available to me. 
To supplement this information I visited institutions such as commercial banks in 
Hikkaduwa and Galle, Tsunami Mediation Boards in the region surrounding 
Hikkaduwa, and the Ministry of Justice and Law Reform in Colombo. I obtained data 
on tsunami loans and on the way grievances pertaining to the distribution of tsunami 
relief, by the Divisional and District Secretariats, were being addressed by the 
Mediation Boards and the Justice Ministry, which had set up a special programme for 
this purpose, at the regional level.  
My main source of information regarding local government institutions was the Urban 
Council (UC) in Hikkaduwa. In the course of several sessions with the Chairman, the 
Vice-chairman and other officials of this office I was able to get a sense of the role 
played by local government in this region, after the tsunami. This was in the context of 
little tsunami aid being channelled through this avenue, by the central government, and 
the creative ways in which local government politicians satisfied their electorate. 
Besides the UC, I was able to secure several informant sessions with an ex-UC member, 
who belonged to the party which was in opposition in the UC, at this time. This 
individual, who had been very helpful to us in the work of the Trust, proved to be a 
mine of information about local government politics. A session with a Provincial 
Councillor of the Southern Province, based in Tangalle, gave me a perspective on local 
government politics at the provincial level in the south.   
In collecting data from the state agencies based in Colombo, Hikkaduwa and Galle, I 
was concerned with acquiring a sense of the interaction between fishing communities 
and these arms of government, as well as the actions taken by these agencies in the 
aftermath of the tsunami. I visited the Department of Fisheries, the Ceylon Fishery 
Harbours Corporation (CFHC), the Ceylon Fisheries Corporation (CFC), and the 
National Aquatic Resources Agency (NARA). In visiting the main fisheries harbours 
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along the coast, from Panadura to Hambanthota, my aim was to get an impression of the 
wider damage suffered by the fishing industry. In Galle I had to get permission from the 
Commander of the Naval Base, Dakshina (adjacent to the fisheries harbour), in order to 
enter the fisheries harbour, as the Galle harbour had been attacked by the LTTE a few 
months previously.  
 
My principal object in visiting the Coast Conservation Department (CCD) was to obtain 
information regarding the 100m buffer zone placed on reconstruction, on the south-
western coastline. I was interested in the rationale behind this adaptation of the existing 
35m rule, and the processes by which embargoes on construction on the coastline were 
established. From the Sri Lanka Tourist Board (SLTB) offices in Colombo I obtained 
some insights into the post-tsunami revival of the tourist industry, as well as their views 
on the 100m buffer zone.   
In the case of the Reconstruction and Development Agency (RADA) the object of my 
visit was to gather information about its activities as well as that of its predecessor, 
TAFREN. I was particularly interested in the way in which RADA coordinated the 
agreements between the government and various organisations, regarding the 
construction of housing schemes. In this connection, it seemed important to visit the 
Urban Development Authority (UDA) as this institution had an important role in 
overseeing the construction plans of these various organisations, from an architectural 
and engineering point of view. Thereafter, I visited the Disaster Management Centre 
(DMC) to get some information about its role as a new institution, and the various 
measures taken to provide an early warning in the case of future tsunamis.   
In the collection of data from the Non-Governmental Organisations which were 
involved in relief and reconstruction work along this coastline, based in Colombo, with 
regional offices in Galle and Hikkaduwa, I visited as many of the offices in Colombo as 
was feasible and several in Galle and Hikkaduwa.101 I was concerned with their policy 
and practice as well as, of getting a sense of the commonality and difference between 
these organisations. I was particularly interested in the organisations which laid a heavy 
emphasis on microfinance, in their post-tsunami work. Amongst those organisations 
which started purely microfinance activities in the region, in early 2005, some were 
                                                          
101 I focused on the organisations which were involved in direct relief work in Sinhapura, as well as the 
large international organisations working on the south-western coast.  
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large NGOs from the neighbouring countries of South Asia. In this context, a visit to the 
Lanka Micro Finance Practitioners Association based in a suburb of Colombo which, in 
mid-2008, had just begun to function, was useful.   
During my visits to the new housing settlements, where tsunami-affected, Sinhapura 
residents had been re-settled, and the tsunami-affected communities along the coastline, 
from Panadura to Hambanthota, I followed a simple principle. In examining the coastal 
communities I sought, as quickly as I could, to develop a framework in terms of which 
these communities could be investigated. Given the time that was available, this turned 
out to be a suitable approach. I followed a similar approach in the tsunami resettlement 
communities. 
As far as all these organisations were concerned I went to them with a fair idea of the 
information that I wanted, and the problems that I wished to explore. Yet, what I knew 
in the early stage was, at times, insufficient for me to design a well-structured interview. 
In such instances, I began with an informant session and moved towards an interview at 
the end. In other cases, the information that I had was sufficient to plan the interview, 
and to explore it systematically. In a few instances, such as the fisheries harbours, some 
observation was part of the exercise. Altogether the information from these sources 
supplemented the data that I collected from Sinhapura, and set it in a context which 
made that data much more meaningful than it would otherwise have been.  
As far as the institutions external to Sinhapura were concerned, I presented myself as a 
social researcher interested in the way that the policies and practices, of these 
organisations, contributed to the reproduction of coastal communities. I obtained 
informed consent in each and every instance, before proceeding with data collection.  
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Chapter 3  --  The Social Processes 
Introduction  
In this chapter my focus is on the social processes of Sinhapura. In order to understand 
the way in which these processes were affected by the tsunami it is necessary to 
understand the processes of this community at the time of the tsunami. My acquaintance 
with Sinhapura prior to the tsunami was that of a visitor. What follows is, therefore, a 
reconstruction based on many sessions with informants.   
Sinhapura is located in a south-western coastal region which is different from many 
other coastal regions in Sri Lanka. It is largely Sinhala, largely Buddhist, with a strong 
urban influence and with good access to educational and health facilities. This is a 
region which has been shaped by the interaction between caste and politics. Particular 
historical processes of regional formation have had implications for resource flows into 
individual communities. In Sinhapura, the result of this has been that its economic and 
administrative importance has waxed and waned over the last sixty years.  
Three types of resources were important in the economic life of Sinhapura at the time of 
the tsunami. They were fisheries; trade and external employment; and, the resources 
such as services and employment made available to the village through governmental 
institutions and caste-oriented political processes.102  
A perception of the nature of these resources available to Sinhapura is necessary in 
order to understand my discussion of the social processes which were taking place in 
Sinhapura, before the tsunami. If, for instance, Sinhapura had been located in a region 
where the caste to which most of its residents belong (Karava) had been the dominant 
caste, the Town Council (TC) and the police station would not have been moved out of 
Sinhapura, and it would have continued to be the important administrative centre that it 
had been in the 1970s. What this demonstrates is that the region in which Sinhapura was 
situated, had much to do with the nature of the community that it was at the time of the 
tsunami.      
The flow of resources of the three types categorised above, and the extent to which this 
flow was a product of regional processes, is the focus in the first half of this chapter. 
                                                          
102 A preliminary account of these resources has already been given in Chapter 1.  
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The focus in the second half, is on the processes which generated the types of 
households characteristic of Sinhapura, at the time of the tsunami. The differential 
strategies through which resources were appropriated by different households and the 
concomitant ways in which aspirations came to be formed, are examined.  
My concern is with the way in which a variety of resources, capital in Bourdieu’s (1977, 
1990) sense, became available to this community and the way in which these resources 
were utilised in the progress towards its future, at the time of the tsunami. I am, 
therefore, interested in exploring the types of capital that were regarded as having value, 
in this cultural context, and the way in which this found expression in the aspirations of 
households and individuals.  
The Resources of Sinhapura 
The Fishing Industry 
During the last 200 years fishing has been the major activity in Sinhapura. Important 
changes that have taken place in the fishing industry in this community, in the last 70 
years, derive from the way in which the policies of the central government have 
interacted with the community. In order to comprehend the significance of this, one has 
to understand the wider, national context of the fisheries industry in Sri Lanka.  
The social processes of Sinhapura, detailed in the second half of this chapter, can be 
understood only in the light of the interaction between national fisheries policy and the 
local context. Sinhapura, at the time of the tsunami, was a product of this interaction.  
Beginning in the 1940s, and accelerating after independence, in 1948, successive 
governments initiated a series of measures to improve the fishing industry in Sri Lanka. 
The stated policies were: to enhance national wealth; to improve the nutrition of the 
population; to increase the income and to develop the lifestyles of fishing communities; 
and, to stimulate economic growth in particular geographical regions. While the 
measures mentioned above have meant that, in the last 70 years, many fishing 
communities have seen a rise in income, the catch has remained substantially below 
what is considered desirable in nutritional terms for the country. Dr. Champa Amarasiri 
of the National Aquatic Resources Agency (NARA) stated that in 2008 fish 
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consumption per capita, per annum, was 15-17 kilogrammes, which was considerably 
below the desirable national level.103  
In the 1950s and 1960s the government-initiated innovations were: boats with outboard 
engines; nylon nets; and, fibreglass hulls. The new technology was accompanied by the 
establishment of various institutions and services.104 The Department of Fisheries 
founded in 1941, was intended to provide a wide range of services: to increase the 
overall catch of fish; to cater to the needs of the consumer; to enhance the income and 
welfare of fishermen.105 The Ceylon Fisheries Corporation (CFC) was created to handle 
the marketing and the sale of fish. Amarasinghe (1989) states that the CFC has not been 
a success, as it has been unable to compete with private fish merchants  --  the mudalalis  
--  and has not handled more than 2.7% of the total marine landings of the country. It 
has to be noted, however, that the CFC has performed an important function of being a 
check on the monopolising tendencies of fish merchants. In this sense, the figure of 
2.7% is not an appropriate indicator of the overall success of the CFC. The Ceylon 
Fishery Harbours Corporation (CFHC) was formed to construct and maintain harbours. 
In 2008, there were eleven main harbours around the country managed by this 
organisation. The CFHC provides the following services: fresh water; ice; electricity for 
maintenance activities and repairs; petrol, kerosene and diesel; and, protection for the 
boats berthed in the harbour. In addition to these institutions the government established 
ice plants; repair workshops; initiated transport services and started the fisheries co-
operative movement.106  
                                                          
103 In October 2010 the Minister of Fisheries made a policy statement in which, amongst other objectives, 
he stated that it was the hope of his ministry to increase fish production, per annum, threefold. Source: 
Franklin R. Satyapalan, The Island of 24/10/2010. 
104 The problem of capital was addressed by various government schemes: the issue of motorized boats 
under a loan scheme through the co-operatives; loan schemes for the purchase of outboard motors to be 
attached to artisanal craft (1962); the issue of large mechanized craft (3.5 ton boats) through co-operatives 
under a hire purchase scheme (1958); highly subsidized loan schemes through state banks. Source: 
www.fisheries.gov.lk Accessed on 10 April 2007. Interviews with officials at the Department of 
Fisheries, the CFC, the CFHC.  
105 For a comprehensive account of the various state policies instituted in Sri Lanka since independence, 
in 1948, refer Bavinck (1984).  
106 The co-operative movement has been active since the 1940s and fisheries has been an important 
component of this movement. The co-operatives have had both consumer and producer functions. The 
fisheries co-operatives have also been selling institutions but have never been able to compete 
successfully with fish merchants. For details of the working of co-oporative societies in Sri Lanka see 
Bavinck (1984). For an account of the importance of the middleman in the fisheries industry see Acheson 
(1981).  
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The policies instituted by the government interacted with local processes, to produce a 
wide variety of coastal communities around Sri Lanka. The southern and western coasts 
of the country illustrate this diversity. Akurala and Thotagamuwa were completely 
artisanal communities at the time of the tsunami as they had not had the access to 
capital, at the level required, in the way that Sinhapura had. At the other end of the 
spectrum, communities like Mirissa, Hikkaduwa and Devinuwara had been able to 
invest in multi-day boats. Hikkaduwa in particular was ‘capital rich’, from tourism, at 
the time when the multi-day boat initiative was launched by the government. In these 
communities harbours had been constructed by the CFHC. Weligama, like Sinhapura, 
did not have many multi-day boats but did have mechanised wallams and some canoes. 
Thus, while it was not a rich community like Hikkaduwa; neither was it a totally 
artisanal one like Akurala. Ambalangoda was famous for its affluent fish merchants. 
Hambanthota was a fishing community with much variety: many multi-day boats, but as 
many motor boats and canoes.     
In the 1960s when the government initiated new technology, Sinhapura, as a 
community, with its trade with India had the capital, at that time, to undertake the 
transition from artisanal craft to mechanised wallams. Thus, Sinhapura became one of 
those communities with a large number of mechanised wallams, where artisanal craft 
had little importance. It is these innovations in technology, and the institutions and 
services provided by the central government, which enabled Sinhapura to utilise its 
capital and transform itself from a purely artisanal fishing community into one that was 
well on its way to mechanisation. The increased income became a source of credit and 
facilitated investment in a diversity of ventures.  
Fish caught at sea is brought to the harbours and to the beaches. At the harbours the fish 
is usually sold, by auction, to the prominent middlemen who transport it to distribution 
centres in, among others, Colombo and Kandy. Alternatively, it is sold directly to 
retailers, tourist resorts and the army. On the beaches the sale is usually by auction. At 
other times, the fish are sold in terms of previous arrangements with fish merchants. As 
mentioned before, in Sinhapura, the fresh fish are sold by auction on the beach.  
 
The nature of the relationship between boat owners and traders varies from geographical 
area to area in Sri Lanka. These relationships arise due to the fact that boat owners often 
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need liquid cash for consumption purposes, at one end of the scale, and capital related 
purposes, at the other end. Fishermen, for the most part, are reluctant to deal with 
commercial institutions. They prefer to borrow from an individual with whom they have 
a personal connection, rather than from an impersonal organization. In Sri Lanka, the 
fish traders and merchants perform important functions of credit and insurance, as far as 
the fishermen are concerned. In Sinhapura as wallam owners are relatively affluent they 
do not require binding agreements with traders which would provide them with liquid 
cash.  
 
The practice of ‘boat tying’ gives trader-creditors first claim on the catch (Amarasinghe, 
1989). Hikkaduwa and Galle have many such arrangements. In Sinhapura and 
Kotigama, however, there is no such practice as the fish is sold by auction on the beach. 
Merlijn (1989) describes how the keen competition between fish merchants in Sarawak, 
Malaysia ensures that fishermen wield significant bargaining power, in relation to the 
creditor/debtor relationship.107  
 
In the 1970s the government promoted the export of high value fish products, prawns in 
particular.108 This was in the context of the emergence of international markets for 
frozen seafood products and the high income elasticities of comparatively rich 
consumers, in the developed as well as the developing world (Platteau, 1989). This 
phenomenon entailed the involvement of capitalist giants in this sector, worldwide. In 
India, for instance, industrial concerns such as Kelvinator, Tata and Union Carbide 
diversified into prawn fishing (Platteau, 1989). This has meant the support by the state 
of big business, and the concomitant marginalization of the artisanal sector. In Sri 
Lanka, the multi-national Unilever got involved in large-scale prawn farming on the 
western coast. The venture was not a great success and, subsequently, abandoned 
(Senaratne, 1987). Today, the export of luxury seafood products is on a much smaller 
scale. Investors did not see Sinhapura as a location which had potential for these 
ventures, but on a minor scale prawns and crabs were bred in the river behind 
Sinhapura, for sale to the tourist hotels in Hikkaduwa.  
                                                          
107 For a detailed account of a fishing community in the Kelantan state of Malaysia see Firth (1966). See 
Stirrat (1988) for an account of the fishermen’s connections with traders in western Sri Lanka.    
108 See Reyntjens (1989) and Senaratne (1987) for a comprehensive account of the problems of prawn 
farming on the western coast of Sri Lanka in the 1980s.     
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In the 1990s the state introduced multi-day boats to the Sri Lankan fisheries industry. 
This was an imperative arising from the over-fishing of inshore, coastal waters. It also 
enabled the fishermen to access the sea beyond the 5-10 kilometres from the shore, 
which is the territory of the small mechanized boats. The multi-day boats were allocated 
to fishermen by the government through the fisheries co-operative societies.109 Under 
this scheme half of the cost of the boat would be borne by the members of the co-
operative society themselves, while the other half would be a combination of a 
government guaranteed bank loan and an outright grant from the government. Unlike 
the earlier technological change in the 1960s, to outboard motors, this change to multi-
day boats could not be financed at the local level. Although Sinhapura lacked a harbour 
suitable for multi-day boats a few individuals who were able to mobilise the necessary 
capital responded to this initiative and purchased multi-day boats. These boats were 
berthed in the harbours of Galle and Hikkaduwa. For a time it looked as if a new era had 
dawned, in the fisheries history of Sinhapura. With government assistance it appeared 
likely that more individuals would buy multi-day boats and, eventually, that a harbour 
would be built in Sinhapura. However, the new, multi-day boat owners found that 
running such an enterprise involved more risk and more expenses than they had 
foreseen. The result was that many could not service the repayment of their co-operative 
society loans.110 Eventually, the fisheries co-operative society in Sinhapura ceased to 
function because of the conflict over this issue.   
The construction of an anchorage in the natural harbour (inlet) in Sinhapura was started 
in 1995, owing to the political pressure upon government from a combination of 
sources: the Urban Council; the fisheries co-operative societies of Sinhapura and the 
surrounding communities; the Fisheries Inspector; the Co-operatives Inspector; 
fishermen and their families. However, when there was a cabinet reshuffle and the 
minister for fisheries changed the construction was halted leaving a half built ridge of 
stone  --  an incomplete breakwater  --  jutting out into the sea on the south side of the 
inlet of Sinhapura. This incomplete breakwater had a disastrous impact on wave action. 
It meant that the waves became very strong at this point, such that during the rough 
                                                          
109 These societies were established under the Co-Operatives Act in many of these coastal fishing 
communities. They were formed with the idea of being self-help organisations as well as providing credit 
and information on issues such as health and sanitation. Source: Personal Communication with the Co-
Operatives Inspector, Hikkaduwa, in 2008.  
110 Court cases have been filed against the seven individuals concerned.  
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season it was very difficult for wallams to enter the inlet and berth safely. The wallams 
ran the risk of being dashed against the ridge. Thus, during the rough season, the 
fishermen of Sinhapura had to berth their wallams on the beach in Dewata (south of 
Galle). In 2005 a wallam was destroyed by being flung against the ridge, while 
attempting to enter the inlet. In the process a crew member fell overboard to his death, 
by hitting his head on a rock. Consequent upon this episode, there were many protests 
by the community, including a demonstration on the Galle Road which disrupted all 
vehicular traffic for a couple of hours. The agitation which was the result of this 
incident, put pressure on the government and culminated in the construction of the 
anchorage being resumed and completed, in 2008.    
At the time of the tsunami, in 2004, the big issue that the fishing community in 
Sinhapura was concerned with was the problem of whether the log-centred fishing by 
multi-day boats was reducing the volume of fish closer to shore.111 This was particularly 
an issue for the mechanised wallams which fish 5-6 kilometres from shore. These 
wallams were finding the fishing enterprise less productive than it had been at any time 
in the previous 20 years. Apart from this, there were various reasons given for this 
downturn in fisheries: the impact of the illegal ‘light course’ and dynamite blasting 
methods; global climate trends; and, Sri Lanka’s narrow continental shelf. There was, 
furthermore, the prohibitive cost of fuel which was beginning to have an impact on 
profits, compared with those of earlier times.    
These were the characteristics of the fishing industry, in Sinhapura, in the period before 
the tsunami. Sinhapura did not have the political influence to secure a large harbour for 
itself. Therefore, the wallam type of craft and the level of investment and the working 
capital which was required to operate the craft, came to be its reality. It is in this manner 
that Sinhapura had developed, in the years prior to the tsunami.   
I shall now present a few cases of fishing households and their investments. These 
households will be discussed in different contexts again in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.  
Wijeratne Mudalali’s family had always been involved in the fisheries industry, both 
going to sea as well as trading in fish, particularly jadi. When the move towards 
                                                          
111 This refers to the method of fishing where a natural object such as a log or a man made one such as a 
buoy, is floated on the ocean surface to encourage the aggregation of fish. This device, called a Fish 
Aggregation Device (FAD), is used to attract pelagic fish.  
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mechanised craft got underway he was one of the first to make this investment, as he 
had the capital to do so. He used such contacts as he had, both in trade and in politics, to 
launch this venture. In time, the success of the mechanised wallam enabled him not only 
to buy more wallams but also to invest in the far more expensive multi-day boat.   
Jayatissa’s trajectory has been somewhat different. In his early years he was a crewman. 
However, he soon acquired a reputation as a skilled crew member who was a good man 
to have on a boat. In time, he managed to save enough capital to buy a wallam, through 
his own savings and with some help from kin. From here onwards some proportion of 
his profit as owner had been set aside and he had bought, by the time of the tsunami, his 
second and third wallams.    
Rohan’s wallam was bought with heavy financing. Before he had paid off this loan he 
had bought a three wheeler, also on credit, with the attendant high monthly repayment. 
His wife’s kin in the hill country helped him put together the deposit required for this 
venture. At the time of the tsunami, he had plans for using different sources of credit for 
the expansion of his income-generating activities, which included the purchase of land 
in the interior.   
Bennet was a senior crew member. At the time of the tsunami, he was in his early 
forties. Though acknowledged as being good at his job he had never managed to save 
enough to buy his own wallam. According to him, this had much to do with the fact that 
he had three children to bring up and to educate and, therefore, found it difficult to save.  
Wimalasiri was also a senior crew member in his late forties. In addition to this he had a 
small canoe for inshore fishing. The combined income, from crewing on a wallam and 
from the canoe, appeared sufficient for Wimalasiri. He had no aspiration to buy a 
wallam. His three children were all independent. He told me that he received a 
reasonable income from inshore fishing in his canoe, during the rough season, because 
with so many wallams going 5-6 kilometres out to sea the inshore area was not as over-
fished as it used to be. Furthermore, he did not want all the trouble  --  dealing with the 
vagaries of crew; finding the capital for each trip out to sea  --  which running a boat 
involves.    
In early life, Gunasena had been employed in various parts of the country. When he 
came back to Sinhapura he invested some of his earnings in the purchase of a wallam 
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and a canoe.  He, himself, had never been an active fisherman. It is his eldest son who 
had learnt the skill and was, in effect, in charge of the two craft owned by him.   
The Problems faced by the Fishing Industry 
In its expansion the fishing industry has encountered a series of problems. Sri Lanka has 
a narrow continental shelf and a rocky seabed which makes trawling difficult. The 
country has a 200 kilometre Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), according to the UN Law 
of the Sea. Within this zone, it has the rights to mineral and other resources.112 
However, foreign vessels break the law and fish with impunity, within the EEZ, and 
derive much greater benefit from the wealth of the zone than does Sri Lanka.113 There 
have been some efforts to reach a compromise in terms of the provision, by the Sri 
Lankan state, of harbour facilities to these foreign vessels: an Unloading Fish Licence; 
and a landing rights licence issued by the Board of Investment (BOI). Under new 
regulations all foreign vessels which discharge stock at any fishery harbour, anchorage 
or commercial port have to obtain a permit and sell 25% of the catch to the CFC.114 
Furthermore, many foreign vessels (approximately 500 at any given moment) fish to the 
south of Sri Lanka  --  beyond the EEZ  --  so that Sri Lankan fishermen do not have 
clear access to these waters. Sri Lankan multi-day boats cannot compete with the 
superior technology of these foreign vessels. They are larger, faster and have a greater 
carrying capacity as far as the catch is concerned.    
In theory, foreign vessels fish in international waters (outside the EEZ), unload in Sri 
Lankan harbours and air freight the fish out of the country. In reality, these vessels fish 
both in international and Sri Lankan waters (within the EEZ), unload in Sri Lankan 
harbours and air freight abroad. There is no tax revenue to the country and the 
nutritional entitlement is compromised.115 In 2010 the Minister of Fisheries stated that 
he expects to have installed effective vessel monitoring systems, which would track the 
entry of unauthorised vessels into Sri Lankan waters.116  
The government has attempted to address this problem through a series of policies 
which have not, however, been successful. Communities such as Sinhapura have the 
                                                          
112 Source: www.fisheries.gov.lk  Accessed 10 April 2007.       
113 Source: Personal Communication with the Manager, Ceylon Fisheries Corporation in 2008.  
114 Special Gazette Notification 1555/13 of 26 June 2008. The Sri Lanka Government Gazette is a weekly 
publication, dating back to colonial times, which details all government news and advertisements.  
115 Source: Interview with the Manager, Ceylon Fisheries Corporation. 
116 Source: Franklin R. Satyapalan, The Island of 24/10/2010. 
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perception that the government has been ineffective in dealing with foreign vessels, and 
that the catch which is their entitlement, is going into the storage containers of foreign, 
multi-day boats. The fishermen of Sinhapura feel that their traditional hunting grounds 
have been invaded and that their losses are substantial.  
The industry has also faced another problem. While the government realised the 
importance of mechanisation for the growth of the fishing economy, it has, nevertheless, 
had to respond to the pressures of the small-scale, artisanal sector as a political force. 
This is particularly so in the context of foreign multi-day boats encroaching onto the Sri 
Lankan EEZ and the perception of small communities, such as Sinhapura, that they are 
of marginal importance as far as the government is concerned. Fishing areas, both in the 
north and the south of the country, have always been well represented in parliament. 
Therefore, there has been political pressure on successive governments to respond to the 
needs of the artisanal sector. Politically motivated initiatives, to address the needs of the 
artisanal sector, have rarely been successful. There has been considerable opposition 
from the artisanal sector to the introduction of the mechanised mode of fishing. This 
opposition has been partially successful because of the electoral power wielded by 
fishing communities on their parliamentary representatives. The consequence of this has 
been that the state has not invested the required capital to create an industry of large-
scale, commercial, mechanised fishing. Nor has the state entered into any arrangements 
with outside interests, in the form of joint ventures.  
 
The state in Sri Lanka, unlike in Kerala for instance, has not had to face the unenviable 
task of balancing the vote banks of fishing communities with the interests of large-scale 
entrepreneurs. It has not had to mediate between the artisanal and the mechanised 
sectors unlike in Kerala, the Coromandel Coast in Tamil Nadu and in Thailand, where 
there have been conflicts between these two sectors (Kurien, 1985; Kurien and Achari, 
1990; Bavinck, 1997; Johnson, 1997). The mechanised and artisanal sectors have 
managed to co-exist, due to the fact that the former is still, relatively, small and not a 
significant threat to the latter.117 Platteau (1989) states that Sri Lanka is unusual in this, 
                                                          
117 This has something to do with the productive capacity of Sri Lanka, as a small country, in terms of 
export as well as domestic consumption.    
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as most Third World governments have tended to focus on mechanised fishing, leaving 
the artisanal sector to fend for itself.118     
 
NGOs involved in development have not promoted mechanised fishing in Sri Lanka for 
a variety of reasons: the narrow continental shelf; the fact that small trawlers are not 
suitable for Sri Lankan waters; and, the fact that the large trawlers which would be 
compatible with Sri Lankan conditions, necessitate heavy investment. The imperatives 
of development interventions, as far as the fisheries sector is concerned, have been the 
improvement of the technology of craft and gear. Bailey, Cycon & Morris (1986) 
critique a paradigm of development which does not acknowledge that technology 
transfer is value-laden, and that it disrupts the social dynamics of fishing communities. 
Thus, Sri Lanka’s fishing industry has not been infiltrated by international capital, in a 
significant way. This can be contrasted with other countries of the South Asian region, 
such as India, where development efforts have been focussed heavily on the mechanised 
sector (Bailey, Cycon, Morris, 1986; Kurien, 1985; Platteau, 1989). At the same time 
fishing communities in Sri Lanka are being, increasingly, integrated into the wider 
market economy of fish. This is happening, through the demand for luxury seafood 
products such as prawn, lobster and crab. Furthermore, the problems of over-fishing 
exist (Kurien, 1985; Kurien & Achari, 1990). As Alexander puts it: “Overfishing occurs 
when the point of (short term) pro fit maximisation is higher than the maximum 
sustainable yield of the fishery.” (1982:260).      
Another problem that the industry has had to face relates to the methods of fishing 
which are condemned as being harmful to the industry but which continue to be 
practised, by those looking for short-term financial gain. These methods are: light 
course; the use of hooks to catch dolphins and whales; and dynamite blasting. The 
equipment in these cases can be very expensive but the returns are commensurately 
high. This is a problem that the fishermen of Sinhapura face. These harmful methods of 
fishing are prevalent in the south-western region, conducted by the fishing combines of 
the larger towns, consisting of entrepreneurs and fisherman backed by regional 
politicians.    
                                                          
118 Mechanised refers to the capital intensive, production oriented, commercial, large-scale fishing 
conglomerates based on a modern growth model. Artisanal is the traditional, small-scale, subsistence-
oriented fishing and is characterised by relatively low capital intensity (Platteau, 1989).    
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Sinhapura belongs to a type of community on the south-western coast which stands 
between the heavy mechanization of the multi-day boat and the artisanal fishery. 
Disputes regarding government policy  --  support for mechanization or the exercise of 
care in relation to the income of the artisanal sector  --  do not find easy resolution.119         
Trade and External Employment 
 
I describe now two other areas which are of importance to the economy of Sinhapura  --  
trade and external employment, both governmental and otherwise. The High Street in 
Sinhapura is the centre of trade and commerce. It is the place where a variety of 
consumer goods and services are available to the people of Sinhapura and to the small 
communities of the area. The volume of business depends, to a large extent, on the 
success of the fishing enterprise.  
 
By 1875, British-style public schools set up in many regions of the country had been 
established in Galle and Ambalangoda. With access to education, up to secondary level, 
the people of this region were able to secure employment in government in a 
transferable service: the police; the railways; the postal service; the administrative 
services; the teaching profession; and the medical services. The opportunities for 
external employment saw the beginning of a trend, in the early decades of the 20th 
Century, towards movement away from the village. The village economy derived little 
benefit from this employment as little of this income was remitted back to Sinhapura. 
Apart from employment in Sri Lanka, some of these people have reached positions of 
eminence in countries such as the USA, the UK and Australia. Very few, however, have 
maintained their connections with the village.120   
 
Employment in government service was at a premium: it was seen as permanent and 
there was the security of a pension upon retirement. At the time of the tsunami in 2004, 
there were 74 persons working in government departments: amongst others, the Survey 
Department; the Agriculture Department; the Plywood Corporation; the National Youth 
                                                          
119 The important conclusions regarding the fishing industry as revealed by this study are presented in 
Chapter 6.  
120 Every now and again people in Sinhapura will mention a relative, or an ancestor, who has achieved 
prominence in Colombo, in important institutions in other parts of the country, and also outside the 
country. This is usually followed by the statement that they have no connection with Sinhapura today.    
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Services Centre; the Samurdhi Department; and the Ceylon Electricity Board. Avenues 
of external employment were also provided by tourism; the garment factories; the retail 
trade and security firms. 104 persons from Sinhapura were employed in these sectors. 
There were also those employed in the Middle-East  --  29 men in a variety of 
occupations such as driving; fork lift driving; life-guard work; dairy work. There were 7 
individuals, all women, who were employed by the development organisations working 
in the village.  
 
Sinhapura as a centre for business goes back to the time, more than half a century ago, 
when the trade on the High Street was dominated by the jadi retail outlets selling the 
cured fish which had been brought back from India. For several decades Sinhapura 
enjoyed a lucrative trade with selected areas of southern India, on both its western and 
eastern coasts. People from Sinhapura went to India in sea-going vessels, built in 
Sinhapura, laden with salt and huge wooden jars called peeppa. In India the appropriate 
fish was bought, cleaned and salted, and tightly packed into the peeppa and stored for 
three months. This preparation, called jadi, was then brought back to Sinhapura along 
with other consumer goods such as roofing tiles. This cured fish was sold at the several 
jadi retail outlets on the High Street. From the 19th century Sinhapura was famous for 
this commodity.  
 
The natural harbour in Sinhapura became a regular port for customs purposes and had a 
permanent Customs and Excise Office beginning around the 1900s. Seven or eight 
families handled the jadi trade, together with their employees. Sinhapura’s economy, at 
the time, revolved around this activity. Its heyday was in the first three or four decades 
of the 20th century. These families were the main sources of credit for the community. 
In the 1960s the government began to impose restrictions on that export of foreign 
exchange which was necessary to keep the Indian trade afloat. The families involved in 
this trade turned to other activities. Jadi mudalalis ceased to be the prosperous people in 
the community and its leaders. The younger generation began to look towards education 
and external employment to realise their aspirations. Furthermore, this decline coincided 
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with the fishing boom such that the import of jadi ceased to be important to the 
economy.121  
 
With the introduction of the new technologies in fishing, incomes increased and capital 
began to be more plentiful in the community. The mechanised wallams were able to 
make a greater catch of fish, and to provide higher incomes both to boat owners and to 
crew members. The demand for consumer goods and services in the village grew. This 
demand was satisfied by people from the community, with the descendants of those 
who had engaged in the jadi trade now carrying on retail and service enterprises on the 
High Street.  
 
Hikkaduwa had by then grown in size and importance, and was providing a range of 
goods and services. For the High Street in Sinhapura, competing with Hikkaduwa, the 
advantage lay in proximity. For people whose mode of consumer expenditure consists 
of shopping for a few items on a daily basis, the essentials have to be at their doorstep. 
The increase of cash in the economy, i.e., disposable income, saw an increase in local 
business opportunity which expressed itself in the establishment of new stores and an 
expansion in the range of goods, from basic essentials to a wide range of consumer 
products. Located on the High Street at the time of the tsunami were: nine grocery 
stores; a greengrocer; a garment retailer; a firewood and coconut retailer; a hardware 
store; two stationery stores; a newspaper vendor; a retailer of seafood; a peanut vendor; 
an ice-cream vendor; a gas cylinder retailer; a retailer of engine spare parts; a retail store 
for fishing nets; a bicycle sale and repair business; an ornamental fish outlet.      
 
As Sinhapura expanded, the demand for services such as masonry, electrical work, 
carpentry, and plumbing grew. The traders of the High Street responded to these 
demands and at the time of the tsunami there were: three communication centres; a 
carpentry workshop; two beauty salons; a welding centre; a betting centre; a 
photography centre; a sign painting service; a three wheeler repair service; a ritual 
practitioner; a printing press; a music centre; a DVD library; and, several electricians, 
masons and plumbers. I give below a few examples of High Street businesses to 
                                                          
121 Source: A series of informant sessions on the history of Sinhapura with older informants in the village 
such as Wilbert and Gunasena.  
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illustrate the scope and extent of this activity, in this community, at the time of the 
tsunami.    
 
The history of grocery stores in the High Street is one of quick turnover. Few people 
have managed to make a success of this enterprise. Some of those who have attempted 
this have inherited either the premises or an actual business itself. Hiranthi’s case was 
different.  Personal misfortune and the cutting short of her education led her to try her 
hand at a grocery store. Her husband’s kinfolk helped her both with the capital which 
had to be raised, and with useful contacts.   
 
Kanchana, at the time of the tsunami, was engaged in a business selling spare parts for 
outboard engines, inherited by her husband from his father. Her brother, before he 
travelled to Italy, had been running a repair service. Kanchana, as she told me, felt that 
the repair arm would complement the spare parts business and was exploring the 
possibility of combining the two businesses.  
 
Sushila’s father had owned a jadi shop on the High Street in the 1950s, but the business 
had been defunct for many years at the time of Sushila’s marriage in the early 1990s. 
The land and premises were given to Sushila as her dowry. Situated in a prime location 
on the High Street, just by the main foot path leading to the inlet where the boats are 
berthed, this gift enabled Sushila and her husband to cater to the particular needs of the 
fishermen. The eating house that they set up provided fishermen with hampers of food 
when they set out to sea, and a sustaining meal upon their return. This couple have two 
children, twins deaf from birth, for whom they have to incur considerable expenditure 
for their medical treatment.    
 
Wilbert inherited a printing business from his father. At one stage it had served the area 
well in that the type of printing which the press handled, with its rather simple level of 
technology, was what the customers wanted at the price that they could afford. 
However, as time went on and new technology superseded the old, Wilbert was unable 
to make the investment to install this new technology. As a result, his business was 
almost defunct at the time of the tsunami.  
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Shanika’s husband, Viraj, is not from the village. They live in a house inherited by 
Shanika from her father. Viraj had learnt the skill of welding and had obtained 
employment in a major governmental organisation. In addition to this external 
employment he had started a little workshop at home to provide the service of welding 
both for domestic and commercial purposes. This means that sometimes Viraj had to 
take an extended leave of absence from his regular employment with the government. 
Shanika, meanwhile, was entrusted with the day to day management of the venture, 
together with a helper. This effort at an additional income, apart from the salary from 
government, was primarily for the purpose of educating their three sons. They were 
getting the best education that the region could provide, at the time of the tsunami. Viraj 
and Shanika were very conscious of the fact that their educational aspirations for the 
boys could be realised only through a heavy financial outlay on their part.       
Historically, coir rope making was an important activity in the village, engaged in by 
the women. Over the last 20 years, however, the demand for coir rope has dwindled, 
largely because of the availability of superior alternatives like nylon rope. At the village 
level this, together with the fact that coir rope making is an arduous activity, has meant 
that the younger women do not engage in it.122 It has also been superseded by other 
cottage industries which are more lucrative. Amongst these cottage crafts were: crochet 
work; pillow lace work (beeralu); the sewing of garments, tablecloths, cushion covers; 
fabric painting; candle making; soap making, pappadam making; the manufacture of 
sweetmeats and brown paper bags. Other small scale manufacture included the 
production of concrete blocks for use in house construction. The primary raw material 
was cement and a simple machine, obtained with a limited outlay of capital, churned out 
the blocks. In Sinhapura this was a family business which had, in the years prior to the 
tsunami, established a reputation for a good product.    
The significant characteristic of all these activities was that they were supplementary 
sources of income. They were important during the rough (monsoon) season but were 
regarded as dispensable, at other times, if the time required was too great or the income 
generated was too low. There is a contrast to be observed with other, less affluent 
                                                          
122 The coconut husk is rotted for three months in retting pits in the river or in the lagoon. The skeins are 
removed, once rotted, and this is twisted into rope using the hands or a coir machine operated by three 
people.  
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communities of the region where people would undertake this type of production even 
though the rate of payment for their labour was low.  
Traditionally, various forms of credit have been used by this community. The jadi 
mudalalis were the most popular source of credit, as long as they were the dominant 
figures in the village economy. As described in Chapter 1, apart from these mudalalis, 
there were money-lenders operating on a lower scale of capital, who lent only to known 
and trusted individuals. There was, besides, the revolving system of credit popularly 
known as the seettu (this system is prevalent in many parts of South Asia). It is a form 
of forced saving where several individuals contribute to a fund, on a monthly basis, and 
a particular individual gets this lump sum by lottery or by auction. The big problem 
with the seettu is that one must have a regular income in order to make the monthly 
contribution. Fishing households in Sinhapura have been loathe to get into this venture 
as their income is too erratic. Consequently, it is among the High Street traders that the 
seettu is in common use.   
 
Money-lenders and the seettu were inadequate to service the volume of capital that a 
fast-growing economy required. For a brief period, during the 1980s and 1990s, 
commercial banks attempted to provide credit for communities of this type. However, in 
the aftermath of recurrent defaults in the repayment, of loans commercial banks 
abandoned their policy of lending to such small-scale communities.  
 
It is at this point that microfinance attempted to supply the dearth of capital. The 
rhetoric, both at the national and local level, has been that microfinance performs a 
secondary role: it represents borrowings by women with the object of generating small 
avenues of income which are purely supplementary to the primary income of the 
household. In Sinhapura the reality has been very different. From the early 1990s it is 
the microfinance loan which promoted the growth of the village economy by, primarily, 
providing the fishing industry with the capital that it required.  
Over the last 50 years, therefore, the profile of Sinhapura’s economy has changed 
considerably and by the time of the tsunami there had been substantial diversification. 
The economy, at the time of the tsunami, displayed the following characteristics: the 
whole character of the fishing industry had changed; coir making was no longer an 
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important household activity; the High Street was providing a much greater range and 
variety of goods and services; there was variety in the avenues of external employment; 
and, expansion in the access to education. These characteristics resonate with the 
features identified by Long (2001) when he observes that the engagement in multiple 
enterprises; regional economic diversification; ‘low economic integration’; the small 
scale of economic activity; and, a low level of capitalisation of the economy are features 
of economies of this type.  
Politics, Caste and Resources 
The resources available to Sinhapura in terms of the fisheries industry, trade and 
employment have been described. I now turn to the connection between caste identity 
and party political affiliation in the election of an individual to representative office, at 
the national and local level. An account of this historical narrative, the political trends of 
the south-western region during the last 80 years, is important because this interaction 
between caste and politics was an avenue through which Sinhapura and other 
communities of the region accessed resources relating to education, employment, trade, 
infrastructure and, fisheries. The interaction also had implications for the fact that 
Sinhapura was once a centre for the region and the commercial advantages of this. 
Successive constitutional changes have had an effect on institutions, on political 
representation and on the ways in which resources were accessed. In the following 
section I will describe the way in which the everyday decisions of the people of 
Sinhapura were influenced by the constitutional changes which took place, and the way 
that these changes shaped the social processes in the village.123  
Sinhapura had been a prominent regional centre prior to 1977 but had lost that 
prominence by the time of the tsunami, when, for instance, government institutions such 
as the Town Council (TC) and the regional police station were moved out of Sinhapura 
                                                          
123 This discussion is based, largely, on informant groups as well as on sessions with key informants in 
the village: Gunasena a long standing member of the Communist Party and an active campaigner in 
several elections, both local and national; Somaratne a strong supporter of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party 
(SLFP) and a campaigner in many elections; Abeypala a strong supporter of the United National Party 
(UNP); Bernard the ‘village historian’. It is also based on interviews with the Chairman and members of 
the Urban Council; a member of the southern Provincial Council; officials of both the District Secretariat 
and the Divisional Secretariat; an interview with a former Personal Secretary to Sirimavo Bandaranaike, 
Prime Minister of Sri Lanka 1960-1964 &1970-1977; an interview with a Special Advisor to the former 
President of Sri Lanka, Mahinda Rajapaksha; an interview with a Member of Parliament at various stages 
between 1965 and 1994.  
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and relocated in Hikkaduwa.124 Up to 1977, it was members of the Communist Party, 
from Sinhapura, who had dominated the Town Council. Resources were, consequently, 
channelled to Sinhapura and, with Sinhapura established as the administrative centre for 
the region, trade and employment flourished. People from the surrounding communities 
had to come to these two institutions to transact government business. All this added to 
the services that Sinhapura provided for the people of the region.   
With the relocation of the Town Council and the police station to Hikkaduwa, 
Sinhapura lost its importance as a regional centre, lost its volume of business and 
received, for example, little in the way of community resources from the central 
government. With the growth of its tourist trade, Hikkaduwa was becoming important 
as a commercial centre. At the same time Kotigama, to the south of Sinhapura, 
dominated by the Salagama caste, engaged in a sustained effort to challenge the 
dominance which Sinhapura had exercised up to that time, and to establish itself as the 
significant township of the region. This was done by affluent caste members, residing in 
other parts of the country, who extended their support for the community by way of 
donations. For instance, the educational facilities of the Kotigama school came, in time, 
to be far superior to those of the two schools located in Sinhapura. With, moreover, the 
institution of a parliamentary seat, Kotigama gained prominence in the area. Thus, both 
Hikkaduwa and Kotigama had, relatively, large inflows of resources in the course of the 
1970s.  
 
At the time of the tsunami, in 2004, the role played by politicians of specific castes in 
helping local communities to access national resources had been downgraded. This had 
much to do with the constitution promulgated in 1978 which involved the abolition of 
the single member constituency, as the unit of representation, and the diminished 
importance of national politicians in local communities. 
The relationship between caste, politics (party political affiliation) and resources, a 
significant feature of this coastal area had its origin in the system of government 
instituted by the Donoughmore Constitution of 1931. This was representative 
government with universal adult franchise. The Donoughmore Constitution instituted a 
set of constituencies some of which, particularly on the south-western coast, were 
                                                          
124 The Town Council (TC) was the local government institution for the region.  
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heavily dominated by one caste. Sinhapura, like many similar communities on the coast, 
then had to contend with two new types of personalities: a member of the legislature in 
whose electorate Sinhapura was located; and, the supporters of this personality, in 
Sinhapura, who came to be, by virtue of this relationship, political and community 
leaders. Notions of political support and the political patronage which could be claimed 
for this support, began to have currency in this as well as in other constituencies, not 
long after the Donoughmore style of government had been established (Senaratne, 
1970).  
1947 
 
The Soulbury Constitution of 1947 was the framework within which independence was 
granted by the United Kingdom, in 1948. Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) became fully 
independent, as a dominion, within the British Commonwealth. The single member 
constituency of the Donoughmore Constitution, with the seat as the electoral unit, 
except in a few multi-member constituencies, was retained under the Soulbury 
Constitution. In some instances multi-member constituencies were introduced to 
accommodate ethnic and caste interests, in a non-homogeneous geographical area. In 
certain parts of the country the final shape of constituencies was influenced by the 
lobbying of particular castes, to secure constituencies in which there was sufficient 
representation for these castes. This demand for caste-based constituencies was 
especially strong on the south-western coast. Thus, the single member constituencies 
were shaped in such a way that they were, largely, single caste and were represented in 
parliament by an individual from the same caste. Caste was, therefore, an important 
aspect of the linkage to national politicians. The MP was the important political figure 
and the mediator between the electorate and the central government.  
 
The MP was the link through which central government resources flowed into villages 
like Sinhapura. When a new technology, such as the outboard engines, was promoted by 
the government, the MP played a critical role in ensuring that Sinhapura received loans 
for the purchase of engines over and above, perhaps, what should have been its due 
share. Similarly, the MP’s support was sought in securing places in the prominent 
schools of the region. The hope was that attendance at these schools would enable 
students to excel at examinations, and secure employment or admission to universities 
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or entry into the professions. A recommendation from one’s MP would often pave the 
way to gainful employment in government service. Thus, the MP was a critical figure in 
the access to resources, linked to Sinhapura by the fact that he was a member of the 
same caste as the people of Sinhapura.    
Through the caste association with the local MP, individuals in Sinhapura were able to 
cultivate contacts with national politicians such as Pieter Keuneman, of the Communist 
Party, who was the Minister of Housing for the majority of the 1970s. These linkages 
were important to both sides: for national politicians it related to the political support 
base at the local level; for local individuals it was contact with an influential person who 
could be deployed to realise various aspirations. At election time the local supporters 
had to canvass votes for the candidate and, in general, to play the role of client. In 
return, they could ask for favours from the local MP, who might, if the request was 
serious enough, extend his patronage to mobilise the influence of the relevant national 
politician. People like Gunasena became powerful people in the community, at a 
comparatively young age, through the political connection with Keuneman. Gunasena 
told me that he used his connection with Keuneman to get his sons admitted into 
Devananda College, a prominent school in the town of Ambalangoda to the north of 
Sinhapura.    
In the years after the institution of the Soulbury Constitution, the demands on MPs, 
throughout the country, escalated. Admission to favoured schools became increasingly 
difficult and support from the MP was a necessity. With increased demand, 
opportunities for employment grew scarce. Here, again, recommendation from the MP 
was useful and even a necessity in the case, sometimes, of government service. Relief 
for the poor and disbursements to those affected by a disaster were processed more 
speedily and equitably, if the MP was involved or took an interest. Infrastructure 
expenditure for, e.g., bridges and roads, would be sanctioned depending, primarily, on 
the priorities of the MP for the area.  
An episode, in the early 1970s, illustrates the way in which a local community, 
manoeuvring in a caste dominated electorate, was able to move national politicians. 
Premachandra Mudalali of the Salagama caste, from Kotigama, was eyeing a plot of 
land in Sinhapura, on the Sinhapura/Kotigama boundary, with a view to purchase. This 
was opposed by people in Sinhapura who had, by then, emerged as political leaders 
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owing to their connections with the regional MP who, in turn, had connections to the 
then Minister of Housing, Pieter Keuneman. The Minister intervened to acquire the land 
in question for the State, and Premachandra Mudalali’s aspirations were thwarted. 
Eventually, a housing scheme was constructed on the land in question. These houses 
were given to people, from both within and outside the village, who were in need of 
housing. This episode illustrates the way in which the local-national linkage was 
activated, in a time of ‘crisis’, through the caste connection with the MP. Local leaders, 
deploying their caste connections, appealed to the MP and, through him, secured the 
backing of the Minister for their cause. Thus, Sinhapura acquired a community resource  
--  a housing scheme  --  through the working out of caste political affiliations.    
1978 
The 1978 Constitution brought about radical change in the electoral system. The single 
member constituency was abolished. Instituted in its stead was the system of 
Proportional Representation (PR) with the district as the electoral unit, electing 10-12 
members to parliament from each district. In the Galle District the voting patterns since 
1978 have resulted in the 10 parliamentary seats being distributed between the castes in 
the following manner: 7 Govigama; 1 Vahumpura; 1 Salagama; and, 1 Karava. One 
consequence of this was that an MP no longer had a small electorate which he 
represented in parliament; he, together with his colleagues, became the MP for a whole 
district. He now stood for a much more diffused and larger electorate. There were no 
longer small, caste-based electorates which were represented by a person of the same 
caste. MPs had to seek support from beyond their previous caste-based electorates. 
While people in communities such as Sinhapura continued to seek the assistance of 
fellow caste members holding political office, it became necessary for them to seek the 
patronage of politicians who belonged to other castes.   
The post-1978 system of Proportional Representation is weighted in favour of the castes 
which are in the majority in any region. When a district is taken as a whole, the security 
which a small, single caste electorate had, in being able to elect a member of its caste, 
directly, to parliament is no more. With the expansion of the electorate into a whole 
district, rather than a caste dominated single member constituency, the consequence has 
been that a large majority of the ten MPs who represent the district are from the 
majority caste  --  in the case of the Galle district the majority, Govigama caste. Thus, it 
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is the Govigama majority vote which gets the majority of candidates, from the 
Govigama caste, into parliament, in this region. The implication of this is that minority 
castes like the Karava and the Durava do not have a caste link to the majority of the 
MPs of the Galle district. They have lost their capacity to access the resources which 
they had previously, through the caste MP in the single member constituency. 
Therefore, they feel marginalised and unrepresented at the national level.  
Villages like Sinhapura had, now, a wider circle of political patrons. Those whose caste 
loyalties had precluded them from supporting political candidates from other castes, 
now found themselves in a dilemma, since in the wider constituency there were 
candidates from other castes who might, eventually, be their representatives in 
parliament. Candidates in the Galle district needed votes from, for example, Sinhapura, 
if they were to get elected as representatives for the new, expanded electorate. In order 
to increase their network of political clients, candidates had to be ready to come to the 
aid of individuals irrespective of caste. Equally, the voter decided that under this system 
it would be politic to support more than one MP. It was at this point that party loyalties 
began to supersede caste affiliation. The leading supporters of an MP, in the single 
member constituency, who had had some influence in the electorate by virtue of their 
connection with the MP, and who had been the first people to be approached when 
voters needed some special assistance from the MP, now began to lose some of the 
importance which they had previously had. My older informants, such as Gunasena, 
bemoaned the abolition of the old system whereby ‘their' MP could be lobbied for a 
variety of resources and services. They were of the view that the lack of action by the 
Ministry of Fisheries vis-a-vis the harbour in Sinhapura, from 1995 to 2008, was due to 
the lack of connection between the community and national politicians and the, 
consequent, lack of pressure exerted by the community on politicians at the national 
level. After 1978, in the eyes of the people in small communities such as Sinhapura, the 
MP came to be seen as a remote and distant personage.    
The following episode illustrates the diminished role played by caste in the sphere of 
political influence, post-1978. In the mid-1980s Sumanasena, of the Karava caste, had a 
son who had made an application to join the police force. Sumanasena was, at that time, 
a teacher in a prominent school in Galle and lived on the landside in Sinhapura. In 
earlier times he would have approached the MP, who represented the caste dominated 
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constituency to which Sinhapura belonged. In the new circumstances there were several 
MPs, most of them not from the Karava caste, who could be approached to intercede on 
behalf of his son. In the event, he chose an MP who was not of the Karava caste, to 
which Sinhapura belongs, but with whom he had established a political connection with, 
as it turned out, only partial success. Sumanasena’s son was in fact eventually recruited 
to the police force. Though it may not have been as a result of the non-Karava MP’s 
intervention, what is significant is the fact that Sumanasena felt that he had to seek 
support outside his own caste affiliation.    
 
In the pre-1978 period (from 1931 to 1978) many constituencies, particularly those of 
the south-western coast, were dominated by a single caste and a member of this caste 
was the member of the legislature. He was the patron and the line of patronage operated 
on caste lines. Thus, the caste politics linkage was a significant avenue through which 
Sinhapura accessed resources relating to education, employment, trading opportunities 
and fishing. When this situation changed in 1978 the new, enlarged electorate had both 
MPs and voters from different castes. MPs saw the advantage of having clients (voters) 
from other castes. Voters, too, sought patrons other than those from their own castes. As 
Dilesh Jayantha (1990) asserts patronage on bases other than caste has been, post-1978, 
the potent force in political allegiance.     
 
1987 
  
In 1987 local government institutions underwent a radical re-structuring, in terms of the 
13th Amendment to the 1978 Constitution.125 With this amendment Sinhapura and 
similar communities experienced a further change. A new type of local politician came 
on the scene to fill the vacuum created by the distancing of the national MP from his 
small, post-1978, constituency. More power and resources were given to the Provincial 
Councils (PCs), nine in number, as well as to the other tiers of local government  --  the 
Municipals Councils (MCs), the Urban Councils (UCs), and the Pradeshiya Sabhas 
(PSs). The representatives to these bodies are elected in a manner similar to that of the 
                                                          
125 With this legislation previous local government bodies such as Village Committees (VCs) and Town 
Councils (TCs) were reconstituted under a new entity, the Pradeshiya Sabha (PS).     
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national parliament and their operation is on the basis of legislative enactments. The 
southern Provincial Council comprises the districts of Galle, Matara and Hambanthota.  
 
With the 13th Amendment, the remoteness of the MPs began to be compensated for by 
the far more accessible local government politicians. Local objectives and aspirations 
could now be realised through these new arrangements. For example, when a road was 
required in Sinhapura to connect the Coir Factory with the High Street, it was the local 
government politicians who constructed this road, drawing on the local government 
budget for the purpose. Thus, local government rose in importance, in local affairs, and 
the central role of the national MP was further compromised. Caste linkages with local 
government politicians began to be activated and caste became, once again, important, 
this time in local rather than politics.  
 
Broader objectives, however, which required the mobilisation of forces at the national 
level could not as easily be achieved. Bringing pressure to bear on the national system, 
on issues such as the harbour in Sinhapura which required action at the national level, 
remained problematic. Local politicians were not sufficiently powerful, at the national 
level, and there was no single MP with special responsibility for this community for 
whom, therefore, lobbying his national colleagues on the matter of the harbour would 
have been a significant issue. Briefly, the functions performed by the MP, in the single 
member constituency, of lobbying parliament on behalf of his constituency for changes 
and for resources that were required, were still not being performed by anyone. 
 
This description of regional caste politics which I have outlined, has some resonance 
with Subramanian’s (2009) account of the interaction between caste and politics in the 
Kanyakumari district in India. In southern India, during the post-independence period, 
politics and economic development have emphasised the division between inland and 
fishing communities. Subramanian writes about the contestation between agrarian 
castes, such as the Nadars, and coastline castes, such as the Catholic Mukkuvars. Her 
argument is that due to shifts in the organisation of social power and caste status, the 
Mukkuvars have a marginalised position vis-a-vis the inland, agrarian castes, which 
have come to be the politically dominant caste of the region. In Sinhapura, due to the 
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shifts in electoral arrangements, the Karava caste has become marginalised, in terms of 
political power, vis-a-vis both the inland Govigama and the coastline Salagama.  
 
This chapter describes the types of resources which were available to Sinhapura, 
historically, and the ways in which these resources were accessed. Government 
initiatives in the sphere of technology had had an impact on the role of fisheries in the 
village economy. Fishing had become more lucrative and this, together with the 
increase of income from external employment, had led to a larger volume of High Street 
trade. The other avenue through which resources had become available to this 
community was through political avenues which were accessed through the caste 
linkage.   
 
In the next section I draw upon the context described above, in order to analyse the 
social processes in Sinhapura. The impact of the tsunami on these processes is analysed 
in Chapters 4,5 and 6.    
The Social Processes of Sinhapura 
At the time of the tsunami, different types of households were utilising the resources 
described in the previous section, in different ways, in order to realise their aspirations. 
They were doing this in terms of their capital, the consequent capacity, and the alliances 
available to them. It is with the essential features of this process and with the categories 
of households that result, that I am concerned.  
The categorisation of households in Sinhapura which follows, is based on occupation, 
sources of income, and networks of alliance, i.e., capital and capacity. It is also based on 
patterns of consumption; behaviour; ideology; lifestyle; and, aspiration.  
The Households of Multi-Day Boat Owners 
There were fifteen households which were those of the owners of multi-day boats. The 
multi-day boat was buttressed by other businesses such as fish trading. All of these 
individuals had advanced to the ownership of the multi-day boat from the ownership of 
two to three wallams. Some had bought their boats, in the early 1990s when the 
government introduced these craft. They received the boat through the fisheries co-
operative, and were among those who had the right political connections. Others raised 
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the initial capital themselves. When it came to the operation of the boat many found that 
profitability was an issue. Expenditure was often as high as income. Those who 
continued to operate the boat were those whose other businesses could ‘carry’ this one 
during lean times. The individuals who did not have such businesses to support this 
venture were struggling, both to repay the finance on the boat and to provide the 
running costs of fuel and frequent repairs to nets and engines.  
The aspiration of the owners of these craft, was to enter the big league of fishing which 
would place them amongst the ‘big’ businessmen of the region, bringing with it a 
particular lifestyle.126 This lifestyle involved an imposing residence with furniture and 
fittings to match.  It also involved dining in the restaurants of Hikkaduwa and Galle and 
travel around Sri Lanka. Many of these multi-day boat owners had connections with 
local government politicians and even, on occasion, with politicians at the national 
level. Wijeratne Mudalali, for instance, was a multi-day boat owner who had cultivated 
connections with politicians both at the local and national level. In the event of the 
launch of a political career these contacts could be utilised.127  
The women of these households were not very visible in village life and did not 
participate in the microfinance societies of Sinhapura. The children were being educated 
in prominent regional schools. The idea was that this education would lead to lucrative 
employment.  Marriages were planned with suitable families of similar lifestyle. 
Wijeratne Mudalali had arranged a marriage between his daughter and the son of the 
owner of a bus, from the landside. He considered this a marriage of equal status, in 
terms of social position in the village, and expressed great satisfaction with the match. 
These households were all located on the seaside. Their kinfolk were also their 
neighbours.  
All this is illustrated by the household of Palitha Mudalali. At the time of the tsunami, 
he lived in a house on the seaside with his wife, his mother-in-law and his eight 
children, regarded as palatial in village terms. Palitha Mudalali came from a family 
which had been involved in the fis9heries industry for several generations. He had 
graduated to the ownership of a multi-day boat through the ownership of several 
                                                          
126 Before the advent of the multi-day boat the ‘big men’ of the fishing industry were the owners of the 
large nets (madal).  
127 One of the important Provincial Councillors of the south had been a multi-day boat owner before his 
involvement in local government. 
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wallams. His grandfather had been a jadi mudalali. Three of his sons were crew 
members on his multi-day boat and his wallams, while the younger children were 
attending school in Galle. Though the older children were involved in his fisheries 
enterprise, Palitha Mudalali was very anxious that the younger ones should be educated 
and pursue occupations unrelated to fishing.   
Palitha Mudalali had connections with local government politicians, with officials of the 
regional bureaucracy, and with the fisheries industry more generally, i.e., traders and 
other multi-day boat owners from Hikkaduwa and Galle. Altogether, his extra-village 
connections were far more important to him than those within the village. For his two 
older daughters he aspired to marriages with families with a similar level of income, 
similar lifestyle and similar aspirations for the ‘good life’. To this extent, as a family, 
their interactions with their neighbours, in fact with the community as a whole, was 
limited. This is illustrated by their attitude to the temple. Involvement in temple 
activities was minimal, and it was clear that the temple played little role in their 
aspirations regarding the future.   
As a family, this household enjoyed dining out at the restaurants of Hikkaduwa and 
Kotigama, and regular trips to various parts of the country. Gold was regarded as an 
investment and worn by his wife and daughters.  
Palitha Mudalali told me that he had discouraged his wife from getting involved in any 
of the microfinance organisations in the village. He stated that this resource was for 
people in need. Before the tsunami, he had been able to supply his wife and children 
with all their needs and, therefore, saw no reason for them to get involved in this 
activity. This household was aspiring to a lifestyle which placed a high degree of 
emphasis on conspicuous consumption: an imposing residence and a style of 
consumption which included expenditure on consumer goods, on dining out, and on 
travel.   
The Households of Wallam Owners 
The owners of wallams had started by purchasing one craft  --  often with capital, in part 
borrowed from kinfolk, or from money lenders or from microfinance organisations. The 
accrued profit from the first wallam would be used to buy a second and then a third, and 
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so on.128 Of these three sources microfinance was, overwhelmingly, the most common 
source. At this point, there was usually some diversification of investment in terms of 
purchasing a three wheeler and/or land in the interior. In this group, at the time of the 
tsunami, there were people at different stages of wallam ownership  --  one, two, three 
or more  --  with the addition of diversification once a couple of boats had been 
purchased. Whatever the stage of the trajectory, these households were carrying a heavy 
debt on the craft, confident that the income from fishing would enable them to repay it 
without difficulty. Their aspiration was to increase their ownership of wallams and then 
to graduate to the investment in other ventures. Apart from this, the greatest ambition of 
these wallam owners was to educate their children to enable them to secure desirable 
employment, and to free them from dependence on fishing for their livelihood.  
Jayatissa owned three wallams and lived on the seaside with his wife, three sons and 
daughter. He had inherited his house from his father and as his finances improved, had 
renovated it, making it was one of the nicest ones on the seaside. His kin as well as that 
of his wife, were their neighbours. He had been a crewman in his youth, and through 
saving and microfinance loans had bought his wallams, one by one. His wife was active 
in several microfinance societies and this was an important network as far as his 
household was concerned. Investment in further ventures was their main aspiration and 
the heavy involvement in microfinance was the pathway to achievement.  
Jayatissa and his wife were keen to educate their children and to promote their 
advancement through this avenue. One of his sons was a certified cricket umpire at the 
local league level, at the time of the tsunami, and his daughter had just completed her 
A’level examination. The focus was the advancement of their own household and, as 
such, the involvement in community activities was minimal. The Jayatissa family 
participated only in those ritual activities of the temple which they felt were obligatory. 
Beyond that the temple played a marginal role in their lives. Dining out and trips of 
leisure to other parts of the country were important to this household.   
The Households of Crew Members 
There were 254 crew members in Sinhapura at the time of the tsunami.129 Some 
engaged in small businesses as a side line, while others had outrigger canoes from 
                                                          
128 26 individuals owned one wallam while 34 wallams were owned by those who had two or more.  
129 This was the figure at the time of the tsunami. Source: survey conducted by the Trust.  
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which they derived a supplementary income. In one category were the crew members 
whose wives had some assets, from a dowry, or by way of income, deriving from 
cinnamon land in the interior, or from some form of employment. Crew members in this 
category were enabled to save their earnings from crewing towards the purchase of a 
wallam. With the others, there was no surplus and their income was absorbed almost 
entirely by the daily expenses of the household. The purchase of a wallam remained a 
distant aspiration, as they did not have the capacity to invest the required capital. For 
crew members as a whole, the education of children was a heavy item of expenditure. 
At the lowest level of this occupation were the boys. Aged 15-18, they helped to beach 
the boats and performed those tasks which are necessary in the preparation of a boat 
when it puts out to sea.130 They hoped to become crewmen through this 
‘apprenticeship’. These boys came from the most disadvantaged families of the village. 
Their education had been cut short unlike in the case of boys from the more established 
fishing families who, at the time of the tsunami, were being encouraged to aspire to 
occupations other than fishing.  
Bennet was a crew member who had three young sons at the time of the tsunami. He 
and his family lived on the seaside. He had eloped with his wife when they were both 
teenagers and, therefore, she brought no dowry to the marriage. She ran a small, home-
based business making stringhoppers (a breakfast food made with flour) which she sold 
to neighbouring households. She told me that with this income she was able to cover the 
day’s living expenses, in their most basic form, in terms of food and transport. Bennet’s 
earnings looked after their other expenses, particularly the education of the children. 
What was left over was put aside towards the purchase of a wallam, at some point in the 
distant future. This saving was in the form of gold jewellery, which was as much 
insurance as adornment. As Bennet’s wife told me saving towards the wallam was 
difficult as the education of the boy ‘swallowed up’ the money. Bennet’s wife was 
involved in several microfinance societies and the loans were being used for various 
consumption purposes, especially the children’s education. The important networks, as 
far as this household was concerned, were the neighbourhood and the fisheries network. 
As with the household of Jayatissa, the temple was marginal to their lives.  
 
                                                          
130 Their number was 110 at the time of the tsunami. Source: survey conducted by the Trust.  
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The Households of the High Street Traders 
At the time of the tsunami, there were 57 persons engaged in business on the High 
Street. It was usual to have two or three ventures running concurrently. Some had either 
inherited the premises or the business. In the case of others the capital for the ventures 
had derived from previous employment, from migrant labour in the Middle-East or from 
small bank loans. In addition to retail businesses, some also provided a service such as 
an eating house. Many of these individuals were looking to other forms of investment  -
-  the purchase of a wallam the operation of which was handed over to a skipper and his 
crew; the purchase of a three wheeler hired out on commission basis to another 
individual; the purchase of land in the interior in order to build a house, very often as 
dowries for their daughters. Some of these traders were involved, either openly or 
covertly, in some level of money-lending.  
Apart from this, these households invested in the purchase of a variety of household 
goods as well as in the purchase of gold, in the form of jewellery. Their domestic 
rituals, such as marriage, and age-attainment by girls were celebrated on a much grander 
scale than was the practice with the fishing households. This was their particular form 
of consumption. Dining out, for instance, was not a form of consumption indulged in by 
these households. In fact, they denigrated this activity and saw it as an example of the 
‘reckless spending’ of the fishing households.   
The celebration of their domestic rituals on this scale involved regular contact with the 
temple and the temple was at the centre of their lives. By taking part in the ritual 
activities of the temple their attempt was to demonstrate that their lives were lived 
according to the tenets of Buddhism. The attempt was to show up and distance 
themselves from the fishing households whose major economic activity and, on 
occasion, public behaviour were derided as violating the tenets of Buddhism. To this 
end pilgrimages were an important activity to places of religious veneration such as 
Kataragama a shrine dedicated to the God Skanda, located in the deep south.  
The High Street traders had external connections with those who facilitated their trading 
ventures. They found it useful, besides, to maintain some political contacts with, for 
instance, local government politicians so that these could be called upon to address the 
difficulties which crop up every now and again in the management of a business.  
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The aspirations of the High Street traders and their families were founded on notions of 
respect and propriety. This was enunciated in opposition to the lifestyle of the fishing 
households. This involved economic advancement in order to provide a satisfactory 
education for their children such that they could secure commensurate employment and 
make marriages of equal, or higher status. These households aspired to living in a 
vadagath (respectable) way in the style of usas thathvaye minissu (people of high 
status).  
Wijepala Mudalali had four businesses: a bakery on the High Street; the provision of 
luxury seafood products to the tourist resorts in Hikkaduwa; the wholesale supply of 
fish to retailers in the Kandy fish market, in the Central Province; and, the sale of dried 
fish in Sinhapura and the surrounding villages. He told me that he had built up the 
businesses using a judicious combination of bank loans and microfinance organisations. 
He also owned four wallams bought, as an income generating investment, with the 
profits from his other businesses. Furthermore, he was lending money to some of his 
customers, although he did not consider himself a ‘money-lender’ in a formal sense. He 
did not regard this as a ‘business’ but as a way of helping out his customers when they 
were in a temporary financial difficulty. This activity, although a sideline, was in fact 
financially quite lucrative. Wijepala Mudalali had an extensive network through his 
numerous business activities, in Sinhapura, in the Central Province and in the villages of 
the area.   
Wijepala Mudalali lived on the High Street, in a comparatively luxurious house, with 
his business premises adjacent it. He had four children, two boys and two girls, who 
were all schooling except for his eldest daughter. They participated regularly in the 
ritual activities of the temple and were major donors to the temple. Their connections 
were with other households on the High Street and, to a lesser extent, those on the 
landside. The recent ownership of the four walllams had, however, meant that some 
connections with seaside households were in the process of being established. At the 
time of the tsunami, this household saw itself as advancing steadily forward with a high 
degree of entrepreneurial activity. Wijepala Mudalali and his wife were very concerned 
about the children’s education and about their older daughter’s marriage.  
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The Households of the Service Providers 
There were 23 service providers living mainly on the landside with a few dwelling on 
the High Street. It was usual to have a qualification from a Technical College, followed 
by an apprenticeship with a senior practitioner. Their levels of income were lower than 
those of the High Street traders, nor did they have extensive, external, particularly 
political, contacts. Their business was such that from time to time an expensive item of 
equipment would have to be purchased. They did not have the capacity to pursue 
avenues of investment such as the purchase of wallams, or three wheelers, or land in the 
interior. As with the High Street traders, the temple figured prominently in their lives 
and the education of children was regarded as very important.    
Wasantha provided the services of a carpenter to this and other communities of the 
region. He operated this venture from premises on the High Street, next door to the 
eating house of his sister, Sushila. His wife’s dowry had included some cinnamon land 
in the interior, which gave this couple a separate income. The property on the High 
Street had been gifted to him by his father, upon Wasantha’s marriage. The ground floor 
was his workshop while the living quarters were on the storey above. Wasantha had 
trained in carpentry at a Technical College in Colombo and had apprenticed with a 
senior carpenter in a township to the interior of Sinhapura. At the time of the tsunami 
Wasantha had established a reputation as a skilled and reliable carpenter and was 
investing in better equipment and expanding his business. His links with a wide circle of 
customers was an important network for this household. Most of the profits were being 
ploughed back into the business and this household exhibited few signs of conspicuous 
consumption. Participation in the activities of the temple was important. Wasantha’s 
two sisters and three brothers lived in close proximity, some on the High Street and 
others on the landside. Thus, the networks which were important for this household 
were those of the High Street and their kin. To this extent, this household was inward-
looking in the sense that their focus was, very much, Sinhapura. The aspiration was to 
build up the business and live in a vadagath manner.  
The Households of Persons Externally Employed 
Externally employed persons lived, for the most part, on the landside. Those employed 
in government, 74 in number, were in the armed services; the postal services; the 
railways; the medical service; the teaching service; and the bureaucracy. There were 
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104 individuals employed in the private sector  --  in the retail trade, in the tourist 
industry, and in other capacities such as the life-guards. Employment was secured on 
the basis of varying levels of education. Some also ran a home-based business. In both 
income and social position there was variety within this group. These were households 
which had no desire to be involved in the fishing industry, and did not have the capital 
to start a business. They had succeeded in utilising their education together with such 
external contacts as were within their reach, to obtain the types of external employment 
detailed above. The extra-village contacts which resulted from their employment was 
important for this category in a variety of ways: for instance, in getting children into 
regional schools. Those in government service felt that this gave them a social position 
which was respected throughout the country  --  a group of elite bureaucrats  --  and that, 
therefore, they were worthy of a special respect in the village. Their aim, much in the 
way of the High Street traders, was to live in a vadagath style. To this end there was a 
high degree of temple involvement. They placed a great emphasis on the education of 
their children and for this category the biggest item of household expenditure was 
education. The microfinance loan was often harnessed to achieve education-related 
objectives.  
Nayana worked as a nurse at the Karapitiya General hospital. Her husband, whose home 
village was Sinhapura, was attached to the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) as a 
Technical Officer. They lived on the landside and did not have many kinfolk in the 
village. The education of their three teenage children was their major concern. Nayana 
was a member of several microfinance societies and she told me that when she took a 
loan it was usually to fund some special educational need of her children. Living in a 
vadagath way was important to this household and to this end they were very involved 
in the affairs of the temple. Because of her nursing skill Nayana was much sought after 
in her neighbourhood and was, consequently, a person of some importance. My research 
assistant’s father had been a patient in the Karapitiya Heart Unit where Nayana was 
employed. As my research assistant told me, Nayana had been very helpful easing the 
traumatic experience for them in many ways. The networks which were important to 
this household were the neighbourhood and the external network resulting from 
employment. This was a household which was strongly pursuing education as the 
pathway to advancement, anchored to the temple and the norms and behaviour 
concomitant to it. 
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The Female-Headed Households 
There were female-headed households, where the husband as the main breadwinner was 
no longer in the picture, on the seaside as well as the landside. They were few in 
number. The woman would be found running a small business from home or doing a 
cottage craft, such as the weaving of coir mats, so that she could take care of the 
children and do the household chores while earning an income. It was most often some 
tragic occurrence which had lead to the loss of the male breadwinner. The women were 
anxious to maintain their independence and not become dependent on kin or 
neighbours. They had, however, to work very hard just to make ends meet. Their 
aspiration was to overcome the tragedy and to live in as vadagath a way as possible. 
These women saw education as the pathway out of their difficult circumstances, and 
provided all the encouragement that they could to their children. Much of their social 
contact with the community was through the temple. These households did not have the 
wherewithal for the repayment of loans and their involvement in the microfinance 
societies was, therefore, minimal. Nor did they have strong alliances which could be 
mobilised in times of crisis.  
Hiranthi had eloped at a very young age and lived with her husband and his family on 
the seaside. Her own family who were located on the High Street and the landside, had 
opposed the relationship because the young man was from a fishing household, and 
upon the elopement had cut off all connections with the young couple. Within three 
years of the marriage, however, Hiranthi’s husband was dead, the victim tragically of an 
incident of gang warfare in the area. Although a small house had been built for the 
young couple by her husband’s parents on their property, Hiranthi was left with an 
infant son with no visible means of support. Hiranthi started a grocery in her house with 
her husband’s grandmother residing with her to provide both company and help with the 
business. At the time of the tsunami, the business was a fledgling one although it was 
providing her with the day’s expenses. Her main aspiration, at this stage, was to secure 
her financial independence and, through this, the education of her child. Participation in 
community activities was in no way a priority for Hiranthi. All her efforts were directed 
towards the business and the upbringing of her son. Hiranthi had been a bright student 
who had shone in her studies while at school. She had eloped just before her O’level 
examination and, as she told me, now regretted her lost opportunities.  
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There were a few households of senior citizens supported by a daughter, either through 
external employment or through a home-based business. The parents sometimes had a 
small pension from minor government service. The daughter provided financial support 
and also played the role of carer. It was often the case that though there were other 
children, they did not share the responsibility for their parents, financially or otherwise. 
In fact, for the most part, they did not live in the village. The household aspiration was 
to live in as vadagath a way as the circumstances would allow, maintaining the good 
health of the elderly parents, and with the hope that a suitable marriage for the daughter 
would materialise.  
The Households of the Unavasara Dwellers 
The 18 unavasara households were the beach dwellers who lived near the boundary of 
the village with Kotigama. They were people from outside the village who had, eighteen 
years prior to the tsunami, come to the beach as squatters. They were permitted to 
continue through the intervention of a local government politician, on the understanding 
that this was a temporary measure and they would be given land and a house in the 
interior. This had not come to pass and they continued to live in Sinhapura where they 
were regarded with suspicion and, sometimes, outright, hostility. With little education 
and few skills they were eking out a precarious existence, living in houses which were 
little more than shacks. Casual work, which did not require any great skill, is what was 
available to them in Sinhapura and the surrounding villages. A few were crewmen. 
 
The unavasara neither had capital, of a financial nature, nor a special skill with which 
to lift themselves out of their circumstances. They felt that they were unwelcome in 
Sinhapura and that they were living on the beach on sufferance. Their main aspiration 
was to reside in a community where they were respected and welcome. 
Ranjanie lived with her family in a shack amongst the unavasara dwellings. Her 
husband was an itinerant fish trader and casual labourer and her son got work, on and 
off, as a temporary crewman. She was not very forthcoming about their antecedents. 
What she did tell me was that they had come to Sinhapura and squatted on the beach 
because it was rumoured that this was the way to get a house from the government. As a 
seamstress Ranjanie had developed a trade in the production of bedsheets. Her son had 
married a girl from another unavasara household, in much the same circumstances as 
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their own, and lived with Ranjanie and her husband. Their main contacts were with the 
other unavasara households. They felt unwelcome at the temple and had little 
participation in its rituals, ceremonies and activities. For example, they were not 
assigned duties for providing meals to the temple. The focus of their aspirations was the 
acquisition of a permanent residence in a settled community where they had rights and 
respect, and where they could earn a living in an acceptable manner.   
Households with Special Features 
There were some households in Sinhapura which, though falling into one of the eight 
categories described above, exhibited features which marked them off from other 
households in their category.  
There were the households where the husband and the wife contributed more or less 
equally to household income. In the case of the wife, this income was usually from 
external employment or from a lucrative cottage craft such as the weaving of coir mats. 
The women felt that one income was not sufficient to take the family in the direction 
that they wanted it to go and, furthermore, that the men lacked the energy, the 
enthusiasm and the drive to propel the household into a new level, in terms of lifestyle. 
The women were very active in steering the family in the ‘right’ direction, in terms of 
living in a vadagath style. Where the household had daughters, the aspirations centred 
upon a suitable marriage. The ability to purchase household goods and gold jewellery 
was important in this context. In addition, an educated girl with income-earning 
potential had enhanced prospects for marriage. These households were found on the 
seaside as well as on the landside. These families were among the lower income groups 
in the village. The energetic and proactive role of the woman in these households, was 
in marked contrast with the role played by the woman in the affluent fishing households 
or those of the High Street. There, the man would be making good money from fishing 
or from trade, while it was the part of the woman to confine herself to the domestic 
sphere with little say in the decision-making, oriented towards the future of the 
household.    
In Sinhapura it was men who sought overseas employment. With little education but 
with a skill such as driving or a training such as that for life-guards they went abroad to 
countries in the Middle-East, to Cyprus or to South Korea for periods of 2-3 years. With 
their earnings these young men supported the household back home. Connection with 
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someone who had influence with an employment agency, who could get them the job in 
the overseas country without the payment of heavy premiums, was essential. Their 
earnings, often as much as six or seven times the remuneration for comparable 
employment in Sri Lanka, was the factor which motivated them to endure a harsh 
climate and work environment; very basic and crowded living quarters; unfamiliar food 
and the isolation from kinfolk and the warmth of extended family life. These young men 
were from households which, in village terms, were far from affluent. The immediate 
need was to support the family in Sri Lanka with their remittances. Their aspirations 
centred on the family: to buy land and build a house; to start a business; to give their 
sisters in marriage with a dowry; to get married themselves on a secure economic basis; 
to support the education of younger siblings; and, to support elderly parents.    
 
In many of the categories mentioned above, there were women who were active in one 
or more microfinance societies. Though it was the woman who secured the loan it 
became part of the capital of the household. This capital was used to buy a wallam, an 
engine or nets, or to start or expand a business. It was also used for a variety of other 
purposes: to buy land in the interior; to finance the purchase of a three wheeler; to fund 
an educational purpose; to pursue a craft venture; to finance the expenses of a marriage 
ritual. Thus, at the time of the tsunami, the microfinance loan had come to be a source 
of credit for many people, in pursuing their different aspirations. Shirani, for instance, 
was a member of all seven microfinance organisations operating in the village at the 
time. At any given time, she had loans from several organisations which were then used 
for money-lending purposes and also to fund a seettu. While making this money ‘work’ 
for her she would use it to repay loans as they arose.      
 
*** 
 
It will be clear from the account presented above that the productive activity and the 
nature of the patterns of consumption of this community were directed towards the 
advance of the individual household: securing the material wealth of the household; 
educating children and establishing them in suitable occupations; arranging marriages. 
This is related to the fact that community feeling in Sinhapura, at the time of the 
tsunami, had been eroded by its diminution as a centre of importance. There were few 
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institutions which drew people together as a community  --  activities were oriented 
towards an economic purpose, and involved clusters of households. Therefore, there 
was little scope for community leadership. As the leaders of one generation passed away 
new ones had not emerged to fill their place. There was little for leaders to take up as a 
cause which would have united people and given them the feeling that community 
advancement was as important as personal advancement.    
 
This can be contrasted with neighbouring Kotigama, for instance, where the school was 
an important community focus and drew the support of those living in Kotigama, as 
well as those of the Salagama caste who had migrated out of Kotigama and advanced in 
the world.  
 
For the landside, living their lives in a vadagath way was very important and this 
lifestyle was epitomised by involvement in the activities of the temple, the pursuit of 
education, white collar (non-manual) employment and decorous behaviour. For this side 
of the village, the normative base of this lifestyle was located in the temple. In all their 
domestic rituals, such as age-attainment and marriage, the temple was accorded a 
significant place. This can be contrasted with the seaside. Here, the conspicuous forms 
of consumption that were considered important, lay in activities such as dining out and 
going on trips of leisure. A central component of the vadagath lifestyle, on the landside, 
was decorous behaviour. Behaving in a vadagath manner was considered very 
important and was a way in which these households differentiated themselves from the 
seaside  --  a marker of identity. A respectable, although not ostentatious, house, 
consumer goods, and discreet gold jewellery were all elements of this lifestyle. 
Marriage with families of equal or better social position, preferably from other villages, 
was important both in terms of the advance of the family and the alliances that this 
would create. The community was conscious of these distinctions and communicated 
them to me as an observer.  
 
On the landside, different types of people aspired to the vadagath lifestyle in different 
ways. The resources, or capital in Bourdieu’s terms, which were valued in this cultural 
context were accumulated in order to enhance capacity and social position (Douglas & 
Isherwood, 1996). It was the capacity to consume these resources which shaped and 
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defined aspiration, and which gave each household its vadagath orientation. The 
account above illustrates that this was an active process. Some households used their 
accumulated capital to accumulate more capital as, for instance, the investment in 
further entrepreneurial activities by High Street traders. Others, such as those externally 
employed, used their capital to educate their children; the returns here were obviously 
long-term. Yet others, spent their capital on consumer goods. Here the return was an 
immediate and visible improvement of social position; however, the capital was no 
longer available to accumulate further capital. Thus, it becomes clear that individuals 
and households were consuming resources, changing position in the social field and 
advancing in the social order, in their chosen ways.  
 
The lifestyle and behaviour of the fishing households was not regarded by those on the 
landside as being a vadagath one  --  a point often communicated to me. The taking of 
life in any form is against ahimsa, one of the cardinal tenets of Buddhism, and the 
income derived from an activity such as fishing was seen as ‘tainted’.131 The fishermen 
contested the assertion that their lifestyle was a non-vadagath one, on two bases, the 
pragmatic and the material. One of these was the amassing of material objects for the 
good life, rather than the display of piety and devotion by constant attendance at the 
temple. The other was the independence that the lucrative occupation of fishing gave the 
seaside. By virtue of their high incomes these households were less dependent than the 
landside, on government institutions and political connections for progress and 
achievement in their lives. In their assessment of social position, it was the advantage 
they possessed in terms of material wealth, and what could be done with this in terms of 
the accumulation of consumer goods, dining out and travel, that was stressed by the 
seaside. Furthermore, the dependence of the landside on the hierarchies of government 
service and corporate entities, was emphasised. While it was on the basis of their 
occupation, wealth and lifestyle that the fishing households asserted their superiority, it 
was, nevertheless, an object with them that their children should be educated enough to 
engage in occupations other than fishing and to hold their own in terms of the normative 
framework of the landside.   
 
                                                          
131 Ahimsa refers to the concept in Buddhist thought of respect towards all living things, and the 
avoidance of violence towards others, both in thought and in deed. Source: The Concise Oxford 
Dictionary, 9th Edition, 1995.  
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The landside and the seaside were dealing with two distinctly different sets of resources, 
had different aspirations and two distinct ideologies as illustrated by the account above. 
The fishing households stressed material wealth and the style of consumption that this 
wealth enabled. Opposed to this was the ideological framework of the landside, which 
purported to uphold the non-material side of life, based on a proper observance in daily 
life of the tenets of Buddhism. The competition between these two ideologies was 
displayed in everyday activities such as the organisation and conduct of the households; 
the participation in temple activities of the landside; in the leisure activities of the 
seaside. Neither ideology being dominant, gave the community an egalitarian aspect, 
since neither the landside nor the seaside was able, in fact, to vindicate their respective 
claims to social superiority.  
 
The conflict arising from the tension between the landside and the seaside was held in 
check by the fact that both sides were well aware that any full-blown conflict within 
Sinhapura could be exploited by Kotigama and Hikkaduwa. Thus, Sinhapura was held 
together by its reality as a political unit, in relation to the other units of this region. 
Caste was, of course, a significant factor in this identity. It is, therefore, as people of 
Sinhapura rather than as those of a fishing community, that they encountered others 
from the communities of the region and, for instance, competed for the access to 
government resources and institutions.   
 
The tension between the two sides of the village, in Sinhapura, resonates with Stirrat’s 
(1988) account of Ambakandawila, where he states that the arguments between the 
social groupings in the village (kattiyas) were arguments over relative status and that 
these were worked out in contexts such as the church, fishing societies and local 
government politics.  
 
Clearly, therefore, different categories of people in this community were exploiting 
different resources, oriented towards productive activities to increase their capital, with 
the concomitant enhancement of their capacities, with the intention of improving their 
social position and better pursuing their aspirations. A variety of connections and 
alliances were used by individuals and households in furthering their exploitation of 
resources: the alliances of neighbourhood and kin; business and trade connections; caste 
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and politics; networks of government service, fisheries and tourism. While the two sides 
of the village placed the aspirational emphasis on different things  --  one side placed the 
emphasis on what they designated the vadagath lifestyle, while the other side placed the 
emphasis elsewhere  --  as far as both sides were concerned, it is the behaviour of 
different types of people, the resources that they exploited and the aspirations that they 
pursued, in terms of their capacities, which came to constitute what I refer to as the 
social processes of Sinhapura.  
The Impact of the Tsunami on the households of Sinhapura  
On 26 December 2004 many of the multi-day boats were not out at sea since it was a 
poya (full moon) day. They were berthed in the harbours of Hikkaduwa and Galle 
where they suffered heavy damage.132 As the rich men of the community, the multi-day 
boat owners found themselves left with drastically reduced incomes almost overnight. 
Their enterprises were ones which depended on the generation of high incomes to 
service the heavy loans which these boats carried. It was a great blow when the capacity 
to generate such incomes was lost. Wallam owners, though the scale was much less, 
suffered losses of capital; drastic reduction in income; and the consequent inability to 
repay their loans. Crew members, too, lost their income and savings.  
The traders and service providers on the High Street had their businesses severely 
disrupted. They lost capital and income and the capacity to restock their stores. Their 
enterprises too carried a heavy load of debt and the repayment of loans now became a 
problem which reduced them to despair.  
With those engaged in external employment the picture was a varied one. Living for the 
most part on the landside, their dwellings and property were largely undamaged and, by 
and large, they continued to receive their earnings from employment. There were those, 
however, who were working in the tourist industry who suffered loss of income so that 
day to day living became problematic.       
The unavasara lost their homes and all their belongings as the flimsy shacks in which 
they lived, on the beach, were washed away by the tsunami waves. The demand for their 
labour ceased abruptly: in the wake of the disaster the residents of Sinhapura did not 
                                                          
132 Fishermen in Sri Lanka avoid going to sea on a poya (full moon) day because the belief is that on this 
day the catch will be poor. The full moon day, in Sri Lanka, is a day of Buddhist religious observance.  
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require the services of gardening, cleaning, coconut plucking, and the digging of coir 
retting pits. The unavasara were rendered homeless and had to take refuge in the 
temple.   
Compared to the simpler economies of neighbouring communities the economy of 
Sinhapura was, at the time of the tsunami, a diverse and growing one. In these terms, 
the losses of capital were large. When the first shock of the disaster had passed people 
had to come to terms with reality. Individuals had very little liquid cash; the owners of 
boats and traders had borrowed up to the limit of their repaying capacity; people on 
fixed incomes had little in savings given the heavy expenditure incurred by them on the 
education of their children. Even those unaffected by the disaster were unable to help 
those who were the immediate victims.   
Once the problems of living expenses and shelter had been, temporarily, solved the 
problem of debt repayment loomed large. The tsunami had struck, in the case of many, 
at a particular point in the borrowing cycle. Loans had been taken and were being paid 
back through the high earnings that were possible at the height of the fishing season. 
Despite the loss of capital and of income, the loans had to be repaid if people were not 
to face dire consequences under the law.  
The disaster was on such a scale, affecting coastal communities over a large swathe of 
the country, that the networks which the inhabitants of Sinhapura might otherwise have 
invoked could not in these circumstances come to their aid.  
What happened, then, after the tsunami in a community where the temple had a central 
importance in people’s lives where there was a heavy stress on the accumulation of 
capital; where the education of children was a paramount concern; where community 
activity was limited; and where the old-style community leaders were not to be found?  
The impact of the tsunami on Sinhapura is the focus of the chapters which follow: in 
Chapter 4, I describe the forms of state assistance and how those affected by the tsunami 
responded; in Chapter 5, I look at the initiatives of NGOs and responses at the 
community level; in Chapter 6, I attempt to identify the ways in which strategising by 
individuals and households was oriented towards recovery.  
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Chapter 4  --  The State Programmes 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I set out what I have identified as the social processes of 
Sinhapura. The way in which resources were utilised in the pursuit of aspirations and 
the tension between the competing ideologies and the lifestyles of the seaside and the 
landside, encapsulated the social processes of Sinhapura at the time of the tsunami. I 
also demonstrated the fact that the interaction between caste and politics, in the region 
in which Sinhapura is located, was important in the constitution of the social processes 
of this community and the sense in which Sinhapura had come to be a political, social 
and economic reality.   
In this chapter, my focus is the impact of the state programmes of relief and 
reconstruction, consequent upon the tsunami, on these social processes.  
At the time of the tsunami, Sinhapura’s relationship with the state had evolved as a 
result of various historical events. These events integrated the norms of the state with 
the culture of the community (Althusser, 2006; Gramsci, 2006) and a relationship was 
established within which day to day business could be transacted. The state had been 
visible in Sinhapura from colonial times, in the early decades of the 20th Century, when 
there was an Excise Office located in the village. Subsequently, there was the Town 
Council (TC) and the police  --  one, an institution of central government, and the other, 
one of local government. With the Donoughmore Constitution in 1931, it was the 
Member of the State Council who intervened on behalf of the community, to obtain 
better services from the state in return for their vote. In communities such as Sinhapura 
a sense of entitlement, vis-à-vis the rights in relation to the state, came into being. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, caste was an important feature of this process because 
the electorate, the village (Sinhapura), and the Member of the State Council were all of 
one caste.   
Over the years, therefore, the citizens of Sinhapura had developed a multi-faceted 
relationship with the state. This included treating the services provided by the state, at 
the central, regional and local level, as a pool of resources to be exploited in pursuing 
their aspirations (Fuller & Harriss, 2001). This is in accord with Spencer’s comment: 
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“For the villagers in Sri Lanka I worked with in the 1980s, the state was 
generally perceived as a source of resources (jobs, healthcare, land, contracts), a 
source of social capital (the prestige that follows either possession of a job, or 
exploitation of a privileged link to local politicians or officials), a source of 
oppression (the venal activities of the police), an arena for disputes (the courts, 
selective appeal to the police), and a screen on to which villagers could project 
their visions of their own future.” (Spencer:2007:141) 
The state was not perceived at the community level, therefore, as inaccessible or as a 
top-down entity (Das & Poole, 2004; Gupta & Sharma, 2006).  
Sinhapura had long since recognised and experienced the political modernity of the state  
--   its impact on the community through everyday practices and representations (Gupta 
& Sharma, 2006). In everyday terms, there were the regional and local institutions of 
the central government as well as local government; the police; the courts; and, the 
services of health, transport and education. Caste allegiance and patronage was 
intertwined with the exploitation of these resources. These institutions were infused 
with much in the way of local culture, at times violating some of the principles on 
which the institutions were expected to operate. For instance, the police played a part in 
the resolution of domestic quarrels and civil disputes though this was outside their scope 
of activity.    
There is the constant shifting and blurring of the boundaries between the state and 
society  --   for example, when the representatives of the state (bureaucrats) are also 
members of society and the distinctions between public concerns and private ones blur 
(Gupta, 1995; Gupta, 2012). In Sinhapura while these distinctions did, on occasion, 
become hazy because of the issues of patronage and caste, there were the boundaries of 
territory, defence and administration which were perceived as constituting the state 
(Fuller & Harriss, 2001). The state’s boundaries were being constantly emphasised and 
remade through Sinhapura’s interaction with the various representatives and institutions 
of the state.    
With the abolition of single member constituencies after the promulgation of the 
Constitution of 1978, the links between national level politicians and communities such 
as Sinhapura within the wider, district-level, multi-member electoral constituencies, had 
become tenuous. Furthermore, the shift of the Town Council and the police from 
Sinhapura to Hikkaduwa had taken place in the 1970s. As a result of these events, at the 
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time of the tsunami, Sinhapura had few leaders with connections to the state 
apparatus.133     
Unlike some of the smaller villages of the region, however, which were seen as 
marginal communities because of poverty, distance, insignificance and a limited 
contribution to the life of the region, Sinhapura was not regarded in this way because of 
the fact that some remnants of its days of importance remained.   
Due to the lack of contact between Sinhapura and the state apparatus, Members of 
Parliament (MPs) did not feel that they had an interest in involving themselves, to any 
great extent, in the programmes for the relief and regeneration of disaster-affected 
communities such as Sinhapura. Accordingly, on the south-western coast, they 
concentrated their efforts on relief programmes oriented towards the large 
constituencies of Galle, Matara and Hambanthota, into which two or more of the old 
single member constituencies had been amalgamated. In this context, it was as a 
community of the Karava caste, a community which felt itself to be in a vulnerable 
position when compared with the neighbouring village of Kotigama (a community of 
the Salagama caste), and with Hikkaduwa, a multi-caste community, economically 
diverse and by then established as an important seaside resort in the tourist industry, that 
Sinhapura interacted with the state institutions in the aftermath of the tsunami. The 
perception was that, as a community, it would have to fight hard if it was to receive its 
fair share of resources from the state.      
The state programmes to restore disaster-affected communities were directed at the 
compensation of the losses of individual households; the reconstruction of damaged 
infrastructure; and the resuscitation of the affected industries of tourism and fisheries. In 
its programmes to rehabilitate the households of tsunami-affected communities, the 
state adopted a policy of uniform prescriptions with regard to immediate relief. 
Differences between communities, as well as within them, in terms of wealth, income, 
occupation, demographic patterns, caste composition and political affiliation were not 
incorporated into the design of programmes. These programmes did not take into 
account the diversity of communities around the country, in these terms, and their 
specific needs. Furthermore, within communities there was no mechanism to identify 
the particular needs of a household and to design a relief package which was suited to 
                                                          
133 Please refer Chapter 3 for the growth and the decline of the importance of Sinhapura over the years. 
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these needs. The imperative behind the design of programmes was to deliver relief 
speedily, visibly and equitably in the face of pressure from disaster-affected 
populations, the media and civil society, in a manner that could be handled by local 
level officials such as the Grama Niladhari.134  
Narratives about entitlement  --  the moral discourses surrounding loss and 
compensation  --  legitimacy and accountability were central to the way in which 
Sinhapura responded to the state programmes, and the history of the interaction between 
the state and Sinhapura was the context for the generation of these narratives.     
It is in terms of this background that the implications of state aid to Sinhapura has to be 
seen. In what way did the resources which flowed into this community, through the 
state programmes in the aftermath of the tsunami, shape the interaction between the two 
sides of the village and the social processes of Sinhapura? What happened to the social 
position of the categories of individuals and households detailed in the previous 
chapter?     
Before responding to this question another point has to be noted. Due to structural 
tensions between the central government and local government bodies, since the 13th 
Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka in 1987, the latter found themselves 
marginalised when it came to the disbursement of relief provided by the state. 
Therefore, local government politicians had no access to central government funds in 
order to provide relief to their political clients. Deprived of state funds, they had to 
depend on private agencies to sponsor those efforts which they felt compelled to initiate 
as local level politicians, particularly in view of the local government elections in 2006. 
Exacerbating this situation was the fact that at the time of the tsunami some of the tiers 
of local government  --  the Provincial Councils (PC), the Municipal Councils (MC), the 
Urban Councils (UC) and the Pradeshiya Sabhas (PS)  --  were dominated by parties 
politically opposed to the party in power in central government. The Southern 
Provincial Council, for instance, was controlled by the party in central government, the 
People’s Alliance (PA), while it was the United National Party (UNP), the main 
opposition party, which dominated the Hikkaduwa Urban Council.135 Local politicians 
                                                          
134 Please refer Chapter 1 for a description of the hierarchies of the central administration and the various 
institutions involved in the state disbursement of aid.   
135 Source: Personal communication with an official of the Galle District Secretariat; officials of the 
Hikkaduwa UC; a Special Advisor to the President; a previous Member of Parliament.  
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were, thus, deprived of their role as intermediaries between the state and the 
community.  
The State Programmes 
The Buffer Zone 
One of the first steps taken by the state in response to the tsunami was the extension of 
the boundary of the buffer zone, imposed upon construction on the south-western 
coastline, from 35 metres to a 100 metres.136 The purpose was the protection of the 
community in the event of another tsunami.  
The 35 m reservation had been fixed on the recommendation of the Coast Conservation 
Department (CCD). The task of the CCD is to do a survey of the coastal belt, every four 
years, and on the basis of the scientific evidence of this investigation to change the 
limits of the buffer zone depending on existing economic activities, biodiversity, 
existing laws and the viability of implementation.137  
The decision to extend the buffer zone in the context of the disaster had several 
implications.  Building was not permitted within this extended zone, while repairs to 
existing structures could only be undertaken with due permission. The government’s 
policy, enunciated at the time, was to rehouse all those who lived within this newly 
demarcated zone in the new tsunami resettlements.   
It was not clear whether the boundary for the buffer zone was the vegetation line or the 
high water line. Furthermore, there was uncertainty regarding residence, in proximity to 
the beach and fears about the depreciation of land values  --  land was important as 
collateral in loan transactions. As Hyndman puts it: “These setback areas, where home 
reconstruction was prohibited along the affected coastlines, vividly illustrate how a 
policy to enhance public safety at a national level stirred, instead, nationalist feelings of 
discrimination, tension, and fear.” (Hyndman:2011:42).  
This new restriction was also challenged for being implemented with double standards. 
Tourist resorts were able to obtain planning permission, for reconstruction within this 
restricted area, from the Urban Development Authority (UDA), the CCD, and the Sri 
Lanka Tourist Board (SLTB). The Coral Sands Hotel in Hikkaduwa, for instance, was 
                                                          
136 The buffer zone for the eastern coast of Sri Lanka was extended to 200 metres.  
137 Source: Personal communication with Mr. Hewage, CCD, 20 August, 2008. 
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rebuilt where it had stood previously, virtually on the beach.138 Ordinary citizens, 
however, could not get their construction plans passed, especially by the CCD.  
Fishing households, in Sinhapura, reacted with dismay to the potential move to the 
interior of the country. The rhythm of their lifestyle, particularly the fact that their boats 
and engines are berthed on the beach, required that they live by the sea. Although they 
felt entitled to compensation from the state, they saw the move to the interior as 
completely disruptive of their lifestyle. It was the government statement that these 
households would acquire the unfettered ownership of a new house and its appurtenant 
land, while retaining their rights to the damaged property on the seaside, which 
reconciled them to the shift. Thus, this began to be seen as a legitimate compensation 
for the cataclysm which had struck their lives.    
At the time of the tsunami the unavasara, with their dwelling within the 35m zone, were 
viewed by the rest of Sinhapura as illegal residents on the beach. As a result, the 
perception was that they were not entitled to any compensation, even if their houses 
were totally destroyed. Many people, including Palitha Mudalali and Jayatissa told me 
that this was a very unjust situation. People without any rights in Sinhapura such as the 
unavasara dwellers were getting very much more than they lost  --  freehold land and a 
new house in a new community  --  while the boat owners, for instance, were only being 
compensated for a fraction of what they had lost.  
The approach of the Sri Lankan government can be contrasted with that of the state 
government in Gujarat, consequent upon the earthquake of 2001. As Simpson puts it: 
“By the middle of 2001, the Government of Gujarat implemented legislation for the 
creation of Area Development Authorities (ADAs). In essence, this provided the 
government with the legal right to alienate the people from what they considered 
inalienable, their property.” (Simpson:2005:229). In Sri Lanka there was no wholesale 
takeover of land, as in Gujarat under a special authority, for development under a 
government plan.139   
 
 
                                                          
138 Source: Personal communication with the Manager and a Director of the Board of the Coral Sands 
Hotel, Hikkaduwa, in June 2005. 
139 In April 2006 the 100m rule was rescinded and the 35m reinstated as the boundary.   
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Immediate Relief 
Three weeks after the tsunami the government issued Tsunami Cards to all tsunami-
affected households. This entitled each household to food stamps and a cash allowance. 
The sum per person, per week was Rs. 375/-.140 The criterion for receiving this benefit 
was very broad and it was a programme which was operative for a year. The issuing 
authority was the Samurdhi Bank for the cash, and the co-operative stores, for the food 
items  --  rice, flour, dhal, sugar, salt and coconut oil. These households were also 
entitled to a one off sum of Rs. 2000/- for the purchase of kitchen utensils.  
This sum was obtained from the People’s Bank, in Hikkaduwa, and the Ruhuna 
Development Bank in Batapola, in the interior.141 In the case of the loss of a family 
member the state compensation was Rs. 15,000/-.       
 
In order to be eligible for any of the state benefits, each household had to be certified as 
having suffered damage by the governmental official of the area, the Grama Niladhari 
(GN), as well as the Technical Officer (TO) of the Divisional Secretariat. A report from 
the local police was also a requirement.142 Thus, the GN and the TO played a significant 
role in the decision-making surrounding compensation.   
 
Soon after the Tsunami Card began to be disbursed there were allegations from the 
majority of those affected by the tsunami, living on the seaside, that those who had no 
legitimate right to a Tsunami Card were recipients. Rajith, a crew member, and his 
friends told me that Hemasiri, living on the landside, employed in the retail sector 
external to the village, received this benefit when he was in no way entitled to it. The 
GN’s defence was that when he tried to limit the issue of Tsunami Cards to those who 
were rightfully entitled to it, at his office in the village, he was met with aggression and 
the threat of assault. He stated that in this context, he had no option but to yield to the 
pressure of the collective. Another GN, from a nearby community, confirmed this view 
that limiting the distribution of Tsunami Cards only to those who were eligible, was not 
possible at this time. The result was that the Tsunami Card was issued to 95% of the 
                                                          
140 The Rs. 375/- comprised Rs. 200/- worth of dry goods and Rs. 175/- cash. At the time of the tsunami 
the exchange rate was approximately US $ 1 =  SL Rs. 100/- 
141 The People’s Bank and the Bank of Ceylon are the two government banks in Sri Lanka.  
142 Two weeks after the tsunami the GN and the TO inspected properties and assessed the levels of 
damage. 
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households of Sinhapura. The perception on the landside of the community was that this 
benefit from the state was not merely for those affected by the disaster, but an 
entitlement for all legitimate citizens, at a time of national difficulty. Those most 
affected by the tsunami, on the seaside, opposed this view vehemently.  
In addition to the Tsunami Card there was the state benefit of Rs. 20,000/-. All 
households affected by the disaster, those whose main source of income had been 
disrupted, and those deriving their income from the fishing industry were eligible for 
this benefit. This sum was given in four tranches of Rs. 5000/- each, and the first one 
was disbursed in March 2005. Although this benefit did not reach as many as the 
Tsunami Card, a broad spectrum of Sinhapura society received the first two instalments. 
After the second instalment there was concern about the legitimacy of recipients, in 
particular the fact that some people had obtained this sum from two separate GN 
divisions as a result of being registered as residents in two different communities. There 
was the allegation that the GN encouraged claims by those not genuinely affected by the 
disaster and favoured those with whom he had a personal connection, thereby, depriving 
legitimate recipients.143 One of my informants told me that Nandapala who was not a 
fisherman, whose house near the boundary with Kotigama was not damaged, who was, 
however, of the Salagama caste as was the GN, received all four tranches of this 
benefit.144 He was convinced that this was because of caste solidarity.145 Bennet, who 
was a crew member, who had lost his mode of income and was entitled to the Rs. 
20,000/- compensation, did not receive it because, as he told me, the GN claimed that 
the state was out of funds by the time it was his ‘turn’. He felt that the GN had given 
this benefit to those not entitled to it, and had finished the ‘quota’ for Sinhapura. He was 
vocal about his situation and, like many others, gave plenty of publicity to the injustice 
that he had suffered.  
By the time of the third instalment, the policy had concretised into one where those 
eligible were fishing households and those who had lost their mode of income. Thus, 
government employees, even if their houses and household goods were affected, did not 
                                                          
143 When I refer to those with whom the GN had a personal connection I refer to those who were his 
patrons as well as his clients.  
144 . There were a few families living on the boundary with Kotigama, who were of the Salagama caste 
who fell within the administrative division of Sinhapura, although most of their connections were with 
Kotigama.  
145 The GN for Sinhapura was from Kotigama. He lived in Kotigama and was of the Salagama caste.  
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receive the third and fourth tranches. Charlotte, a teacher at one of the schools in 
Sinhapura, only obtained the first two tranches of this benefit. She did not receive the 
rest, although her house and household goods were substantially damaged. Her house 
was on the landside, immediately to the interior of the High street. As a teacher she was 
a government servant who continued to receive a salary and, therefore, her household 
had an income.  
The consequence of all this was that there was a feeling of uncertainty and confusion 
about the criteria applicable in the disbursement of this programme of relief. The 
second, third and fourth instalments were disbursed in May, July and September 
2005.146  
Many households utilised the Tsunami Card to fund their living expenses, and the Rs. 
20,000/- benefit for other urgent needs such as the repair of boats and the repayment of 
loans. As mentioned in the previous chapter, many households in this community 
carried a burden of debt. The main concern, in the wake of the tsunami, was the 
repayment of these loans  --  on a wallam; a three wheeler; a piece of equipment for a 
business. Jayatissa, a wallam owner, told me that if he had not used this compensation 
to repay the microfinance loan taken by his wife, to fund his latest wallam, she would0o 
have been facing severe interest on this loan and even court action, eventually. As far as 
he was concerned, there was no moral dilemma. He was entitled to this compensation, 
and having obtained it, what he did with it was his business.   
The majority of the community did not see it like this. What people did with the 
compensation which they received was a matter of community concern, because this 
revealed whether they had a moral right to it in the first place. If a household was really 
in need they would use this sum for essential, day to day, living expenses. If, instead, 
they used it for repaying loans or other consumption purposes such as buying a 
television set then, clearly, they were not in real need and, therefore, not morally 
eligible for this compensation. There were many lively debates on the verandah of the 
Trust premises, in Sinhapura, during the period that this benefit was being disbursed, 
regarding this issue  --  namely, the purposes for which this compensation should be 
utilised.  
                                                          
146 According to the Divisional Secretariat in Hikkaduwa 347 households in Sinhapura received this 
benefit.  
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The government’s relief programme of the Tsunami Card and the Rs. 20,000/- was 
viewed by different categories of people in different ways. For crew members this was 
essential relief in a situation where their income had ceased. Those who were employed 
outside the village did not have a uniform reaction. On the one hand, those who were 
employed in the private sector and whose workplace was either a tourist hotel or a 
business premises which was destroyed were, like the crewmen, grateful to receive the 
benefits. On the other hand, those who worked for the government did not receive all of 
these benefits because they continued to draw their salaries even if their place of work 
was destroyed. High Street traders and service providers found the benefits useful; 
however, they were disenchanted with the state because the losses of livelihood that 
they incurred were not addressed. For the wallam owners and the multi-day boat owners 
these benefits were not of great significance, given their previous income and the 
expenses of their lifestyle. What they regarded as legitimate compensation was a boat 
for the boat that they had lost, or a house, of a commensurate dimension, for the one 
that was destroyed. For the unavasara, these benefits were the sort of steady income 
which they had never experienced before.      
Temporary Housing 
Those who had taken refuge in the temple and in the school, due to damage to their 
houses, were in urgent need of temporary accommodation. This took the form, in the 
first week of January 2005, of tents pitched on land belonging to the temple and in the 
playgrounds of the two schools.  
After a few weeks temporary structures to provide accommodation were constructed on 
three plots of bare land in the village  --  a plot of land at the main junction in 
Sinhapura, adjacent to the High Street; land belonging to the temple; the playground of 
one of the schools. The temporary houses, made of wood or reinforced asbestos, were 
constructed by an NGO and by a political party, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP).  
People lived in these structures for some months, from May 2005, until they moved to 
the permanent housing outside the village. These temporary shelters were dismantled 
between June and December 2006.  
The state’s role in the construction of temporary housing was limited to one of 
facilitation between the community and the organisations willing to construct them. The 
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state focus was on permanent housing. In the case of Sinhapura, the NGO and the JVP 
came to the village and made the offer to construct temporary accommodation, through 
their contacts. Suitable land was identified. It was when construction was imminent, that 
the GN and the Divisional Secretariat in Hikkaduwa were informed. Thus, relief 
organisations and local communities settled the matter of temporary accommodation, 
with little state involvement. 
Repair to Damaged Housing 
Those whose houses were totally destroyed within the 100m zone were entitled to a 
house in the new settlements. Those whose houses were outside this zone, were entitled 
to Rs. 250,000/- to rebuild them.  
Once the 35m buffer zone had been reinstated, in April 2006, those whose houses were 
between 35m and a 100m were given the option of a house in a new community or Rs. 
250,000/- to rebuild their house. Most took the option of resettlement in the interior. 
There were only four householders in Sinhapura who chose to rebuild their house on the 
same place where it had been. These were neighbouring households, all of crew 
members, with their damaged houses very close to the beach. They lived in one of the 
temporary shelters until their new houses were rebuilt on the spot where the old ones 
had been, and they were able to move back. The Red Cross added Rs. 750,000/- to the 
state grant of Rs. 250,000/- and built each of them a two storey house by August 2006.     
These four households expressed their satisfaction with the houses which, particularly 
with the assistance from the Red Cross, gave them a two storey house. There was little 
conflict over the state grant of Rs. 250,000/-. The damage was apparent, the entitlement 
clear and the compensation was given through the proper bureaucratic channels.    
The entitlement from the state to repair a partially damaged house was Rs. 100,000/-. 
This partial damage included holes in the floor and damaged foundations; water soaked 
walls with cracks; broken windows and damaged outdoor toilets; damaged roofs. The 
Grama Niladhari (GN) took the Technical Officer (TO) around Sinhapura and pointed 
out the damage. The TO, with the GN’s collaboration, made the assessment of partial or 
full damage and noted it on the GN’s housing register. 130 houses were deemed 
partially damaged. However, there were another 48 houses which, according to the 
survey of the Trust, were also damaged, in differing degrees, which were not included 
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in this list. Several households on the High Street, apart from those on the seaside, 
claimed this compensation. The ability to prove ownership of property  --  whether joint 
or single  --   in terms of a deed or the paying of rates and utilities, had implications for 
the entitlement to the Rs. 100,000/- and the Rs. 250,000/-.147 However, the most 
important criterion was to have the endorsement of the GN and the TO, and to be on 
their list. Once the lists of partially damaged houses were compiled the officials at the 
Divisional Secretariat, Hikkaduwa, did not query, in great detail, deeds and other 
documentation relating to the rights of ownership. The first round of disbursement of 
the Rs. 100,000/- was in June/July 2005. The second round was at the end of 2006.   
The most intense conflict between the state and the people of Sinhapura centred around 
the Rs. 100,000/- grant. The controversy arose over the allegation, by many disaffected 
householders, that the GN and the TO had done the assessment of damage in a cursory 
and biased manner. The majority in the village felt that the GN had favoured those with 
whom he had personal connections and deprived others of their entitlement to state aid. 
Furthermore, that the GN had demanded a bribe of Rs. 5000/- from every householder 
in order to release the Rs. 100,000/-. This sum, it was alleged, he shared with the TO.  
Shanika was one of those whose application for the grant for partial damage was 
rejected. She asserted that the real reason for this was that it would have been awkward 
for the GN to ask her for the Rs. 5000/- ‘bribe’  --  one of his colleagues, the GN of the 
next village, was her uncle. Furthermore, she asserted, the GN had not even come inside 
the house but had ‘inspected’ it standing on the High Street. The GN had responded 
evasively to Shanika’s repeated requests for inclusion in his register. He had told her 
that he was willing to confirm that her husband’s welding business, located in their 
garden, had been destroyed. The letter from the GN certifying damage to the welding 
business was endorsed by the Divisional Secretary in Hikkaduwa. This was neither here 
nor there as the Rs. 100,000/- grant applied only to partial damage to houses. Shanika 
campaigned vigorously in pursuit of her claim. Fobbed off, as she felt she had been, by 
the Divisional Secretary who had told her, misleadingly, that the grant was limited to 
damage within the 100m buffer zone Shanika had written to the District Secretary in 
Galle setting out her grievances in detail: that her house, and not merely the welding 
business, had been damaged; that, despite her entitlement the GN had unfairly omitted 
                                                          
147 Source: Informant Session with Mr. Dhanapala, Assistant, Projects Division, Hikkaduwa Divisional 
Secretariat, 8/8/2008. 
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her household from his register; that this rejection had placed her household in serious 
difficulty; her husband, a government servant had had to obtain a loan for repairs to 
make the house liveable; that his salary was drastically reduced by the loan repayments 
and that their household of six was finding it very difficult to meet their day to day 
living expenses. The District Secretary replied with the promise that he would get the 
Divisional Secretary to investigate the matter and take action. However, neither at the 
time that I was doing my fieldwork, nor subsequently, had any action been taken to 
redress Shanika’s grievance.148       
Daya owned a shop on the High Street which sold nets and other gear to fishermen. It 
was one of the few buildings which had suffered considerable structural damage. He did 
not, however, qualify for inclusion for inclusion in the GN’s register because, as alleged 
by the GN, the premises housed a business and was not a private residence. Daya felt 
that his exclusion, though technically correct, was without any moral justification since, 
as he pointed out, there were several people who had received the grant without a 
vestige of a rightful claim to do so. As far as he was concerned, from a moral point of 
view, he was entitled to this compensation. Daya told me that those who had received 
this compensation, fraudulently, kept very quiet about it, although it was common 
knowledge in the village as to who these people were. Although in 2005, as Co-
ordinator of the Trust, I came to ‘know’ who these individuals were, when I was doing 
my fieldwork, I found it impossible to get a single person to admit to having received 
this benefit. People were discrete, even three years after the event. In the course of an 
interview, I asked the question outright from one of this group, who denied it 
categorically. The individual concerned was only prepared to go so far as to admit that, 
to his knowledge, there were ‘others’ who had received this grant on a fraudulent basis.   
Ranee’s house, on the seaside and adjacent to the High Street, was not included by the 
GN on his register though, as she claimed, it met all the criteria for partial damage. The 
family petitioned the Divisional Secretary and as a result the TO was compelled to visit 
the house again after which, certification that it qualified for compensation was made. 
Ranee’s family had had a long-standing property dispute with the GN. She felt that this 
personal dispute was the cause of the GN’s attempt to deprive her household of its 
rightful entitlement. This was one of the few instances where the intervention of the 
                                                          
148 See Caron (2009) for the discussion of similar experiences in the post-tsunami context, in the Colombo 
District.  
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Divisional Secretary had a positive outcome. Most often the decision of the GN was 
allowed to stand.  
The school teacher, Charlotte, was also refused this grant. Charlotte’s assertion was that 
the GN and the TO did not do a proper investigation of the damage to her property. She 
stated that they looked at it from outside when most of the damage was internal. 
Charlotte told me that she felt that the GN and the TO had already decided, before they 
commenced the investigation, who was to be compensated and who was not, on the 
basis of who would be likely, and able, to pay the bribe of Rs. 5000/-.  
When it began to be apparent that individual appeals to the Divisional Secretariat in 
Hikkdauwa were, in effect, a waste of time Shanika took the initiative and banded 
together eighteen non-recipients of the Rs. 100,000/- compensation, who felt that they 
were entitled to it, into an action group. They planned to agitate for their rights. On 
behalf of the group, Shanika wrote to several state organisations: the Director of the 
Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation (TAFREN), later the Reconstruction and 
Development Agency (RADA); the Divisional Secretariat; the District Secretariat; the 
President via the Presidential Secretariat; the Ministry of Nation Building and 
Reconstruction; the Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights; the Health 
Inspector, Hikkaduwa; the Human Rights Commission. She also sent a Tsunami 
Petition to Transparency International which was forwarded to the Investigations 
Division of the Ministry of Public Administration and Home Affairs (the Divisional and 
District Secretariats come under the authority of this Ministry). To all these 
organisations she explained that there were eighteen petitioners who had not received 
the Rs. 100,000/- state grant because the GN and the TO had, fraudulently, not certified 
that their houses were damaged. Furthermore, that they had disbursed compensation to 
those totally unaffected by the tsunami. Shanika demanded that an investigation be 
carried out and the injustice rectified. She expressed outrage and stated that officials 
who commit fraud like the GN are a shame and a disgrace to the state. The 
organisations wrote back to her acknowledging receipt of her letters and stating that 
action would be taken. The organisations also wrote to each other, with copies to 
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Shanika, calling for an investigation into the complaints and appropriate redress for the 
petitioners.149   
The majority of the community denounced the GN’s actions as morally reprehensible: 
on the one hand, he demanded a bribe to release what was a citizen’s legitimate 
entitlement from the state; on the other, he certified as damaged those who were not, in 
order that they might receive this compensation. In these circumstances, the claim has 
been that those who were legitimately entitled to this compensation did not receive it 
whereas those who were not, did.      
The defence of the GN was that people had abandoned their houses and were not there 
to be consulted when he and the TO did their rounds to assess damage. They could not 
enter the premises and could only certify the damage observable from the outside. 
Taking a similar stance, a clerk at the Divisional Secretariat told me that people had 
stayed away for months at a time from their damaged houses, and then descended on the 
Divisional Secretariat with their demands for compensation. As made out by this 
official, 80% of this grant had been disbursed equitably. On the issue of fraud, he took 
the line that at such a time it was to be expected, and that there was little that could have 
been done about it. He informed me that the funding for this programme which had 
come from the World Bank was exhausted so that even legitimate claims of those who 
had not by then received compensation under this scheme were highly unlikely to be 
met.150 Furthermore, he expressed the view that in the case of fraud by officials such as 
the GN there was no legal action that could be taken against them.151 Thus, in the face 
of dispute the strategy of state officials was to stall, to say that the claimants were out of 
time, and that the state was out of money.  
This scheme to grant Rs. 100,000/- for partial damage posed other problems. It was the 
householder, as the owner of the property, who was entitled to the compensation. In 
some instances tenants were also claimants, for the most part unsuccessfully, for a share 
of the compensation. Where a house, jointly owned by several siblings, with only one of 
them resident, had suffered damage the problem was even more intractable. The non-
                                                          
149 I was able to peruse all the correspondence referred to above, intensively, with Shanika and my 
research assistant.  
150 I was told by an ex-civil servant that if the sum allotted for a particular purpose is exhausted, and the 
matter is important enough, it is possible to divert funds from savings under other items.    
151 On the contrary, there are many legal mechanisms which citizens can deploy to prosecute officials of 
the state. Source: Gratian E. Perera, Attorney-at-law, Sri Lanka.  
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resident siblings would also lodge their claims to compensation, especially where it was 
apparent that the full sum would not be required for the repairs.   
When Sunil, a crew member, received this compensation, his sister’s husband, 
Suneetha, felt that the sum should have been shared between the two households. The 
damaged house had belonged to Sunil’s father and his sister, too, had a share in it. Sunil 
felt that as the resident the compensation was his due. The conflict arose from the fact 
that, according to Suneetha, the house was not greatly damaged and did not require the 
whole of the sum of Rs. 100,000/- for the repair. Suneetha told me that after having 
repaired the house Sunil kept the remainder of the money for his household. 
Furthermore, Suneetha stated that Sunil did not need the money as he was deriving a 
reasonable income from the canoe given to him by the Trust.  
Sajith, who ran a gas cylinder business on the High Street and lived on the same 
premises was the sole owner of a damaged house for which he received full 
compensation. He was resident in the house which housed his business, which he co-
owned together with his siblings who were also resident. These premises were also 
damaged but the GN refused to sanction the payment of the Rs. 100,000/- for this house 
on the grounds that Sajith had already received compensation for one house. Thereupon, 
Sajith transferred legal ownership of the house to his younger brother after which the 
GN sanctioned payment. The rigidity with which the GN had applied the rule in his case 
angered Sajith since, as he told me, he had gone out of his way to help the GN with 
tsunami work in the immediate aftermath of the disaster.   
If the partial damage to a house had been repaired by an NGO the regulation, as 
Namalie’s family discovered, was that the household became ineligible for this 
compensation. This family lived off the High Street, on the seaside, and Namalie’s 
father ran a small carpentry business. Their house was repaired by an Italian NGO fairly 
soon after the tsunami. The GN then crossed this household off his register. Namalie’s 
father was deeply angered and told me that he felt that the obligation to redress his loss 
was that of the state; therefore, irrespective of the fact that he had received outside 
assistance (that of the NGO) he was entitled to this compensation.    
Although the households situated on the boundary with Kotigama suffered very 
minimal damage  --  for example, a broken window  --  they too received the grant. My 
informants stated that these households had received much more than they should have 
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and that the excess money had been used for other purposes. The complaint was that the 
state failed to look at the extent of the damage in a nuanced way. The compensation for 
‘partial damage’ was a flat sum and disbursed even where the damage was negligible. 
There was much debate about this ‘wrong’ policy of the state which meant that some 
people benefited totally out of proportion to their loss. Furthermore, the recipients, too, 
were held to blame for the uses to which the ‘excess’ monies had been put, i.e., for a 
variety of consumption purposes. This scenario resonates with Porwal’s (2007) 
comment that relief money is paid out to victims by the state on a supposedly equitable 
principle but often results in inequality.  
New Housing 
The initial policy of the government was to clear the 100m zone of all building and to 
resettle residents in housing in the interior. The houses were to be constructed on state 
land by a variety of organisations. Each had to sign a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) wi0pth the Reconstruction and Development Agency (RADA).   
The design and development of these housing schemes should have been entrusted to 
the National Housing Development Authority (NHDA), as the only institution of the 
state, as asserted by a former manager of the NHDA, which was experienced in the 
handling of large housing projects. However, as the manager informed me, there were 
‘political’ reasons why these schemes were entrusted to the Urban Development 
Authority (UDA), with the NHDA sidelined. The NHDA was associated with the late 
President Premadasa whose party the United National Party was then in Opposition. 
Because of this connection, I was told, the NHDA’s wealth of experience was not 
utilised by the government.   
When the 100m rule was rescinded, in April 2006, those within the 35m line were 
entitled to a house; those between the 35m and 100m were entitled to a house but could 
opt to rebuild their house within this area. As stated above, except for four households 
in Sinhapura, all other residents opted for housing in the interior. In Sinhapura 75 
houses on the seaside were razed to the ground all within the 100m zone. This included 
all the houses of the unavasara, who had lived on the beach.   
The state was concerned with speed. The President, Chandrika Bandaranaike 
Kumaratunga, had stated that all affected populations would be rehoused within three 
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months. The UDA architect whom I interviewed regarded this statement as absurd as 
the planning of a settlement, in terms of water, drainage, sewage systems etc., takes a 
minimum of six months. Furthermore, he contended that even in a disaster situation 
certain rules and procedures regarding the construction of a human settlement would 
have to be followed. The state put pressure on the UDA architects and engineers to 
speedily contour the land for building, and provide the designs for roadways, drainage 
and sanitation. There was pressure from the government, as well as from donors and 
NGOs, to rehouse the tsunami affected populations speedily. Owing to this pressure 
once the plans had been approved by the UDA architects there was no provision for 
quality assurance, on issues such as sanitation and drainage. There were, moreover, 
many conflicts between various ministers, the UDA and individual politicians who 
wanted the UDA to act quickly such that the tsunami-affected could move into their 
new homes speedily.  
The UDA provided four types of designs of houses from which the organisation doing 
the construction could choose. This can be contrasted with Tamil Nadu, India where 
Dharmaraj (2007) asserts that the state government had one design for housing which 
was, in many ways, unsuitable for coastal communities.  
The NGOs mediated between the prominent, international donors and the government. 
Once the MOUs had been signed with the Reconstruction and Development Agency 
(RADA), the NGOs farmed out the tsunami housing contracts to the big companies in 
the construction business, which then sub-contracted them out to smaller contractors.  
At this time, there were many allegations in the public domain that these organisations 
took a percentage of the funds, received from donors, for their own purposes. They did 
this, it was alleged, by the state authorities and by the target communities, by issuing 
false receipts and by encouraging contractors to over-estimate costs and, thereafter, use 
inferior material. According to the UDA architect only a percentage of the original 
donor amount ‘trickled down’ and was utilised in the construction of the houses. Few 
NGOs have responded to these allegations in any public forum. Some NGOs, however, 
have defended themselves by asserting that it was the sub-contractors who had 
defrauded them. The RADA official that I interviewed stated that it was the NGOs that 
were responsible for the deficiencies in the construction of the houses: they had failed to 
control and supervise the construction leaving it to the contractors. This official 
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contended, furthermore, that the speed with which the government had signed MOUs 
with NGOs, meant that the MOUs were flawed and that it was difficult to hold the 
NGOs to account for their breaches of contract.   
The District Secretariats, the NGOs, the UDA and the contractors blamed each other for 
the substandard housing that had resulted. Officials that I spoke to at the District 
Secretariat and the UDA assigned the blame for the poor quality of the housing to the 
inferior work produced by the sub-contractors. The UDA architect, for instance, told me 
that, given the knowledge and expertise to be found in Sri Lanka at the time, much 
better results should have been achieved, in terms of the quality of the housing and in 
terms of the selection of geographical locations for the siting of the new housing 
complexes. This same point is echoed by Mulligan & Nadarajah (2012) and by Brun & 
Lund (2010). The officials of the District Secretariat on the other hand placed the blame, 
fairly and squarely on the UDA for not having adequately overseen the housing 
projects. They also blamed the NGOs for the corrupt activities of their sub-contractors. 
The UDA, in its turn, blamed the politicians and local administrators for the pressure 
placed on the organisation to deliver within a stipulated time-frame, with no cognisance 
of the fact that a housing settlement needs extensive preparation in terms of approach 
roads, drainage and sanitation. Hettige (2007) makes the criticism that settlements 
should have been planned better in the sense of composition in terms of ethnicity, 
religion and caste. Despite their differences, all the officials that I spoke to at the 
NHDA, the UDA, RADA and the District Secretariat in Galle, were united in their 
insistence that the inefficiency and corrupt practices which, as they alleged, were rife in 
the housing projects, were due, on the one hand, to the pressure applied by politicians at 
all levels who were determined that coastal populations should be resettled in their new 
homes, speedily and very visibly, and, on the other, to the negligence of the NGOs and 
their defaulting contractors.152  
Right throughout 2005 there was uncertainty whether the policy that everyone within 
the 100m buffer zone was to be allotted a house would in fact be fully implemented. 
The people in temporary housing, in three locations in Sinhapura, received their new 
houses in the middle of 2006, towards the end of 2006, and at the beginning of 2007, 
                                                          
152 This account of the wider, post-tsunami housing dynamic in Sri Lanka is based on interviews and 
informant sessions with the following organisations: the UDA; the NHDA; RADA; the UC in 
Hikkaduwa; the Divisional Secretariat in Hikkaduwa; the District Secretariat in Galle.  
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respectively.153 In the case of a joint household, each nuclear family within it, received a 
house. There was no conflict and the 75 households in Sinhapura were given houses. 
While the allocation of houses went smoothly in Sinhapura this was not so elsewhere 
along the coastline. People in these communities felt that a policy intended to promote 
their security and wellbeing, was being manipulated, to their detriment, by the lower 
tiers of the bureaucracy who used this opportunity to extend or withhold patronage. The 
unrest over this issue escalated to the point that the government feared that it had the 
makings of a political disaster. To avert such an outcome it was decided to give houses 
under this scheme with no strict adherence to the criteria originally stipulated. As a 
result houses were given, en masse, even sometimes to those whose dwellings had been 
outside the 100m buffer zone.154     
As people began moving to the new settlements the defects of construction began to be 
apparent. The roofs leaked, cracks appeared in the walls, and the kitchens were 
unsuitable for those accustomed to cooking with firewood.155 Despite this the majority 
of the new settlers were glad to have acquired a house and land. Ranjanie, a member of 
the unavasara group, described her house as a ‘palace’. She told me, however, that the 
roof in her kitchen alcove leaked so much that she had to hold an umbrella over her 
head while cooking if it was raining heavily.  
75 households from Sinhapura moved to the settlements in the interior. Although the 
fishermen came to Sinhapura everyday to go to sea during the fishing season it became 
apparent that the relocation, 7kms to the interior, would have an impact on Sinhapura. 
The volume of business on the High Street dropped markedly as the new settlements 
developed their own commerce. The supply of casual labour  --  unskilled work in 
building construction, coconut plucking, the clearing of gardens, the cutting of trees  --  
was affected, as the unavasara households who had supplied much of this labour had 
left the village. As the emigrants were largely from the seaside the relationship between 
the landside and the seaside was affected. In any dispute with neighbouring Kotigama 
Sinhapura was left weakened.   
                                                          
153 There were 105 housing complexes established in the Galle District. Source: Clerk, Hikkaduwa 
Divisional Secretariat, 23/5/2008. 
154 Source: a Special Advisor to the President; official of the District Secretariat in Galle.  
155 In Sinhapura and right along the coastline people were used to cooking in small outhouses, at the back 
of, and separate from, the main house. The reason for this is that cooking with firewood releases a lot of 
soot which stains everything in its vicinity.  
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Some years before the tsunami the Galle Road had been widened. In all these coastal 
communities private land had been acquired by the state and compensation paid. In 
some instances some part of the compensation due was yet to be settled, at the time of 
the tsunami. In the late 1990s, premises, which included lands and buildings, had been 
acquired. Though people lost their houses the funds allocated for the payment of 
compensation, were limited to payments based on land value only, excluding the value 
of the house.156 For most people, the limited compensation that they received, enabled 
them to buy land but not to put up a house. Many harboured a sense of grievance 
against the state on this account. The tsunami afforded these people the opportunity to 
seek redress in the form of petitioning the Divisional Secretary for a house. This was a 
latent dispute with the state, which erupted at the time of the tsunami.   
 
Sharma had owned a house and land on the High Street, at the main junction in 
Sinhapura. The house was demolished when her land was acquired for road widening in 
the late 1990s. Sharma was one of the few people who received land, in 2003, as 
compensation instead of a lump sum in cash. This land, ten perches (1 perch = 272 
square feet) in extent, was situated in the interior 10 kms from Sinhapura. Since the 
acquisition, Sharma had had to move around, staying for short spells in each case with 
relatives and friends. Sharma, aged 52 in 2008, was unmarried and made a living selling 
vegetables door to door. Although she did own land, there was no hope that her daily 
earnings would enable her to build a house. In any event, living in the interior, far away 
from family and friends was not, for her, an attractive proposition.   
At the time of the tsunami Sharma was living in a rented room in a neighbouring 
village. The GN of Sinhapura had issued a certificate stating that Sharma was living in 
rented premises. Sharma claimed that the GN had rendered her ineligible for 
compensation and deprived her of a house since he had not taken into account her 
previous history which, in her view, should have clinched the matter. Her reasoning was 
that if her house had been standing in its original location, at the junction, it would have 
been destroyed as the tsunami waters had flooded this area. It was on this premise that 
she claimed that she was entitled to a house. The state criteria for post-tsunami 
compensation excluded Sharma: she was living in rented accommodation; at the time of 
                                                          
156 When the state, in Sri Lanka, gives compensation for the acquisition of land it is based on the 
assessment of a government valuer.  
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the tsunami her house had not existed at the site near the junction; most important, she 
had already received compensation for acquisition of premises under the state’s road 
widening project. These ‘technicalities’ were repudiated by Sharma. Sharma’s position 
was that the government took her land and her house but that she received only land as 
compensation. In this transaction she felt that she had been unjustly treated and that, 
from a moral point of view, she was entitled to a house.    
Sharma wrote to the Divisional Secretary seeking compensation in the form of a house 
under the Tsunami Housing Scheme. She appealed also to the District Secretary who 
wrote back, stipulating that she should obtain a certificate verifying that the facts that 
she had alleged were true and that she should, thereafter, see him together with the GN. 
Sharma showed me this correspondence and told me that the GN had refused to go to 
the District Secretariat with her. Sharma also made an entry at the police station 
detailing her personal circumstances and stating her conviction that she was entitled to a 
tsunami house which, as she asserted, was being given to other people randomly and for 
a host of reasons. She wrote, in addition, to the Ministry of Disaster Management and 
Human Rights stating that she had written to the Divisional and District Secretariats but 
that they had rejected her claim. 
Fisheries 
The state was required to give a craft as restitution only to those that were registered 
with the Fisheries Inspector of the area. Lack of registration with the state authorities 
had implications for entitlement to compensation. At the time of the tsunami 
Sinhapura’s fishing fleet consisted of 60 wallams, 15 canoes and 15 multi-day boats. 
While the multi-day boats were registered with the Fisheries Inspector very few of the 
wallams were. In such circumstances, boat owners had to produce a witness, to the fact 
of ownership, at the Fisheries Inspector’s Office and to swear an affidavit, before a 
Notary Public or a Justice of the Peace (JP). Only then was compensation a possibility.  
The state’s programme of providing boats as compensation to fishermen was conducted 
through organisations such as the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). It 
supported the reconstruction of the fishing industry in various ways, mainly by 
providing services such as the repair of engines etc. through organisations such as the 
Cey-Nor Development Foundation and the Sri Lanka Navy. Centres run by these 
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organisations were located at various points on the south-western coast, including 
Sinhapura.  
Although many of the wallams in Sinhapura were not registered with the fisheries 
inspector boat owners, nevertheless, saw it as the obligation of the state to provide new 
craft for that which had been lost. There were some who attempted to exploit the 
prevailing uncertainty by swearing false affidavits about ownership and by getting 
‘witnesses’ to support their contention. Samarapala, for instance, a crew member, 
managed to get two witnesses to swear before the Fisheries Inspector that he had owned 
a wallam. When this information spread through the village there were several other 
‘witnesses’ who refuted this claim to the fisheries inspector. These, and similar 
attempts, provoked a strong reaction from the established wallam owners in the days 
after the tsunami. They had gone through an arduous process  --  saving, securing a 
loan, buying a boat, repaying the loan  --  in obtaining their wallams and saw no reason 
why there should be a shortcut to wallam ownership, because of this disaster. These 
wallam owners could do nothing, however, about the boats which were distributed by 
foreign nationals. They felt that the ‘undeserving’ people who received them had 
disrupted the established order of the community.  
In the event, only one person in Sinhapura received a boat from the state for the one that 
he had lost. All the other boats were given by NGOs and by foreign nationals. The boat 
owners’ perspective was that the few net pieces that were given by the state were not 
adequate for fashioning into a complete net.  
Dispute Resolution 
One of the mechanisms instituted by the state to resolve the disputes, between the state 
and tsunami-affected populations, relating to the programmes of relief and 
rehabilitation, was the creation of the post of Additional District Secretary. In the case 
of alleged injustices perpetrated by the GN, the first step was a petition to the Divisional 
Secretariat in the case of Sinhapura, situated in Hikkaduwa. The second step was a 
petition to the District Secretariat. The idea was that these Additional District 
Secretaries would investigate and solve the problems encountered by the tsunami-
affected populations. Communities such as Sinhapura had little faith in the investigative 
abilities of this official and the impartiality of this process. As a result, people sought 
redress from the higher levels of the administration. In the case of the eighteen 
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petitioners from Sinhapura although there was a great deal of correspondence between 
the various arms of the central administration, as no institution made itself accountable 
for the investigation there was no resolution of this issue.  
Another mechanism was the Tsunami Mediation Boards. Mediation Boards had been in 
existence for many years to settle disputes between private citizens, without recourse to 
the courts. The Tsunami Mediation Boards held special sessions to deal with petitions 
regarding tsunami injustices. The case of the eighteen households in Sinhapura which 
did not receive the Rs. 100,000/- was referred to the Tsunami Mediation Board, for the 
Galle District, by the Divisional Secretary of Hikkaduwa. The Chairman of the 
Mediation Board had written to Shanika and asked her to come for a mediation session 
on the matter, bringing all relevant documents and witnesses with her. She was told that 
absence from the meeting would be taken as a lack of interest in the resolution of the 
problem. At the meeting, Shanika and some of the other petitioners presented their 
evidence and the GN, who was also present, admitted his wrong-doing. However, he 
contended that he could not rectify the wrong that he had committed, without grave 
repercussions for himself such as the loss of his government position and pension rights. 
The Tsunami Mediation Board stated that they could not resolve the matter, as there 
was no common ground from which the two disputing parties might attempt to reach 
resolution. They stated that the petitioners should take legal action in terms of a 
Fundamental Rights petition as this was a dispute between several citizens and the state, 
whereas the Mediation Boards dealt with disputes between citizens.157 Legal Aid was 
willing to appear on behalf of the eighteen disputants, but stated that eighteen individual 
cases would have to be filed. These petitioners were unwilling to file Fundamental 
Rights petitions in the Supreme Court. They preferred to continue their campaign vis-à-
vis the Divisional Secretariat in Hikkaduwa, in the belief that persistence would yield 
results.        
A series of workshops to resolve the problems relating to the tsunami injustices were a 
special, foreign-funded project of one of the ministries. These workshops were 
presented as a forum to discuss problems and air grievances. According to the co-
                                                          
157 Fundamental Rights are those rights guaranteed by the constitution in Sri Lanka. The infringement of 
these rights, by executive or administrative action, means that a citizen, or a relevant body, can petition 
the Supreme Court on a Fundamental Rights action. Source: Gratian E. Perera, Attorney-at-law, Sri 
Lanka.  
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ordinators of this project, it had no authority to prosecute wrong-doers such as the GN 
of Sinhapura. Their remit was to receive petitions and refer them to the relevant 
government authority, such as the Commission of Bribery and Corruption.  
I attended the workshop held at a school in Hikkaduwa, in May 2008, together with my 
research assistant and some of my informants. These included Shanika and some of the 
other eighteen petitioners. The event was structured in terms of several issues: Child 
Abuse; Women’s Abuse; Domestic Violence and Rape; Bribery and Corruption; Land; 
Housing; Compensation; and, Public Administration. The Registrar General’s 
Department; the Social Services Department; the Ministry of Public Administration and 
Home Affairs; the Commission for Bribery and Corruption; and, the National Child 
Protection Authority (NCPA) had been invited to attend the workshop and were present. 
The police and the GNs of the Grama Niladhari Divisions coming under the Hikkaduwa 
Divisional Secretariat, were also present, including the GN of Sinhapura. The project 
co-ordinators had written to all eighteen petitioners in Sinhapura requesting their 
presence and stating that absence would lead to the assumption that the injustice had 
been rectified.     
Once inside the main hall Shanika and the other petitioners approached the 
compensation desk. Shanika, as their spokesperson, stated the facts to the official in 
charge, regarding their petition. Then Shanika requested that the official summon the 
GN and question him. Accordingly, the GN was called. He stated that in the case of 
Shanika’s house water had only gone into the garden, where the welding centre was 
situated. Shanika countered this with the statement that he had stood on the street and 
viewed the premises and how could he, therefore, have seen the state of damage to the 
floor, the kitchen or to the toilet at the back of the house. Shanika excused herself, went 
away, and brought back a witness. This was the previous GN of Sinhapura who was 
known to her uncle, the GN of another village. Although obviously reluctant, he came 
with Shanika, a forceful personality, with an uncle who was a respected GN. At 
Shanika’s urging he stated that the tsunami waters had entered her house and caused 
considerable damage. Consequent upon this, the official took down the details of the 
petitioners present. He stated that the matter would be investigated and that Shanika and 
the others would be informed. Once the communication with the official at the 
compensation desk was over, and we were all about to move away, Shanika berated the 
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GN. She repeated her allegation that the GN could not take the bribe of Rs. 5000/- from 
her, to endorse the Rs. 100,000/-, because she was the niece of a fellow GN, and that, 
therefore, he had decided to deprive her of this benefit to which she was entitled.  
After Shanika’s confrontation with the GN my research assistant and I became the 
nucleus for a little group of Sinhapura people. One of the petitioners told me that he was 
in great mental pain (hithe vedanawa) because deserving people like himself had not 
received the Rs. 100,000/- compensation, whereas the ‘undeserving’ were enjoying the 
benefits of what should have come to him.  
People attended the workshop from all over the region. They had come to air their 
grievances which they did. Some even went to the extent of berating the officials of the 
various government departments, for state inaction. Many asserted that these injustices 
arose from the wrong-doing of government officials such as the GN and the TO. They 
had already presented their complaints to the Tsunami Mediation Boards, the Divisional 
Secretaries and the District Secretaries. At the conclusion of the workshop, people were 
told by the organisers that they would be informed about the progress of their case.  
As far as the petitioners were concerned the workshop was not perceived as a success. 
They thought it a waste of time, where nothing was accomplished other than another 
‘recital’ of their problems, to indifferent representatives of various government 
institutions. The workshop organizers, on the other hand, were pleased with the 
outcome of the event. They felt that a ‘productive’ airing of grievances had taken place. 
As an observer of the event, it appeared to me that the workshop was a damage 
limitation exercise to make tsunami-affected populations, who felt unjustly treated by 
the state, feel that their concerns were important to the state and that something was 
being done. It also seemed more like a research exercise, by the organisers of the 
workshop, to examine how the state programmes of compensation had worked out in 
practice. According to the petitioners, some of whom were my informants in Sinhapura, 
they have heard nothing further from the organisers of this workshop or from any 
government body.   
The Implications of the State Programmes  
The relief and reconstruction initiatives of the state gave rise to several issues. These are 
analysed, below, in terms of the responses of different categories of people. My focus is 
166 
 
on the interaction between the state programmes, and individuals and households in the 
remaking of Sinhapura.   
On the seaside, the fishing households and the unavasara felt that, as it was they who 
had been primarily affected by the disaster, compensation by the state should be 
reserved for them. The traders of the High Street countered this claim: their lives, too, 
had been shattered and they were equally entitled to compensation from the state. 
People on the landside were not deterred by the fact that they had not, for the most part, 
suffered actual damage. They argued that the community as a whole had suffered owing 
to the devastation caused by the tsunami and that, therefore, they, too, were entitled to 
the state benefits, particularly the Tsunami Card and the Rs. 20,000/-.  
For many people, the state programmes were a source of capital which could be put to 
‘work’ in terms of realising aspirations. There were those who were entitled to state 
compensation, in terms of the policy criteria, but who, owing to the uniform and 
undifferentiated operation of state programmes had received sums in excess of that 
which they had lost. In this category were, the households of crew members, service 
providers, those employed external to the village, and the unavasara.      
As it became apparent that the resources at the disposal of the state were limited, a keen 
sense of competition to obtain as great a share of it as possible began to surface in the 
community. As Simpson states in relation to the Gujarat post-disaster phenomenon: 
“…… access to the government’s coffers became highly competitive and a source of 
jealousy, rivalry and suspicion.” (Simpson:2005:238). People in Sinhapura were acutely 
aware that in its attempts to access these resources it was in competition with the 
villages of the region, particularly Kotigama and Hikkaduwa. There were those 
households which had ‘creatively’ interpreted the notion of entitlement and managed to 
accrue to themselves, by circumventing the rules of disbursement and by exploiting the 
ambiguities of the schemes, the state benefits to which they had no legitimate right. This 
was alleged to be the case where the Tsunami Card; the benefit of Rs. 20,000/-; and the 
Rs. 100,000/- compensation for partial damage were concerned.   
There was the perception, in the community, that those on the seaside who had suffered 
very little damage to their properties should not have received the entire Rs. 100,000/- 
benefit for partial damage. People felt that very little of the benefit, obtained in such 
circumstances, was used for reconstruction, the majority of the sum being spent on 
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consumer goods or diverted to an income generating activity. Where a household used 
the compensation for a purpose other than the intended one, the community took it as 
amounting to proof that that household was undeserving of the benefit. Among those 
who expressed themselves freely on this issue, were the 48 households who had not 
received the compensation of Rs. 100,000/-. These allegations were made by those who 
felt that they were entitled to this benefit and did not receive it. They were also made by 
those on the landside who felt that these households were acquiring illegitimate capital. 
They were also concerned about the implications for their relative social positions.   
For the households of crew members, given their levels of income, the Tsunami Card 
and the benefit of Rs. 20,000/- was a substantial sum in village terms. Those who 
received a house were very satisfied with their lot, especially where they had no clear 
title to the property in respect of which they were being compensated, or where the 
property had been held in joint ownership. The female-headed households on the 
seaside who were affected by the tsunami were also at a level of income where the 
Tsunami Card and the Rs. 20,000/- were a substantial benefit. Some also received a 
house while others had to fight for the Rs. 100,000/- given for partial damage. The 
unavasara were the category of households in Sinhapura who felt that they had 
benefited the most from the operation of the state programmes of compensation. From 
their condition of poverty and marginalisation, living as unwanted squatters on the 
beach, the state schemes, particularly the house in the interior, were unexpected 
windfalls. They found themselves in a new community, with some capital at their 
disposal through the Tsunami Card and the Rs. 20,000/-.   
Those who were employed in organisations external to the village were, for the most 
part, from the landside. In the case of those who suffered damage, in the aftermath of 
the tsunami, the loss was a loss of employment income stemming from the fact that 
businesses had been extensively destroyed whether, e.g., a retail store or a tourist hotel, 
in Hikkaduwa and Galle and all along the southern coastal belt.158 If income was 
affected then they were entitled to the Tsunami Card as well as the benefit of Rs. 
20,000/-. In this category were those whose salary was less than the sum that they 
received through the Tsunami Card and the Rs. 20,000/-. Therefore, their ‘income’ 
improved and their overall resource position was enhanced. Similarly, the service 
                                                          
158 This predicament did not affect government employees. Even if the local premises were considerably 
damaged the government continued to pay its employees. 
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providers received the Tsunami Card and the benefit of Rs. 20,000/- but were not 
entitled to a house or the Rs. 100,000/-, as they lived on the landside and their properties 
were not damaged. Their grievance was that, in the event of damage to expensive 
equipment, which had implications for their livelihood, there were no state schemes of 
compensation.  
The government did little to help businesses recover except by making arrangements 
with banks regarding low interest loans. However, the banks tended to follow 
established principles and the result was that only ‘big business’ was able to secure such 
loans.159 The small and medium enterprises, such as those in Sinhapura, found it very 
difficult to secure loans from banks because their business activities were not 
sufficiently large in scale and they found it difficult to provide collateral for the loan. 
The High Street traders of Sinhapura felt that in terms of the scale of their loss, the state 
benefits of the Tsunami Card and the Rs. 20,000/- did not approach anything like the 
full compensation for their loss. At their level of income, somewhat similar to the 
wallam owners, these benefits were not very relevant. They were not eligible for houses 
as their premises were not totally destroyed. They were not eligible for the Rs. 
100,000/- if the premises damaged was not also a residence but purely a business centre. 
The most serious lacuna in the state programmes as far as the High Street traders were 
concerned, was the lack of compensation for the losses suffered by small-scale 
businesses.  
Bernard had a grocery store on the High Street and lived behind the store. The tsunami 
waters came right into his premises and washed away his stock, in addition to the 
household goods. He had little capital, saved, with which to re-start his business, nor 
was its scale of such an order that the banks would consider a loan. While he received 
the Tsunami Card and the Rs. 20,000/-  he received no direct help from the state to re-
start his business. He felt entitled to state compensation and was aggrieved that there 
was no such scheme.   
The affluent households in Sinhapura, particularly the multi-day boat owners, felt that 
the state compensation did not amount to more than a fraction of what they had lost. 
The perception in the community was that Palitha Mudalali was a ‘rich man’ who had a 
multi-day boat and several wallams. However, as he told me, he was not ‘cash-rich’ as 
                                                          
159 Please refer Chapter 1. 
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he was paying off a heavy loan on the multi-day boat and had eight children to clothe, 
feed, educate and give in marriage. Thus, he felt that he was entitled to much more than 
what he saw as ‘minimum’ compensation from the state  --  a small house of 500 square 
feet, in one of the new housing complexes, the Tsunami Card and the benefit of Rs. 
20,000/-. In a similar vein, the wallam owners whose boats were completely destroyed 
felt that the state should have had a scheme for the restoration of a boat, irrespective of 
the lack of registration. The affluent households found that they were thrust into the 
position of playing client vis-à-vis the institutions of the state. They felt that the state 
compensation was inadequate. In addition, they felt that being dependent on the state for 
assistance compromised the social position which they had previously enjoyed. For the 
poor, however, playing client was a role to which they were accustomed.  
The narratives of blame articulated by the households of multi-day boat owners as well 
as wallam owners was the context in which there was an ongoing debate on the question  
whether a household was entitled to the full value of its loss, from the state. The feeling 
in Sinhapura, amongst the poorer households, was that affluent households had a variety 
of contacts and avenues to recover their loss whereas poorer households were wholly 
dependent on state benefits. The multi-day boat owners, were in total disagreement with 
the view that they had the capacity to recover with little assistance from the state. On 
the contrary, their view was that their capacity to recover was not as strong as it was 
popularly supposed; that what they had lost was considerable; and that, therefore, they 
were entitled to a far greater volume of state compensation than those of a lower social 
position who had had little and, therefore, had lost little; and, that activating contacts 
was very difficult in a situation of widespread devastation. This point of view resonates 
with that made by Cernea (2003) that compensation in disaster situations does not 
compensate people fully for what they have suffered  --  that while there is obvious 
financial compensation, there is little for the loss of intangibles such as goodwill, 
custom and networks. The affluent households of Sinhapura felt that the poor, such as 
the unavasara, had improved their social position, through no effort of theirs, but 
entirely through the state benefits which they had received. The perception was that this 
was not a legitimate advancement of social position. It may then be said that the 
uniform scheme of compensation devised by the government had this effect. On the one 
hand, the richer segments felt that they were not adequately compensated for their losses 
and also that the losses of intangibles were barely recognised in this scheme. On the 
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other hand, the uniform application of the rules meant that some people ended in a 
much better position than that prior to the tsunami.  
There were those households which were entitled to compensation but did not receive it 
due to the literal and rigid application of the criteria of eligibility, by the officials of the 
state agencies. Charlotte, for instance, felt that she missed out on the last two tranches 
of the benefit of Rs. 20,000/- on a technicality. Similarly, those such as Suneetha, with a 
joint-share in a partially damaged house, felt that they had a claim to a share of the Rs. 
100,000/-. They felt that the joint owners, residing on the premises at the time of the 
tsunami, had illegitimately appropriated the entire compensation for themselves. So, 
too, with those whose premises had been repaired by NGOs. They felt that they had 
been unjustly treated when they were informed that the NGO assistance rendered them 
ineligible for compensation. Every household experiences a disaster in a very distinctive 
way. In this sense, the state’s schemes of rehabilitation, designed for uniform 
application, and formulated on an assumption of the homogeneity of household need, 
did not meet the needs of every household. In the case of Sinhapura, those individuals 
who felt that the state schemes were implemented to their detriment, were quick to 
allege that the programmes had not been implemented by the state, equitably; and that 
the principles of justice and entitlement had not been followed.   
Using state compensation intended to repair housing or for living expenses, for the 
repayment of loans was regarded as indefensible. This criticism was made, most 
strongly, by those who felt that they had not received the full complement of 
compensation for the losses that they had suffered. The perception was that if these 
benefits were used in this manner, the losses suffered by these households did not merit 
compensation.    
Another issue that merits some discussion is the way in which unresolved disputes with 
the state, such as the matter of land acquisition for road widening, came to play a role in 
the citizens’ interaction with state at the time of the tsunami. Sharma’s experience 
reveals that there was the feeling in Sinhapura that this was the opportunity to resolve 
the dispute, to the advantage of the citizen. The perception was that the state was 
disbursing ‘hand-outs’, and that if their needs, relating to the issue of road widening, 
could be brought in under the tsunami umbrella, then they would have a better chance of 
success than in more ‘normal’ times.  
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The view in Sinhapura, widespread in the immediate post-tsunami period, was that the 
way in which state aid came to be channelled to the undeserving and away from those 
with legitimate claims, was to be laid at the door of the GN, and his partner in 
wrongdoing the TO. The GN was the central government official at the village level and 
had a wide range of administrative functions. These functions meant that the residents 
of the village were dependent upon him for certificates and approvals of various sorts. 
Thus, linkages were established with the community and he was in a position of 
patronage and power.   
In the aftermath of the tsunami, the imperatives of the situation were such that the state 
had little option but to place a large measure of responsibility upon the GN. Little 
supervision by his superiors in the central administration, was possible if relief was to 
reach the tsunami-affected populations quickly. The GN had it in his power to certify 
damage to a household. It was on the basis of this that categories of aid were disbursed. 
This placed the GN in control over tsunami aid, at the village level. Thus, the GN had 
power over sums of money which were substantial in village terms, and his position 
developed into one of even greater influence than before the tsunami. As far as 
households were concerned, the capacity to acquire the benefits of the state was 
mediated, in many instances, by alliances with the GN and the significance of these 
alliances in the GN’s decision-making behaviour regarding damage.  
The opportunity, therefore, presented itself for many GNs, including the one of 
Sinhapura, to acquire extra-legal income. All GNs, on the south-western coast, were not 
perceived as having used this opportunity to consolidate their personal resources. The 
GN from a neighbouring village, one of my informants, was regarded as having 
behaved in an exemplary manner in the post-disaster disbursement of aid. No taint of 
bribery or corruption attached to him. His reward was not financial, but the appreciation 
of the community for a job conscientiously done, at a difficult time. He was regarded 
with much respect in the community where he was the GN  --  as embodying certain 
ideals and values  --   and this vadagath position was very important to him. Thus, in the 
post-tsunami context, he pursued a very different strategy to that of the GN of 
Sinhapura. The latter had little interest in the cultivation of this kind of social position, 
but was far more interested in the pursuit of financial capital.  
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Given the fact that Sinhapura’s linkages to national politicians, since 1978, had become 
attenuated, the community was not able to call upon ‘higher authorities’ to influence 
and discipline local officials, such as the GN, as would have happened in an earlier era. 
This scenario also illustrates the point that in this disaster context a local official 
collapsed the distinction between his role as a ‘public servant’ and his role as a ‘private 
citizen’. The public role was utilised to increase his personal resources and to pursue 
private aspirations, thereby, improving the position in his social world (Fuller & 
Harriss, 2001).160 The two roles came to be blurred. At any one point the GN was acting 
both in his official capacity as GN, disbursing funds and exercising patronage and 
power, and in his capacity as a member of the Salagama caste, of the community of 
Kotigama, pursuing his private interests.   
From the multiplicity of perspectives articulated by different segments of Sinhapura 
society two opposing positions can be identified. On the one hand, the more affluent 
households of the community took the view that the purpose of state aid was to restore 
households to what they were, not in terms of an absolute standard, but in relation to 
other households. On the other, those households characterised by poverty and 
marginalisation, felt that this was an opportunity for the state to facilitate their rise in 
social position, and for Sinhapura to move in the direction of a more egalitarian and 
more equitable society.  
Conclusion 
Compensation, and the moral narratives about the entitlement to this compensation, had 
thus become the dominant idiom of interaction between Sinhapura and the state in the 
post-tsunami context.  
Sinhapura’s cultural context shaped the narratives about entitlement, and it is in terms 
of this that individuals and households made moral judgements about the legitimacy of 
the compensation. Underpinning these views was the articulated concern with the 
distribution of capital, in the aftermath of the tsunami, and the impact of this on relative 
social position. As described above, the idea that households should be the recipients of 
                                                          
160 I came to know in 2008 that the GN had given his daughter in marriage with a car as part of her dowry. 
As my informants told me, this was far in excess of what would be given as a dowry both in Sinhapura 
and Kotigama, except perhaps by the households of the multiday-boat owners. The perception in the 
village was that the GN had been able to give this enhanced dowry because of the financial benefits he 
derived, extra-legally, during the post-tsunami period.   
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benefits which were not the result of personal effort and hard work, was regarded as 
unjust. Thus, there were views about legitimate social advancement, as exemplified by 
the social processes of this community before the tsunami  --  hard work; the 
accumulation of capital; investment; and the continuation of this cycle  --  and 
illegitimate social advancement, as portrayed by the way in which some households 
utilised the resources from the state, to ‘leap-frog’ to an enhanced social position. These 
views were not always consistent with the principles of equitable restitution which 
underpinned the policy criteria of the state assistance programmes.   
The resources provided by the state, had the effect of situating households in Sinhapura 
in different social positions, in relation to each other. Some individuals and households 
were able to accumulate capital, principally economic capital, through the productive 
use of alliances such as those which had been established with the GN, in a way that 
would not have been possible had the processes of community reproduction continued 
without the impact of the tsunami. There was an urgency and an immediacy with regard 
to accessing the new sources of capital which, clearly were recognised, as not being 
limitless, which had the effect of generating strong competition. The resource position 
of households was altered in terms of capital and, therefore, capacity and the consequent 
ability to pursue aspirations. The social position of households changed relative to each 
other.  
The unavasara were the households which most dramatically improved in social 
position and, in doing so, realised many of their aspirations. The households of the 
multi-day boat owners, the wallam owners and the High Street traders found that their 
losses of capital had implications for their social position in the community. In the case 
of the households of crew members, service providers, and those externally employed 
the state schemes of compensation, together with the non-governmental ones, detailed 
in the next chapter, secured for them a compensation which was commensurate with the 
loss suffered. However, in this latter group of categories there were households which 
differed from this pattern. In some cases they managed to secure compensation which 
was greater than their loss. In contrast, households such as that of Charlotte, whose 
losses were greater than the volume of compensation that they received, experienced a 
decline in overall capital, capacity and, therefore, social position.     
174 
 
What comment can be made about the tensions between the two sides of the village, in 
this context? The landside felt that the seaside had received compensation from the state 
which was commensurate with loss and that a particular group on the seaside, the 
unavasara, had received compensation at levels which were far in excess of their loss. 
The seaside, on the other hand, maintained that it was they who had been principally 
affected by the tsunami and that, therefore, the landside’s entitlement to compensation 
was morally suspect. Furthermore, that in a situation of finite resources the landside had 
received resources which should by right have come to them.    
The volume of resources which flowed into Sinhapura was not of a sufficient order to 
affect the ideology, the aspirations and the lifestyle of the two sides of the village. 
Those on the landside continued to pursue a vadagath lifestyle. The fishing households 
continued with their lifestyle, disrupted for a time in the immediate aftermath of the 
tsunami, although the social position of some households, had been altered relative to 
others. To this extent, the equilibrium which had prevailed between the two sides of the 
village  --  in terms of behaviour, lifestyle, the pursuit of aspirations, conditioned by 
ideology  --  was maintained. Thus, the social processes of Sinhapura, as described in 
the previous chapter  --  where individuals and households were accumulating capital, 
redefining capacity, in terms of the alliances available to them, and pursuing their 
aspirations  --  were not transformed by the inflow of state resources, consequent upon 
the tsunami.      
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Chapter 5  --  The NGO Programmes 
Introduction 
In this chapter I am concerned with the impact of the post-tsunami rehabilitation 
initiatives of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and of the organisations of the 
United Nations (UN) system, on the social processes of Sinhapura.    
At the time of the tsunami in contrast with the state, with which Sinhapura had an 
established relationship, NGOs  --  both international and local  --  were not prominent 
in Sinhapura and the villages surrounding it. Bornstein (2003) describes a situation in 
Zimbabwe where religion and economic development, intertwined within an over-
arching political framework, were the basis for the actions of NGOs. This was not a 
feature of the south-western coast of Sri Lanka. Furthermore, there were few village 
level associations supported by local NGOs. There were, however, a number of 
microfinance organisations operating village level savings societies.161  
As described in the last chapter, the programmes instituted by the state in response to 
this disaster were criticised on two counts. The first was that the nature of the policy 
criteria of the programmes designed by the government, left some categories of people 
with little compensation for their losses while others received in excess of that which 
had been lost. The second criticism was that the programmes were not implemented 
equitably. Some of these criticisms were articulated in a statement made by civil society 
organisations on the occasion of the Donor Forum held from 16-17 May 2005, 
‘Rebuilding Sri Lanka: Post-Tsunami Action Plan’. At the Forum these organisations 
put forward the demand that TAFREN, the taskforce dominated by ‘big business’, be 
disbanded and replaced with a people’s planning commission composed of 
representatives of affected communities and their organisations. These organisations 
were of the view, moreover, that the government should abandon all attempts to restrict 
people’s rights of access to land in terms of buffer zones, tourism zones and high 
security zones.162  
 
With the programmes initiated by the NGOs the issues were somewhat different. Local 
communities did not feel entitled to compensation from these organisations, in the way 
                                                          
161 In Sinhapura there were 7 microfinance societies.  
162 Source: www.omiusajpic.org/docs/disaster/sri_lanka_sign-on.htm Accessed 2 May 2008. 
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that they felt entitled to compensation from the state. The same imperatives which 
operated on the state did not operate upon them: “While welfare states speak of 
entitlements, NGO discourse, in contrast, has moved toward a charity model.” 
(Bornstein:2003:116). Thus, the discourse of NGOs in the south-western region was a 
humanitarian one, dominated by ideas about community participation, and underpinned 
sometimes by a religious ideology as in the case of the organisation, World Vision 
(Bornstein, 2003).  
As far as the NGOs were concerned, while there was competition with the state which 
was functioning on a very broad canvas, there was also complementarity in terms of 
filling the gaps of the state programmes and, thereby, putting resources to their best use. 
Furthermore, the procedures followed by the state, in the aftermath of the tsunami, had 
an impact on the programmes initiated by the NGOs. There was, for instance, the 
requirement of government certification for the disbursement of NGO relief.   
In the wake of the disaster the first concern was with immediate relief: food, clothing 
and temporary shelter. Long-term needs such as housing, livelihoods, education, health, 
nutrition, as well as the repair of damaged roads, canals and bridges, and the 
resuscitation of the fisheries industry became the focus thereafter.   
The approaches followed by NGOs were characterised by several assumptions. One of 
these was that affected populations were homogeneous when it came to loss and, 
therefore, to needs. Thus, the perception of needs and priorities was not the result of a 
needs assessment, made on the spot, quick though that would have had to be. It was an a 
priori assessment on the basis of pre-conceived notions relating to disaster relief. While 
this, in itself, is perhaps inevitable, what was missing is that these notions were not 
adapted to the prevailing conditions at the local level.163 Devastation was defined, 
narrowly, so that needs could be seen to be met speedily and visibly. This was in order 
to conform to a particular construct of success and legitimacy (Hilhorst, 2003). As with 
the state programmes, differences between disaster-affected populations were rarely 
recognised in the design of programmes intended for uniform application. One or more 
programmes were duplicated in many villages and regions. This contrasts with the point 
                                                          
163 The evidential base for this comment is both my experience of Sinhapura and the trends that I 
observed in the other communities along the southern and western coast. The interaction and, sometimes, 
the conflict between relief organisations, and tsunami-affected coastal populations is discussed much 
further in Chapter 5.   
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made by Frerks (2010) which is that those seeking to intervene, must know the 
community response in order to do the best for them.  
 
It was a discourse dominated by ideas about rationality and progress, ideas about 
accumulation and consumption, and ideas about the right way to live (Bornstein, 2003). 
This is in contrast to the imperatives of the state programmes where the emphasis on 
entitlement implied restoration of what had been lost, and no more. With the NGOs, 
however, there was the implicit objective of going beyond what had been lost. This was 
the recurring concern with connecting relief to long-term development.164 
Reconstruction after a disaster was seen as an opportunity to initiate development 
programmes, which decrease the susceptibility levels of local people and mitigate the 
potential impact of hazards, while at the same time fostering progress. The disaster 
policy of NGOs was also shaped by the conditions regarding the disbursement of aid 
enunciated by donors who were, in turn, concerned with their constituencies.     
 
Many organisations had clear ideologies on the basis of which their policy was founded. 
Aeberhard (2008), for example, points to the humanitarian model developed by 
Medecins du Monde on the basis of which they conducted their programmes. This 
model involved a focus on the emergency and the long-term medical care of vulnerable 
populations, untrammelled by rules and regulations, and the advocacy on behalf of these 
populations.  
 
The sheer volume of aid, generated in the wake of the tsunami, involved a large number 
of stakeholders, with varying degrees of accountability and pressure to perform, as well 
as to be seen to perform, in a context where the political imperatives of speed were 
many (Hilhorst, 2003). Explanations of this avalanche of aid range from the huge media 
coverage of the event, to the fact that many of the countries affected by the tsunami 
were favourite tourist destinations; the fact that this disaster happened just after 
Christmas; and the fact that it was ‘natural’ rather than ‘man made’. Jeevan Thiagaraja, 
Executive Director of the Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies in Sri Lanka, stated 
that in response to the tsunami, at least US $ 13.5 billion was pledged or donated for 
emergency relief and reconstruction: 44% from governments, 41% from private sources 
                                                          
164 For an account of the issues surrounding development in Sri Lanka see Woost (1997). 
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and the remainder from International Financial Institutions (these figures based on 
countries studied in the TEC Funding Response study).  
The media representation of this disaster was dominated by the premise that the Third 
World, particularly its governments, needed help in a disaster situation because it was 
incompetent: “For the western news media the Third World is a place of natural and 
political disasters and not much else” (Fiske:1987:285). This construct was under-
pinned by the notion that assistance to tsunami-affected populations was best provided 
by NGOs who had the expertise and the capacity to do so.  
Therefore, the media, both international and local, played a role in shaping relief 
interventions by framing the disaster in terms of a series of narratives: “Internationally, 
decisions with far reaching consequences for the intended recipients were based on 
political or public opinion considerations resulting from anecdotal coverage by the mass 
media. Coordinating agencies were often reluctant to encourage donors and actors to 
discontinue visible but unnecessary or counterproductive activities.” (Tsunami 
Evaluation Coalition: Thematic Evaluation Report).165 The representation was that it 
was the poor, a homogeneous category, that had suffered and that it was the 
responsibility of both the state and the non-governmental sector to rehabilitate the poor.  
Thus, through a particular representation of this disaster event, the media created a 
standard against which the performance of both the NGOs and the state was assessed. 
There was tremendous pressure on NGOs and the government to respond in particular 
ways, where the categories of ‘devastation’, ‘reconstruction’ and ‘need’ had been 
defined in a specific manner.166 Out of several potential representations, one 
representation came to be constituted as the legitimate discourse of recovery. This 
related, particularly, to the re-settlement of tsunami victims in permanent housing. Thus, 
the partial representation of certain realities, to the exclusion of others, by the media, 
assisted NGOs in pursuing a discourse oriented towards the notion of success.   
                                                          
165 Thematic Evaluation Report  --  “The Role of Needs Assessment in the Tsunami Response” Tsunami 
Evaluation Coalition. www.tsunami-evaluation.org/THE+TEC+Thematic+Evaluations/needs. Accessed 
on 07/10/2006 
166 Source: www.asiamedia.ucla.edu; www.bbc.co.uk; www.cnn.com; www.skynews.co.uk; 
www.island.lk; www.dailynews.lk; www.sundaytimes.lk; www.sundayleader.lk Accessed 01/11/2006. 
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The communities along the south-western coast responded to the initiatives of these 
organisations in a diversity of ways. There was controversy over the principles of 
disbursement, as well as over the uniform applicability of these initiatives.  
In this chapter, therefore, I am concerned with the way in which the resources which 
flowed into Sinhapura, through non-governmental means, had implications for social 
position as well as for the relationship between the landside and the seaside. I am also 
concerned with the way in which these resources were viewed by the community in 
terms of ideas about the gift, accountability, justice and legitimacy.   
In the rest of the chapter I describe the programmes of NGOs in the south-western 
region, in Sinhapura in particular, and the responses at the local level. Then I go on to 
draw out the implications of these programmes for Sinhapura.  
This situation can be contrasted with the north and the east of Sri Lanka, where the 
tsunami affected a population in the midst of a civil war. Here, in addition to the state 
and the NGOs there was another actor on the stage: the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE). The issues that emanated from the interaction of these three actors have 
been comprehensively discussed by, for instance, de Alwis & Hedman (2009). 
The NGO Programmes on the South-western Coast 
Overview of the Region 
This section is an overview of the relief programmes of NGOs, in the south-western 
region, in order to contextualise the specific programmes in Sinhapura.167  
The programmes of NGOs had a greater variety than those of the state. However, they 
were not uniformly implemented in the manner of the state programmes  --  i.e., not 
every organisation worked in every tsunami-affected district. Moreover, the focus on 
                                                          
167 This information regarding the programmes of organisations in Sri Lanka was gleaned from interviews 
with officials of the relevant NGOs, in Colombo and Galle, as well as observation of the programmes in 
operation, between Panadura and Hambanthota, both during my period as Co-ordinator of the Trust in 
2005 and 2006 as well as during my spell of fieldwork in 2007-2008. They were: members of local 
societies of NGOs; informant group sessions with members both from the same society and across 
societies in Sinhapura; the managers of the regional offices of these organizations and officials in the 
Colombo office; the Urban Development Authority (UDA); the Sri Lanka Tourist Board (SLTB); the 
National Housing Development Authority (NHDA); the Reconstruction and Development Agency 
(RADA) ; NGOs and UN Organizations based in Colombo with a broad based activity landscape (IFAD, 
Oxfam, MercyCorps, FAO, GTZ, IUCN, ADB, World Vision, Red Cross, the Asia Foundation, Caritas, 
CARE International).  
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some issues, such as women’s particular medical and hygiene needs, was marginal (de 
Silva, 2006).168     
 
In the immediate aftermath, emergency relief  --  food, clothing and shelter  --  was the 
main focus on the south-western coast with a concomitant concern for health and 
nutrition, in terms of safe drinking water and access to good sanitary services. Among 
the principal organisations involved in this relief effort were OXFAM, specialising in 
immediate disaster relief, World Vision, with a focus on temporary shelter, and 
MercyCorps encompassing both these elements of relief. The conduit between NGOs 
and affected communities were local level organisations, local government politicians 
and tourist guides (Solomon, 2007; Mitlin & Satterthwaite, 2007).  
 
Once the phase of emergency relief was over and the affected populations had been 
housed either in tents or in temporary structures, it was household goods which were 
found to be in short supply. Many NGOs provided packages containing mattresses, 
blankets, linen, clothing, bottled water, non-perishable food items, mosquito nets, and 
kitchen utensils. Some were culturally appropriate while others, such as blankets, were 
not (Mulligan & Shaw, 2011).    
 
The concern with livelihoods was the focus thereafter. MercyCorps and World Vision 
conducted cash-for-work programmes as a component of their livelihoods programme. 
OXFAM supported the coir industry in the southern district of Matara and assisted 
agriculture in the Hambanthota District by helping, for instance, to desalinate fields of 
cultivation which had been flooded by tsunami waters. The Post Tsunami Livelihood 
Support and Partnership Programme (PTLSPP) of the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD) facilitated the regeneration of the artisanal fisheries 
industry; promoted mechanized craft; and, in liaison with the Ceylon Fisheries Harbours 
Corporation (CFHC), assisted the construction of anchorages and landing sites in 
Suduwella, in the Matara District. The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) liaised 
between donors and the Ministry of Fisheries in the regeneration of the fisheries 
                                                          
168 de Silva (2006) states that if not for local organization like the Tsunami Women’s Fund, which was 
established to cater to women’s particular needs, women would have been, more or less, ignored by 
government authorities and NGOs.       
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industry, specifically in the distribution of craft. In the midst of these efforts to 
resuscitate livelihoods, however, there was little support for the commercial sector, by 
NGOs, on the basis that banks and insurance companies were there for this purpose.  
The government repaired the railways and the major roads and bridges. There were, 
however, minor ones which were important to local communities, which were of low 
priority for the state. Some UN organisations, such as IFAD and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), in liaison with local government institutions, 
effected these necessary repairs on the south-western coast. They were also involved in 
the replacement of equipment and furniture as well as the repair of buildings. IFAD, for 
instance, assisted the Department of Fisheries to repair its damaged buildings in Galle. 
The UNDP replaced the fuel facility in the Galle harbour, managed by the Galle District 
Fisheries Co-operative, which was completely destroyed.   
 
Housing soon became the dominant discourse of NGOs, often at the expense of 
livelihoods. In Chapter 4, I have discussed the state perspective on housing and the 
partnership with NGOs in the construction of housing.169 The houses were built by 
church organisations; a variety of NGOs, both international and local; commercial 
organisations; and, ad hoc organisations such as the Sri Lanka Minnesota Friendship 
Society. One of the issues that NGOs faced, especially in the construction of ‘home 
owner driven housing schemes’, was the problem of collusion between the field workers 
of NGOs and the contractors, the former certifying the poor quality work of the other. 
One organisation told me that they had to terminate the employment of several 
employees of their housing division, because of malpractices of this nature.  
Education was the other issue upon which the greatest efforts of NGOs was placed. The 
Caritas Sed Galle ‘back to school’ project, for instance, provided children with 
temporary classrooms, furniture, uniforms and stationary. The construction of pre-
schools was the most common of the education-related initiatives.  
 
Then there were more long-term programmes such as those concerned with disaster 
management and gender development. The Red Cross organised trainings in disaster 
management. The Post Tsunami Coastal Rehabilitation and Resource Management 
                                                          
169 The only construction of permanent housing by an NGO in Sinhapura was the 4 houses which were 
constructed by Red Cross on the seaside, as described in Chapter 4.  
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Programme (PTCRRMP) of IFAD, in collaboration with the Ministry of Fisheries, the 
National Aquatic Resources Agency (NARA) and the Coast Conservation Department 
(CCD), was concerned with community-based coastal resource management. Other long 
term programmes such as the support by the FAO of landing sites were designed to 
encourage the better handling of fish for export.         
 
These were some of the main programmes implemented in the south-western region by 
NGOs, both local and international. Not all of these programmes were implemented in 
Sinhapura. The significance of this description is that it contextualises the relief 
interventions which were implemented in Sinhapura.   
Overview of Sinhapura 
NGOs were not involved in the initial problem that Sinhapura faced, which was a 
scarcity of food.170 Temporary shelter in Sinhapura has already been mentioned in the 
previous chapter. The tents where people were initially housed were provided by 
organisations such as World Vision, before the construction of transitional housing in 
the village.  
 
Within a week of the tsunami, a procession of vehicles, belonging to NGOs and to 
commercial organisations, passed through Sinhapura distributing packages with a 
variety of household goods.171 They came from Colombo and were headed towards 
Galle, Matara and Hambanthota. These packages were distributed with little 
discrimination. My research assistant’s brother, who was studying for his O’ Level 
examination, received five school bags suitable for a child attending pre-school. 
Although tsunami debris had not contaminated the sources of drinking water in 
Sinhapura, many relief agencies distributed bottles and barrels of mineral water. Fifteen 
                                                          
170 It is the surrounding communities, the temple and the Trust which played a critical role in food relief.  
171 The following gave aid to Sinhapura: the Coastal Fisheries and Industries Trust (COFIT); the 
Arthacharya Trust; the Siyath Foundation; the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Galle 
District; the Southern Fisheries Organisation; World Vision; Caritas Sed Galle; St. Aloysius Church, 
Kaluwella; the Dutch Church, Galle; the Salvation Army, Hikkaduwa; Holy Trinity Church, Patuwatha; 
the German Technical Corporation (GTZ); the Asia Foundation; individuals both foreign and local; local 
government politicians; UNICEF; Red Cross; Neil Marine Company; Bank of Ceylon; Rupavahini 
Corporation.  
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bicycles, given by a church in the interior, were distributed to the friends and supporters 
of a member of the congregation, resident in Sinhapura.  
Amongst those that stood on the roadside, there was intense competition to collect as 
many packages as possible. Some of these people were from the landside of Sinhapura 
as well as from the interior of the country, as some of my informants informed me. The 
residents of Sinhapura felt that those from the interior were undeserving recipients. 
Some Sinhapura residents were unwilling to stand on the road waiting for these 
handouts, as they saw this as having a negative impact on their social position: 
“Hinganna vage pare hitiya hekida apita?” (Can we stand on the road like beggars?)  
 
Gunasena, my research assistant’s father, told me that he would not permit his four 
children to ‘run after’ (badu pitipasse duwanna) the NGO vans driving along the 
coastline handing out packages of goods. He was concerned with maintaining his 
position as an ‘upright’ citizen in the community; one who had been prominent in 
Communist Party politics in the 1960s and 1970s when the Communist Party dominated 
local government politics in the region. He was scornful of those who were constantly 
on the lookout for hand-outs. He was also conscious of his daughter’s forthcoming 
marriage and the necessity to maintain a vadagath position, in this context.    
 
Charlotte, the teacher, is another person who explained to me that she could not pursue 
aid, aggressively, in the way of the unavasara and some of the fishing households, for 
the reason that her social position in the community did not permit her to do so. 
Teaching in the Sinhapura school and living nearby, Charlotte was highly involved with 
the school and its students. She felt that had she ‘greedily’ pursued tsunami aid, in full 
view of the community, her standing as a teacher  --  a repository of the moral universe  
--  would have been permanently damaged. Thus, for her, the preservation of social 
position was more important than the material goods she might have received from 
NGOs. Another teacher, Vinitha, echoed these sentiments as did Bernard and Wilbert, 
both of whom belonged to the ‘old’ families in Sinhapura. These families have lost 
much of the material base of their social standing, but continue to be respected for their 
past.           
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The restoration of Sinhapura’s fishing fleet was a multi-pronged effort. The 
government’s marginal role in this has already been described in the last chapter. The 
part played by the Coastal Fisheries and Industries Trust (referred to hereafter in this 
Chapter as the Trust), will be described later on in this chapter. My concern, here, is 
with the way in which other NGOs and philanthropic individuals, mostly foreign 
nationals, contributed to this reconstruction effort.  
 
Some of the smaller NGOs gave a few boats and nets, operating through a local broker, 
often a tourist guide, concentrated on a particular neighbourhood of the village. 
Suneetha, the Sinhapura fish auctioneer and a tourist guide, was such a broker who 
received a commission for identifying recipients from the ad hoc organisations 
mentioned above as well as from foreign nationals who had, as tourists, been holidaying 
in the area. Three of his nominees received funds to repair their boats; another received 
a new boat; and another, according to my informants, who had never had a boat, 
received one nevertheless. What Suneetha told me was that he had played the role of 
broker out of the goodness of his heart: “Game minissu amaruwata watunama udaw 
karanna onene.” (When people in the village fall into difficulty one has to help them.). 
He did not mention the commission that he had received. My informants told me that 
his role as a broker of international finance, through his contacts with former tourists 
from Germany and Sweden, proved financially lucrative to him.  
Duminda was a crewman who received a wallam from a German national. He told me 
that this foreign national had met him on the High Street, begun to converse with him, 
at random and had, eventually, offered cash to help stock his mother, Lalitha’s 
vegetable shop. Duminda had refused, as he told me, on the basis that his mother’s shop 
was stocked at the time. When Duminda explained that he was working as a crew 
member in the fishing industry the German national had offered to buy him a wallam. 
Duminda accepted. He received a wallam and nets worth approximately Rs. 800,000/-. 
He told me that he had to buy the engine, himself, which he did by pawning his wife’s 
gold jewellery. He bought it second-hand paying Rs. 75,000/-, from someone who had 
received it as a gift. This was approximately half the cost of an engine, of that 
horsepower strength, in 2005. Duminda’s position was that the community had suffered 
great losses which were being made good in diverse ways, and that what he had 
received was his share of this entitlement.   
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William was an entrepreneur, from the next village, with various interests in the tourist 
industry, who acted as a broker between foreign money and those affected by the 
tsunami. He set up a boat construction and repair yard with funds received from foreign 
donors. Susith’s wallam was swallowed up by the tsunami waves. The arrangement was 
made by an organisation to pay William to construct a wallam for Susith at his 
boatyard.172 There was another boatyard in a village somewhat to the interior, which 
had been patronised by the Sinhapura fishermen before the tsunami. It is these two 
boatyards which replaced, through construction, the destroyed fishing fleet of 
Sinhapura. The Navy and Cey-Nor boatyards, of a temporary nature, attended to the 
repair of engines.    
 
Asanka was a crewman who was also involved in the tourist industry. Through his 
contacts in the tourist industry he was able to attract foreign money into Sinhapura, 
directed towards the fishing industry. He expected a 20% commission for providing this 
service. Eventually, a foreign national provided him with the means to buy land and 
construct a house in the interior. He told me that this was in recognition of his liaison 
role. His tsunami-affected clients viewed this with great disapprobation. Brokers such as 
William, Suneetha and Asanka mediated the flow of finance between external sources 
and Sinhapura.  
As far as the role of NGOs and foreign individuals was concerned, in relation to the 
gifts of boats and engines, the criticism by the large majority of people in the village 
was that the arbitrary nature of disbursement meant that the wrong people received 
boats and help with repairs, by virtue of a connection to a broker or by being in the right 
place at the right time. Furthermore, there was the criticism that at no stage was a census 
taken  --  either by the state or by any organisation  --  in which the ownership of boats, 
before the tsunami, was properly enumerated, the losses identified and a scheme drawn 
up for making good these losses. The Fisheries Inspector had a list of boats destroyed. 
However, according to him, donors rarely consulted this list when making their 
donations. It would appear that they had little faith in the integrity of the Fisheries 
                                                          
172 In 2006 when the repair and construction of boats had gone back to pre-tsunami levels, William 
converted the boatyard into a tourist guest resort. Amongst his other entrepreneurial activities, he runs this 
venture.  
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Inspector’s list. While the impression in Sinhapura was that many organisations and 
foreign nationals walking about the village gave boats indiscriminately, and plentifully, 
when I updated the survey conducted by the Trust in 2005, in 2008, the final increase in 
the number of craft, pre-tsunami to post-tsunami, appeared to be only 20%.    
 
Microfinance 
In the period after the tsunami Sinhapura required capital and credit. In a situation 
where income was seriously disrupted, houses and boats had to be repaired or 
substantially rebuilt; businesses had to be resuscitated; and, education had to be 
pursued. The demand for microfinance increased several fold, across a wide cross-
section of the community. The opportunity for those who provided this type of finance 
also expanded.   
There were 7 microfinance organisations operating in Sinhapura at the time of the 
tsunami. They provided loans for small and medium enterprises, housing, education, 
and cottage crafts. Soon after the disaster, new microfinance organisations commenced 
operations in the community and their number increased to 15. Those who were already 
in microfinance expanded their activity. Where, previously, 40% of the community 
were clients of these organisations, the figure soon rose to 60%.173 A long established 
organisation, for instance, instituted a loan called the Sahana Naya (relief loan) of Rs. 
25,000/- at an interest of 6% per annum. There was a six month grace period on 
repayment and the individual could take two years to pay it back. This proved to be a 
very popular loan.     
With these microfinance organisations coming into the village the borrowing life of the 
community expanded. Shirani who was already a member of the existing 7 
organisations came to be a member of 12 microfinance organisations. She took loans 
from some to pay others; she also used the capital, so acquired, for money-lending and 
other credit ventures such as the seettu. There were several others whose reach was not 
as extensive, but who followed the same principle of making external capital ‘work’ for 
them. Thus, the availability of microfinance, on a scale hitherto unknown to this 
community, had an impact on the internal commerce of Sinhapura.  
                                                          
173 Source: Survey conducted by the Trust as well as my own update of the survey in 2007.  
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Inevitably, with many microfinance organisations and a large number of people wanting 
credit, a situation of considerable competition was created. Individuals in the 
community were competing for credit and for the control of the organisations, while the 
organisations, themselves, were competing for clients. There had been people in the 
village who had acted as the propagandists for the older microfinance organisations 
before the tsunami. They were involved in the selection of clients and were responsible 
for repayments. They were, by virtue of this role, important in the credit life of the 
community. When the new organisations began to operate in Sinhapura, after the 
tsunami, new people presented themselves as those who were capable of playing this 
role and who would, therefore, be useful to the microfinance organisations. This 
situation arose from the allegations of people like Ranee who stated that after the 
tsunami, the management committee of some organisations gave loans to their ‘clients’, 
and withheld them from people who were equally, if not more, deserving. These 
organisations were seen as being in the control of a small clique. At this point, Ranee 
and others took the initiative, when new organisations visited the village, exploring the 
possibility of commencing microfinance societies in the village. They appropriated to 
themselves the societies which were, eventually, established. In a short time, therefore, 
not only had the village a large number of microfinance organisations, there were 
several individuals, such as Ranee, who were members of more than one society. Thus, 
individuals in Ranee’s network, neighbours and kin, also became clients of these new 
organisations. Several networks of the community  --  those of neighbourhood and kin  -
-  were utilised in establishing the clientele of these new organisations.  
 
This expansion in the activity of microfinance to meet high demand, in a disaster 
situation, and the speed at which it happened, had its own problems. The recruitment of 
clients was not done with the same scrutiny as before, as far as the assessment of the 
ability of repayment was concerned. Supervision of the local branch of the microfinance 
society by the regional one, and even the headquarters in Colombo, was cursory. In this 
context, deviation from correct procedure took place, sometimes in the form of 
embezzlement. There was an episode at a regional office of an organisation where the 
administrative staff absconded with a large percentage of the repayments of clients, 
including those of Sinhapura. The field workers of another large organisation were 
found to be, literally, snatching jewellery off female clients if they could not pay their 
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weekly instalment. While people appreciated the expanded access to capital they did not 
appreciate the high interest rates  --  in the case of one organisation as high as 34%.  
The other issue that I observed was the lack of transparency which some of these 
organisations exhibited in their operation. One of my informants, Nadika, told me that 
in the case of one microfinance organisation, all the documentation, except for the 
passbook detailing the loan and the interest paid, was held by the organisation. Nadika 
was not permitted to retain a copy of any of these documents. When I met the manager 
of this organisation in Galle, I asked to see the loan application form. He refused saying 
that the policy was to show these forms to loan applicants alone. Another organisation, 
with its regional office in Hikkaduwa, had their Vision and Mission Statements printed 
in large font on the wall in the reception. While I was waiting to meet the manager I 
wrote it down. The accountant who was seated nearby watched me with suspicion and 
seemed highly agitated all the while that I was writing. My impression was that he 
seemed worried that I was taking down classified, privileged information which might 
be used to ‘indict’ the organisation in the future; whereas, this was information which 
was, in fact, in the public domain. The manager whom I eventually met, was very young  
--  much younger than some of the workers in the office  --  and seemed unaware of 
these under-currents. She was a recent graduate and was quite forthcoming about the 
organisation, unlike the accountant, who was obviously more experienced and, 
therefore, wary. 
In this context, microfinance moved in the direction of commercial lending, where 
capital was lent at a high interest, and began to lose its humanitarian emphasis. 
Microfinance organisations filled the lacuna for capital in these tsunami-affected 
communities, and made a profit in the process. The manager of a microfinance 
organisation told me that they had so much capital from the payment of interest that 
they could give the loans ten times over. This was, however, achieved at some cost. 
Increasingly, local communities began to see microfinance organisations not as a 
charitable concern but as a commercial venture. The result was feelings of aggression 
and hostility to these organisations. The reaction to this was that microfinance 
organisations established the Lanka Microfinance Practitioners’ Network. The idea was 
that this body would protect these organisations from the allegations of extraction, 
bullying and coercion. There is no mechanism, however, to protect the recipients of 
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microfinance or to regulate the industry in a consistent manner, as these organisations 
come under various legislative enactments and are regulated, therefore, by different 
government authorities.174    
Apart from the organisations and individuals which assisted Sinhapura, detailed above, 
there were a few organisations which conducted very specific programmes which had a 
significant impact on the community. The following sections focus on these 
organisations and the ways in which they affected the social processes of the 
community, by giving some individuals and households the opportunity for accelerated 
social mobility.    
 
The Coastal Fisheries and Industries Trust 
 
The context in which the Trust commenced its work in Sinhapura has been described at 
some length in the Introduction to this thesis.175 To recapitulate, our interaction with 
Sinhapura led my parents and myself to the recognition that there were many different 
types of households, with varying levels of income, each of which had been affected by 
the tsunami in its own  way. This showed us that it was the household and not the 
community, as a whole, which should be the focus of reconstruction and that the first 
step of this recovery should be the resuscitation of livelihoods. Furthermore, the 
household was the institution (the social unit) in the community, which made requests 
for assistance from the Trust.     
 
Thus, the Trust differed from the other organisations providing relief in this region, in 
that the focus was on one community and the differential needs of each household, in 
that community. The principle regarding the disbursement of funds, which was made 
transparent to the community very early on by the Trustees, was, that a single household 
would be helped to the point where it had a stable means of income.    
Immediately after the tsunami the Trust focused on the fishing fleet, the High Street 
businesses and the coir industry. These activities were supported by the ongoing 
research of the Trust. The basic household survey was deepened in two ways.176 The 
                                                          
174 A specific Microfinance Act has been in the pipeline but has not yet, as at 2015, become law. 
175 In terms of the broad categories used in this thesis I treat the Trust as an NGO.  
176 Please refer the Introductory Chapter for the circumstances surrounding the household survey.  
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first, was that information on the household was expanded through interviews. The 
second, was that the information on households led to the exploration of various 
institutions such as the kin group and the neighbourhood, which were critical in the life 
of the community, through informant group sessions. This developed into a substantial 
corpus of data which, as the activities continued, contributed to the taking of day-to-day 
decisions. 
The judgement concerning the basis of need was the province of the Trustees. This 
judgement of who was genuine and who was not was mediated, initially, by those 
known to the Trustees in village, before the information from the survey and wider 
interactions with the community began to yield information.   
Sometimes the urgency of the situation were such that households had to be assisted 
even though basic information about the households had not, yet, been gathered. This 
created tension between the Trust the community and the investigators. The 
investigators were accused of doing the job forgetting their allegiance to the village, in a 
situation where their influence with the Trustees could have been used to swing 
decisions in favour of kin or neighbours. They were positioned as insiders and outsiders, 
by virtues of their investigative role. On one occasion when they visited a particular 
household, at the end of the day, those in the neighbouring household thought that this 
was a deliberate attempt to exclude them from the survey. Some pacification of both the 
household and the investigators, by the Trustees became necessary. At one stage the 
Trustees found that the connection with the caretakers of the beach land was being 
exploited. 
The tsunami struck Sinhapura at the height of the fishing season. Out of 60 wallams 8 
were completely destroyed, with the wrecks plainly visible. There were others which 
disappeared and were presumed to be sunk. All the others suffered damage in varying 
degrees: some to the hull, some to the engine and many to both. The repair centres 
established by the Navy and Cey-Nor operated with limited financial resources. Within 
two weeks of the tsunami they had exhausted their capacities and closed. There was 
William’s boatyard, concerned with the repair and construction of fibreglass wallams, 
and Lucky’s engine repair centre in Kotigama. However, these were not charitable 
institutions and their services had to be paid for.  
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It was in this context that the Trust came to play a role in the repair of hulls and engines. 
When a request for assistance, as regards the fishing industry, was made to the Trust the 
decision to help was made in terms of whether the wallam would be put back to sea and 
provide an income to eight crewmen. The Trust did not repair more than one engine or 
wallam belonging to the same individual, although numerous such requests were 
received. The rationale was that given the limited resources of the Trust once an 
individual had one boat in working order, his household and that of his crew had an 
income and its survival was no longer a matter for immediate concern. As far as nets 
were concerned small ones were distributed to 8 river fishermen. The larger nets used in 
sea fishing were too costly for the Trust to fund.177      
To give a few examples, Premasiri’s engine, repaired by the Cey-Nor centre, stalled 
while at sea. The Trust provided the assistance to have the engine overhauled by Lucky. 
Cleaning this engine, in 2005, cost Rs. 17,000/- which was a large sum of money in 
village terms. In a similar manner, Jayatissa’s engine was rendered seaworthy. The hull 
of Rohan’s wallam needed extensive repair. It was lying in William’s boatyard where 
the repair was delayed due to lack of funds. On one of the frequent visits to the boatyard 
the Trustees saw the damaged boat. Upon investigation it was agreed to fund the repair. 
William, meanwhile, was constantly telling the Trustees that the Trust was being 
defrauded by the wallam owners because they were getting funds from other sources as 
well for the repair: “Api degolla avankava ape vade karanawa. Namuth me minissu eka 
vedata depolakin mudal laba gannawa.” (We are doing our job honestly but these 
people are getting funds from two sources for the same job).  
The Trust helped with the repair of 35 wallams and, in this way, helped approximately 
250 households to re-establish their sources of income.  
Apart from conducting repairs, the Trust distributed 26 outrigger canoes (non-
mechanized artisanal craft) on 11 April 2005. 12 canoes were manufactured by a local 
craftsman from a small village in the interior, recommended by the fishermen, and paid 
for by the Trust. The remaining 14 were donated to the Trust by AdoptSriLanka.178 The 
older fishermen came forward with the suggestion that until all wallams were fully 
operational, canoe fishing could provide an alternative source of income. As far as the 
                                                          
177 Some of the large NGOs funded the nets.      
178 AdoptSriLanka was an NGO started by Geoffrey Dobbs, a British National resident in Sri Lanka, in 
the aftermath of the tsunami, to assist disaster-affected communities.  
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Trust was concerned, this made sense. The right recipients then became the issue. The 
choice of 26 individuals from a much larger pool of displaced crew members presented 
a great challenge. At one point it seemed an impossible task because all the claims for 
canoes seemed justified. To be eligible for a canoe the individual in question had to 
have lost his mode of income, and had to be a skilled canoeist. These two criteria were 
the basis for the disbursement of the canoes. One of the problems was that not every 
crew member was skilful at handling a canoe. However, all those who made application 
for a canoe were insistent that they had the required skill. There were many sessions 
with the group that was advising the Trust: the Chairman of the Fisheries Co-operative 
Society; a prominent High Street trader who was the brother of our care-taker; and, two 
young, crew members who were experienced canoeists. The discussion revolved around 
the question of skill regarding the handling of a canoe and involved many debates, 
including some disagreement, as to who was the most eligible. Finally, a consensus was 
reached although not everyone was satisfied. On the day when the canoes were 
disbursed those who did not receive one, expressed their dissatisfaction. In the event, 
not all of the recipients made the proper use of the canoe. Some months later it was 
discovered that 7 had been sold. Others were quick to point out that this had been the 
intention of those recipients all along. On the other hand, Karunadasa, used his canoe 
most productively. He landed a 10 kg seer fish within two days of receiving the canoe 
which was a very unusual catch for inshore fishing.   
The High Street Traders lost stock, equipment and cash. Some were also owners of 
wallams which were either destroyed or damaged. They came to the Trust seeking 
capital to restart their businesses.  
Sushila, who ran the eating house, told me that she was very grateful for the grant of Rs. 
10,000/- which she received from the Trust as she had been unable to get funding from 
the state or any other organisation. She restarted the eating house, in a small way, with 
four tables and sixteen chairs which she received from an NGO. Eventually, she 
received display cabinets and all the other equipment necessary for her business from 
various NGOs. In the first few weeks after the tsunami, however, her perception was 
that there was no one to assist her but the Trust: “Ayathanaye udawwa naththan, e 
avasthavedi apata harenda athak naha.” (We had nobody to turn to in our hour of need 
except the Trust).  
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Dinesh had a beauty salon, a music centre and a video cassette rental on the High Street, 
all of which he told me were yielding an income which, in his opinion, was a good one. 
He had started these ventures with his earnings from six years of employment in Saudi 
Arabia. Through the Trust he received Rs. 12,000/- worth of equipment from a 
Colombo beauty salon and was able, once the premises had been cleaned, to start this 
business again. After a while, he restarted the video cassette rental through the 
assistance from other organisations.       
The more prosperous of the High Street traders were reluctant to come to the Trust for 
assistance. It is only after the livelihoods programme was well established and many 
people had sought assistance that these individuals came to the Trust. They stated that 
they had felt that coming to the Trust meant a compromise of their social position. 
Wijepala Mudalali, for instance, told me that it would be a matter of shame for him and 
his family  --  not merely his nuclear family but his brothers as well, who were all 
prominent businessmen in the community  --  had he queued for aid, like a poor man, 
since he had enjoyed a superior social position in the community. Wijepala Mudalali 
contrasted himself with the unavasara (the beach dwellers whose homes were 
completely destroyed by the tsunami and who were in the temporary accommodation) 
who, in his perception, pursued every source of tsunami aid, whether they were entitled 
to it or not, and ‘made a spectacle’ of themselves. He requested, and received, a grant of 
Rs. 20,000/- from the Trust. He told me that he had lost about Rs. 3 million in the 
tsunami and that he was owed Rs. 500,000/- by the tourist resorts in Hikkaduwa for 
seafood which he had supplied.  
The High Street traders had little in the way of savings, which they could draw upon, 
because all their capital had been invested in their businesses. Commercial lending 
institutions such as banks would not lend them capital as they had neither suitable 
collateral, nor a turnover that was high enough for the type of loan that they required. It 
was in these circumstances that the grants that the Trust was able to disburse, small 
though they were, became important.    
The Trade Association comprising 37 members was established in the village under the 
aegis of the Trust, on 1 February 2005, in order to link up with various organisations 
and receive benefits, both in the way of training and direct assistance. It was the natural 
outcome of the feeling amongst the business people that neither the state nor the banks 
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were doing anything for the recovery of their businesses and that while NGOs had 
distributed packages of goods they were, by and large, not willing to help resuscitate 
businesses.   
   
The Trust informed the Chamber of Commerce (Galle Branch) that the business people 
of Sinhapura were in dire need of help. At a meeting at the Trust premises in June 2005 
the traders communicated their needs to the Chamber representative. Out of the 37 
Trade Association members 13 received equipment to help their businesses, from an 
NGO, BBB, through the Chamber.179 The items were disbursed in a staggered way 
during July and August, 2005.   
The remaining 24 members of the Trade Association, who did not receive grants were 
resentful and could not understand the NGO’s basis of the selection. They asserted that 
the Executive Committee of the Trade Association had influenced the Chamber and 
BBB to accrue the benefits to themselves and their supporters. There was particular 
hostility when it emerged that the secretary, Sampath (who ran a Communication 
Agency on the High Street), who had liaised with the Chamber on the behalf of the 
Association, had been invited to become a member of the Galle branch of the Chamber. 
This was seen as a great honour as membership was limited to the ‘big’ businessmen of 
the southern region. The wife of Bernard, a member, asked at a Trade Association 
meeting: “eyata thiyana mona sudusukam nisada saamaajikathwaya thenda hadanne”? 
(What qualifications does he have to be singled out for a membership offer?). It 
emerged, at a subsequent meeting, that those who had not received anything had sent a 
petition to the Chamber, stating that those who received assistance did not deserve it. 
Whereupon Sampath wrote a letter thanking the Chamber for facilitating the funding for 
the 13 recipients and requesting them, if possible, to assist the others as well. Sampath 
followed this up with a personal visit to the Executive Officer dealing with Sinhapura, 
in order as he told me, to neutralise the petition. During this visit Sampath became a 
member of the Chamber. The Trust, too, requested the Chamber to assist the other 
Trade Association members. The response of the Chamber, both to Sampath and to the 
Trust, was that BBB had certain criteria on the basis of which those businesses which 
                                                          
179 When recounting the interactions between Sinhapura and specific organisations I shall anonymise 
them. BBB, CCC, DDD and EEE are the pseudonyms that I use for NGOs which conducted specific 
programmes in Sinhapura.  
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received assistance had been selected. The gambling centre on the High Street, for 
instance, did not come within the purview of these criteria. The Chamber informed the 
Trust that BBB did not, as a policy, reveal the basis of these criteria.   
The Trust disbursed grants to 471 households in Sinhapura between January and 
September 2005. In terms of an evaluation study which was conducted in March 2006, 
the Trust established that 75% of the households which had been the recipients of grants 
had used them for the purpose intended. As far as the remaining 25% were concerned, 
there was some ambiguity: the grants may have been used for another purpose or they 
may have been acquired on a disingenuous basis. The information for the evaluation 
was gathered through interviews, with recipients, as well as informant group sessions. 
There was also follow up of individual recipients, on the basis of the original survey, by 
the local investigators. The data gathering here was similar to the survey, in that the 
Trustees had a discussion with the investigators at the end of the day, to arrive at the 
most accurate conclusion as far as a household was concerned.    
With the tsunami, the coir activity in Sinhapura fell into disarray because the retting pits 
in the river which produced the coir yarn from coconut husks had been washed away.180 
The Trust arranged for coir to be transported from mills in areas unaffected by the 
tsunami in the deep south, about 90 kms from Sinhapura so that the women could 
continue to make coir rope. The income that the women received from the sale of the 
coir rope, though small, enabled them to keep the home fires burning during the critical, 
immediate post-tsunami period when the programmes of government and other 
assistance, were in an embryonic stage. Bennet’s wife, for instance, was a keen worker 
of the coir enterprise as the wallam that Bennet crewed on was damaged and, therefore, 
he was without income. They had three children, one of whom refused to eat the 
traditional fare of rice and curry and demanded the far more expensive milk and 
biscuits. The middle men who bought the coir rope from the women of Sinhapura 
attempted to beat down the price while they were in difficulty after the tsunami. The 
Trust arranged with Charles P. Hayley Company, situated in Galle, to buy the coir rope 
of the Sinhapura women at Rs. 18, per kilogram, which was almost double the price 
paid by the middle men. The Trust also facilitated the donation of thirty coir machines 
to the women from AdoptSriLanka. This reinvigorated coir activity continued for a 
                                                          
180 Please refer back to Chapter 1 for a description of the raw material and the mode of production of the 
coir industry.  
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couple of months and provided a steady income until other avenues became re-
established.  
 
While the main focus was livelihood regeneration the Trust found that as the 
organisation working intensively in this village it could not ignore the welfare needs. 
For example, Lalitha who had a vegetable shop on the High Street appeared one day at 
the Trust premises with highly swollen feet. The Trust arranged for her to be taken to 
the main teaching hospital in the south, the Karapitiya General. The doctors had said 
that she had an advanced kidney problem which, if not treated, would have proved fatal. 
Furthermore, two pregnant women who did not have the wherewithal to purchase 
everything that they required for their confinements, were helped by the Trust. The 
Trust also found that it had a liaison role to play, such as the instances where an 
individual was in a standoff with a commercial organisation, particularly insurance and 
finance companies. One of the Trustees, being a lawyer, intervened in several of these 
cases. For example, the repossession of Geetha’s van, necessary for her tea business, 
was stayed and the terms of the repayment of her loan renegotiated. Similarly, the 
insurance payment for the repair of Rohan’s three wheeler was expedited by the liaison 
with the insurance company. There were other activities that the Trust was involved in 
such as facilitating the attendance of the traders at a Trade Fair in Tangalle in October 
2005; organising a craft evening for a group of visiting Australians; and, supporting 
initiatives in the arena of education.  
As mentioned in the Introductory Chapter, 2006 saw a shift in emphasis in the work of 
the Trust. By the middle of 2006 the evaluation had been accomplished, and the reports 
submitted to the foreign and local donors. At this point the project might well have 
come to a close. However, those that the Trust interacted with closely demanded that it 
continue to be active in the community. Thus, in consultation with the community, the 
Trust devised a series of income earning projects, particularly for the women  --  
manufacture of candles, soap, pappadams, and dress making. 25 women were trained in 
the manufacture of candles by the staff of the Industrial Development Board (IDB). The 
necessary equipment was bought by the Trust which also located a buyer in Colombo 
who was a supplier to a chain of retail stores. The women produced between 80-
100,000 candles per month. Two to three women acted as coordinators and the 
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production was kept going so long as there were orders.181 The women produced the 
candles in their homes using the moulds provided by the Trust and brought them to the 
Trust premises to be packed. The dozen or so regular workers earned an income which 
was a satisfactory addition to that of the household.   
The demand for spoken English arose from the following circumstances. The aspiration 
in Sinhapura has been that its young people should acquire that knowledge of English  -
-  especially spoken  --   which would secure for them lucrative employment in the 
wider marketplace of this country, particularly in the commercial sector. The acquisition 
of this skill was seen as one of the main requirements of current employability. The 
Trust instituted spoken English classes, primarily for adults. They were conducted by 
one of the Trustees during my fieldwork year (2007-2008). The student body ranged 
from a 12 year old school boy to a 65 year old grandmother. There was also the science 
teacher from the Sinhapura school, Charlotte, who was very keen to improve her 
English, and her 65 year old sister, Annette, who had handed over a successful garment 
business to her son and was now enjoying retirement, which included improving her 
English. The other students were a sprinkling of young men and women, on the 
threshold of employment, a few about to enter university, who were keen to improve 
their English. There were also three wheeler drivers who came when they could spare 
time from hires, and a merchant seaman, on shore leave.  
 
As the relief organisation most active in Sinhapura, the Trust became a focal point for 
the release of frustration, anger and despair. This was particularly the case when 
requests for assistance had to be turned down by the Trust. There were allegations, by 
those disaffected that the Trust was being ‘taken in’ by fraudulent applications and that 
the disbursements were insufficient. There were, besides, those households which felt 
that they had a good case for assistance and demanded that they be investigated and 
interviewed. Conversely, there were those who felt that the whole business of research  -
-  of investigating households and their circumstances  --  was a waste of time, which 
took away from the immediacy of the disbursement.   
 
 
                                                          
181 The orders stopped in 2010 when the buyer’s orders ceased.  
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CCC  
 
I now turn to another organisation, CCC. The Chamber of Commerce informed the 
Trade Association that a representative from CCC, an NGO, was interested in meeting 
the High Street traders of Sinhapura. A meeting was arranged by the Trust, in liaison 
with the Chamber, and it took place at the Trust premises in July 2005. When asked 
about their needs, by the representative of CCC, the traders requested aid to rebuild their 
businesses. The response was that as businesses could secure loans from banks there 
would be no funding of ongoing businesses. Then the representative asked for the other 
needs of the people. Kanchana, the owner of the store supplying spare parts for engines, 
rose to her feet and explained that her brother Lucky was going abroad and that she was 
taking over his engine repair centre as it would be bad for the fishermen if this centre 
ceased to exist. They would have to go to Aluthgama, further to the north of Sinhapura, 
or Galle for even the smallest of repairs. She said that finding a proper, stable mechanic 
had been a perennial problem for Lucky and that she wanted to train her elder son as the 
centre mechanic. Kanchana stated that she had applied to the Yamaha Company for 
training; she just needed the funds. 
  
CCC investigated the issue, spoke to the Yamaha Company and then asked Kanchana to 
forward an estimate for the construction of the repair centre, on land next to the spare 
parts store, as well as one for the training of her elder son. Once they received the 
information, Kanchana was told that she would receive a grant of Rs. 1.5 million from 
CCC to fund this venture. A representative of CCC in Colombo, who spoke to me, 
stated that they had decided to assist Kanchana because she displayed initiative in 
developing her existing business. An important aspect was the fact that, if this repair 
centre folded up because Lucky had gone abroad, it would leave this whole stretch of 
coastline without this service. Thus, from the point of view of CCC, choosing one 
person to assist in Sinhapura was logical  --  by doing so they were helping not just one 
individual but, potentially, a whole industry. Furthermore, as the representative stated, 
unlike Kanchana, the other business people had asked for capital without a specific 
scheme in mind. Kanchana told me that she was delighted with the situation, as it 
panned out, and that she did not feel at all defensive that she was the only person from 
the whole Trade Association to be helped by CCC. Nor was she concerned about the 
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fact that the grant was a very large sum, in village terms. She told me that she knew that 
others were envious of her good fortune and did not see why only she should be 
assisted. She stated that she had not done anything wrong. She had made her request 
and her application fitted the policy criteria of CCC. The construction was completed 
and the repair centre was opened, with some fanfare, in January 2006. The institution of 
this repair centre, next to the existing spare parts business, had a multiplier effect. The 
expansion of the volume of business was significant. Kanchana told me that she was 
very grateful to the Trust because it was through the Trust that the Chamber and, 
therefore, CCC came to Sinhapura.    
 
DDD 
DDD, an NGO, set up a Disaster Management and Environment society in the village in 
September 2005 with the stated objectives of community development; disaster 
preparedness, mitigation and management; and, tsunami warning. Committees were set 
up to deal with these various aspects and training was provided by DDD. Households 
were encouraged to keep all important documents in a ‘tsunami bag’, such that in an 
emergency they could run to safety carrying with them their most precious belongings. 
The performance of certain communal tasks such as recycling waste and sweeping the 
roads, was required of the members of this society. One of the visible activities, apart 
from the training programme, was the placement of bright green garbage bins at 
strategic points around the village for the recycling of waste. These were not a success. 
The bins were vandalised within a few days. Jayatissa said to me: “meka apata sahenda 
amaru kalayak. Me vidiha vinoda katayuthu valata apata vela nehe” (This is a very 
difficult time for us. We have no time for these frivolities.). Charlotte’s comment was: 
“Mee vyapruthiye vadagath vada kotasak tharuna pirisa gen balaporoththu venava 
namuth tharuna pirisata me avasthavedi karanna vadagath vada keepayak thiyanawa. 
Gama naggala genima egollage vishesha vagakeemak.” (In this project they expect 
young people to play an important part. However, at this time the community needs the 
young people to perform a whole lot of more important tasks. The rehabilitation of the 
village is their special responsibility.). Thus, a society which had started with much 
enthusiasm folded up, as attendance at meetings began to dwindle. As my informants 
told me, people did not have the time nor the interest for an activity from which they got 
no direct benefit when their lives were in such disarray.    
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EEE 
While Sampath, the secretary of the Trade Association, was in Galle he happened to 
hear that an organisation, EEE, a religious one, was helping tsunami-affected 
businesses. He met them and they explained their scheme: the High Street traders 
should form into a group of 12 people and establish a savings society. Once the society 
had been established the members would receive an item of equipment, chosen by 
themselves, to support their businesses. Sampath told me that he had stated that the 
Sinhapura Trade Association had 37 members. The response of the organisation was 
that their rules specified 12 members. Thus, if Sinhapura wanted to be part of this 
scheme the society should have only this number. The Executive Committee of the 
Association informed their intimates and formed the society. They were told by EEE 
not to tell the other Trade Association members but to form the society in secret. When 
the EEE field worker was informed by the Executive Committee that secrecy would 
lead to problems in the future, he had over-ruled their concerns and said that the others 
could form their own societies later. I was told this subsequently by those who had been 
present.   
The society was formed in May 2005. It was not divulged to the wider membership of 
the Trade Association nor to any of the Trustees. Weekly meetings and the savings 
continued. The ‘carrot’ for the saving was not the possibility of bigger loans from EEE, 
but the item of equipment. Furthermore, people had to do things to foster community 
feeling such as helping each other.     
The goods were received towards the end of 2006, almost one and a half years after the 
society was started. During this long period people began to be very disillusioned with 
the organisation. There was concern as to whether the goods would, indeed, be 
forthcoming.  With this confusion, the secret nature of the society began to falter. The 
field officer was at the receiving end of much of this dissatisfaction. He stalled, 
regarding the disbursement of the goods, to keep the society functional. The people of 
another village went even further. They went to the organisation’s headquarters in Galle 
and told the director that if they did not receive the goods, immediately, they would end 
the society.  
The goods had to be bought from a particular store in Galle with which EEE had come 
to an arrangement. When Nadika, who ran a Communications Agency on the High 
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Street, complained to the field officer that the goods in the store were inferior, and that 
she would like to purchase her item from another store, he replied that there was 
nothing he could do as the decision had been taken by the Accounts Department of 
EEE.  
After the 12 society members had received their items  --  fax machines, refrigerators 
and so on  --  the officials of the organisation came to a Trade Association meeting and 
publicly announced that a 12 member society had been formed, that a programme of 
savings had been conducted, and that goods to assist their businesses had been received. 
They invited the remaining members of the Trade Association to do the same. There 
was a lecture on community togetherness, the journey towards sustainability and the 
importance of activities such as shramadana (voluntary work towards a community 
purpose). The Trade Association members were polite to the officials but after they had 
left they expressed their hostility. The original 12 members had to endure much 
criticism for the fact that they had been secretive about their society. This became a 
source of great tension within the Trade Association. There were accusations of 
inappropriate conduct and lack of transparency on the part of the Executive Committee, 
as well as the illegitimate improvement of social position by the members. Eventually, 
the remaining members of the Association did form into two societies. They received 
their goods in mid-2007. By this time cumulative strains had taken its toll on the Trade 
Association which had virtually disintegrated.  
I met the director of EEE, in June 2008, to discuss the programme in Sinhapura. He 
asserted that there were no problems with any of the programmes and denied that there 
had been any dissatisfaction amongst the recipients. I stated that I had heard differently 
from the people of Sinhapura. Whereupon, he got the current field worker  --  the one 
who had dealt with Sinhapura from 2005 to 2007 had left the organisation  --  to show 
me a printout of all the recipients, i.e., all 37 seven members of the Trade Association. 
The field worker, too, stated that there had been no problems and that I had been 
misinformed. She stated that the society in Sinhapura had had a meeting the previous 
month and had sent a report. Both denied that the original 12 members of the first 
society were dissatisfied about the time that it had taken for them to receive the goods. 
They denied, too, that the other members of the Trade Association had been resentful 
about the secrecy with which the first society had been formed. As the officials of EEE 
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repudiated any knowledge of the entire episode, I was not able to have any sort of a 
discussion with EEE about the implications of their action for the Trade Association. I 
was also not able to ask them how they reconciled what had happened in Sinhapura, 
with their stated goal of developing community organisations.  
The Implications of the Programmes of NGO 
In the section above I have described the relief efforts of NGOs in Sinhapura and the 
region. I now comment on the various issues emerging out of the interaction between 
the community  --  individuals and households  --  and these organisations.    
 
In Sinhapura there were households which received aid from NGOs to compensate them 
for the losses that they had suffered. However, there were also households which were 
compensated for losses not incurred. Both types of households were found amongst all 
the categories identified in Chapter 3.  
 
The multi-day boat owners received little assistance from the non-governmental sector. 
The wallam owners received aid from the Trust, from some NGOs in the form of 
packages and boats, and from private individuals. However, this was of a completely 
random nature. Crew members, too, were helped by these sources. Initially, the High 
Street traders were not the recipients of aid from the wider, non-governmental sector. 
They were assisted by the Trust in the immediate post-tsunami period in resuscitating 
their businesses. The help from NGOs began to flow in only when it became clear that 
banks and other commercial organisations would not provide assistance due to the issue 
of collateral. Furthermore, they benefited from the expansion of microfinance in the 
village, in the aftermath of the tsunami. Service providers and those externally 
employed received the packages of goods and were also able to access the expanded 
microfinance enterprise. Many of my informants stated that the unavasara received a 
large number of packages from NGOs, as they pursued every such assistance available 
in the most diligent manner. Their greatest benefactor, however, remained the state. As 
far as the unavasara were concerned, there was no question of excess --  the assistance 
was available and they were in need.   
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In Sinhapura, some of the tsunami-affected individuals and households accepted aid 
from NGOs, framed as a gift, and the position of subordination and the necessity of 
reciprocity (gratitude) that a gift implies (Stirrat & Henkel, 1997; Mauss, 1990; Parry, 
1986). As Stirrat and Henkel put it “…the act of receiving is hedged with conditionality 
at best, while at worst the gift may become a form of patronage and a means of control.” 
(Stirrat & Henkel:1997:72). The unavasara households are an example of this attitude.    
 
Others attempted to transform relief aid from the frame of the gift into one of 
entitlement. These were people who took the position that, as those who had suffered 
greatly, they were legitimately entitled to compensation, from non-governmental 
sources, from a moral point of view. Duminda who received a wallam and engine from 
a foreign national is an example of this attitude. While they were determined to benefit 
from these organisations, they did not want to compromise their social position within 
the community by being seen as the recipients of patronage. The denial of the necessity 
for reciprocity, in the form of gratitude, was central here. Thus, they positioned 
themselves not as recipients of a gift, but as those entitled to compensation and, in the 
process, attempted to redefine the dynamic of relief aid in terms of an entitlements 
framework. This situation is illustrated by the Country Representative of an 
international NGO who found many people in Sinhapura lacking in those expressions of 
gratitude which he felt were due to his organisation. Korf’s (2007) point that aid should 
be framed not as a gift, which requires the reciprocity of gratitude and reinforces the 
position of ‘victim’, but as an entitlement, which implies independence and dignity, 
resonates with the position taken by some of those in Sinhapura.  
 
Another section of the community saw the acceptance of aid as the acceptance of a 
position of subordination, vis-à-vis external organisations, and were concerned about 
the implications of this for their social position in Sinhapura. Gunasena and Charlotte, 
for instance, viewed the accumulation of economic capital, from NGOs, as being at the 
expense of another type of capital  --  social standing, respect and honour  --  and 
refused to accept any assistance from these organisations. Some individuals, however, 
such as Wijepala Mudalali, were forced by the imperatives of their economic 
circumstances to accept such assistance but they did so after a struggle with themselves, 
and this acceptance remained a constant source of tension.  
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There were many foreign nationals in Sri Lanka at the time of the tsunami, on vacation 
in the holiday resorts, who saw the devastation in the coastal areas and felt morally 
compelled to assist these communities. In Sinhapura, donations made at the time of the 
tsunami did not lead to a long-term relationship between a foreign donor and a local 
recipient. To this extent, these donations can be regarded as a disinterested gift. This can 
be contrasted with a large project in Galle where disinterested gifts came to be 
transformed into ongoing relationships, involving reciprocity, as the donors became far 
more involved in the community, than they had originally intended. This involvement 
was perceived by those who managed the project, locally, as necessary for ensuring that 
these gifts were successfully utilised (Hollenbach, 2013).  
 
In many instances, the intermediary who functioned as the broker between the foreign 
donor and recipient was the tourist guide. Every such gift was accompanied by a 
sizeable commission to the broker, from the recipient, according to my informants. 
Here, the relationship of reciprocity was not with the donor but with the broker. 
Expecting a commission for the brokerage of tsunami finance, incurred much censure in 
the village. This was seen, in the community, as the morally reprehensible act of making 
money out of people’s misery. Although the brokers attempted to keep these material 
transactions under a veil of secrecy, this was not always possible. From the brokers’ 
point of view they, too, had lost their source of income. The hotels were damaged and 
tourist arrivals into the country dropped. In these circumstances, they felt that liaising 
between foreign donors and the local community was an action worth some material 
reward.   
The question of ineligible recipients, in the context of relief aid, was a source of much 
debate. Those who sold goods that they obtained, in a disingenuous manner, and used 
the capital to repay loans, buy luxury consumer goods etc. were viewed with great 
disapprobation. The concern was that capital accumulated in this way was used to 
improve the resource position of the household, in an unjust manner. In this context, the 
view of the large majority of the community, particularly those whose losses were 
heavy and who did not benefit from assistance, was that the organisations should be 
held accountable for the indiscriminate way in which they distributed assistance. 
Anything beyond legitimate compensation was seen as indefensible. The view in the 
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community was that legitimate compensation, in this sense, was the restoration of what 
had been lost, to the poorer sections of the village.  
In the case of the state the perception was that those who received benefits, which were 
not justified, did so because of the inefficiency and corruption of state officials. The 
perception, as far as NGOs were concerned, was that policy, design and implementation 
all contributed to the inequitable distribution of resources to affected populations.    
There were many people who felt that they were deserving of assistance and that it was 
because of external policy imperatives that they were not considered suitable recipients. 
BBB, CCC and EEE were seen as operating, very much, on the basis of external policy 
criteria rather than of local need. BBB made the disbursement to some members of the 
Trade Association, and not to others, as stated, on the basis of their policy imperatives. 
It was not on the basis of need, after a degree of consultation with the community. In the 
case of CCC their initial premise  --  the assumption that High Street traders would 
receive help from commercial institutions  --  turned out to be wrong. Therefore, they 
ignored the plainly articulated needs of the traders of this community. They helped one 
person, Kanchana, because her scheme fitted into their policy and also because they 
wished to provide a whole region with a service. In this, they did not take into account 
the implications of their actions which was that a situation of envy and conflict was 
created, because the other traders felt that, with so many of them in dire need, it was 
inequitable for such a large capital sum to be concentrated on one person.  
 
As far as EEE was concerned, the needs of the community had little bearing on the 
decision regarding the implementation of the programme in Sinhapura. The majority of 
the Trade Association was marginalised because EEE wanted one society, not three, in 
this one village. A concentration of three societies in one village was contrary to the 
organisation’s policy, which was to have one society per village, in a large number of 
villages. This would, then, extend its influence over a wide geographical region. In this 
case, too, the imperatives of external policy prescriptions created much conflict within 
the community. These cases illustrate the operation of the criteria of eligibility for aid, 
where some did not receive aid because of the externally formulated policy imperatives 
of organisations.   
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DDD’s programme in Sinhapura was an approach to reconstruction which was 
concerned with resuscitating a community in terms of mobilising its own forces in civil 
society into a consensual, collective and combined effort which would benefit the 
community as a whole, and not merely the individual units (Samarasinghe, 2006; Shaw 
& Goda, 2004). This was a narrative which attempted to designate a set of conditions, 
for the emergence of a ‘legitimate’ civil society, which is conducive to disaster 
reconstruction. In this discursive construction there was a powerful, underlying, 
assumption that a strong civil society, able to mobilize itself successfully in a disaster, 
was one in which ideas, interests and action were homogeneous: “civil activism has 
been severely constrained by enduring ethnic polarisation and acute social inequality” 
(Ozerdem & Jacoby:2006:3). This narrative is in contrast, to a certain extent, to Aldrich 
and Crook (2008) who argue that a strong civil society in a disaster-affected community 
can be a double-edged weapon. They cite the trailer parks in post-disaster New Orleans 
in 2005 as an example. Strong civic action in these parks preserved the status quo, even 
though it was not in the interests of the community to do so. They argue that a strong 
civil society can inhibit the actions which are ultimately to the long run advantage of the 
community.  
 
DDD’s initiative which focussed on community development found little acceptance in 
Sinhapura. The point which was emphasised to me, time and time again, was that 
individual households should be permitted to recover before a focus on the environment 
and the community as a whole. Except for the few people who were involved in the 
venture the majority of village were critical of the organisation. While the programme 
performed some very important functions in terms of making people aware of the 
importance of tsunami bags it was not sustainable because it appealed to a collective 
feeling in the community which did not exist, except temporarily in the immediate 
aftermath of the tsunami. DDD did not read the pulse of the community, at that moment 
in time. The needs and expectations of Sinhapura were not incorporated into the design 
of the programme. This echoes Sanderson & Sharma (2008), drawing upon the 
experience of the 2001 Gujarat earthquake, who state that post disaster reconstruction 
programmes are easy to get wrong for a variety of reasons.  
The point about civil society is that it is a space for debate and contestation between 
different interest groups and individuals. Consensual civic action, is the product of this 
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engagement and it is negotiated. The demand for consensus, on the basis of an 
assumption of homogeneity, highlights an agenda which ignores the fact that consensual 
civic action is the product of debate and contestation, between different interest groups 
and individuals. When consensus and community mobilisation are a response to an 
external source, as it was in the case of the programme of DDD, it is ephemeral and 
disintegrates all too easily. Thus, a strong civil society is one that provides that notional 
space for debate, not one, necessarily, that acts collectively, on the basis of a spurious 
homogeneity. This is where different interests engage on a level playing field and 
consensus, on any issue, emerges out of this engagement. Thus, in my view, DDD’s 
narrative of community development imposed a demand for consensual civic action 
without taking into account the reality of the situation. It ignored the fact that this was 
not a moment at which ‘community development’ was at the forefront of people’s 
minds. Communities have their own dynamics, in terms of which civic action comes to 
be defined, and this action can be directed only up to a certain extent.  
A lack of transparency was a feature of some of the programmes of assistance in 
Sinhapura. BBB did not reveal the criteria upon which 13 members of the Trade 
Association received aid, even when queries were instituted. My impression, after 
discussion with BBB, was that this decision to restrict the number of recipients to 13 
had to do with the fact that the organisation wished to spread its assistance over a large 
number of villages in the district. This lack of transparency, in the selection process, 
provided the space for the allegations of misconduct on the part of the Executive 
Committee of the Trade Association, by the individuals who did not receive any 
assistance. In the case of EEE its encouragement of the secretary of the Trade 
Association, Sampath, to form a society, together with his intimates, in secret, reveals 
the fact that this was an organisation which was not concerned with transparent 
practices, in spite of the rhetoric contained in their Mission Statement. Furthermore, this 
episode reveals the lack of accountability shown by this organisation in relation to the 
community (Hilhorst, 2003). The director’s attempts to suppress the problems that they 
encountered in Sinhapura, because he did not want public exposure reveals the recurring 
concern with success.   
All these organisations  --  CCC, BBB and EEE  --  played a role in the dissolution of 
the Trade Association. The Trade Association may have disintegrated once the necessity 
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for tsunami aid was curtailed, but there is little doubt that its demise was hastened by 
the actions of these organisations. These actions created a situation which is the 
diametric opposite of the fostering of good community relations through their 
programmes. This can be contrasted with Nisha’s comments on World Vision’s 
activities in Tamil Nadu and the Andaman Islands:  
“There is a lot of potential fighting between villages when we give relief to one village 
and we do not give to the other. As much as possible we tried to integrate into our 
planning that we did not harm anything and we used local capacities for peace.” 
(Nisha:2007:170).  
The microfinance organisations which came to operate in Sinhapura had many of the 
characteristics detailed above, such as a lack of transparency and operation according to 
external policy criteria. However, in one important respect, the microfinance activity 
was different from the other types of assistance described above. It was a direct 
response to the needs of the community. The community needed credit, at this time, and 
the microfinance organisations supplied it. However, there was a downside to this. It 
soon became clear to the community, on the basis of the punitive conditions and the 
high interest levied on loans, that this was not a humanitarian activity but a commercial 
one. In this context, gratitude was felt to be unnecessary.   
In many instances the actions of these organisations provided the space for people to 
expand their alliances. Through the assistance of organisations such as BBB, individuals 
were able to gain membership of institutions such as the Galle Chamber of Commerce 
and, thereby, access a variety of services and resources, which they would not have 
been able to access otherwise. Sampath, for instance, through his new position as a 
member of the Galle Chamber of Commerce was able to provide patronage to other 
members of the Trade Association, in terms of sponsoring training in a variety of fields. 
Brokers were able to expand their alliances, especially with foreign nationals, which 
lead, in some instances, to travel abroad. Furthermore, with the wave of microfinance, 
there was the opportunity for people such as Ranee to link up with new organisations 
and to expand their contacts and their sphere of influence. In this way not only did they 
improve their access to credit but they established new credit networks, using external 
finance, and new alliances within the village.  
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The intensive approach of the Trust was different to that of many of the other 
organisations which assisted Sinhapura. The household was the focus and the premise 
was that each household was affected by the disaster in a specific way, requiring a 
specific response. For the Trust, the imperatives of visible success were not all-
consuming because it was not an organisation which saw itself as having a future which 
would require continuous funding from donors. Indeed, the fact that the Trust was 
wound up in 2013 reveals its lack of ‘success’, from this point of view. It becomes 
clear, therefore, that as far as the Trust was concerned the concerns were not those of 
success and continuity but about the amassing of moral capital through a humanitarian 
initiative.    
As mentioned earlier there were individuals, sensitive to their social position, who were 
uncomfortable with receiving assistance from unknown, random, donors. Others 
attempted to neutralise the receipt of such assistance by transforming the gift into a 
form of assistance to which they were entitled. This was possible in many cases because 
once the gift had been given the donor went out of the picture  --  there was no ongoing 
relationship. This position could not, of course, be taken in relation to the Trust because 
the Trustees were in the village, constantly. It would have been difficult for any member 
of the community to have expressed the sentiment, to the Trustees, that there was an 
obligation on the part of the Trust to make good any part of their loss. There were those 
who did not mind receiving assistance from the Trust because the Trustees were seen as 
long-term patrons and, to some extent, as insiders enjoying an on-going relationship 
with the community.  
The main controversy surrounding the disbursements of aid by the Trust had to do with 
the issues of equity and justice. Necessarily, a judgement had to be made by the 
Trustees. It was a judgement made on the basis of their personal moral worldview rather 
than policy criteria. The perception within the community was that there should have 
been better mechanisms within the Trust, to distinguish genuine applicants from those 
who were not. This had much to do with the issue of whether the assistance provided by 
the Trust disturbed the existing social order, based on legitimate social advancement.  
It becomes clear, therefore, that non-governmental organisations had a perspective on 
the basis of which they designed and implemented their disaster relief programmes. 
Central to this perspective was the recognition that legitimacy and success  --  speedy 
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and visible  --  were the bases upon which future funds could be attracted to the 
organisation and, therefore, that legitimacy and success were essential to the continuity 
of the organisation implementing the programmes (Mosse, 2005).    
In the post-tsunami period, the achievement of success became so important that 
organisations competed to disburse aid, even in situations where the return (reciprocity), 
at the local level, was limited (Stirrat & Henkel, 1997). This is because, as Stirrat & 
Henkel (1997) state, following Mauss (1990), a gift always implies a return and, when 
NGOs give something, the return comes to them, not necessarily in a direct way through 
the appreciation of their efforts by recipients, but, through the reactions and responses 
of a variety of other institutions and agencies.  
It is within this broad framework, oriented towards success, that policies regarding 
reconstruction evolved, and that programmes were designed and implemented. This 
meant that the careful matching of programmes to the particular needs of communities 
and, more especially, to the needs of households were low priorities. BBB, CCC, DDD 
and EEE all exhibited these characteristics. Programmes had to follow a set form, a 
formula for quick and efficient implementation, based on uniform prescriptions for the 
resuscitation of disaster-affected communities. Only then could the organisations claim 
that their programmes were a legitimate response to the disaster and, therefore, a 
success. Thus, there was little in the way of a culture of participation and consultation 
with recipients, on the part of the organisations which were implementing the 
programmes (Sriyananda, 2007). Needs were defined in a manner that they could be 
met quickly and visibly in terms of what the organisations were able to supply: “Donors 
often tended to be supply-oriented rather than demand-responsive” (Jayasuriya & 
McCawley:2010:8). The needs of target communities, therefore, had to fit into the 
external policy criteria of organisations. Davis (2006) sums it up aptly when he 
comments that the three classic principles of aid provision  --  assessment of needs and 
damage by experienced local personnel; the non-provision of goods not requested; the 
non-duplication of goods that the country concerned, and local communities, can 
provide for themselves  --  seems not to have been systematically followed. This point is 
echoed by Raj (2005) who states that there was much repetition of initiatives and, 
therefore, that the integrated effort which was clearly required was lacking.   
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The lack of transparent processes in the delivery of aid was an element of the 
framework oriented towards success. A great concern with transparency would have had 
implications for the speedy implementation of programmes. Issues would have had to 
be explained and discussed. All this would have involved resources and manpower. 
Thus, these organisations chose speed and success over transparency.   
The demand for consensus as the basis of community development, was another means 
of establishing legitimacy and of pursuing success. For example, the organisation DDD’ 
initiative to keep the village clean through the mobilisation of the community was 
intended to be seen as the creation of community feeling which could, eventually, be 
utilised for other more important purposes. The mobilisation of the community had a 
two-fold significance: on the one hand, the community would be seen to come together 
in the pursuit of common objectives which, in itself, could be described as a success; on 
the other, a platform was now created for other activities which depended on 
community mobilisation. It is this potential, which was seen as a continuing success of 
the endeavour.     
The focus on housing over livelihoods, which came to be constituted as two distinct 
processes rather than as the two sides of the same life-world, had much to do with the 
imperatives of success. Housing lent itself far more easily to formulaic, uniform 
prescriptions, whereas the resuscitation of livelihoods was more complex. Uniform 
prescriptions were rarely adequate as the livelihood resuscitation of one household was 
not that of another.  
This concern with success also meant that the role played by local populations, in the 
initial stages of the disaster, was marginalised. The Tsunami Evaluation Commission 
(TEC)  --  an independent, learning and accountability initiative set up after the tsunami  
--  echoed this point when it made the following statement: that the most damaging 
mistake of the immediate response was to neglect and overlook the contribution of 
affected populations, local organizations and authorities as they were, usually, the ones 
who carried out the most critical life-saving efforts, immediately after an event; that 
relief efforts reflected a lack of understanding of local contexts, and the reluctance on 
the part of some international agencies to consult and work with local communities; that 
this approach led to poor and ineffective programme planning and, even, undermined 
local initiatives. Thus, giving prominence to the efforts of local populations dilutes, 
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underplays and diffuses the significance of the aid distributed by relief organisations.182 
As far as the organisations were concerned, marginalising the contributions of local 
populations contributed to the construction of the discourse of success.     
The transition from reconstruction into long-term development, which was a stated 
objective of many organisations, was another casualty of the imperatives of success. 
This is illustrated by the dilemma faced by the FAO, regarding its response to the 
tsunami.183 A strategic response would have involved using this opportunity to steer the 
fishing industry in the direction of mechanisation  --  a restructuring of the industry 
towards multi-day craft. However, such an exercise would have taken time and would 
have been at the expense of fishing families who were in immediate need. A 
humanitarian response, on the other hand, involved the resuscitation of the existing 
technology, speedily, so that the fishermen could go back to sea. In the event, the policy 
which was followed in Sri Lanka was one titled, ‘build back better’, on the basis of a 
humanitarian approach. This was not a restructuring of the fishing industry. It was about 
restoration with some improvements and refinements, wherever they were possible 
(Mulligan & Shaw, 2011). A complete restructuring of the industry would have meant 
that fishing communities had to be supported in the transference from one technology to 
another, without the loss of livelihoods in the process. Clearly, the FAO felt that this 
would be difficult to achieve in the circumstances, even if the capital for the new 
investment was a possibility. Thus, from the point of view of success, the decision to 
‘build back better’ was the more practical alternative than the restructuring of the whole 
industry.  
There was the belief, amongst these organisations, that good policy and good design 
was all that was necessary in order to achieve success. This resonates with Mosse’s 
(2005) statement that such a belief is held by organisations without taking into account 
the dynamics of their own organisations, or that of the target community towards which 
a programme is beamed:  “…..it is dangerous to impose policy prescriptions without 
taking institutional context into account…” (Mosse:2005:230).  
There was, inherent in this situation, a certain incompatibility between the desire for 
speed and success, on the part of organisations, and the complexity of the needs of the 
                                                          
182 See Marcussen (1996) for a discussion of the validity of the objectives of development interventions.  
183 This information was communicated to me by an FAO consultant.  
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communities, on the other. This was a formulaic approach to reconstruction and was the 
logical response to the necessity for speed, in order to achieve a particular construct of 
success. It becomes clear, therefore, that the reconstruction discourse of the NGOs, on 
the south-western coast, was one which was characterised by the subordination of the 
needs of recipients, to the imperatives of success.   
Conclusion 
The reconstruction discourse of non-governmental organisations was characterised by 
many features: an assumption that the affected populations were homogeneous; the 
desire to operate on as broad a canvas as possible; the concern with success, with the 
consequent competition that this entailed; and the concern with the long-term 
development of disaster-affected communities.  
The resources which flowed into Sinhapura from the state came to be framed in terms of 
the idea of entitlement, because of the jural relationship between the state and the 
citizen. Thus, communities could receive state assistance without a compromise of 
social position. NGOs, on the other hand, had no such clearly defined parameters or 
obligations. Therefore, in Sinhapura, the moral narratives with regard to the resources 
emanating from NGOs came to be conceptualised within the framework of the gift and 
the humanitarian imperative, with the implications for social position that this implied.  
The volume of capital which flowed into the village through the NGOs  --  in many 
forms, through many programmes and institutions  --  resulted in an expansion in the 
alliances and relationships of some individuals and households, to various degrees. 
Those who had existing alliances had the capacity to access external capital  --  such as 
the tourist guides  --  and to pass on this capital, accumulating some of it for themselves, 
in the form of commission. Others, such as Ranee, were able to establish new alliances 
using new, incoming capital such as microfinance and, hence, expand their capacities. 
Sampath, on the other hand, used the alliance established with the Chamber of 
Commerce to improve his knowledge through the benefits of membership as well as 
disburse patronage through this membership to his contacts. Such people were able to 
accumulate capital, for themselves, as well as to provide patronage to their network of 
relationships. Thus, the options available to individuals and households in the pursuit of 
aspirations and social advancement became more diverse, and the process more 
complex, than in the case of state assistance. On the other hand, individuals such as 
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Charlotte, the teacher, did not benefit from the assistance of NGOs as the element of 
patronage was one which she could not reconcile with her social position.     
As far as the tension between the landside and the seaside was concerned, the landside 
denounced the behaviour, of some of the fishing households and that of the unavasara 
dwellers in pursuing NGO assistance, indiscriminately, as not conforming to a vadagath 
standard.  
In contrast with the social advancement relating to state resources some households, 
such as that of Duminda, were able to improve their social position in a far more 
dramatic manner. This was regarded as an illegitimate advancement of social position 
and was viewed with disapprobation in Sinhapura. As in the case of state benefits, the 
volume of capital which flowed into the village, through non-governmental means, was 
not of an order to affect the ideology, the aspirations and the lifestyle of the two sides of 
the village, nor the interaction between them. Thus, the social processes of Sinhapura, 
were not transformed by the inflow of non-governmental resources, consequent upon 
the tsunami, although some individuals utilised these resources and improved their 
social position, exponentially.      
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Chapter 6  --  The Impact of the Tsunami on Sinhapura 
 
Introduction 
 
The focus of this chapter is the impact of the tsunami on the social processes of 
Sinhapura, and of the rehabilitation efforts of the state and the non-governmental sector, 
on these processes, in the reproduction of this community.  
When the tsunami struck Sinhapura in December 2004 individuals and households, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, were utilising the resources available to them, accumulating 
capital, in terms of their capacity to do so, drawing upon their alliances and pursuing 
aspirations. This process took place on both the landside and the seaside of the village, 
although in terms of different ideologies and different aspirations. On the landside the 
aspiration was to a vadagath lifestyle, with the temple at the centre, which involved 
education, employment, and a particular pattern of consumption. On the seaside the 
lifestyle placed the emphasis on material wealth and independence. The tsunami 
influenced these social processes, in that it destroyed capital and affected networks of 
alliance which functioned as a potential safety net in times of crisis.  
In this chapter, I present types of loss suffered by households placed in different 
circumstances, in terms of the categories identified in Chapter 3. I indicate the 
differential strategies of recovery pursued by these households, in the context of the 
resources that flowed into the village, and the networks and connections which they 
were able to access. Then, I analyse these post-tsunami circumstances in terms of my 
key theoretical concepts. I am, therefore, concerned with the remaking of Sinhapura in 
terms of the interaction between external initiatives and internal responses.  
I am also concerned with how Sinhapura compares with some of the other communities 
of the south-western coast. In the final section of this chapter I examine some of the 
wider issues raised in this thesis.   
 
The Post-tsunami Experience of the Different Categories of Households of Sinhapura   
In this section I focus on the eight types of households and the ways in which each 
category utilised capital, from in-coming resources as well as those in the village, and 
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alliances, with kin, neighbours, the commercial world and the tourist industry, to fund 
their recovery. In the next section of this chapter I analyse these ethnographic data, in 
terms of the theoretical framework formulated in Chapter 2, and examine the impact of 
the tsunami on the social processes of Sinhapura.  
The Households of Multi-Day Boat Owners 
In the case of multi-day boat owners I shall look, particularly, at the capital that was 
available and the alliances that were deployed in their recovery. When the tsunami 
struck Sinhapura most of the multi-day boats were at sea and, therefore, escaped 
damage. However, the multi-day boat owners suffered damage in other ways: with 
wallams either completely destroyed or needing extensive repair; damage to their 
houses; loss of household goods; and loss of savings in the form of gold. The multi-day 
boat owners found the aid from the state and non-governmental sources insufficient to 
cover their losses. A few received help from kin in the interior. Those who had 
established relationships with commercial institutions, such as banks, received 
concessions on the repayment of loans. Their relationships with crewmen and their 
families were placed under strain as the multi-day boat owners were unable to help 
crewmen in their predicament as they were in straitened circumstances themselves.     
Palitha Mudalali was a multi-day boat owner earning a high income, in village terms. 
His house was severely damaged as were his household goods. Two of his wallams and 
two engines were totally destroyed; one wallam and one engine required substantial 
repair. Two nets were also destroyed. The multi-day boat was out at sea and was, 
therefore, undamaged.  He received the state benefits and a house in the interior. Palitha 
Mudalali told me that his strategy of recovery was to make the necessary repairs to his 
house and its effects; re-establish his sources of income; and, build back his capital. 
Thus, from an early stage he was determined to recover the lifestyle to which he had 
aspired, prior to the tsunami, through investment and expansion of the fisheries 
enterprise.    
Palitha Mudalali told me that he received Rs. 230,000/- from a foreign national with 
which he had bought an engine. He also received Rs. 17,000/- from another private 
source. He had a contact in the Commercial Bank in Hikkaduwa and was, therefore, 
able to postpone the repayment of the loan on the multi-day boat, for a period. He had 
bought the boat with Rs. 1 million of his own money, the proceeds of the pawning of his 
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wife’s gold and a bank loan. By July 2005 he had repaired his damaged wallam and was 
sending it out to sea, with the new engine. He also had the income from the multi-day 
boat. He negotiated a new loan from the Commercial Bank of Rs. 1,600,000/-, to buy a 
plot of land in the interior, where he planned to build a house. The cost of the land was 
covered by the loan, except for a small part which he had borrowed from his wife’s kin. 
Eventually, he was making repayments on two loans from the Commercial bank --  on 
the boat and the land  --  which worked out to Rs. 35,000/- a month. The income from 
the multi-day boat and one wallam funded the repayment of these loans, with some 
difficulty, as he was supporting his wife and some of his eight children.     
Palitha Mudalali’s position in different social fields, of different networks, meant that 
he had the capacity to activate alliances, which facilitated the accumulation of capital. 
He had access to commercial credit, through one type of alliance, and access to other 
types of credit through personal connections such as kinship. Thus, he was able to make 
his alliances ‘work’ for him, in the matter of credit. He was not, therefore, totally 
dependent on aid, whether from the state or the non-governmental sector. The purchase 
of land, inland, and his continuing involvement in fishing demonstrate the fact that his 
aspirations remained unchanged. His social position in the community suffered because 
of the losses of capital that he sustained. However, he had the capacity to move towards 
recovery.        
Danasiri Mudalali was another multi-day boat owner. He had bought the boat in 1997 
with state assistance of Rs. 700,000/-, a bank loan and help from his brother, and had in 
addition two wallams. He told me that he could not save much from the multi-day boat 
income which amounted to, sometimes, as much as Rs. 100,000/- from a single trip. 
This was because he was repaying the loan on the boat; maintaining his wife and three 
children; looking after his elderly, ailing parents; and supporting his siblings and their 
families. Furthermore, he said that there were constant problems with the multi-day boat 
such as net damage at sea  --  which had happened three times  --  and engine repairs, 
after every trip. He asserted that a man who owns two wallams and a multi-day boat is 
not, necessarily, ‘cash rich’ although he is perceived as a ‘rich man’ in the community.   
 
Danasiri Mudalali’s house was partially damaged and the household goods destroyed. 
One wallam was wrecked; the other substantially damaged. Although his multi-day boat 
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was at sea and, therefore, not affected by the tsunami it developed engine trouble and 
had to be towed into Galle harbour. It remained there for a while as he did not have the 
wherewithal to repair it. He restored his damaged wallam using some part of his 
savings. He crewed on another multi-day boat and received an income from his repaired 
wallam. He also received the state benefits. At this stage, his strategy was to put 
together the capital to repair the multi-day boat and to get back to the trajectory that he 
had mapped out for his household.  
 
Danasiri Mudalali did not have the same capacity to activate those alliances  --  
commercial and kin  --  as did Palitha Mudalali in effecting his recovery. He can also be 
contrasted with Wijeratne Mudalali, the brother of Palitha Mudalali, who was able to 
call upon his commercial contacts for credit as, in addition, to owning and operating a 
multi-day boat, he was a fish merchant, wholesaler, selling fish to retailers in the Kandy 
fish market. Danasiri Mudalali told me that he had funded his extended family and had 
not been able, therefore, to maintain a current account in the manner that would have 
enabled him to obtain a bank loan in the post- tsunami period. Furthermore, his children 
were young and dependent upon him while Palitha Mudalali’s four sons had been 
crewing for a while. Thus, Danasiri Mudalali’s recovery was effected through his own 
labour, some saved capital and the state benefits.   
 
The Households of the Wallam Owners 
The wallam owners did not find themselves in the same situation as the multi-day boat 
owners. They did, of course, receive the state benefits. Many benefitted from the grants 
given by the Trust and there were also several other sources from which they drew 
support. This variety will be seen shortly.  
The tsunami left some wallams completely wrecked and others needing substantial 
repair. Houses were damaged, household goods and gold washed away, and many of the 
wallam owners found themselves burdened with loans and with little income. Many had 
to go into temporary accommodation. Their recovery was facilitated by assistance from 
the state, from NGOs, and private sources. They, too, received some help from the 
Trust. Rohan, for instance, had difficulty with insurance. The insurance company would 
not, initially, make payment for the damage to his three wheeler as the cover did not 
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include earthquakes and tsunamis. Eventually, as mentioned in Chapter 5, the Trust 
interceded on his behalf with the insurance company, and secured the compensation.   
One of Jayatissa’s wallams was totally destroyed while the other two and their engines 
were damaged. The Trust helped to repair one engine, at a cost of Rs. 17,000/-, and one 
wallam. He received the state benefits and some of the packages from NGOs. The 
family were in temporary accommodation until they received a house in the interior. 
Jayatissa and his family survived on the state benefits until his wallam was in operation. 
Once he had received the house, he rented it out, repaired his old house by the seaside, 
and lived in it. Thus, he had a rent income in addition to his wallam income. Next, he 
repaired his second wallam and put it out to sea. When I interviewed him in 2008 he 
had just bought a third one. His network of relationships did not afford him the capacity 
to fund his recovery. However, he was able to utilise the resources available in the post-
tsunami context, such as the Trust and other external organisations, to fund his 
recovery. While there was some loss of social position due to the loss of capital, 
Jayatissa felt that he had successfully overcome the consequences of the catastrophe. He 
did not, therefore, see it as an occasion to reassess his aspirations. Jayatissa’s recovery 
can be contrasted with that of Somadasa whose wife had kin in the North Central 
Province, who provided him with the credit to buy a new wallam, after three of his 
wallams had been destroyed in the tsunami.   
Gunasena was a wallam owner who had no experience of fishing. He had worked for 
the State Engineering Corporation, amongst other institutions, in his youth. When he 
came back to Sinhapura, and settled there upon marriage, he had bought a wallam and a 
large canoe with his savings. His wife was from the interior and her dowry included 
cinnamon and paddy land. They had three sons and a daughter. Gunasena had income 
from various sources: the cinnamon and paddy land; rent from a house which he had 
inherited from his father; the two boats; and, some interest income. He believed in 
putting some part of his income into his savings account, every month, and insisted that 
his children do the same. The house that he live in, fronting onto the High Street, was 
bought with his earnings. The connections of this household were with their neighbours, 
in the vicinity of the High Street, and with some of his wife’s kin in the interior. His 
wife’s brother was the chief incumbent of a temple in the interior and was an important 
patron, as far as this household was concerned. Gunasena had been involved with the 
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Communist Party since the 1970s and his political links were important. Gunasena’s 
main concern was to see his children creditably established, in suitable occupations, and 
to ensure that they made suitable marriages.   
The tsunami caused no structural damage to Gunasena’s house but his household goods 
were washed away; the wallam required repair; and the canoe was destroyed. Gunasena, 
unlike many Sinhapura residents, had the capital to get his wallam repaired and the craft 
was soon at sea. He used the state benefits to replenish household goods such as the 
television. However, he would not permit his children or his wife to accept any 
packages from NGOs, particularly if this involved standing on the roadside. Only one of 
his many sources of income was affected by the tsunami and, consequently, the damage 
that he suffered was marginal. His recovery was facilitated by his savings together with 
the benefits, i.e., those disbursed by the state which he regarded as his entitlement. 
Although Gunasena had several networks of alliance  --  kin, commercial and political  -
-  which he might have accessed he was far too conscious of his social position to do so. 
The impulses of recovery were oriented towards the aspirations which were being 
pursued.    
Jayantha Mudalali, the brother of Wijepala Mudalali, had four wallams at the time of 
the tsunami. He had, besides, a store on the High Street which sold fisheries equipment. 
It was with the income from the store that he invested in the wallams, one by one. Two 
wallams were destroyed; the other two were damaged. With his savings he repaired the 
two damaged wallams and put them back to sea. The store was not structurally damaged 
but the stock was ruined. He told me that he had lost around Rs. 2 million worth of 
assets. He received Rs. 15,000/- from the Trust to restock the shop. He also received Rs. 
20,000/-, from the organisation, BBB, for the same purpose. While he suffered serious 
damage to some of his assets he had, nevertheless, the capacity to fund some part of his 
recovery  --  the repair of the wallams. For the rest, he was able to utilise the resources 
of BBB and the Trust. The two repaired wallams soon began to give an income. The re-
opened store cashed in on the need to restore fisheries equipment. Furthermore, his 
house, inherited from his father, was on the landside and unaffected by the tsunami. He 
also received the state benefits. Unlike others who had to use the state benefits to 
replace household goods, he ploughed this capital back into the business.  
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Shortly after the tsunami Jayantha Mudalali was operating his economic ventures to 
advantage. He was seen as having made a successful recovery. It was in this context that 
he was able to demonstrate to the Commercial Bank  --  where he had a long standing 
current account  --  that he had sufficient income to service a loan of Rs. 2 million, 
which he required to buy a second-hand multi-day boat. In 2006 he obtained the loan 
and bought the multi-day boat. At the time I interviewed him in 2008  --  the first 
interview had been in 2005  --  he was having no difficulty in repaying this loan at an 
amount of Rs. 38,000/- a month. At the interview he told me that he had just made a 
profit of Rs. 1 million from the multi-day boat and that, with this kind of profit, he 
could easily repay the loan. Most of his aspirations were centred upon the future of his 
three small children and the best education that he could secure for them, through his 
earnings.  
All the wallam owners incurred some degree of loss. Without exception they wanted to 
get back to their scheme of income and to the centrality of the wallam in it.   
The Households of Crew Members 
The tsunami damaged the wallams on which the crewmen worked which left them 
without income. At the same time, it damaged their houses and their household goods. 
Many had to go into temporary accommodation and depend on state benefits and NGO 
relief. Some received canoes from the Trust. One or two of the crewmen, such as 
Duminda, benefitted from windfalls in the form of wallams from foreign nationals. 
Through an external resource Duminda experienced a marked improvement in the level 
of his capital, his capacity and, therefore, his social position. While the effects of the 
tsunami were catastrophic, it did not turn crewmen away from the sea. This is because 
they had previously managed risk successfully, and conceived the tsunami as a once in a 
2000 year experience. Their aspirations, although suffering a setback, remained much 
the same. As crewmen their closest relationships were with other crewmen and boat 
owners, although on occasion there was competition and conflict between crewmen for 
places on a boat.  
Priyantha was a crew member who had a small canoe of his own which was destroyed 
by the tsunami. He also ran a business from his home, selling batteries for the large 
electric lamps which were taken to sea. The wallam on which he crewed suffered 
damage. His house was demolished and the household goods washed away, including 
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the gold which was in his wife’s wardrobe. Priyantha was rather bitter. He told me that 
he had completed his house not long before the tsunami and that he had built it very 
carefully, with the foundation alone costing Rs. 85,000/-. When the tsunami struck he 
had forty batteries in the house, each worth Rs. 4500/-, which were washed away. He 
had been making Rs. 30,000/- a month from the battery business, which he had started 
with capital from his earnings in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, there was a bank loan of 
Rs. 25,000/-  -- obtained to build the toilet  --  which was being repaid in instalments. 
He had also borrowed Rs. 50,000/- from a money-lender, Shirani, who was pressing 
him, in the aftermath of the disaster, to return the loan.    
Immediately after the tsunami Priyantha, his wife and six month old baby were housed 
in the temple. Eventually, he moved to temporary housing on the school land, before 
receiving a house in the interior. Priyantha received the state benefits and a canoe from 
the Trust, as well as some packages from NGOs. He told me that this was very 
inadequate compensation for everything that he had lost. He made the point that many 
of those coming to the Trust for assistance were ‘charlatans’ and that the Trust should 
have been funding genuine claimants, like himself, to the full extent of their loss. Thus, 
Priyantha’s modes of income  --  crewing, the canoe and the battery business  --  were 
disrupted and he had loans to repay. With the canoe he received from the Trust, he 
started inshore fishing and was receiving an income. Eventually, the wallam which he 
crewed upon was repaired and he began to go to sea. However, he was not able to 
restart his battery business as he did not have the capacity to accumulate the capital 
necessary for this. He felt that his social position in the community had contracted and, 
with it, the aspirations which had been his before the tsunami. He did not see himself as 
having made a successful recovery.  
Bennet’s house and household goods were destroyed by the tsunami. He and his family 
were in temporary accommodation on the school land. They received the state benefits. 
The boat on which Bennet had crewed was destroyed and he was without income. He 
received a canoe from the Trust from which he derived an income. His wife obtained 
the capital to buy a stove from a foreign national and, the money for a gas cylinder, 
from the Trust. Whilst still in the temporary accommodation she was able to restart her 
stringhopper business. Just prior to the tsunami she had taken a loan of Rs. 50,000/-, 
from a microfinance organisation. Of this, Rs. 12,000/- was lost in the tsunami. She told 
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me that the repayment on this loan was Rs. 1700/- per month, and that the interest had 
been unpaid after the tsunami.  
 
They received a house in the tsunami resettlement inland and, once established in the 
new housing settlement, Bennet would come to Sinhapura on his bicycle, in order to go 
to sea. His wife continued with her stringhopper business. Overall, he and his wife felt 
that they had come through the tsunami experience without too much trauma. They 
were granted a house and ten perches of land in the interior. This was in addition to 
their land on the seaside in Sinhapura, on which they could even rebuild, once the buffer 
zone had been shifted back to the 35m limit. At the time I interviewed them, in 2008, 
they were thinking about selling one of the properties in order to buy a wallam. This 
household did not have many networks and the ones that they did have, their neighbours 
and kin, were in the same situation as themselves. Thus, their recovery was facilitated 
by assistance from external organisations and state benefits.  
 
Ranee’s husband was a crewman, a skipper of a wallam, at the time of the tsunami. 
They were living in a house, on the seaside, built on her father’s property off the High 
Street. They had two small children. Ranee had become proficient in the making of jadi, 
soap, clothes, and coir mats which gave the household a supplementary income. The 
immediate consequence of the tsunami was that a good part of the house was damaged 
and household goods washed away. The wallam on which Ranee’s husband crewed was 
damaged. The wallam owner used his savings and had the craft repaired speedily so 
that, within a month of the tsunami, the boat was back at sea. For a brief period, Ranee 
and her husband were without the income from the wallam with the result that they 
were unable to pay back the instalments of a loan, of Rs. 100,000/-, taken from two 
microfinance organisations. The house, along with some others in the neighbourhood, 
was repaired by an Italian NGO. Meanwhile, Ranee received a sewing machine from 
the Trust and a zig-zag sewing machine from the Salvation Army. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter Ranee got involved in the new microfinance societies and used loans 
from these organisations to repay the microfinance loans taken previously. It was 
through the establishment of alliances with the new microfinance organisations that she 
was able to expand her household’s capacity to accumulate capital.   
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The crew members also did not see a better alternative than to continue with their 
occupation. It had possibilities of advancement which they expected to utilise and as 
with the wallam owners they did not, after some weeks, regard another tsunami as a 
serious possibility.  
The Households of the High Street Traders 
The tsunami destroyed equipment as well as stock on the High Street. In the case of 
those who lived on the High Street their household goods were washed away. The Trust 
and other NGOs such as BBB and EEE enabled them to restart their businesses. Help 
was also received from kin in the interior. Credit facilities were provided by trading 
partners from other regions such as Kandy and Colombo. Thus, alliances established 
before the tsunami were important in this context. Banks were of assistance only to 
those people who had a current account and a credit history. Daya, for instance, who 
had a nets and spare parts store on the High Street had a long-standing relationship with 
the Commercial Bank in Hikkaduwa. He had taken loans, previously, and had a good 
repayment record. Thus, he received a loan of Rs. 900,000/- to re-stock his shop. He 
had the capacity to activate his commercial alliances, in order to access credit in terms 
of his established record as a sound businessman. In Daya’s own view, and in that of the 
community, he recovered successfully after the tsunami.   
Wijepala Mudalali’s house on the High Street suffered partial damage and the 
household goods were washed away. He was a brother of Jayantha Mudalali. The 
bakery, situated next to the house, was devastated with the equipment damaged beyond 
repair. His luxury seafood business was owed Rs. 500,000/- from the Hikkaduwa resorts 
which he has not, to this day, received. The fish business was disrupted as there was no 
catch due to the fact that the fishing fleet was damaged. Furthermore, those who owed 
him money could not repay it. Two of his wallams were shattered; the other two 
required substantial repair. He told me that his losses amounted to Rs. 3 million.  
Wijepala Mudalali repaired his two wallams with his savings and sent them back to sea. 
The bakery had not been a successful venture. However, it had been providing the daily 
expenses of the household with a profit of approximately Rs. 500/-. The resuscitation of 
the bakery required an investment of Rs. 100,000/- to obtain what was a marginal 
income. He decided that this expenditure was not worthwhile and the bakery was 
abandoned. He received a grant of Rs. 20,000/-, from the Trust to re-start his fish 
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business. His capital was being rolled between the businesses so that when they all 
crashed Wijepala Mudalali found himself cast into the position of being grateful for the 
grant of Rs. 20,000/- from the Trust. He was able to demonstrate to the Trust that he 
was a worthy recipient of a grant, in terms of his successful entrepreneurial record, in a 
context where there was great competition for the limited resources which the Trust had 
to disburse. Furthermore, he was able to access credit from Kandy fish merchants with 
whom he had cultivated contacts, who extended lines of credit to him. His experience 
was similar to that of Romesh who had a business connection with bicycle spare parts 
wholesalers in Colombo. They extended lines of credit to him by promising not to 
collect on his cheque, for four months. Wijepala Mudalali received the state benefits 
and some household goods from a church. Like Gunasena he felt that his social position 
would be compromised by standing on the roadside for hand-outs from NGOs. After the 
tsunami Wijepala Mudalali focused on his fish business. He felt that his social position 
had suffered with his loss of assets. While he lost capital, the fact that he was positioned 
in several different social fields, and different networks, meant that he had some 
capacity to access those alliances which helped him to accumulate the capital to 
facilitate his recovery.     
Dinesh had three businesses on the High Street. He had established these with hard-
earned capital from employment in Saudi Arabia, working as a lorry driver. They were a 
music centre; a video cassette rental; and a beauty salon. All the businesses suffered 
damage to stock worth Rs. 600,000/-. His house was on the landside and was 
unaffected. He had one child. He received Rs. 15,000/- from the Trust to re-equip his 
businesses; a similar amount from BBB; and Rs. 12,000/- worth of goods from a 
Colombo beauty salon.  
Although Dinesh re-started the beauty salon and the video cassette rental he was not 
able to re-start the music centre. He found that the capital outlay was more than he 
could fund at that time. Once he had re-established the businesses he found that, as 
luxury businesses, they were not doing well. Visiting a beauty salon was a low priority 
at such a time. Thus, using a loan from his wife’s kin and having pawned her gold he 
bought a three wheeler, on finance. He ran it himself leaving his assistant in charge of 
the other two businesses. Dinesh’s recovery was based on some capital of his own in the 
form of gold and assistance from the Trust, NGOs and kin. Although he lost much in 
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the way of capital he had some capacity to fund his recovery. He came from one of the 
poorer families in the village. He felt that the social position which he had worked hard 
to carve out for himself had suffered and that he would never recover the capital  --  his 
earnings from Saudi Arabia  --  that he had lost.    
Kanchana’s experience, detailed in Chapter 5, meant that she acquired a capital asset 
through an external organisation. Her strategy of recovery was regarded as a successful 
one in the village as it enabled her to improve her social position in the sense that she 
now became the owner of a substantial High Street business, in village terms. Her 
experience can be contrasted with that of Nimal who had a crab business. He had twenty 
crab pens in the river which were washed away. He told me that an NGO had expressed 
some interest in helping him to reconstruct his pens but it had come to nothing in the 
end. In the case of Kanchana the organisation, CCC, felt that assisting her would help to 
develop a whole industry. In Nimal’s case the expensive outlay of restoring the crab 
pens was seen as benefitting just one individual and his family. 
  
Sampath had a communication centre on the High Street, launched in November 1999, 
shortly after his marriage. It provided the services of telephone calls and faxes. He 
started the business with his savings from the army, of Rs. 35,000/-; a loan from his 
wife’s aunt, of Rs. 50,000/-; and the pawning of his wife’s gold, amounting to Rs. 
113,000/-. Sampath stated that it was a good business and that he had nurtured it by 
ploughing the profits back into the business, rather than using it for domestic 
consumption, as he had a job in which he worked on a shift basis. He had one child. 
 
At the time of the tsunami he had just bought a computer for Rs. 70,000/- and a printer 
for Rs. 20,000/-. He stated that the idea behind this expansion of his communication 
business, was to offer computer generated, astrological predictions. With the tsunami he 
lost stock worth about Rs. 500,000/-. He was back in business by 6 January 2005. A 
telecom company, Suntel, repaired his phone and he was able to re-open his doors as a 
communication centre. He received a grant of Rs. 12,000/-, from the Trust, to buy a new 
fax machine. He did this, putting in Rs. 5000 from his savings. Subsequently, the 
organisation, BBB, donated a fax machine. As he already had a machine he asked BBB 
whether they could give him another item in its stead. BBB refused the exchange. 
Whereupon, he asked BBB whether he could sell the machine and use the money for 
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something else. They agreed. He sold it for Rs. 12,000/-. With this money he bought a 
laminating machine. He had a connection with a company in Galle and they sold him a 
second hand photocopy machine on the basis of a hire purchase scheme. He had to pay 
a deposit of Rs. 20,000/- and Rs. 5000/- a month. He also received Rs. 25,000/- worth 
of stationery from the organisation, EEE.  
 
Sampath had the capacity to activate some commercial alliances in order to accumulate 
capital. He was also able to access capital from external sources. A bank loan was not a 
possibility as he did not have a current account, on the one hand, and on the other, the 
turnover of the business was insufficient. The aid from BBB was facilitated by the Galle 
Chamber of Commerce. He formed a connection with this organisation and through 
their activities attended training and management courses all around the country. He 
also came into contact with the ‘big’ businessmen of the Galle region. Eventually, 
Sampath was invited to become a member of the Chamber. The five hundred members 
of the Chamber were, largely the big business people of the region  --  Hikkaduwa 
Odiris, Kumarakanda Harischandra, Kotigama Senadheera. Membership involved a 
complicated process of vetting which he was able to bypass. Sampath built new 
networks of alliance, through strategic manoeuvring, in order to establish the capacity 
for the accumulation of capital in terms of continuing aspirations. He felt that he had 
used both the alliances that he had, and the ones that he was able to cultivate, to his 
advantage, and that he had recovered successfully.   
 
The Households of the Service Providers 
In the case of the service providers the damage was to the premises, to equipment and to 
stock. Where the premises were next to the residence this too was damaged and 
household goods washed away. Income and the repayment of loans became a problem. 
These households benefitted from the state programmes, from the packages of NGOs 
and from the Trust. The organisations, BBB and EEE, also helped people in this 
category as did the new microfinance organisations which came to Sinhapura after the 
tsunami.   
Sushila, the sister of Daya, and her husband ran an eating house next to their residence 
in the High Street. It was started in 1991, upon their marriage, with a loan from the 
228 
 
Bank of Ceylon. With the tsunami the eating house was razed to the ground. Although 
the house was not structurally damaged the household goods were ruined. Sushila’s kin  
--  her four brothers and sister who were all neighbours  --  were in the same situation, 
as was her husband’s sister, Shirani. This household received the state benefits. The 
household goods were restored through several packages from NGOs. With a grant 
from the Trust, of Rs. 10,000/-, the eating house was re-opened on the verandah of their 
house. Thereafter, they received four tables and sixteen chairs from an NGO and also 
two tables and eight chairs from the organisation, BBB. They used their savings to get 
the freezer repaired. The refrigerator, however, could not be repaired. With a further 
grant of Rs. 10,000/-, from the Trust, and the pawning of Sushila’s gold they bought a 
refrigerator. In 2006 they built a small retail outlet next to the house, using the proceeds 
of a seettu. In 2008, when I was doing my fieldwork, the eating house was popular with 
the fishermen while the retail outlet was able to cash in on the custom of those 
travelling along the Galle Road. The household felt that they had recovered their capital 
losses, had, in fact, even advanced, in terms of the income from the retail outlet. Thus, 
the aspiration to a vadagath lifestyle, in which the education of their three sons figured 
significantly, was enhanced. This household did not have the capacity to activate many 
alliances; their kin were in the same situation. They recovered, substantially, through 
the inflow of capital from external organisations.  
With the disaster Wasantha, the brother of Sushila, lost much of his equipment and the 
stock of wood in his carpentry workshop. For a period his income, from this source, was 
non-existent. Since he lived on the upper storey of his house, his household goods were 
unaffected. He received a grant of Rs. 17,000/- from the Trust. This enabled him to buy 
some of the equipment that had been washed away by the waves. The partially damaged 
houses in Sinhapura which required repair provided him with work. He received 
assistance in the form of equipment from the organisations, BBB and EEE. He also 
received some of the packages from NGOs and the state benefits. His family  --  three 
brothers and two sisters were all affected by the tsunami  --  were in no position to help 
him. His wife, however, was from an affluent family living in a village in the interior. 
She had an income from some cinnamon land which was her dowry. This income 
sustained this household after the tsunami. Neither Wasantha’s kin nor client networks 
were of much help as they were in the same predicament as himself. His recovery was 
funded by the state benefits and external sources.   
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Shirani, the sister of Sushila’s husband, was involved in the lucrative activity of money-
lending. She had three properties on the High Street from which she received rent. She 
helped out at Sushila’s eating house and received some remuneration. The property in 
which she lived had a large garden with eighteen coconut trees from which she derived 
an income. Her husband ran a printing business which was not doing well at the time of 
the tsunami. The financial burden of the household was borne by Shirani, which 
included the education of her three teenage children. Though on the landside her house 
was quite close to the river. With the tsunami the river overflowed and flooded the 
premises. The house was not structurally damaged but the household goods were 
washed away and the equipment of her husband’s printing business was damaged, 
requiring substantial repair. Shirani’s money-lending activity suffered because those 
who owed her money could not return it. She was the organiser of two landside seettus 
which broke down amidst recrimination and some conflict. She had taken loans from 
the seven microfinance societies of which she was a member, and was cast into great 
difficulty in the matter of repayment. The income from rent also became uncertain as 
the High Street traders who rented her properties took a while to recover. The income 
from the eating house also ceased for the period that it was out of operation. It was only 
the income from coconut which continued. However, Shirani soon had the household 
back on the path towards a vadagath lifestyle. When the new microfinance 
organisations started operating in the village she joined several, making a total of 
twelve. She then took loans from these organisations to service some of her debts and to 
start the money-lending activity again. She also constituted a new seettu. This was not a 
household which had many alliances which could be activated for its recovery. Their 
kin were in the same situation. It is the capital from the external organisations, and the 
state benefits which secured their recovery.  
The Households of Persons Externally Employed 
Where the main bread-winner of this category of household was employed by the 
government the salary continued to be paid. Where people were employed in the 
commercial sector or the tourist trade, their salaries ceased to be paid as many of these 
organisations were not functioning as viable units. The tourist guides, in some instances, 
managed to function as brokers and received some income by way of commissions.    
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Charlotte was a teacher in one of the government schools located in Sinhapura. She was 
on a fixed, government salary and her husband had retired from government service. 
The lump sum of his retirement fund had been used to purchase a variety of luxury 
consumer goods which were ruined by the tsunami  --  an organ, a television, a music 
set, a refrigerator etc. She had supplemented the teaching with a small home business of 
sewing clothes for the neighbours. She stated that a teacher’s salary was not enough to 
live on, with her husband in retirement and a daughter still in school.  
Both her sewing machines were damaged by the tsunami. Although they were repaired, 
at a cost of about Rs. 3000/-, they broke down again and she had to dispose of them. 
Charlotte was no longer able to continue the sewing business and this mode of income 
ceased. The walls of the house were made of kabok (laterite) and the salt in the tsunami 
water affected the walls. Charlotte stated that the house was, literally, falling down 
about their ears and that she had started to repair it using some of her own savings. She 
had not waited for the Rs. 100,000/-, which, as detailed in Chapter 4, she did not 
receive. She asserted that she had obtained the Tsunami Card benefit from the state, but 
that she had not received the third and fourth tranche of the Rs. 20,000/- on the basis 
that she was a government employee with a steady income. Her point, however, was 
that the salary was in no way sufficient to recover all that she had lost. A Foundation for 
Teachers disbursed Rs. 10,000/- to her. Like Gunasena, neither Charlotte nor her 
husband was willing to pursue the NGO aid as they felt that this would compromise 
their social position.   
Without any political alliances, to activate, Charlotte could not fight for the Rs. 
100,000/- which was her due. Nor did she have the capacity to recover the luxury 
consumer items which were destroyed. An NGO to which she made an application for 
assistance refused to help her, because they said she had an income in the form of her 
salary. She told me that if one were a government servant one did not get anything from 
NGOs, because one had a salary, however small it was. The expenditure of her 
husband’s retirement fund on luxury consumer items was, in Charlotte’s perception, a 
step towards a vadagath lifestyle. She felt that it would be impossible to recover this 
capital. Thus, she was bitter because she felt that the household had taken a permanent 
step down in terms of social position. Furthermore, she was worried about the 
implications of this decline for her 16-year-old daughter’s education and marriage. 
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Charlotte had few alliances, either of a business of kin nature, to fund her recovery. She 
had to rely on her savings and the state benefits.  
Nayana, a nurse employed at the Karapitiya General Hospital, the main teaching 
hospital in the south, was in a similar situation. As she and her husband were both 
government employees and received salaries, they too faced many problems in 
establishing their eligibility for aid and replenishing the household effects which had 
been washed away.   
Harin, the brother of Nimal, had a heavy vehicle license and, at the time of the tsunami, 
was employed as a fork lift driver for the Road Development Authority (RDA), on a 
temporary basis. The day after the tsunami he had been instructed, by the army, to drive 
an RDA lorry which was transporting bodies to mortuaries in the interior. When he 
reported for work at the RDA, after a couple of days, he was informed that he would be 
sent to the North, as a punishment transfer, because he had used an RDA lorry without 
permission. He refused the transfer and was summarily sacked from his position. When 
I asked him why he did not go to the Labour Tribunal he explained that it was time-
consuming, and that he had been attempting to get his job back through channels of 
patronage. He had approached two local government politicians but, according to him, 
they had little influence with the RDA and, further, they were not interested in helping 
an ‘unimportant’ individual such as himself. With the loss of this income Harin was cast 
into great difficulty as he had a wife and two small children to support. Furthermore, he 
had just bought a three wheeler, on finance, two months before the tsunami which was 
damaged. The repayment was Rs. 4500/- per month. He got into arrears after the 
tsunami. He had to borrow Rs. 40,000/-, through his wife who was a member of a 
microfinance organisation, to get his three wheeler repaired as the insurance refused to 
pay. With the income from the three wheeler, once it was repaired, he had to repay the 
finance company and the microfinance loan, and support his family. Harin lost his mode 
of income and did not have the capacity to recover it.    
Tourist guides like Suneetha and Asanka, lost a part of their income because of the 
devastation of the tourist industry. However, they had some capacity, in terms of 
alliances with foreign nationals, to act as brokers of tsunami finance and fund both their 
own recovery and that of others in the community.        
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The Female-Headed Households 
The damage suffered by the households in this category was to the house itself, the loss 
of household goods, and damage to the equipment used in the income earning activity. 
Sewing machines were a case in point. These households were helped by the state, by 
the NGOs and by the Trust.  
Lakmalee engaged in three types of businesses: hairdressing and beauty culture; cake 
making; and dress making. She lived with her mother on the High Street and was the 
main income-earner for the household. While there was no structural damage to the 
house the equipment of the businesses and the household goods were either washed 
away or ruined, as in the case of the sewing machine which was beyond repair. With 
initial assistance from the Trust, of Rs. 15,000/-, she bought a new sewing machine and 
cloth. People needed new clothes and she was able to respond to this need. She also 
received assistance from the organisations, BBB and EEE, packages from NGOs and 
the state benefits. Her clients were mostly from Sinhapura  --  in fact, her neighbours. 
Thus, her network was of little use in recovery. It was the capital from the external 
organisations and the state which facilitated her recovery.      
Ramya and her mother lived in a house fronting the Galle Road, near the main junction 
of Sinhapura. Since her father’s death, two years before the tsunami, the household 
position as regards income, had been precarious. Her mother received a very small 
benefit from the Department of Social Services and plaited coir for a low wage. Their 
income, as I discovered in the course of my fieldwork in 2008, was so small that it 
seemed a miracle that they were able to live on it. It had not been possible for Ramya to 
pursue higher education after the Ordinary Level examination due to financial reasons. 
She told me that she had made little effort to secure any employment either. They had 
few relatives in Sinhapura and contacts were limited to one or two neighbouring 
households. Their aspirations centred on the marriage of Ramya.  
The tsunami damaged the rear wall of the house and the household goods were washed 
away. The income from coir ceased as the retting pits were destroyed. The house which 
was in a dilapidated state was made worse by the tsunami. Their neighbours helped 
them to buy the raw materials necessary to rebuild the damaged wall and Ramya did it 
herself. They received the basic government assistance of the Tsunami Card but, as 
mentioned in Chapter 4, did not receive the Rs. 100,000/-. They received a few 
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packages from NGOs. Through the initiatives of the Trust, which established a weekly 
welfare grant for this household, they were able to improve their weekly consumption 
of essential items. Ramya was drawn into the activities of the Trust in terms of helping 
to pack the candles and interacting with other women on the Trust premises. Thus, she 
was able to forge new alliances of friendship. This household occupied a low position in 
the community and were the objects of pity and scorn. They did not have the capacity, 
either in terms of capital or in terms of alliances, to fund their recovery. They recovered 
through the state benefits, some NGO aid and the initiatives of the Trust. Eventually, in 
2010, Ramya married a young man, a cinnamon peeler, whom she had met on a visit to 
relatives who lived in the interior. Now, she lives with her husband, her mother and a 
baby in Sinhapura. The most significant aspiration of this household has been realised.    
The Households of the Unavasara Dwellers 
The unavasara dwellings were washed away by the tsunami. Those who were 
accustomed to utilising the labour of the unavasara households were unable to do so as 
they, themselves, were in straitened circumstances. The unavasara did not have the 
capacity, either in their networks of alliance nor in terms of their own capital, to achieve 
their recovery. Their hopes were realised as the fortuitous consequence of the tsunami  -
-  a house, rather than a shack, in a new community with the commercial, educational 
and recreational opportunities that this shift presented. In addition to this they received 
the state benefits. Their social position was such that they were not constrained by the 
more obvious concerns which influenced people such as Gunasena and Charlotte. They 
had little choice but to stand on the roadside and pursue the varied forms of NGO aid.  
With the tsunami Ranjanie’s household had to take refuge in the temple until they 
received temporary accommodation on the school land. She told me that when you have 
nothing you are not too proud to stand in queues, and that she had obtained many 
packages from NGOs apart from the state benefits. I visited her in 2008, in her new 
house. She was very proud of it although she did complain of the leaking roof and the 
cracks which were developing in the walls. She stated that all her aspirations had been 
realised: a house and land in a community where, since everyone was a newcomer, they, 
the unavasara, were not the socially unacceptable outsiders that they had been in 
Sinhapura. She felt that in this community her family would have the opportunity to 
accumulate new types of capital, forge new alliances and begin a new life.     
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The Impact of the Tsunami on the Social Processes of Sinhapura 
 
My concern in this section is to analyse the social processes of Sinhapura, consequent 
upon the tsunami, in terms of the ethnography described above. In doing so I utilise the 
framework of analysis spelt out in Chapter 2, which draws upon the concepts of 
Bourdieu (1977, 1990) and Appadurai (2004). To do this effectively I must recapitulate 
some of the features of Sinhapura described in Chapters 1 and 3.  
 
Sinhapura was a community which took shape during the colonial period. In the 1950s 
fishing, which was artisanal, and coir provided the income of the majority. The jadi 
(dried fish) trade with India was important, as was the gem trade with the countries of 
South-East Asia. Thus, the important personages of the community were the jadi 
mudalalis and the owners of the madal (beach seine net). The Town Council of the area 
was in Sinhapura, as was the police station, and there was a functioning harbour with an 
Excise Office. The railway, by then, had long been established which meant that 
educational institutions in Galle and Amabalangoda were easily accessible and urban 
occupations became a possibility. With these options of education and employment, 
migration to the larger towns of the region and to Colombo took place.  
 
With the first steps of mechanization in the 1960s, and the fishing boom and the 
concomitant rise in incomes, an important change took place. The wallam owners and 
their crews began to be important people in the community challenging the jadi 
mudalalis and the madal owners. This coincided with the diminution of the jadi trade in 
the 1960s. While madal fishing continued, its contribution to the catch was a fraction of 
that of the wallams. More formal systems of credit emerged, such that credit was no 
longer the responsibility of a few patrons. The sale of fish also underwent a change. 
Middle-men with appropriate equipment and transport, catering to markets in Colombo 
and Kandy, became the new buyers of Sinhapura produce. Political and administrative 
changes  --  with caste continuing as a political force  --  also took place at this time.  
 
With the decline of the jadi trade and the increasing wealth and importance of the 
fishing families, the jadi households adopted the stance that while the fishing 
households might have wealth, and the power which comes from this wealth, they did 
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not have the refinement that comes from living according to Buddhist values. This was 
the genesis of the vadagath lifestyle.  
 
The wallam owners and, subsequently, the multi-day boat owners did not become the 
new capitalists of the village, replacing the madal owners and the jadi mudalalis of a 
previous generation. The multi-day boat owners were not oriented towards village 
leadership but towards prominence in the region, in terms of contact with the big 
businessmen of the region and with its important politicians.    
 
I have already commented on the manner in which the loss of Sinhapura’s position as a 
regional centre had implications for leadership. The division between the landside and 
the seaside has been such that in the prevailing situation, with neither side able to 
impose its ideology on the other, there is little likelihood of leaders emerging who are 
acceptable to both sides. Thus, Sinhapura continues to be without village leaders who 
are able to lobby the external world on its behalf. 
 
While the internal divisions between the landside and the seaside had become very 
marked, the state continued to regard the village as one entity for administrative 
purposes. There were resources which were available to Sinhapura as a community, 
especially in the matter of services and governmental employment. Besides this, in 
political terms, in relation to the surrounding communities, particularly Kotigama, 
Sinhapura continues to regard itself as a unit. These integrating forces, therefore, tend to 
operate against the divisive forces that are expressed in the respective ideologies of the 
two sides.  
 
*** 
 
When the tsunami struck Sinhapura, the impact of this disaster was, primarily, an 
impact on capital  --  economic, social and symbolic. The destruction of this capital 
meant a concomitant effect on the capacity to accumulate capital, as well as on 
aspirations. With the new resources which came into the community, the avenues for 
the accumulation of capital became more varied and diverse. However, what was valued 
in this community before the tsunami, for example government employment, continued 
236 
 
to be valued afterwards. Some households were more successful in accessing the 
external sources of capital and advancing the social position of their households, 
accordingly, than others which did not have the capacity to do so.  
In terms of the ethnography presented in the previous section of this chapter it is 
possible to categorise household response to, and recovery from, the tsunami. In this 
section I shall draw out the salient features in terms of which individuals and 
households felt that their social position had either contracted or expanded.   
Some households lost capital, therefore the capacity to accumulate capital, and therefore 
social position. Social position is the position designated by virtue of the possession of 
capital and, therefore, of capacity. It implies a social order which is hierarchical, where 
social positions are in relationships of domination, subordination or equivalence relative 
to each other, in terms of capacity (Jenkins, 2002). The scale of loss was such that these 
households did not have the capacity to access those sources of capital which could be 
deployed to recover the capital that they had lost. These were households which did not 
possess many political or commercial alliances which could be used in this situation. As 
a consequence, these households felt that their aspirational horizons had also contracted. 
Priyantha, Dinesh and Charlotte are examples of this type of household. They felt that 
their social position had contracted, relative to others who were in a similar position 
before the tsunami.  
Priyantha lost his house, his canoe and his business, and the wallam on which he crewed 
was damaged. Furthermore, he had loans to repay. Priyantha’s view was that he would 
never be able to recover the capital, some from earnings in Saudi Arabia, which he had 
lost and that the aspirations, which were based on this capital, would have to be 
abandoned. Dinesh was in a similar position. He had started his three businesses with 
capital from earnings in Saudi Arabia and felt that this would never be recovered. In his 
case, too, the aspirations of accumulating financial capital, investing it, educating his 
daughter and establishing her in life, took a downward turn.  
Charlotte’s house was badly damaged and a range of consumer goods washed away by 
the tsunami. She felt that in terms of what her household had lost the state benefits were 
wholly inadequate. She and her husband were people who were very conscious of their 
vadagath position and were unwilling to pursue NGO aid in the way that, for instance, 
the unavasara households were willing to do. Charlotte felt that many of her aspirations 
237 
 
regarding her teenage daughter, relating to education and marriage, could not be realised 
given the circumstances of the household after the tsunami.  
There were other households whose social position contracted  --  position in the social 
order diminished  --  relative to other households, but whose aspirations remained the 
same. While Palitha Mudalali lost wallams, house and property and gold he had 
alliances, commercial and kin, which could be deployed in his recovery. He had the 
capacity, therefore, to get back onto the path that he had been travelling, and pursue his 
aspirations of accumulating financial capital, investing it, and educating his children and 
establishing them in terms of employment and marriage. Wijepala Mudalali found 
himself in similar circumstances after the tsunami. Although he suffered damage to his 
four businesses and to some of his wallams, and in spite of the fact that he refused to 
pursue NGO aid, because of the concerns with his vadagath position, he had sufficient 
capacity in terms of the alliances that he already had and the ones that he was able to 
access, to effect a recovery which enabled him to pursue the aspirations that he had had 
before the tsunami.  
Some households experienced a windfall, in the sense of a capital asset. With this 
increase of capital and, therefore, of capacity the aspirations that they had became more 
realisable. This meant that their social position improved. Furthermore, a new vista of 
aspirations became accessible. Duminda, a crew member, who received a wallam from 
a philanthropic individual, and Kanchana, who received a capital asset in the form of the 
engine repair centre from an NGO, fall into this category. Ranjanie’s household also 
falls into this category. In moving to the tsunami resettlement all Ranjanie’s aspirations 
for her household were realised and with the opportunities of a new community 
previously unimaginable aspirations, in terms of education and employment, opened up.   
 
Then there were the households which experienced substantial loss but had the capacity 
to recover some part of their capital, speedily, so that although their social position 
suffered it was a temporary setback. While capital was destroyed they had capacity in 
terms of networks of alliance  --  commercial, kin and neighbourhood  --  which could 
be mobilised in the strategy of recovery. Thus, these households had alliances which 
could be used more productively than others, in accessing capital.  
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While Jayantha Mudalali lost considerable capital he was able to access aid from NGOs 
and the Trust and effect his recovery through these networks. With his income re-
established he was able, by 2006, to obtain a bank loan in order to purchase a multi-day 
boat. Thus, within a short period after the tsunami this individual’s social position had 
improved greatly, as the owner of a multi-day boat. His aspirational horizons in terms of 
advancing his family expanded accordingly. Daya was in a similar position to Jayantha 
Mudalali. Living on the landside his house, too, was unaffected, and the damage was to 
his store. Through a considerable bank loan he was able to recover.    
Other households utilised the external resources which flowed into this community, in 
the form of state benefits and NGO assistance in their strategy of recovery. This capital, 
and the alliances which became possible because of it, enabled these households to 
proceed in the desired direction at a rate inconceivable, had the processes of community 
reproduction progressed without the intervention of the tsunami. These households 
experienced an expansion of their capital as well as their alliances, with the potential to 
accumulate more capital, and a concomitant enhancement of their aspirations. To put it 
slightly differently, the capital that they were able to access enabled them to strengthen 
their capacity to accumulate further capital and to create networks which could, 
potentially, do the same. Sampath, Ranee, Shirani and Sushila are examples of such 
households. The households whose social position was adversely affected by the sudden 
improvement in the fortunes of others, regarded this improvement in the situation of 
such people as social advancement which was not legitimate.   
Through the connection with the Chamber of Commerce Sampath was able to forge 
many alliances with the ‘big’ businessmen of the region. With this expansion of his 
connections, his aspirations for both his business and the future of his daughter 
expanded. Ranee used the incoming resources, principally, the new microfinance 
organisations, some NGOs and the Trust to effect her household’s recovery. The 
alliances with these microfinance organisations meant that she had an enhanced access 
to capital and her aspirations for her household were enhanced. While Shirani’s 
household lost many of its sources of income and had outstanding loans, she managed 
the resources that she was able to access through the new microfinance organisations to 
such good effect, that some months after the tsunami the household continued pursuing 
the aspirations that they had had. Sushila accessed the external resources flowing into 
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this community in terms of aid from NGOs and the Trust, to effect the recovery of her 
business and to open a small retail outlet. Thus, after the tsunami, her aspirations to 
provide for her three children and live in a vadagath style were being realised.  
Then there were the households which recovered the capital that they had lost with little 
change to their household circumstances and their aspirations. Gunasena lost only one 
of his sources of income. He was able to re-establish this by repairing his wallam using 
his savings.  He used the state benefits to replace the household goods lost in the 
tsunami. The aspirations for his household in terms of amassing financial capital  --  in 
the form of savings in the bank  --  educating his children and establishing them 
creditably in life did not change. Lakmalee too was able to recover the capital which the 
household had lost through state benefits, NGO aid and the Trust. The aspiration of this 
household, modest by village standards, was to stabilise the embryonic businesses. 
Ramya’s household recovered the position that they had occupied through state 
assistance, and aid from NGOs and the Trust. The main aspiration of this household, 
which was the marriage of Ramya, was achieved soon after the tsunami.   
There were households on the landside, principally the households of those externally 
employed, who were unaffected by the tsunami in terms of damage to house and 
property, or income. However, they were affected by the tsunami in the sense that as the 
relative social position of other households either improved or contracted, this had 
implications for the position of these households in the social order of the community.  
The resources which flowed into Sinhapura, through the state and NGOs, were not ones 
which were unfamiliar to the community. There was financial capital; material relevant 
to the fishing industry; and, stock and equipment for the businesses. All of this related 
to the on-going activities of the community. None of these resources required new 
institutions for their utilisation by the community. This meant that the community 
handled the new resources much as it had handled the old. This axis between resources 
and aspirations would not have remained the same if government policy in the aftermath 
of the tsunami had been different. For instance, if the state had established a series of 
post-secondary educational institutions to train the youth of tsunami-affected families in 
technological skills, or established industrial plants in the south-western region, such as 
those initiated by the late President Premadasa for garment factories in the early 1990s, 
this axis would, necessarily, have been modified.  
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As concluded in Chapters 4 & 5, the resources flowing into the village were not of an 
order to change the ideologies, the lifestyles and the aspirations of the two sides of the 
village. Households responded to these resources in terms of well-established 
aspirations, with the result that the resource-aspiration axis of the community, its social 
processes, continued as before. Therefore, it can be seen that in the post-tsunami period 
the recovery of the individual household was contingent, on the one hand, upon the 
capacity to activate alliances in order to accumulate capital, in terms of existing 
networks; on the other, it depended on the ability to navigate new alliances, in order to 
build new networks. Necessarily, this involved the pursuit of differential strategies of 
recovery. Consequently, there were positive and negative changes to the resource 
position of households, their capital, with a concomitant change in capacity, changes to 
networks of alliance, and to social position.  
 
Who changed social position relative to whom? Within each of the categories of 
households identified in Chapter 3 there were households which fell into the categories 
described above. For instance, there were crew members such as Priyantha who felt that 
in the post-tsunami period in relation to households similar to his, those of other crew 
members, his household had experienced a decline in social position. In contrast, crew 
member Duminda’s social position improved, tremendously, through a gift of a wallam 
from a philanthropically oriented foreign national. Overnight, he became a wallam 
owner with the social position and the potential to accumulate financial capital that this 
entails. Duminda and Priyantha, both crewmen, experienced the forces of rehabilitation 
differently. One improved his social position, dramatically; the other deteriorated, 
equally markedly. In so changing their positions relative to each other, they also 
changed their positions relative to many others in the community. Thus, the categories 
of households identified in Chapter 3 did not change. The principal change was of social 
position within a category. The implication of this is that the inflow of resources into 
this community, as a result of the tsunami, was not of an order to affect the social order, 
i.e., there was little movement between categories nor did new categories of individuals 
and households emerge so that the social order itself was modified. Still less did new 
activities transform the structure of the community.  
My broad argument, therefore, in terms of inferences drawn from the discussion above 
is that although there were shifts in the social position of individual households, the 
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social processes in Sinhapura, identified in Chapter 3, were not transformed by the 
tsunami. This is because the axis between resources and aspirations remained, broadly, 
unchanged for the majority of the community. This continuity of aspirations should not, 
however, lead to the conclusion that no changes of significance took place in Sinhapura 
consequent upon the tsunami. The attitude to fishing, the issue of whether it is a 
desirable occupation, had begun to change. Other places of residence were seen as 
preferable to the beach. All this was beginning to affect the divide between the landside 
and the seaside and the ideological tussle between them.   
 
Hence, at the time of the tsunami Sinhapura was a community in transition. Although 
few wallam owners were thinking in terms of the leap to the ownership of multi-day 
boats, the opportunities of education and employment opening up in the regional centres 
such as Galle meant that fishing families were aspiring to alternative occupations. A 
related trend was the purchase of land in the interior. 
 
The tsunami accelerated this process, particularly with the shift of 75 seaside 
households, to new settlements inland. There was concern about personal safety, in the 
event of another tsunami, as well as the desire to move away from the proximity to the 
sea so that young boys were not lured into the fishing industry, with the promise of high 
income. Those such as the unavasara felt that the shift to the new settlement was an 
opportunity to transcend the social boundaries which, they felt, had been imposed upon 
them, in Sinhapura. Others such as Jayatissa, who continued to reside in his house in 
Sinhapura and who rented his house in the new settlement, saw it merely as a capital 
asset.   
This situation in Sinhapura can be contrasted with post-earthquake Gujarat where heavy 
industrial, capitalist investment shaped the community so that a new dynamic, with an 
emphasis on the individual household, in a new setting, was the result (Simpson, 
2005;2007). In Sinhapura there was no such investment, by the state or the private 
sector, in tsunami-affected areas.   
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Conclusion 
 
My research is an attempt to study a disaster, the tsunami, in its many dimensions. The 
disaster has been conceptualised not as a break in the life of a community but as a 
process which moulds the complex processes of a community, and becomes one of the 
entities which shapes its future. Through the lens of a disaster the contexts of fishing, 
trade, caste and politics, and disaster relief have been analysed. Conversely, the 
ethnography of a disaster has been presented through the lens of a fishing village.    
 
The focus of this research was a single village. However, as the study proceeded it 
became apparent that many of the issues thrown up by the research had a wider 
significance, and that a regional perspective was necessary. These issues have a 
relevance for the literature on disaster. They also have relevance for the fishing 
industry. Beyond this, the issues raised by this research in Sinhapura are significant for 
local government and local politics; the national policy on disaster; and international 
aid.   
  
The remaking of Sinhapura has also been the result of the interaction between global, 
national and local forces in the sense that it was the interaction between the community, 
the state and international forces as represented by NGOs which reproduced this 
community. Anthropological research which engages with the interaction between the 
global, the national and the local, produces knowledge which becomes constituted 
within the context of international power relations. This resonates with the 
anthropological perspective on development, described by Lewis and Mosse (2006), as 
deconstructivist. In terms of this characterisation, it could be argued that my study is a 
deconstructivist analysis of those aspects of intervention in a disaster.  
 
In the sections which follow I engage with the issues pertaining to disaster, some of 
which were identified in the Introductory Chapter, on the basis of what my research has 
demonstrated.    
 
It should be reiterated at this point that this was not a study which attempted to compare 
the south and the west of Sri Lanka, with the north and the east, either in the scale and 
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the nature of the damage caused by the tsunami or in the type of rehabilitation 
(McGilvray, 2006).   
Issues of Disaster 
In the Introductory Chapter I have discussed the themes which are important in the 
disaster literature. I am concerned here with the extent to which my research engages 
with this literature.  
One of the prominent themes in the disaster literature is vulnerability (Blaikie et al, 
1994; Oliver-Smith 1999, 2002; Hoffman 1999, 2002; Varley, 1994; Twigg and Bhatt, 
1998; Cannon, 2000; Frerks, 2010; McGilvray & Gamburd, 2010; Lewis, 1999; 
Hilhorst & Bankoff, 2004). While it points to an important feature of disaster situations, 
it relegates various complex phenomena to this one notion. A disaster is a far more 
complex phenomenon than that encompassed by this idea. It has many dimensions 
which the concept of vulnerability does not incorporate into its scheme of analysis. It 
does not, for instance, distinguish the vulnerability of the community, taken as a whole, 
from the differential vulnerability of households. There is an implication of 
vulnerability in the case of households, in Sinhapura, which had a less developed 
capacity to recover. For these reasons vulnerability as a tool of analysis of a disaster 
situation, from an anthropological perspective, seems to have only a limited value, as 
the experience of Sinhapura demonstrates.    
The notion of risk also figures in the disaster literature (Zeckhauser & Shepard, 1984; 
Quarantelli, 1986; Smith, 1996; Paine, 2002). Some of the ways in which it is dealt with 
in this literature, i.e., through mechanisms of repression, insulation and fatalism, have 
already been discussed in the Introductory Chapter. The risks that coastal communities 
are exposed to by living near the sea, and through the occupation of fishing, makes them 
view risk in a way that differentiates them from other communities. On the south-
western coast of Sri Lanka, maritime disasters such as cyclones had been very rare. 
Seafaring did present a risk, but it was a risk which was managed by, for instance, not 
going out to sea in hostile weather. Thus, risk was seen as something which was within 
the control of the community. The tsunami, however, changed this perception. For the 
first time here was a risk that could not be managed or controlled by the community. 
Therefore, the reaction of many people in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami was 
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to think in terms of a second home in the interior. Some did, in fact, purchase land and 
begin to build houses.    
Then there is the notion, discussed in the literature, that a disaster exposes the 
underlying structure of a society, revealing two realities (Oliver-Smith & Hoffman, 
2002). One is the surface reality, encountered in everyday life, and the other, a deeper 
one, revealed only in special situations and which has a deeper significance. While there 
is an obvious sense in which this could be said to be true, I find it more helpful to see 
both of these realities as part of a wider, all-embracing social process. One of the 
implications of this is that external forces have an impact on a community and that its 
social processes can be affected, as in the case of Sinhapura, or changed altogether, as in 
the case of Gujarat.  
As for the point that the object of study is not so much the disaster event as the 
aftermath, my perspective in this thesis has been that there are social processes in 
communities; that disaster events feed into these social processes; and that this leads 
into the phenomenon, in itself a social process, which we identify, study and refer to as 
the aftermath (Simpson, 2012).  
The literature contains many evaluations of the success and failure of the international 
response to this disaster, and as many prescriptions for better performance in the future 
(de Silva, 2007; Jayasuriya & McCawley, 2010; Nanayakkara, 2007; Mulligan & Shaw, 
2011). These involve criticisms regarding inefficiency, duplication, and the 
implementation of programmes according to policy agendas. There have also been 
criticisms that governments as well as other organisations engaged in relief, ignored the 
principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and violated binding 
international human rights law in relation to land rights, housing, livelihoods, and the 
concerns of vulnerable groups such as women, low castes and minorities. My research 
has not been an evaluation of disaster response, in this sense, although it does present 
some suggestions, discussed later on in this chapter, for a more coordinated recovery 
process in terms of liaison between the various actors in this process.   
The literature highlights the point that women are a marginalised category as far as 
disaster response is concerned (Fordham, 2004; Enarson and Morrow, 1998; Mies and 
Shiva, 1993; Agarwal, 1992; Wickramasinghe & Ariyabandu, 2003; Ruwanpura & de 
Mel, 2006k; de Mel, 2009; Ruwanpura, 2009; Goonesekere, 2009). The idea is that 
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women suffer more than men in terms of physical impact; that their role in decision 
making is minimal; and, that reconstruction takes place within a patriarchal framework. 
The experience of the Sinhapura women confirms these perceptions. There are, 
however, two observations which must be made. The first is that the onerous task of 
getting disrupted households functioning again fell, largely, to the women. It is their 
energy in getting involved in coir production, abandoned by many at the time, which 
kept the home fires burning. The other, is that in asserting household rights to state 
assistance, where this was dependent on the assessments of government officials, it is 
the women who fought for justice for their households.     
The Fisheries Industry 
While this is the study of a disaster, it is a disaster which affected a fishing community. 
The issue which arises, in the context of my research, is the way in which the fishing 
communities of the south-western coast were evolving, at the time of the tsunami, in 
terms of their place in the wider economy and whether this disaster hastened this 
process.  
At a first glance, the fisheries industry in Sri Lanka presents some contradictions. Sri 
Lanka is an island, yet the consumption of fish per capita, by nutritional standards, is 
regarded as low.184 This has much to do with the small continental shelf that surrounds 
Sri Lanka’s shores and, consequently, the limited availability of pelagic fish. However, 
fishing is a lucrative activity, depending on the technology used.  
According to my informants, along this coast, as a largely Buddhist country fishing has 
a low moral position. Therefore, although it was financially lucrative, for some of those 
involved in the industry, many were keen to leave it and pursue some of the other 
occupations opening up in the region. They were certainly anxious that their children be 
educated and not follow this as an occupation. It could be argued, therefore, that the 
approach to fishing, as an occupation, was ambivalent.   
To this extent, the communities along the south-western coast were in transition at the 
time of the tsunami. Some of the fishing households were attempting to move away 
                                                          
184 The consumption of fish, in 2008, was 1.5 kilograms, per head, per month. Source: National Aquatic 
Resources Agency (NARA). The fisheries authorities see heavy mechanisation as a solution to the 
difficulties of income of the artisanal sector and the difficulties of consumption faced by the country. 
Source: Discussion with officials of the Ceylon Fisheries Harbours Corporation.  
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from fishing to occupations based on education and entrepreneurship. Others were 
moving in the direction where their main craft would be multi-day boats, fishing largely 
for tuna using the long line method, and operating from large harbours. The harbours of 
Kalutara, Beruwela, Ambalangoda, Hikkaduwa, Galle, Matara, Devinuwara, Mirissa, 
Tangalle Kudawella, Hambanthota  --  all on the western and southern coast  --  were 
turning, almost exclusively, into multi-day boat harbours. The image, amongst the wider 
population, of the fisherman as a person of aggressive temperament given to imbibing 
strong liquor was giving way to one as a well-paid, professional.  
This was, however, a slow process given the difficulties of transforming artisanal 
communities into fully mechanised ones. Harbours have to be expanded to 
accommodate a greater number of craft, and there is further capital investment in terms 
of those other technologies and infrastructure which are necessary to operate large 
numbers of mechanized craft. There is also the issue of retraining fishermen in new 
technology. The infusion of a large volume of capital becomes imperative. There is also 
the implication of inequality as innovation is often accessible only to the more affluent 
segments of the fishing industry (Acheson, 1981). All this has to be done against the 
political strength of artisanal fishermen who compose a sizeable component of voters in 
many coastal electorates.   
Then, there were the immediate and local problems of illegal fishing  --  the use of 
dynamite and ‘light course’  --  which is harmful to the marine environment and which 
depletes the limited resource available to artisanal fishing. In the south-western coast 
the fishing combines which use these methods have strong political backing such that 
the forces of law enforcement find apprehension and prosecution difficult. Then there 
are the foreign vessels, with superior technology, which fish illegally in Sri Lankan 
waters depriving Sri Lankan fishermen of their rightful catch. These policy issues which 
affect the industry, with their many political ramifications, all had an impact on the 
process of transition. 
It is interesting to speculate what might have happened if the restructuring that was 
proposed by the FAO had been implemented, in the aftermath of the tsunami. There 
were, clearly, difficulties of capital, both for craft and for harbours. This apart, the new 
capital intensive mechanized industry could not have absorbed all those employed on 
wallams. This would have necessitated programmes of employment to absorb all those 
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displaced from the fishing industry. The possibility of fishermen being placed in a 
situation of uncertain income would not have been countenanced by the many MPs, 
around the country, who represented them in parliament.   
 
As far as the general progress of this industry was concerned, this disaster did not 
hasten the movement towards multi-day craft, as neither the state nor non-governmental 
organisations supported such a restructuring of this industry. The move away from 
fishing gathered a little momentum, although for the majority of those involved in this 
industry the immediate income was too high to forego. A further factor which induced 
people to remain in fishing was the low level of investment in Sri Lanka, both foreign 
and local, and the, consequently, limited number of jobs that were created in new 
industries.   
Caste and Politics 
Caste and political patronage did not play a substantial role in the reconstruction process 
on the south-western coast. As discussed in Chapter 3, since the 1978 Constitution MPs, 
with their caste affiliations, have not been the significant personalities in local 
communities. This is illustrated by the fact that in the post- tsunami context, no 
politician from the party in government, the People’s Alliance (PA), or the party in 
opposition, the United National Party (UNP) visited Sinhapura to view the damage and 
to commiserate with the affected households. It is in 1987 with the 13th Amendment to 
the Constitution, and the rising importance of local government, that caste became a 
factor in politics once again.   
For the reasons discussed in Chapter 1, after the tsunami, state funds did not reach 
affected communities through local government institutions. Thus, the caste linkage 
between local politicians and their supporters found no expression in the matter of relief 
as this was handled through the network of the central government. It is through private 
sources that local government politicians were able to service their political clients.  
The allegation has been that tsunami aid, from these private sources, was squirreled 
away into private accounts by local government politicians and used for illegitimate 
purposes such as election campaigns. This was certainly the allegation on the occasion 
of the Hikkaduwa Urban Council (UC) election of 2006, where the United National 
Party lost the majority and the People’s Alliance came to power. Individuals were 
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elected to the UC in terms of the material resources spent on supporters and clients, at 
the time of the election, rather than on the basis of caste alliance. Local government 
politicians spent vast amounts of money on campaigning, as well as on direct hand-outs. 
The allegation was that these were funds which should have been disbursed to the 
tsunami-affected populations of the region. UC members re-contesting their seats, such 
as my informant Suranjith Weeraratne, found that they could not compete with this type 
of expenditure. Many lost their seats to the newer contestants contesting on the basis of 
material wealth. Weeraratne helped the Sinhapura community in many ways after the 
tsunami, mainly in terms of performing a liaison role. He is from a respected, political 
family in Sinhapura. His father was a Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) Chairman of 
the Sinhapura Town Council (TC) in the 1950s, a teacher and also the Village 
Headman.     
Thus, the external sources of assistance available to tsunami-affected communities 
generated a culture of depersonalised, material relationships. The decline of the caste 
politics axis as an important avenue through which to accumulate capital to realise 
aspiration, at the local level, became emphasised. The tsunami, as an event which fed 
into ongoing social processes, entrenched a shift to a different politics of resources and 
development, which had been taking place in this region, indeed all over the country, 
since the implementation of the 1978 Constitution.  
Effects of Resettlement 
The immediate result of 75 households relocating to the new settlements was that the 
intensity of neighbourhood social interaction, on the seaside, diminished. Furthermore, 
as mentioned previously, business activity on the High Street was affected. This was, 
however, a temporary phenomenon and as new relationships emerged, neighbourhood 
reciprocities were once again established. Many of the 75 households that left the 
village retained fishing as their chief occupation. Equipment was left in Sinhapura and 
had to be looked after. This meant that in some instances old networks of relations 
continued to operate, so that those who left continued to play some part in the life of the 
village.  
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Relief to long-term Development   
There was the perception amongst NGOs that there must be a connection between 
disaster relief and long-term development  --  that reconstruction must lead to conditions 
better than those which existed at the time of the disaster. These ideas incorporate those 
about justice and equity as well as community involvement (Kennedy, Ashmore, 
Babister, Kelman, 2008).  
Simpson (2012) quoting Mill (1848) states that countries recover rapidly from states of 
devastation, due to the accelerated consumption of what had been previously produced 
which would have been consumed anyway  --  that ‘hyper-consumption’ in the 
aftermath of a disaster provides ‘economic stimulus’. Klein (2007) has referred to some 
aspects of this process as ‘disaster capitalism’ and commented on the strategic 
extensions of free market capitalism; and the instrumental use of a catastrophe to 
promote a range of capitalist interests.   
Investment and the powerful economic stimulus that this provides, did not take place on 
the southern and western coast of Sri Lanka except in Hambanthota. In relation to the 
fisheries industry, the Sri Lankan government and organisations such as the FAO took 
the decision not to pursue a total restructuring of the industry, with the heavy 
investment that this implies. The emphasis was on rebuilding small sectors of damaged 
towns and villages, and on moving people to new housing complexes inland. It is true, 
as the discussion of Chapters 4 & 5 reveals, that there was a considerable inflow of 
capital into the disaster-affected communities. However, this capital was not directed 
towards infrastructure development which could have provided the framework for 
extensive capitalist development, and transformed these communities. The area affected 
by the tsunami was a thin strip of coastline; not one well-defined, geographical, 
political, administrative and social entity, as it was in Gujarat, and as often happens in 
the case of earthquakes. Furthermore, the affected areas were not large political units 
which could exert significant pressure on politicians. Thus, the state did not foster a 
programme of capitalist development in disaster-affected communities which would 
lead to a new order, both economic and otherwise.  
Sri Lanka can be contrasted with Gujarat where, according to Simpson (2005, 2007), 
the central feature of post-disaster development was a heavy inflow of external 
investment which involved the setting up of large-scale industrial ventures, the planning 
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of spatial areas, and the creation of suburban consumers which transformed the disaster-
affected community. This investment transformed infrastructure and provided a new 
framework for economic activity and social interaction. This brought with it many 
others changes, principally, the breakdown of the small communities previously 
familiar to the inhabitants in that part of Gujarat affected by the earthquake:  
 
“For many families…there is now a veiled sense of relief that they have been 
offered a way out of the old town with its oppressive, dirty and airless streets, 
congestion, gossip, hostility and bitterness, and into what is for most still an 
imaginary life in the suburbs. In other cases, families have fragmented, some 
taking the opportunity to escape subordinate or dependent or unpleasant 
relationships. Others have been released from conditions of bondage, and many 
from poor housing conditions.” (Simpson:2005:244).  
 
As far as NGOs involved in post-disaster relief in Sri Lanka were concerned, while 
there was some interest in long-term development, they, too, did not promote the type of 
large-scale investment which was a feature of post-disaster Gujarat.   
  
The point to be made is that not every disaster presents a situation which is conducive to 
capitalist development. Under certain post-disaster conditions hyper consumption is not 
one of the observable phenomena. According to Bandara and Narampanawa (2007), 
aggregate consumption in Sri Lanka declined by 3% after the tsunami.    
The inference to be drawn here is that a disaster is an opportunity for external interests 
to infiltrate disaster affected zones. They may be of a capitalist nature and involve 
greater state control, as was the case in Gujarat. Alternatively, the inputs can come from 
two sources as was the case on the south-western coast of Sri Lanka, where state and 
NGO assistance lead to a kaleidoscope of interventions and reactions on the part of the 
community.   
 
Policy    
The community based approach, favoured by NGOs, which places the emphasis on civil 
society as the generating force of reconstruction, disregards the fact that in the face of a 
disaster, recovery is often perceived by the community in terms of the individual 
household. This was apparent in Sinhapura where the damage was not to community 
property but to individual households. The focus on community development is 
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subsequent to the recovery of the individual household. For these reasons the household 
came to figure in my research as the unit of analysis.  
I have already discussed the particular approach that the Trust adopted in its relief work. 
The focus was one village, Sinhapura, in an intensive manner. Many organisations 
operated over a large geographical area engaging, primarily, in one activity. Given this 
perspective, they had earmarked a particular sum for each community. The sum 
therefore, that was available to each recipient household in a community was 
determined by these imperatives. In contrast, the Trust was limited to one village and its 
households and had as its major principle, the objective of getting as many households 
as possible back to the point where they could facilitate their own recovery.  
The insight I draw from the experience of Sinhapura is that an organisation working 
intensively in a community, supported by the state in terms of the provision of basic 
needs, could liaise with non-governmental relief organisations, operating in a much 
larger way, to the benefit of the community. The needs of each household could be 
assessed and the relevant assistance from the relevant NGO harnessed, to fulfil specific 
needs. This would lead to the rehabilitation of disaster-affected communities in a more 
coordinated and effective manner. Furthermore, such a scenario, particularly if it 
involved the dimension of research, could provide relief organisations with valuable 
information which could inform the perspective and design of their relief efforts. It 
would reveal a whole series of problems and possible solutions, in a way that the 
macro-operation which focuses on the region could not. Thus, the unit of reconstruction 
should be, for most purposes, the individual household.      
This is not to argue that such a model should or could replicate the experience of the 
Trust, in its totality. The strengths and weaknesses of the Trust were very specific to the 
personal circumstances of the Trustees. In this sense, it is not a replicable exercise. This 
is to state that there is a perspective and an approach which has emerged out of the 
experience of the Trust which could be the basis for future intervention in disaster- 
affected communities. It would require a more formal structure than that of the Trust  --  
more rules and regulations and more accountability. It could not be a family-based 
initiative, as the Trust became, for the reasons that I have specified in the Introductory 
Chapter.  
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Towards Handling Disaster     
 
The importance of disaster preparedness was widely accepted as necessary in the 
aftermath of the tsunami. A major concern was the communication of information about 
an impending danger. When a warning was given on 30 December 2004, four days after 
the tsunami, the information reached the relevant areas through the media and the 
police.  
By the time that I began my fieldwork in 2007, some elements of an early warning 
system were in place on the south-western coast. Television, radio and mobile phones 
were used to convey messages of potential disaster. Many organisations had provided 
training for first responders and for households as to their actions in the eventuality of a 
disaster: for instance, the importance of ‘tsunami bags’. I was in Sinhapura when 
tsunami warnings were issued in 2004, 2005 and in 2008. The warning spread fast 
through mobile phones and the radio and most people responded quickly to the direction 
to evacuate the immediate vicinity of the coast, the area of danger, to high ground.    
 
There were also many initiatives in terms of the adaptation of the physical environment, 
to protect against future disasters. At many points along the Galle Road on the western 
and southern coast there is a bund, built at the vegetation line, approximately eight feet 
high, which is expected to act as a barrier against future tsunamis. Other schemes have 
involved the growing of mangroves and other vegetation to reduce the force of potential 
waves. Sand mining, which exposed the village of Peraliya to the full force of the 
waves, has been regulated and, certainly in the immediate post-tsunami period, 
vigorously implemented. A programme was developed to teach those dwelling by the 
seaside to swim. This had government support and the co-operation of many other 
organisations, both local and regional.    
 
When I interviewed the relevant government agency in 2008, they stated that while a 
new Disaster Act had been passed by the legislature, in 2005, government policy in 
relation to this enactment had not been implemented (Patil, 2007). For instance, there 
has been confusion amongst the various arms of the bureaucracy, as to the procedures to 
be followed in the event of a disaster. Equipment, in terms of tents and other emergency 
supplies, have not been stockpiled, nor has there been any plan as to where such stocks 
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would come from in the event of a necessity. Briefly, a detailed plan for the various 
steps to be taken by the country in terms of immediate relief, housing, livelihoods and 
infrastructure, in the event of a disaster has not been comprehensively worked out, such 
that the various arms of government know how they should act in such an eventuality. 
At the village level, as the tsunami of 2004 recedes in the collective memory, there is 
the feeling that another tsunami will not occur for another 2000 years.  
 
Immediately after a disaster has struck everyone appears to be in the same boat, 
undifferentiated in the circumstances in which they find themselves. As the process of 
rehabilitation commences the differences between people in terms of the social order of 
the community begin to emerge. This, as I discovered in Sinhapura, often leads to 
controversy with different categories of people and the rehabilitating agencies often 
being at cross-purposes. Some individuals and households want the status quo restored. 
Others feel that the disaster is an opportunity for change. It is in this context that the 
focus on the household becomes significant. 
 
Comparison of Sinhapura with other communities on the south-western coast 
 
The damage suffered by Sinhapura, and its recovery, can best be understood through a 
comparison with some of the other communities of the south-western coast.185  
 
In Chapter 1, I presented communities on the south-western coast which were diverse in 
terms of features such as population, caste composition, ethnicity, religion, technology 
and the access to capital, education, employment and health. As far as the fisheries 
industry was concerned this diversity related to technology, the access to credit, the 
systems of sale and marketing and the role of fishing in the wider economy.  
 
Looked at in these terms, the communities of the south-western coast can be classified 
into four broad types: communities which were entirely artisanal; communities with the 
first level of mechanisation, i.e., craft with outboard motors and a few multi-day boats 
berthed in nearby fisheries harbours; communities with fisheries harbours where multi-
                                                          
185 The geographical location of these communities is described in Chapter 1. Please also refer the map of 
Sri Lanka.  
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day boats predominate; large towns which are the main centres of the region with large 
harbours where, again, multi-day boats predominate.    
 
Differential damage along this coastline had much to do with the diversity of 
communities. In the totally artisanal communities the damage was to both housing and 
craft. In Peraliya, for instance, the damage was so extensive that the community ceased 
to exist. In the larger communities such as Sinhapura and Weligama, dominated by 
wallams and similar craft, the area which suffered damage was a strip parallel to the 
coastline, often including the commercial hub, the High Street. In the communities 
dominated by multi-day boats the damage to harbours and to boats was extensive. Only 
the boats which were out at sea escaped damage. In the large towns too the damage to 
craft, harbours, the commercial area and residential areas was substantial. Here, too, it 
was a strip parallel to the beach which was most severely affected. In these towns it 
must be noted that the damage to fishing was only a part of the total damage to the 
community.  
   
In the immediate aftermath of the tsunami it was the neighbouring communities of the 
interior who came to the assistance of these communities. Next was the assistance from 
the state  --  the benefits to households; the repair of infrastructure, such as roads and 
public buildings; and the restoration of services, such as transport. Then, came the aid 
from NGOs, and institutions of the UN, ad hoc assistance from private individuals, both 
local and foreign. The credit needed for recovery came from kin in distant villages, 
professional money-lenders, microfinance organisations and banks.  
 
Artisanal communities received the basic state benefits and very little else. There was 
the ad hoc help from a foreign national or a small NGO. The Sinhapura type of 
community, i.e., those with the first level of mechanisation, benefitted from a variety of 
sources  --  the state, NGOs, microfinance, private individuals, communities in the 
interior, kin and commercial sources. In the communities such as those of Mirissa and 
Hikkaduwa, dominated by a harbour, and in large towns such as Galle and Matara, 
infrastructure repair was the responsibility of the state. Capital became available from 
many sources  --  bilateral aid, for instance  --  channelled through the state. The heavy 
expenditure required for the repair of harbours was met by the state and by some foreign 
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companies working through their governments. The state focused on the rehabilitation 
of the larger towns as they were regional centres. The regional economy, much of it 
unaffected by the tsunami, could not function if these centres did not recover quickly. 
The multi-day boat owners in these communities had access to commercial credit, to 
fund their recovery, as they had been operating profitable concerns. The capital they 
required also came from microfinance, NGOs, and from the fish trade, for example, the 
fish merchants. 
 
As stated in Chapter 1, a large-scale development had been planned for Hambanthota, 
which included an international airport and an international harbour. The rehabilitation 
of Hambanthota, after the tsunami, incorporated many of the features of this proposed 
development.186 In Sri Lanka it is only in Hambanthota that this type of wider 
development, on the basis of a state plan previously formulated, took place after the 
tsunami.  
 
The recovery of the communities along the south-western coast was, thus, a product of 
the interaction between the resources which flowed into these communities and their 
social processes. The relative importance of the community, in terms of its commerce 
and technological sophistication, determined, to a large extent, the type of assistance 
that it received. In the case of Sinhapura this correlation reveals why this community 
did not receive the assistance from banks which the communities with a large fleet of 
multi-day boats received.  
 
The differences between the fishing communities of the south-west coast can be 
identified in a somewhat direct way in terms of the technology used; the way in which 
the fish is sold; how it fits into a wider economy; the size of the community; its 
relationship to the rest of the community where such exists; migration; education; caste 
and so on. However, as my acquaintance with each of these communities grew I became 
aware of the complexity of circumstances which have produced the communities that 
we see today. All those factors which influenced Sinhapura during the last 100 years or 
more, also influenced these other communities, sometimes in very different ways. 
Capital and the uses to which it was put, is one of these. While this account helps to 
                                                          
186 Source: Discussion with local government officials in Hambanthota.  
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place Sinhapura in a wider context a fuller comparison of the communities of this coast 
has to await a future study.  
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